

Press Notices of Volume I

"I record my fullest appreciation of a notable book, one that cannot fail to add to the author's already splendid reputation, and one which will enlarge not a little our knowledge in a great field of science. . . . The time has come for the reconstruction of the entire discipline of logic—a reconstruction of logic on the basis of a genetic explanation of our actual knowledge seems to be manifest destiny in the light of Professor Baldwin's present work."—Prof. J. E. Russell in JOURN. OF PHILOSOPHY.

"This is a most earnest, profound, laborious, systematic analysis of cognition, such as cannot fail to be of continual utility to students of psychology. It appears to be a signal setting forth of science—what the Germans would call an 'epoch-making' book. When one has to build a house, a definite plan is drawn, in which all the conditions are duly considered—and this plan becomes the focus of study. Such a preliminary project it is with which Professor Baldwin has now enriched the psychology of cognition. The vocabulary of well-considered new terms is in itself a precious gift to psychological investigation. For with each of these new terms there goes a valuable new conception. The publication must serve as a precious landmark in future investigation, in that it lays down for the first time a definite project of structure of the theory of cognition in great detail."—C. S. Peirce in THE NATION.

"The genetic method has been wielding an influence shaking up the old distinctions; but there has not been such a traversing of the whole psychological field solely by its intellectual right and its scientific authority, as that made by Baldwin's *Thought and Things*. It promises a complete reconstruction of psychology and also of the cognate philosophical disciplines of logic and epistemology, leaving the time-honoured distinctions far behind. The achievement can be interpreted as an age-movement, and be closely related to the current intellectual need which has been finding widespread satisfaction in pragmatism. The item of historical interest is that the initiative has come from within psychology, and the results stand closer to the assured gains of the science than do the quasi-metaphysics of the time."—Prof. Buchner in a résumé of Psychological Progress in 1906.

"This is the most comprehensive attempt in logic yet made in America. The fact that such a programme is offered, and the general standpoint and method of treatment, are further evidence that philosophy in America is rapidly passing from the absorbing, translating, albeit necessary period of German apprenticeship, into a free creative adulthood."—Prof. A. W. Moore in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN.

"The first instalment of what promises to be an important inquiry into the actual movement of the function of knowledge. Prof. Baldwin's account of the process by which cognition is built up is so coherent that it is impossible to give more than a fraction of its substance. But one finds that the writer has always something true and important to say."—NATURE.

"One must heartily acknowledge the importance of Professor Baldwin's contribution in a comparatively new field. [It is] worked out with great thoroughness of detail and with a comprehensive grasp of the guiding principles. One cannot fail to recognize both the importance of the problem, and the real value of his results."—Prof. J. E. Creighton in the PHILOSOPHY REVIEW.

Press Notices of Volume II

"Three volumes are to go to the full making of the valuable and elaborate treatise upon logic, of which this is the second. It expounds experimental logic, explains how the process of thinking goes on, and examines the sanctions of logical validity and the dualisms and limitations of thought. The book is full of matter, and this volume well maintains the promise of its predecessor that the complete treatise will rank as one of the most important among recent contributions to the literature of philosophy."—**EDINBURGH SCOTSMAN.**

"The time has not yet come to attempt an estimate of the general worth of this ambitious effort to construct a systematic logic on genetic lines. The third volume is not written. Meanwhile we congratulate Prof. Baldwin—a thinker of great vigour and ability—on having accomplished another lap in his long course. It is very interesting to observe how America having served its philosophical apprenticeship is now devoting its matured powers to every branch of philosophy in turn. Logic in particular has recently been taken in hand. The present volume belongs to the same movement. It displays a predominant interest in genesis, and considers thinking and thought in live and organic relation to the mental economy as a whole. On the other hand, it is a direct challenge and counterblast to the logic emanating from Chicago. But both parties would agree to condemn as obsolete and barren much that still passes for logic in certain quarters."—**ATHENÆUM.**

"This second volume, while lacking nothing in organic unity, contains a wealth of topics of which a review can give no adequate idea. Prof. Baldwin has shed new light upon many old logical problems and (what is rare enough in logical treatises) has really contributed to our knowledge in several respects. These contributions, together with a broad-mindedness which can combine opposite extremes of theory, are, in our view, the chief merits of the work. There is no recent book in English which has covered the field so fully, in so empirical a spirit, yet with such philosophical and logical power of interpretation. The 'pragmatic' works were constructive, and empirical, yet certainly without taking in as many facts or recognizing as many human needs and interests. The author is able to find a place for the practical, theoretic, aesthetic, social, even 'logistic' motives that enter into human thought, to justify each and to restrain each to its proper limits. It is not easy to say which of the author's special views seem to us most important: on the whole, however, we think the dualism of content and control is probably the most fertile contribution. We agree that every treatment of either logic or the psychology of cognition should proceed along these lines. Prof. Baldwin has surveyed and mapped a region which should now be settled by the logician."—**Prof. W. H. Sheldon, in the PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN.**

"What seems to me especially significant in Mr. Baldwin's work is the account of the stages and means through which the individual mind develops a fully conscious logical experience. It is in part the same undertaking that Hegel left so incomplete. The progress of biology and psychology has made it possible for Prof. Baldwin to present a concrete working out of this problem which is an immense advance on anything that previously existed."—**Prof. Creighton, in DARWIN AND LOGIC.**

"Every one must join in admiration of this [work], which is full of new researches, original thoughts, and serious work, especially when it is compared with the leaniness of most logical treatises. One of its merits is that it clears up many of the points at issue between Pragmatism and the old Philosophy."—**Dr. K. Schalk, in the RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA.**

THOUGHT AND THINGS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY : Vol. I. **SENSES and INTELLECT.** Second Edition. 1891. New York, Holt & Co. ; London, Macmillans.

HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY : Vol. II. **FEELING AND WILL.** 1892. Same publishers.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 1893. Same publishers. Second Edition, tenth thousand.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND THE RACE. New York and London, Macmillans. 1895. Third Edition, seventh printing, 1907. German Translation, Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard, 1897. French Translation, Paris, F. Alcan, 1897.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION. Same publishers, 1902.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Same publishers. Fourth Edition, 1907. In French, German, Spanish, etc. Awarded Gold Medal Royal Acad. of Denmark.

DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 3 Vols. in 4 Parts. Edited (with an international corps of contributors) by J. MARK BALDWIN. 1901-5. New York and London, Macmillans.

STORY OF THE MIND. London, Hodder & Stoughton ; New York, Appletons. For popular reading. In several languages.

FRAGMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE. COLLECTED ESSAYS. London, Nimmo ; New York, Scribners, 1902.

THOUGHT AND THINGS ; OR, GENETIC LOGIC. Vol. I. **FUNCTIONAL LOGIC, OR GENETIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.** 1906. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. ; New York, Macmillans. Vol. II. **EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC, OR GENETIC THEORY OF THOUGHT.** 1908. French trans., Vol. I, Paris, Doin, 1908. German trans., Vols. I, II, Leipzig, Barth, 1908-10. Spanish trans., Vol. I., Madrid, Jorro, 1911.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY. Boston, Badger ; London, Rebsam, 1910. French trans., Giard et Brière, Paris, 1910.

DARWIN AND THE HUMANITIES. Baltimore, Review Pub. Co., 1909 ; London, George Allen & Co., Ltd. 1910. French trans., Paris, Alcan, 1911.

THOUGHT AND THINGS

A Study of the Development and
Meaning of Thought

OR

GENETIC LOGIC

BY

JAMES MARK BALDWIN

Ph.D., Hon. D.Sc. (Oxford, Geneva), Hon. LL.D. (Glasgow)
Foreign Correspondent of the Institute of France

VOL. III.

INTEREST AND ART

BEING REAL LOGIC. I. GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY



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TO THE MEMORY OF
WILLIAM JAMES

WHOSE TEACHING WAS ALWAYS INSPIRING
AND WHOSE FRIENDSHIP WAS ALWAYS TRUE.

Τὸ καλὸν πᾶν

PREFACE

THE present volume contains about half of the matter which it was proposed to publish in Volume III of the work, under the title "Real Logic." As much as I regret the necessity of issuing a fourth, still on the whole it is better, since a single third volume would be very bulky, and also since the matter falls naturally into two principal parts. This course enables me to present in this volume the results of the investigation of the problems of practice and the aesthetic, in a form which makes them independently available, without waiting for the preparation, in final form, of the more philosophical discussions of the theory of reality. It also affords some relief from the necessity of over-compression, of which certain reviewers of Volume II have justly complained. I wish to make very sincere acknowledgments to the publishers, in view of their genuine liberality in allowing the work to be extended to four volumes. It is hoped that the concluding part may be ready for publication in about another year.

As to the subject-matter of this volume, the text may speak for itself. It contains, besides the setting together of results with a view to their bearing on the problem of reality (in Parts I and II), the detailed exposition of the theory of Affective Logic (Part III), the equally detailed investigation of Aesthetic Experience (Part IV), and the general treatment—preliminary to its philosophical discussion—of Immediacy (Parts V and VI), and ends with a succinct intimation of the programme of the following volume.¹ It is to be hoped that the introduction of

¹ In connexion with which see also the Introduction, chap. ii., on the "Problem and Method of Real Logic."

the name *Pancalism* (see chap. xv. sect. 24) for the resulting philosophical point of view, summarising the original motto of the work, *Tò καλὸν πᾶν*,¹ may not seem to be entirely without justification, pending the developments which are to follow. It is the name which I propose to give to the reasoned form of *Aesthetic Immediatism* which is worked out on the basis of the discussions of the entire work.

It will be noted that in Parts III and IV respectively, I have drawn directly upon certain contemporary writers. The theory of "affective logic," accepted in principle and extended in application in these pages, is distinctively French in its origin, as the theory of "*Einfühlung*," also accepted and utilized in its fundamental meaning, is distinctively German. The names of Ribot and Lipps will always be connected respectively with these two fruitful movements in psychological and aesthetic theory. Whatever constructions are made, in attempts like this, to appraise and extend these principles, these writers will always be cited as the original thinkers whose researches have made them possible.

It will not be considered out of place, perhaps, if I take occasion to point out here the convergence between certain of the outstanding results of the study of the "prelogical," in Volume I of this work, and those of a recent and already well-known work, *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* of Monsieur L. Lévy-Bruhl. Without passing judgment on his anthropological theses proper—which seem, however, to be extremely well buttressed by facts—or assenting to his rather dualistic interpretation of the differences between the minds of civilized and primitive man, one may still accept his description of these differences as they are found to exist. He finds the primitive

¹ I may quote the following from a prominent Greek scholar whom I have consulted: "'Pancalism' would not be a regular formation, but neither is 'pantheism' nor 'pancosmism'; so I think the analogy amply justifies you in using 'pancalism'—indeed, it has *πάνκαλος* to rest on, whereas *πάνθεος*, which does not mean 'wholly divine,' does not help 'pantheism.' 'Pantheism' is entirely irregular; and it is only the 'ism' in your 'pancalism' which is irregular."

mind to be "prelogical" (*prélogique*—the same term as that used in our work for the corresponding individual mental functions, before the rise of reflection) as opposed to "logical"; and the characters of the prelogical as he presents them are reducible to two.

In the first place, M. Lévy-Bruhl finds primitive perception and representation to be "collective" rather than individual. The senses do not insist on their immediate reports, but these are interpreted in the sense of social and collective beliefs. The body of prelogical thought is essentially a body of *représentation collective*. The agreement of this with our own description of the "common" character of prelogical meaning is plain enough. We have insisted in great detail upon the essential determination of the individual's belief and conduct by the influence of social opinion and sanction, giving an account of the stages and sources of this "commonness" which would, I think, bear detailed application to primitive mentality as well.¹ The *représentation collective* is equally in evidence in the immature civilized man—in his prelogical stages and in his non-logical exhibitions of himself—and it is in general character the same as that of the primitive man. I think the difference between the prelogical and the logical in this respect, as pointed out by M. Lévy-Bruhl, would bear description in the terms of our discussion: the prelogical is socially common as being "syndoxic" (that is, un-individual in the sense of being consciously "collective"), while the logical is common as being "synnomic" (that is, while individual, still judged by the individual to be convincing or fit for acceptance by all). In the latter sense, the logical may also be described as "collective."

In the second place, the primitive mind, according to M. Lévy-Bruhl, does not recognize the principle of contradiction. The logical mode of process, characterized by the principles of

¹ See vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. vii., and vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. iii. Cf. especially the statement of the problem in chap. vi. § 1, of the present volume, where the corresponding discussion of "commonness" in the sphere of the practical, developed in chaps. vi. to viii., is introduced.

identity and contradiction, seems to be largely undeveloped or absent. The reader of the present work will remember that we have found the logical or reflective mode of process in the individual to take its rise in situations in which the principle of contradiction—based on limitation and exhaustion—first shows itself.¹

Further, M. Lévy-Bruhl finds a positive "law of participation" ruling in the prelogical type of thought, instead of contradiction: the primitive man accepts different things as being one and the same, as occupying the same place at the same time, and especially fails to discriminate between the self and objective things. Things "participate" in a common "mystical" meaning and in one another and in the self.

Again, it will be remembered that we have found that it is only on the rise of the logical as such that the dualism of self and objects fully defines itself, and that in the prelogical stages of individual development the meaning of things of all sorts is in great part determined by the special interests under which their apprehension takes place. The result of these conditions is that a certain mysticism² and relative lack of fixed distinctions, especially as between self and things—summed up by M. Lévy-Bruhl as "participation," characteristic of primitive thought—attaches to the prelogical, whether it be individual or racial, civilized or primitive. No doubt in the absence of logical processes greater scope is given to affective organization, which, as we see in our discussion in this volume

¹ See vol. i. chap. x. § 7, and vol. ii. chap. xi. §§ 5, 6. Cf. also chap. vi. § 1 of this volume. I think the three criteria of the logical, summed up in vol. i. § 8, are all in so far confirmed by M. Lévy-Bruhl's data.

² The "mystic" meaning attaching to things generally is clearly of the nature of "intent," as we use that term (see vol. i. chap. vii. § 1). We can not conclude, as M. Lévy-Bruhl seems to (*Loc. cit.*, pp. 37 ff. and pp. 60 f.), that the content, the thing as such, is not clearly apprehended by the primitive man; but only that the mystic intent excites a dominant and overwhelming interest. Civilized man shows the same thing when the mystical interest is highly excited, as in cases of visions, apparitions, miraculous cures, etc., in which the reports of the senses seem to be contravened.

(chap. vii. §§ 7 ff.), lacks strict opposition and allows confusions of the nature of "participation."

This is only what we should expect to find—that the principal stages of mental development in the individual should be matched in their major genetic characters, at the corresponding stages in the evolution of the mind racially considered. Researches in one field need to be confirmed by researches in the other ; and investigators in the two fields should be in closer touch. It is encouraging to find that such mutual confirmations are in the way of being made out.¹

It is only proper to add that, in my opinion, this only confirms the thesis of the oneness and continuity of development of the human mind ; it does not suggest radical differences of nature, or even abrupt differences of degree between primitive and civilized man.² The race has passed, just as the individual passes, through the "prelogical" as preliminary to and leading on to the "logical." The same sort of progression shows itself in all the faculties, as it is the purpose of this work to demonstrate ; each has its undeveloped and germinal forms in the race as in the individual. There are problems of the relation of the fully moral to the "pre-moral," of the fully aesthetic to the "pre-aesthetic," etc., just as there is also that of the relation of the logical to the "prelogical." For an able examination of M. Lévy-Bruhl's work, in which considerations similar to these are emphasized, the reader may consult the article by Monsieur

¹ The reader may refer to the writer's *Darwin and the Humanities*, chap. vi., where certain similar correspondences are pointed out in the results of the genetic study of religion by psychologists and anthropologists. M. Lévy-Bruhl's refutation of the "associationism" of the British anthropologists is in useful though belated agreement with the confirmed results of functional and "motor" psychology.

² M. Lévy-Bruhl seems to admit this in his admirable concluding chapter, despite his earlier emphasis of the "differences." His suggestion that the rôle of the myth in racial development is that of aiding the transition to the "logical," is in further confirmation of our own position in this work (vol. i., chap. vi., and this vol., chap. i.), that the imaginative functions, in their various "semblant" forms, play the same rôle in individual development.

P. Lapie in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, November, 1910.

No doubt the omission of religious experience from the topics treated in this volume—the hyperlogical functions—may attract notice. It is not an oversight, nor is it due to neglect. The place of religious sentiment and apprehension come up so directly in the later discussion of the meanings of reality, that I have thought it best to postpone the topic entirely, especially as I have already published descriptive accounts of religious experience and of religion (see *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. viii. § 5, *Dict. of Philosophy*, art. "Religion, Psychology of," and *Darwin and the Humanities*, chap. vi.), to which reference may be made. The note to sect. 10 of Appendix B in this volume may serve to suggest the place to be assigned to "religion" in the scheme of apprehensions by which reality is approached, as I view the matter.

A word of appreciation is due to those writers who have honoured the earlier volumes of this work with detailed study and criticism. Though not always specified, still there are not a few places in which I have profited by their suggestions. I may name particularly Professors Lalande, Creighton, Sheldon and A. W. Moore.¹

J. M. B.

July, 1911.

¹ See Lalande, *Revue Philosophique*, Oct. 1907 (on Vol. I.), *ibid.*, June, 1909 (on Vol. II.), and *Athena*, June and July, 1911; Creighton, *Psycholog. Review*, "Darwinism and Logic," May, 1909, and *Philosoph. Review*, "The Implicit," Jan. 1910; A. W. Moore, *Psycholog. Bulletin*, Dec. 1904, and Mar. 1907, *Psycholog. Review*, July, 1907, and *Pragmatism and its Critics*, chaps. viii. and xi.; W. H. Sheldon, *Psycholog. Bulletin*, Apl. 15, 1909; C. H. Williams, *Philosoph. Review*, Jan. 1910; G. A. Tawney, *Journ. of Philos.*, etc., Mar. 30, 1911, and *Science*, July 22, 1910. See also *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, Nov. 1909 (Ceulemans), and Feb. 1910 (Noel). The Appendix (II.) to Vol. II. contains a reply to Prof. Moore, and Appendix B (I.) to this volume debates points raised by Prof. Creighton.

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GENETIC LOGIC

BOOK III

Real Logic. I. Genetic Epistemology

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION

§ I. THE TWO FACTORS IN COGNITION : THEIR MUTUAL DEPENDENCE

1. In the preceding volumes ² we have traced the development of knowledge, showing the moulding and remoulding of the contents that enter into objects, as the mind comes more and more into possession of itself as a principle of inner control and end-seeking activity. We find, through the course of mental development, a growing mass of assimilating, acknowledging and intending process, calling itself the ego or self, over against a fairly stable, presented, recognized body of objective stuff. This latter is found throughout to have marks that make it objective and in certain senses "foreign."

The whole movement is seen to be one of constant redistribution, under the relative dominance, for consciousness itself, of one or other of these two factors, called inner and outer "controls." At one time and in certain modes, the inner assimilating factor seems to be held to the mere recognition of the external as an objective, common, confirmable, and convertible "thing," to which thought must be correct or true; at another time and in other modes, the inner control factor seems to get the upper hand, and its selections, manipulations, constructions seem so free that little limitation of a foreign sort appears.

¹ Part VIII of the entire treatise on *Genetic Logic*. This chapter has been already printed as part of an article having the same title in the *Psychological Review*, May, 1908.

² *Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic*, vols. i., ii. Cf. on the matter of this chapter, the suggestive treatment of Professor A. E. Davies in the *Jour. of Philos., Psych. and Sci. Meth.*, vol. iv. pp. 645 ff. Professor Davies not only admirably states the dilemma of theories with regard to imagination, but also indicates its instrumental rôle in epistemology. His excellent work, *The Moral Life*, chapter vii., may now be consulted.

The "ins and outs" of this movement are traced in the volumes cited with such detail that there is perhaps danger of "losing the forest for the trees." Apart, therefore, from the relative place and function of these two factors at any one stage of the development, I wish now to signalize certain characters of the movement as a whole. This will summarize our results, in a way, and also serve to introduce the topics that still lie before us.¹

The questions, as to how the variations are possible ; what the method of advance is by which the emphasis is thrown now to one side, now to the other ; why the dynamic character is there at all, and in what specific function within the movement it shows itself—these questions may well concern us. Of course if our work has been thorough as well as detailed, we should have a length-wise vista of the movement, and be able to see what is common to the great transition periods through which the objective consciousness normally passes.

2. Taking the point of view of an outsider who casts his glance along the line of the series of objective meanings belonging to one mode after another, we reach a very striking and, I think, secure result : the result that the objective contents—the objects secured by consciousness—always may be and always actually are treated in one or other of two clearly distinguishable ways. Every such object is either one of *knowledge*, recognized as part of the actual, the external, the true ; or it is one of *assumption*, "*semblance*," or *make-believe*, one to be toyed with, "*seemled*" or *Eingeführt*, one to get satisfaction from, to image for personal purposes and selective handling, with some measure of disregard of its exact place and relations in the sphere of the actual. The *actual* and the *imaginative*, the merely known and the usefully or playfully or aesthetically—in short the *semblantly* or *imaginatively*—known, *this is the universal and ever-present contrast in the meanings of cognition.*

Now a most interesting question is that of the play of these two motives. How does the semblant or imaginative reading differ from the actual or truthful ?—and what rôles do the two have in the great movement of knowledge onwards and upwards ? What is the relation between "believe" and "make-believe" ?—between *semblance* and *fact* ?—between *knowledge* and *assumption* ?

3. Our detailed results leave us in no manner of doubt on this point. We have to say—finding it one of the outstanding re-

¹ See chap. xv. below, for a further summing up.

sults of our detailed genetic research—that every cognitive content, every actual “thing,” not only may have but must have both renderings. And this not only because we actually find that each one does, but also because the mergings and reversals of one into the other turn out to show the very nerve of the process of development of knowledge. Consciousness finds nothing so fixed and static that liberties of an imaginative sort may not be taken with it; and on the contrary no flight of imagination can be entertained—even with the slight degree of seriousness that attaches to the mere semblance of truth or personal value—unless it be in turn rooted in the actual and established. *Belief motives make-believe and make-believe engenders belief.* The static, the given, the truthful everywhere owes its establishment to those imaginative means of discovery which in turn again accomplish its undoing; and the projections of will and desire have both their chance of fulfilment and their very body of meaning and motive only in the actual things that they interpret and idealize.

Now when we formulate this by saying that the imaginative rendering is always the instrumental or dynamic factor, and that the actualizing is always the static or truth-recognizing factor—when this is said, we have not only a result that stands out everywhere in our detailed investigation, but one that throws light into the focus-point of current controversy. The instrumental meaning is always and everywhere *a re-reading imaginatively, purposefully, personally of an actual or truthful meaning*, and the truthful reading is always and everywhere *a re-reading as common, stereotyped, actual, of an imaginative personal construction.*

In order to bring out this general statement, we may cite concisely certain of the main results to which we have already come.

§ 2. THE IMAGINATIVE IS INSTRUMENTAL TO THE ACTUAL AND THE TRUE

4. We find the earliest and simplest objects to be by no means mechanically made-up and “set” things. They are shot through with the forming, intending, selecting or neglecting forces of consciousness. To treat them as given and unchanging “things” is only one convenience—an important one to be sure—among many. The uses made of things give them interest, and the interests mark off and circumscribe their meaning. Memory does about the same—it passes on the coin of such a convenient

distribution. But the need of greater control shows itself in the presence of the brutalities of the external when treated thus carelessly. Not to distinguish between a gas-jet and a toy-fish is to invite a certain brutality on the part of Dame Nature. So there arises a way of getting better control, a way never to be again discarded. Images are "set up"—to make a long story short—"semblantly," imaginatively, make-believably. They no longer make up just the one set of things. They come to have the likelihood of pliability, of further control for personal ends. What is known is treated freely under the heading of varied interests and purposes. The great rôle of imagery appears in the play of imaginative constructions, relatively loosened from their actual place and anchorage. So then the fact, the actual thing, *passes into the instrumental image*, becoming a mere "schema" of the further intent read in and through it, to be again "tried-on" in the actual struggle with the world.

This is the sole and sure method of advance. How else could there be advance? The "semblant" of the early play consciousness is the great freeing mode; it frees things from their rigid, one-meaning phase, sets them free to mean more, to mean whatever it is interesting and profitable to have them mean. It is also the freeing-mode for the self—the control that grasps the image, reads it as disposition, interest, utility dictate it may or should be read, to bring new intentions to the issue of fact. Now all this experimentation, trying-on, trial-and-error, is the work of imagination, which projects the new selective readings out into the world of the actual. *We make-believe in order that we may believe!*

5. This method, so conspicuous in the early movements of knowledge, again shows itself, doing precisely the same thing, at the critical stage of development that brings in "general" meanings as such. The general meaning is one of recognition, of the reading of particular things as having common marks¹; it recognizes actual classes as made up by certain likenesses and differences among things. When we ask how this reading of the actual can be secured, how the classes are established, we must have recourse to the imagination again. The "knowledges" we already have are used instrumentally under the urgency of our practical habits. The thing found in a relatively novel situation is assumed, imagined, taken to be like other things which

¹ A type of meaning often ambiguously called "universal," because it is usually embodied in a "universal proposition."

it suggests ; the net of habit—a vague outline or scheme—is set for the new fact. The new is thus treated as if it were already assimilated, as if the old schema would fit upon it. So the imagination as schematizing, assuming, prospecting, experimenting—in short as “instrumental”—gets in its work. Only thus, through the response in habitual ways, is the new item reduced and classified. The result is the modification of habit, the achievement of new accommodation, some addition made to the fund of knowledge salted down in the keg of the actual. Hereafter the class in which the object falls is known, the generalization has taken place, *the imaginative has been instrumental to the actual*. The earliest “presumption” of the actual gives place to the experimental and imaginative “assumption,” only to pass back into the enlarged and confirmed belief in the real.

6. The whole method comes to its critical and momentous rôle in the act or function of judgment. Judgment is just the issue of the same movement on a higher plane and under more advanced presuppositions ; this higher status and its conditions being so clearly marked that the term judgment should be confined to this case. What we may call the maturation of the contents of the psychic egg shows at this stage such remarkable movements that we may describe it—with the embryologists still—as presenting new “rudiments” of meaning. Dame Nature says : I will treat all the objective data—images, memories, intentions, ideas : everything one can think about—as *contents of a single and individual mind*, and segregate the functional processes, the efforts, strivings, dispositions, standing for inner control, *in the “self” of this individual mind*. Let there be a self-object dualism, a group of individuals or single selves, each having its own “experience.”

This indeed actually happens, and happens anew in every person who grows up to be a judging individual. The movement is functionally present in the act of judgment ; and on the side of content it is the relation of reflection, a dualism of self and thoughts. Each such act of recognizing and acknowledging a content as a thought—that is, as a thought of a thing to which it is to hold true—each such act is an act of judgment. Judgment is a movement of actualization, recognition, acknowledgment, following upon an earlier imaginative rendering of a content as proposal, suggestion, schema of what may be actual. When it is found to be actual, it is accepted as true ; and this is judgment.

7. “Truths” are the great body of thoughts about actualities,

thus accepted. We see that they are simply confirmed imaginings, established prospectings. The imagination is here again instrumental to the establishment of the actual. The two controls are now adjusted to each other *through the mediation of ideas or thoughts*.

So then when, in talking about truth, we say that it is "instrumental," we are not careful enough. What is instrumental is not truth; but the imagination of something that may become truth. In its instrumental stage it is *not yet truth*, for truth is precisely what it is instrumental to.¹ After that, it is instrumental only in the tame and secondary sense of representing and standing for the actual. But, on the other hand, when we talk about the fixity and absoluteness, the given-quality, of knowledge and of truth, denying its essentially instrumental and human place and rôle, again we are not exercising proper care. Not only is all truth due to the imagination, having been in the first place experimentally entertained and then confirmed; it is always in a process of flux and flow. And this gives it its main value; for thus it assumes continually its rôle of feeding the imagination for further discovery of fact and further control by the self. The mere telling over of actualities, the items of true and accomplished judgment, is hardly worth while, save possibly to the intellectual miser who loves the mere glint of his erudition; on the contrary, the real thinker is he who melts the known in the crucible of hypothesis, of imaginative speculation, and draws out new casts for common circulation.

For this method of gaining knowledge by imaginative prospecting still goes on in the mode of reflection; it becomes now the method of inductive and intentional research, the method of science. Induction is nothing more; deduction is never less. As in the early stages it may be called "schematic" or "assumptive," an early sort of imaginative reading that is instrumental to acceptance, and later on it is called "semblant" or hypothetical, still imaginative in the same sense, so now in the mode of thought, where the method is explicitly adopted by the thinker himself,

¹ What we mean when we say that truth is instrumental to action, is that ideas, besides being true—as mediating external control—and in consequence of their truth, also justify action—or mediate inner control. See *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. xiv., where the contrast between "knowledge through control" and "control through knowledge" is brought out; also the further account of "Mediation" in chaps. iii. to v. below.

it may be called proposal, suggestion, hypothesis, postulation ; but it has still essentially the same place and rôle.

§ 3. THE IMAGINATIVE IS NEITHER "COMMON" NOR
"GENERAL"

8. The contrast between the two phases of the entire process of knowledge, the "actual" and the "imaginative," is seen in certain other larger results to which our inquiry has led us. This should be emphasized, since it enables us to expose a very general and hurtful confusion. We find that the knowledge found to be true, established—treated as in any way given, presumed, or presupposed, and not merely imagined—is always and inalienably for "common" acceptance. It is "common" both by virtue of its social currency, which is reflected in the growth of the individual's judgment, and also by virtue of the fact that "privacy," or lack of commonness, is a later and more special reading which presupposes a certain commonness. The very judgment that asserts a content to be private, also requires that this result of privacy itself be common, in the sense that it is to hold for everybody.¹

¹ One of the results of this work that might be selected as giving it character is the proof that knowledge is essentially and fundamentally common or social, not private. As in the book *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, the sentence "the individual is a social outcome, rather than a social unit" has been quoted as hitting off one of its results, so this aspect of the present work is hit off in the sentence, "knowledge is common property, not a private possession." As the former of these sentences states the truth that is, in my opinion, finally to refute individualism in social theory, so the latter supplies the analogous refutation of individualism in the world of truth. The question, "how do we get together as citizens in a practical world?" is to be condemned as unreal and obsolete. We *are* together, and only through the social life do we become relatively separate—relatively private and independent selves. So the question "how can we know things together?" ought to be similarly outlawed. We do not have to come together to know; on the contrary, we become only relatively competent and independent in knowing things separately. The kingdom of life does not have to naturalize or matriculate its citizens; on the contrary, the citizen of no-man's land has lost his birthright. So the kingdom of truth has no matriculation examinations; its process is, on the contrary, the separation from its body of the individual who insists on privacy and eccentricity. The normal citizen in this kingdom is the person whose competent private judgment is also and at once the sign and evidence of his social fitness. See "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. iii.

A similar remark may be made with respect to "generality." All judged subject-matter, found to be true and actual—not merely imagined—is a "general" of some mode of repetition or recurrence of cases. A judgment always embodies a class meaning, and acknowledges the particular object or thing as belonging to its class. Even the assertion of the singularity of an object we have found to require at least the generalization of the recurrent appearances of that object, whereby its identity and persistence—meanings requisite to its individuation—are acknowledged.

We see, therefore, that both commonness and generality—the need to be true for everybody and the need to be recurrent and reapplicable to different cases or appearances—always attach to knowledge of the "actual" and "truthful" type.

9. But when we examine imaginative constructions, those defined above as instrumental and prescriptive, those by which the mind does its prospecting for ore in the cosmic mine, we find that both these aspects of meaning, these shadings of intent, disappear. Such a content is imagined just by a return to the individual's personal process. To be sure we imagine a thing "as holding"; that is just what we mean by calling such a meaning "semblant": it has the "semblance" of truth. But that is very different from believing that it does hold. What the individual projects into the world, prescribes for true, intends to secure, is motivated by the impulse to get on further with knowledge. If it were already common and general, established and true, where would be its further instrumental and developmental rôle? The "will to believe" is very real, and very useful in just this instrumental way; but a content so willed is not a truth generalized and commonly accepted. On the contrary, it is personal and selective. Truth is recognized as *what is*, as repeatable, communicable, salted down in the body of tradition, science, language, social embodiment of this sort or that; what is willed, on the contrary, is the imaginative schema charged with the force of the one personality who wills it, who finds imagined fulfilments and satisfactions in it, and who perchance by faith and enthusiasm sets in motion the influences that secure its final confirmation and acceptance as true.

Imaginative constructions then show the return into personal and prospective form. In the imaginative rendering, there is a new moment of personal intention which gives the content further instrumental and experimental value.

It results also that such an imaginative construction has

elements of "privacy." So far as it is the preferential reading of some one's imagination—a form set up to fulfil personal interest and purpose—it is *the only one of its kind*. It is then, as a whole, playing a rôle that no other, no one's else imagination, can then and there play; and this is part of its instrumental force.

10. This result, that thinking can not be read in terms of its accepted results alone, that is, as a body of common and impersonal objects or truths, but must also and always be read as "proposed" by a selecting and prospecting function—this result holds all through the operations of logic, as I have shown in detail.¹ Every thought is in turn both a personal assumption and proposal, and a universal and common proposition. An instrumental and utilitarian intent attaches to the most abstruse and seemingly *a priori* principles that the human mind can be called upon to recognize.²

§ 4. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMAGINATION

11. We are now in a position to make certain remarks on the relation of the two phases of cognitive process to each other, bearing in mind especially the controversies that are now in the air. It is our further interest to trace this relation in the modes of experience that are in some sense hyper-logical or post-reflective, that is, genetically later than the strictly discursive or logical. With this our published investigation has not so far dealt, and our remarks are introductory to the discussions of the later chapters.

Of course, when we use the word "instrumental," we raise at once the question of "ends," either psychic ends or objective ends; for what is instrumental must be instrumental to something. So another and very important question arises which we may state in somewhat this form: granted that it is by the use

¹ In the volume on "Experimental Logic."

² I think this method of reaching a thoroughgoing instrumentalism of knowledge is the only one that gives sound results; but it must be admitted that it is a double-edged sword; for the instrumental aspect is what it is just because there is a body of truth, general and universal in its force, which is used as the instrument of advance, and which is further extended by the use of the imagination—albeit, of course, in its origin it was also experimentally established. The truth to which the imagination is instrumental is as important as the imaginative construction that is used as instrument; it takes both to make up the whole.

of the imagination that thought goes beyond what is already established, what then are the termini, the end-states, the fulfilments to which this process points and which it secures ?

12. Here we come upon the current distinction between the "scientific," or "theoretical" imagination, whose end is the furthering and completion of knowledge, and what may be called broadly the "practical" or "useful" imagination, whose end is some form of appreciation, satisfaction, realization, or fulfilment. The ideal of the former is discovery, the advancement of knowledge, the completion of truth. As to the other, it is not so easy to say in a word what its ideal is ; and it is with a view to making certain introductory distinctions that I raise the point here.

If we say that the end of the scientific imagination is "truth," describing it and the interest that motives it as "theoretical," then over against this there is the exercise of the imagination as instrumental to some form of "good." This, with the interest that motives it, we may call utilitarian, or in a broad sense "practical."

Now what is common to both these, as being imaginative, is that they do not terminate on what is established and actual, but by virtue of their imaginative forward reach, go beyond it. They have a certain prospective and anticipatory reference. They show in common the development of control by the self over its materials, rather than the mere recognition of the several modes of the actual in which the self has to allow and accede to another control foreign to itself. The theoretical or scientific imagination prospects for new facts, for additions to knowledge ; and the practical imagination prospects for results that may in some way minister to the advancement of appetite, affection, disposition, conduct. The latter is most clearly seen in the use of the imagination in defining the prescriptions of conduct and in outlining the policies of economic or other worths ; in short, of what I shall call "practice."¹

The further question then arises whether these two modes of imaginative procedure exhaust the cases, whether there are other types of apprehension which either set up still further ends, or in some way reduce or reconcile the duality disclosed by these two ?

¹ Treated *in extenso* in Part III below in this volume, "The Logic of Practice"; the theoretical has had its turn in the volume (ii) on "Experimental Logic."

§ 5. THE AESTHETIC IMAGINATION

13. There is a type of imaginative cognition, I wish at once to say, that does not allow of description under either of the two foregoing headings; a type which is motivated not by the interest of completeness of knowledge or thought, nor yet by the interest of seeking satisfactions or working practical effects. There is a way of treating a content, usually and properly called "aesthetic," that we may describe as both *over-logical and over-practical*, as not being strictly either of these although involving both of them.

This is the burden of current æsthetic theory—this involvement of the self with an object in a way that does not deny its truth nor discard its use, but which still does not find proper fulfilment either in its truth or in its use. One of the latest and best discussions of the interest involved is that of Mitchell,¹ who calls it "intrinsic," as opposed to both "theoretical" and "practical." This mode of imaginative operation calls for detailed investigation. All the recent work on "semblance" and "Einfühlung," on the subjective side, and on aesthetic "objectivation" and "socialization," on the objective side, is grist for the mill of such a research.

14. The outcome of our investigation,² broadly stated, is that in the aesthetic mode of experience so defined, we have the only inkling of the way that the self-reality of inner control which is the postulate of the practical and worthwhile, and the thing-reality of external control which is the presupposition of knowledge and truth, *can in the process of experience come together after having fallen apart* in the development of cognition. Each of the cognitive modes, perceptual, conceptual, logical, sets up, as is its nature to, a reference in which the "real" for it, its real, is found. But in each case *its* real, not *the* real, is postulated or presupposed, since the control that is discovered is the outcome of this or that special mode and stage of psychic function. The protest of the aesthetic imagination is against just this partialness of each of the modes of "real" meaning. Its own ideal, on the contrary, is one of completeness, of reunion, of *reconciliation*; it gives us the "real" which is absolute in the sense that its object is not relative to, and does not fulfil, one type of interest only to the exclusion of others.

¹ W. Mitchell, *The Structure and Growth of the Mind*, 1907, Lect. VIII.

² To anticipate the later discussions. Cf. the work of Dr. W. D. Furry, *The Aesthetic Experience*, etc., Monograph No. 36 of the *Psychological Review* (1908).

In the aesthetic interest, and in the constructions it motives and enjoys, certain synthetic characters are evident which show at once that the resort to unintelligible feeling, as found in mysticism properly defined, is not fruitful for epistemology ; nor is the resort to one-sided rationalistic or voluntaristic postulates, so often seen in the history of thought. The aesthetic content is always conative or appreciative, inasmuch as it is selective and end-fulfilling ; but it is also always cognitive and intelligible, inasmuch as it is always semblant of the actual. As being, in its stage and place, the legitimate reading of both these interests, intellectual and practical, it is never a state of pure absorption and loss of personal consciousness in an "ecstasy" of feeling. Nor can it be considered an outburst of the "passional nature," that simply wills its own end ; since it is emotionally "disinterested," on the one hand, and affectively idealizing, on the other hand. It absorbs the object in the self, which becomes the principle of realization of both knowledge and will ; at the same time that, as being a state in which the dualistic terms are merged, it has the immediateness of feeling.

15. We may use the word "contemplative," to describe the cognitive aspect of the aesthetic consciousness, giving it this meaning. The self "contemplates" a content when it reads it as ideally truthful and so *real for knowledge*, and also as, in its own mode and meaning, ideally worthful, and so *real for will* ; while in this union of controls the earlier mediation of remote "realities" gives place to *an immediateness of the real in feeling*. The object of contemplative interest is thus not only an object, but an object that embodies and completes the self. The self is realized in it, and the experience becomes one that may be called absolute in certain well-defined senses.¹

Our research will, therefore, include a somewhat full investigation of the two remaining types of imagination, the practical and the aesthetic. This will occupy us largely in this volume, in which the "real" or epistemological reference of conscious function is investigated. The theoretical imagination and its results have had full treatment in the earlier volumes.

¹ Senses stated succinctly in the remainder of the article "Knowledge and Imagination," *Psychological Review*, May, 1908, pp. 192 ff., and to be fully explained in the last volume of this work (vol. iv. *Real Logic*, II). See also below, chap. xv. §§ 5 ff.

Chapter II

REAL LOGIC : ITS PROBLEM AND METHOD

We have already defined in general terms what is known in this work as Real Logic, and indicated its place in the larger whole of Genetic Logic.¹ It is not necessary to repeat these explanations. Yet in order to isolate with greater exactness the problems that lie immediately before us, a short statement is clearly in order. We may therefore briefly formulate the problem and method of this last branch of our study, with reference especially to the studies that have gone before in the preceding volumes.

§ I. THE PROBLEM OF REAL LOGIC

I. In general terms the problem is in the first place an epistemological one. It concerns the meaning of the objects of apprehension—of psychic objects in general—as in some sense presenting, assuming, or implicating reality. The question is, what does reality mean?—the reality that conscious process reveals, discovers, or assumes?

In the foregoing divisions of our subject, we have been dealing with the production and development of objects, and with the progressive meanings attaching to them at the successive stages of the progress of mind; and we have discovered that in their normal functioning the processes of mind issue constantly in a more or less obscure and variable suggestion or implication of what we have called control. The great dualism of controls, inner and outer, has constantly forced itself upon our attention, arising as a prominent factor in the entire meaning of objective contents; and we have had various intimations that in this factor of control the meanings of existence, persistence, actuality, externality, internality, etc., which go to make up the intent of reality, are involved. In fact, we have in certain connexions

¹ Vol. i., *Functional Logic*, chap i, § 5.

already found it necessary to point this out.¹ But in the main we have so far had only detached and isolated intimations from the investigation of the functional processes of knowledge.

The interest of the investigation would be largely lost, however—for the more philosophical reader, at least—if we did not go on to inquire how far our method enables us to investigate this question also. Can we not trace the continuous development of the meaning of reality, in a consistent way, finding out just what for consciousness itself in the first instance, this control factor carries with it at each stage of the development of the objective consciousness? This done, can we not then, in a way still legitimately within our genetic point of view, institute a research into the interpretation and unification of the various meanings of control in the final meaning of reality as such?

2. Distinguishing the two aspects of the problem in this way, we have the two divisions of Real Logic already indicated in the earlier chapter : Genetic Epistemology and Genetic Morphology. The former concerns itself with the implications of reality at each of the greater stages of conscious process, from the most primitive to the most derived ; the latter searches for the element of meaning which these have in common when interpreted comparatively and considered as a series of meanings arising in the development of consciousness as a whole. *What does each sort of "real" mean?*—is the question of Epistemology ; *what do all the sorts of "real" mean in common?*—and *what does each contribute to the final meaning of reality?*—are those of Morphology, as I now use these terms.

3. In the consideration of these two great problems, whether separately or together, we come upon a distinction which grows more and more important as we advance, and requires preliminary statement here.

The assumption so frequently made in philosophical theories that reality is given to us *only through knowledge*, that to apprehend the real we must cognize it, has not been so far challenged in our discussions. We have indeed so far been dealing directly with the objective cognitive consciousness, with knowledge and thought ; and the meanings of the real which have suggested themselves have been those which attach to objects as such. But the assumption mentioned, especially the form of it called rationalistic, which assumes or declares that thought or theoretical reason is the only organ of the apprehension of the real, deserves

¹ See especially vol. i., *Functional Logic*, chap. x. §§ 9–11.

at least a searching examination; not merely a logical examination made *ad hoc*, but such an examination as would come from the discovery that other modes of process, which are not cognitive, also issue in their own forms of real meaning. This is part of our task. It requires, if the research is to be exhaustive, the consideration of the affective and conative functions, of the movements of interest in its play upon contents, and of the hyperlogical, sentimental and intuitive deliverances of mind.

We find our investigation, therefore, considerably prolonged. We cannot be content with adjudicating the respective claims of the varied modes of cognition taken alone, with a view to finding the "realist" form of the real as reported by them; this would rule out in advance all a-logical or non-cognitive meanings. On the contrary, we must ask *how the real feels, why it interests us, how it controls our activity and satisfies our needs*, as well as how it excites our curiosity and confirms our knowledge.

4. The analyses preliminary to this inquiry have been already made, in large part, in the volumes on Functional and Experimental Logic. Those discussions were made more exhaustive with this object in view. It is not necessary, therefore, to trace in detail the affective-conative movement; its general character and place have been considered in connexion with the cognitive. But it devolves upon us to ask whether there is such a thing as a more or less independent movement of this factor, a logic of interest, understanding that term in a large sense,¹ through which the non-cognitive apprehension of reality might proceed. Fortunately the way has been prepared for us here by recent studies in "affective logic" of which we are able to make direct use.

All of this matter pertaining to the development of the active or motive factors of mind, we may place in a division called the Logic of Practice. In the arrangement adopted below this follows the epistemological consideration of the real as given by the processes of mediation, the topics of the Logic of Truth and of Value, in which cognition plays a predominant or very prominent part.²

¹ See vol. i. chap. iii. where the use of the term interest in this sense is explained. Cf. also chapter vi. §1. below.

² It may be surmised, and with reason, that our results somewhat influence the organization of the material at this point. The character of knowledge as being a function of *mediation through ideas* or cognitive contents of some kind, which are means or instruments of reaching both truth and value, grows more and more impressive as the investigation proceeds. The distinction between the mediate and the immediate comes

5. There remains the consideration of the hyperlogical functions, examined with a view to their implications of the real. Of these what is usually called the "reason," theoretical and practical, is of the first importance. The Theoretical Reason, with its self-evident intuitions, has been already found to be the genetic outcome of the empirical processes of cognitive mediation.¹ This is brought out more fully in connexion with the discussion of the Practical Reason in this volume (chap. viii.), in which the latter is found to be a corresponding genetic outcome of the empirical processes of the mediation of value.

6. In the operation of what we have called the hyperlogical functions, the meanings classed as "ideal" present themselves as representing the advance of the imagination. The imaginative functions have a certain intent of finality—a prospective ideality—as the rules of the reason do in the domain of retrospective knowledge. Here it is the group of functions called in a large sense "semblant"—imaginative, schematizing, postulating, idealizing—that we have to consider. Play is their early form, experimentation shows their exercise on the side of serious life, and the aesthetic embodies their hyperlogical modes. The consideration of this important and neglected group of functions—neglected, that is, from the point of view of their epistemological value and implications—follows in Part IV, on "Semblance and the Aesthetic" (chaps. x.-xiii.). Their discussion is followed by that of Immediacy, which constitutes—besides Mediation—the further heading under Epistemology.²

The other great division, Genetic and Comparative Morphology, is then to have its full treatment, with divisions and sub-topics which will be indicated in the Introduction to vol. iv.

7. The divisions thus explained may be set forth as follows :

Genetic Logic.		
II. Real Logic		
1. Genetic Epistemology	<div> <div>Mediation</div> <div>Immediacy</div> </div>	<div> <div>{ Logic of Truth and Value.</div> <div>{ Logic of Practice.</div> <div>{ Aesthetic ;</div> <div>{ (Semblant).</div> </div>
2. Genetic Morphology.		

largely to supersede that between knowledge and feeling. This leads us to place truth and value together, as having a "logic"—a process of mediation through ideas—in common.

¹ See vol. ii., *Experimental Logic*, chap. v, sect. 21, and (especially) chap. xi. § 5.

² See the second footnote to sect. 4 above.

§ 2. THE METHOD OF REAL LOGIC

8. On the subject of method, little need be added to the full explanations given in the Introduction to the volume on Functional Logic (vol. i. chap. i.). The actual employment of the method in the preceding discussions should carry a certain illustrative force. The method remains the same in the treatment of the present subject so far as the first great division, Epistemology, is concerned. We are to inquire as to the rise and progress of meanings of reality, as consciousness itself reaches them. The external reference of knowledge and the inward sphere of existence, each illustrating one of the great factors of control, are traced through their transformations from simpler to more complex stages of mental development.

In tracing out the modes of immediacy, in which the meaning of reality seems to be in some sense directly given, we find the same method applicable, since there are stages in the immediacy to which psychic process tends to return, stages corresponding to these of the mediate processes of knowledge and action. This proves to be a crucial point in our further discussions in the last division, Morphology, in the following way.

9. It turns out that the modes of reality discovered for consciousness, in the great dualisms of knowledge and practice, find their point of fusion and reunion in the imaginative or semblant functions. At each stage of objective consciousness, semblance is the resort of the mind itself for the reconciliation of the oppositions of internal and external control. The point then suggests itself that this method should also be the resort of consistent theory; we should trace the genetic development of just *this reconciling immediacy*.

This procedure we adopt. The immediacy of the aesthetic type is traced and found to be, throughout the entire course of mental development, the solvent of the dualisms created by the partial motives of cognitive and practical interest in working themselves out.

The results cannot be anticipated here; but it is plain that in thus following the lead of the mental process itself, in achieving a mode of "realizing" which supersedes the partial modes of *thinking about* and *acting upon* reality, we are but true to our principal point of view. The application of the genetic method to this mode itself, the aesthetic, carries forward the legitimate employment of the method to which we are committed

How far in the sequel we may find it well to depart from this method strictly understood, in our final interpretations in the part on Morphology, the later Introduction ¹ as well as the text itself will make plain.

¹ The Introduction to volume iv. still to appear.

PART II¹

MEDIATION

Chapter III

PRELOGICAL MEDIATION. THE EXISTENT AS REAL

§ 1. THE NATURE OF MEDIATION

1. We have already found the need of distinguishing two cases under what we may describe as the presence of contents to consciousness: cases characterized as "mediate" and "immediate." Our more detailed description² of the former of these two modes of "presence" may be anticipated again, as it has been before. Mediation, as here intended, may be described as the reference of an objective content away from itself, its "call" on some other experience to give it that aspect of its entire meaning which we call its "control" in a definite sphere or class. It is through such a reference to a sphere, which is in some way more directly grounded than itself, that a bit of objective content is said to have existence or reality. Truthful ideas mediate things.

"Immediacy" on the other hand, is the relative absence of such a reference of an experience away from itself; more positively, it is the relative self-sufficiency of a psychic content to express its own entire meaning. In the one case, that of the mediate, besides *having* the content or experience, we *find it to be*—prove, believe, assume, deny it to be—in some way real or existent; while in the other case, that of the immediate, we *realize* the meaning at once without such a process of intervention or mediation.

¹ Part IX of the entire treatise on Genetic Logic.

² Below, chap. xiv. § 1, where it is taken up in connection with immediacy.

Having in mind this general distinction, we may go on to inquire more closely into these two types of meaning. We may speak, on the one hand, of the present mediating context and of the control which it mediates ; of the content and of its remote or " real " reference ; of the idea and of it grounding in a sphere of existence ; of truth and of the reality of which it holds good ; of an object and of the coefficient which determines its sphere—all of these being more or less familiar ways of describing the type of meaning here called mediation.

On the other hand, in the second case, that of the immediate, we speak of a " realization " of the meaning, of direct acquaintance with the thing, of intuition of the real, of direct apprehension of the object, of immediate experience, etc.

2. Coming now to consider mediation more closely, we find the way prepared by our previous discussion. All the discursive operations of thinking are obviously mediate ; but we are to see that mediation is not confined to thinking proper.

(1) Obviously, we have been dealing with mediation in all our treatment of control. We found a sort of difference appearing very early in the development of meanings which led to the distinction of controls : the difference between the mere constitution or determination of an objective content, and the more or less developed class-meaning or sphere to which it was referred. This sphere of reference was called its " control," as opposed to other spheres in which other contents were likewise found. Accordingly, in seeking cases of mediation, we have only to recognize the typical spheres of control already described. The recognition of a certain control, as attaching to a content, is precisely what we mean when we say that this content mediates existence or reality.

It becomes part of our further task, therefore, to interpret each sort of existence or reality in terms of the mediating coefficient of control present and peculiar to the object. This we shall now do, in a preliminary way, taking up in turn certain modes of objective reference and interpreting their coefficients with special reference to reality. Thus we will arrive at certain distinctions in reality, as mediated in actual experience.

3. (2) It becomes clear at this point also, that in this investigation of the types of mediation we do not at any point break through the circle of the developing experience in which the different coefficients present themselves. That is to say, the reference of an experience away from itself is always a reference

to another experience. The mediated controls are defined in terms of coefficients established in experience. The interpretation of the reference is always of the nature of an elucidation of psychic meaning ; the reality, in other words the sphere of existence to which the object is referred, is one *set up and developed within the organization of psychic contents*. The existence or reality of a thing is a meaning for experience just as the objective content itself is such a meaning.

§ 2. THE TWO MODES OF MEDIATION

4. Our detailed examination of the modes of knowledge has already revealed the classes in which objects are normally controlled. We find the first appearance of the distinction of controls in the sense-mode, at the point at which the differences appearing in mere presented contents become those between the "external" and the "internal." This distinction has been so fully traced already¹ that we may here merely isolate the different modes of existence or reality in which the two progressions continuously issue. These are of course two :

(1) *External Existence*, arising in the perceptual mode and progressing, as a developing meaning, through the image and semblant modes into that of reflection or thought.

(2) *Inner Existence*, arising over against the external, and proceeding, in its characteristic way, through the subsequent stages of cognitive development.

Before taking up the more ambiguous or transitional forms of what passes under some guise for "existence," we will set forth clearly what is common to these two great modes of control, and also that wherein they differ. Of course, each has its peculiar coefficient—the mark, character, or set of characters by which its respective objects are recognized, identified and individuated.

§ 3. THE MEDIATION OF THE EXTERNAL : ITS COEFFICIENT

5. The completed coefficient of external existence was found, it will be recalled, to be two-fold : first, there is the "perceptual coefficient," marking the actual presence of the external object. This we found, agreeing with a number of modern psychologists, to reside in the relative stubbornness, resistance, independence, uncontrollableness with which such an object holds its place

¹ "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chaps. iii. to vi., and chap. x. §§ 9 ff. (on the meaning of "existence.")

in the mass of sense data. We are not able to limit it to "sensations of resistance" as such; for it is a character of all sensations, when these are considered as setting limit to, or exercising a sort of control upon, the affective and conative processes of disposition and interest. The relative possibility of manipulation, together with the relative opposition it meets with, constitute the germ of the dualism of controls, in the early stages of knowledge.

This is the first mark, the indispensable character, of what goes on to become an external object. Its meaning is found *en germe* in the limiting, the opposing, the stubborn, the "foreign."

6. The second factor in the full coefficient comes in, as we found, when the growing opposition of "inner" and "outer" is embarrassed by certain doubtful and ambiguous experiences of the image mode. The "memory coefficient" of external objects of the physical order then comes into play. By it images which are representative of actual objects, and which are also convertible into them, are set off from the entire body of imaged contents; memories are distinguished from fancies, images of real things remembered from those which are fugitive. This memory coefficient of the external was in turn found to involve two marks.

First, it has a certain "contextuation," a train of associated contents, by which the true memory can be confirmed or fulfilled by conversion into the proper sense object which reinstates the resistance mark. Second, there is something more intrinsic by which the image stands for or represents in its own right its proper original.

Whatever this precise mark or coefficient of memory as such is,¹ its rôle is significant. Its function is that of marking the true memory. It introduces into the object, as we have seen above, the meaning of continuance and persistence. The earliest form of the meaning of sameness or persistence arises from the recurrence or renewal of the object. The meaning of its actual persistence, in the external world, arises from the

¹ Various attempts have been made to determine this mark. Some maintain that the relative intensity of a true memory is all that distinguishes it; others look for some more positive qualitative sign, a sort of secondary reinstatement of the sense coefficient itself. The writer inclines to the latter view (see *Mind*, July, 1891, reprinted in *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*), which has been developed with force by Dr. Boris Sidis (*Psychological Review*, January and March, 1908).

identification of the recurrent object as the same ; but this is possible only through the effective working of the memory image in securing the re-establishment of the object after its absence. Indeed, from our study of the matter, we drew the conclusion that the persistence attributed to external objects is of the sort generated by recurrence.¹

7. This leads us to see that the memory coefficient contributes an important element to the physical : its externality in the sense of its persistent " foreignness " to the experience itself. Wherever an object may be when it is not being experienced, it is certainly not present to the consciousness of the person in question ; accordingly that part of its meaning which implies its presence elsewhere, its continuance apart from the process of apprehending it, arises from the combined functions of perception and memory.

8. In the substantive mode, in which the dualism of body and mind hardens into the opposition of substances thought of as quite apart from each other, both these factors of the meaning of the external receive emphasis and advancement. The properties of substance, known in science as static and dynamic qualities—common to all objects existing in the world of physical nature—are more refined differentiations of the resistance and persistence coefficients ; and the relational organization of items, each persisting and recurring in time and place, makes up the physical order, considered as a sphere of persisting existence or reality.

9. When the meaning thus produced attaches to a content, the object is " external." But in the development so far noted, it is not " judged " to be external. The act of judging it to be external is a further movement taking place through the acknowledgment of the same coefficients. In the process of reflection there is, as we have seen,² a redistribution of the factors of the whole psychic movement, in which the inner control recognizes itself as over against the entire body of contents or ideas. All its ideas are consciously recognized as present to it ; and their distribution becomes at once a reference of each to its proper sphere of existence, and also an organizing of them all in a body of reflective thoughts. The coefficients of externality become then the " cues " upon which the judgment proceeds, and the reference of the object becomes its acknowledgment as belonging in the order of things external to the process itself. There is

¹ See " Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. viii. § 3.

² *Ibid*, vol. i. chap. xi.

then entire continuity in the progression of the meaning of externality; but now, in reflection, it is acknowledged by an explicit act of judgment.

10. The external reality of the physical object is what is common to all the actual and possible appearances of this object. I do not perceive the object as existing in just the same way that I judge it to exist; nor do I remember it as existing in just the same way that I perceive or judge it. But still all the modes of getting its existence establish its reality as the same. Its external reality is the characteristic control, which is established, re-established, recognized, and finally acknowledged.

So when we say that the physical world is real we mean that we may perceive it, remember it, re-establish it, judge and prove it—all or any one of these processes may be resorted to, as a method of approach to the one thing, the control, the reality. Its realness is its establishment as of its own kind, by whatever stage or mode of function this may be secured. Whether directly experienced, remembered, or judged, the coefficients remain the same.

§ 4. THE MEDIATION OF THE EXTERNAL: ITS MODES

11. Having now established the right of a given content to be classed as "external," to have, that is, the meaning of external existence, we may now ask as to the modes or methods of the mediation itself. Given the coefficients by which a content is to be identified as external, the further question arises, in what way, in this case or that, these coefficients carry their force in the experience to which they belong. Putting it a little differently, we may ask what attitudes the self of the experience takes up toward the reality which the coefficients are found to mediate.

The evident attitude, of course, suggested by the conditions of mediation itself, is that of belief; we believe in the reality of the things we judge to exist. But belief is itself but one of a variety of attitudes; and states of relative acceptance or rejection, of hesitation, assumption, and doubt, all serve to reflect differences of attitude toward the marks which serve to suggest the real.

Here again we find in our earlier discussions indications that will serve us. We have found it necessary to distinguish, throughout the whole movement of experience, the attitude of positive

decision, of acceptance or rejection, from that of mere supposition and assumption.¹ This distinction will now serve to guide us in our consideration of the modes of mediation. Speaking at present of external reality alone, we may say that it is mediated either in a mode of *acceptance* or in a mode of *assumption*. But whether merely assumed or accepted as being real, it is still by reason of the coefficients of which we have just spoken that it is taken for what it is taken for.

12. In all the range of meanings of reality, we have modifications of these two attitudes going hand in hand. As variations of the acceptance attitude we find first the "presumption" of the earliest reality-feeling; this passes over into the acknowledgment of the existential judgment, and this again into the higher presumption or presupposition of the various forms of implication which are developed in the sphere of argument and proof. On the side of assumption, also, there is the corresponding passage from the early experimental and schematic treatment of contents, the assumption of reality which is still to be brought to the test, through the explicitly hypothetical and alternative forms of logical judgment, up to the postulation of reality in the spheres of higher intuition and practical life. The reality of this or that is in all cases either accepted as actual, or assumed to be so; and the modes of the progression of consciousness show, at every step, these two attitudes advancing with the development of the psychic life. In it all, as we have seen in the introduction above, the imagination is the vehicle of assumption; while positive cognition, giving a deliverance in the form of actual knowledge—of which judgment is the explicit rendering at the stage of reflection—is the embodiment of acceptance. The distinction of the two, running thus longitudinally through mental development, is further seen in the modes of meaning they respectively render. Recognitive meaning, in all its forms—the percept, the concept, the general notion, the proposition, the bit of elucidation or inference—shows the confidence of the mind resting in its acceptances and beliefs. On the other hand, the various sorts of selective meaning—intentions, appreciations, proposals, ends—all show the mind dealing with its contents under the assumption of reality.²

¹ See especially "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. i. § 3, and appendix i.; also chap. i. above in this volume.

² On the character and extent of assumption, I may refer again, as I have before, to the able work of Meinong, *Die Annahmen*, 2 ed. 1910.

13. The essential meaning of external reality, however, remains the same through all these transformations of subjective attitude. We can not assume a thing to be real, until we are also able to presume or believe it real ; its " reality " is the meaning of control arrived at in deriving the content in question. This meaning may be attributed to a content in either way, by acceptance or by assumption. A thing can be hypothetically rendered as real only in some specific sphere of existence, in which objects may also be acknowledged by processes of judgment. So also, in the developed mode of logical thinking, the postulate always renders assumptively a meaning of reality which has already been made the presupposition of accepted implication. The assumption, that is, is a schematic furthering of a meaning beyond the limits of the context in whose organization the accepted control has been developed. For example, to assume the existence of mermaids is merely by hypothesis to extend to mermaids the presumption of physical reality. To propose a new thing as true—as that apples grow on trees—is merely by hypothesis to extend a sphere of accepted beliefs to a new phenomenon. To postulate the moral value of an act is merely to extend the presupposition made by moral judgments to a further class of cases. The essential thing to note, of course, is that such an extension, such a furthering, is not as yet one of acceptance or judgment, but one of hypothesis, proposal, or assumption.

14. We may say, therefore, that the *reality of the external world is mediated through the acceptance of physical things as existing* ; and that, in the case of the assumption of external reality, the process is *one of attempted or proposed mediation*.

The general truth of these statements is most apparent in cases in which the distinction between the simple presence in idea and the further possible truth or falsity of the idea, is clearly present to consciousness. This is the case in all reflection, when the mode of mediation is that of the logical as such. Many modifications as to truth, falsity, problematical force, hypothetical validity, etc., are possible. The mediating context, the statement or hypothesis, and the sphere of reality mediated by that context, are consciously distinguished. Furthermore, the duality of these elements of the entire meaning may be further emphasized by an explicit act of judgment, which asserts or denies existence or reality, instead of simply assuming or presupposing it. The existential judgment may always be truthfully

described as an acknowledgment or assertion due to a successful mediation.

It is clear enough why the logical is the most evident and explicit case of mediation. Reflection is the mode in which the contents of knowledge are recognized as occurring first of all as a system of ideas or as experience. These ideas do not lose the reference to their original spheres of control, but this reference remains as one of mediation.

15. We have justification, however, for applying the term mediation to the less explicit cases. The case of memory, for example, is one in which mediation is undoubted; although it is not of the reflective and intentional type. In memory, as we have seen, the question arises as to the character of the original experience of which the memory image is a reinstatement. In the movement of acceptance of the image as being a true memory, the coefficient is recognized by which the content is referred to a definite sphere of control. In cases in which this coefficient is not operative, the image is read off as fanciful; it does not afford the mediation of existence, as true memories do. The sphere of perceptual existence is mediated in cases of the successful memory of physical things.

This seems to hold true when we go back to the simplest cognition, in the sense-mode itself. The attempt to find a case of objective construction that does not show some moment of mediation will remind us again of certain of our earlier results. The question arises as to whether there are any objects perceived as things in some sense external, which do not involve and require the sort of mediation that memory affords.

16. It will be remembered that we found reason to agree with those who hold that there is no absolutely original *datum* or *primum cognitum* so simple and self-sufficient as not to require a process of assimilation to constitute it an object. It appeared that even the simplest cognized object is a construction, a content made-up in the development of active dispositions and interests.¹

Certain selective processes are always stirred up by sense stimulation; and the formation of the objective thing is due to the union of stimulus and response. There is always sufficient variation of result to justify the reading of the object as the one person's interpretation or meaning. It is not, and cannot be, simply a bare and naked "given" or "datum"; it must always be *what the given means* for the consciousness that gets

¹ "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. iii.

it. Indeed, the reading of an object as merely a given or datum is itself preferential and selective. So that all objects are to be looked upon as personal meanings, having both content and intent, the extreme case being the object whose intent is taken to be or to mean no more than just the content itself.

17. If this is true, we see our way in the matter of mediation. Any variation arising in the meaning of the object opens the question as to the correctness or adequacy of its assignment to a special control. Just as in cases of explicit memory the question of correct reconstruction is one of mediation, so here the question of correct construction is also. In so far as this is a conscious process, there arises a feeling of uncertainty as to the "dependableness" of the result ; and in frequent cases the possibility of illusion or hallucination suggests a conscious revision, or at least some degree of caution in accepting the deliverances of the senses.¹

Looked at from a somewhat different point of view, the case is this. In so far as departure is made from a certain supposed "real thing," an unmodified and unalloyed given, the result, instead of discovering such a reality, can only mediate it. That is, the supposed real thing comes to depend upon what is, in a sense, not a first-hand report ; and although no first-hand report be possible, still the variations in the second-hand reports are sufficient to indicate that they are second-hand. The only first-hand report would be a purely objective, a-dualistic cognition ; a panorama of presentation without depth or filling-in. But this, as we have abundantly shown, is impossible ; and, moreover, *it would be, ipse facto, meaningless.*

18. The nearest approach to this is the content toward which the attitude of acceptance is one of mere presumption. Presumption is the sort of acceptance, without hesitation or question, that the child's early trust embodies. It is the "reality-feeling," the "primitive credulity," the "unsophisticated belief," pointed out by many writers who attempt to find terms adequate to bring out its extreme simplicity. In it there is certainly no consciousness of existence or reality as such, no conscious assumption ; but there comes, in the progress of experience, the sort of

¹ It is just here that the social conversion process is appealed to with such confidence and frequency. The child tests his results by those of others. See *Thought and Things*, vol. i. "Functional Logic," chap. iv. §§ 5-6, where this sort of conversion is described as a process of "mediate" control.

caution and hesitation that foreshadows a differentiation of attitudes of varying degrees of acceptance. The beginnings of all discrimination and classification, and the rise of the subsequent significant dualisms of knowledge, are to be found in the hesitations by which the primitive reality-feeling or presumption is so soon disturbed.

While, therefore, in this early form of acceptance, we find cognition in its simplest form, yet even there it is not without meaning for the theory of mediation. It has in it the germs of those distinctions which develop into meanings of control.

§ 5. THE MEDIATION OF THE INTERNAL : ITS COEFFICIENT

19. Coming to the question of existence or reality of the internal sort, we find the case to be similar. We have to inquire into the derivation of the sphere of reference or control which contents classified as "inner" refer to and mediate. All the senses in which the words "inner" and "internal" may be appropriately used, fall together in this general conception, since in its significance the sphere as such is independent of the contents that may be assigned to it.

Recalling as in the case of the external our detailed discussions of the rise of the "inner-outer" dualism,¹ we are able to treat this topic with a certain degree of conciseness and brevity—the more so since the mind-body dualism is a contrast meaning, a relational whole, and we may ask as to the meaning of the internal at each stage of the development of the external.

Proceeding in this way we are able to trace the marks of the inner which constitute the coefficients of "mind" throughout the entire progress of cognition.

20. The determination of the coefficient of the external, indeed, has already, by virtue of the fact of contrast, suggested the meaning of the inner in its germinal form. The primitive "stubbornness" or resistance of the external is matched by a sort of opposition, felt in consciousness as strain, antagonism, effort against limitation. The poles of this opposition, very largely limitative for consciousness at first, suggest the nuclei of the two spheres of existence. The actual reading of experience as being partly internal, comes only with the germinating distinction between those contents which intrude and so excite opposition and effort, and *those with which the strain or effort is itself identified*. There is a long tract of development, as we

¹ "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i, chaps. v. and xi.

have seen, in which the external gradually becomes clarified, while the contents of the inner world remain merely non-external. We have also seen in detail what the imitative and other processes are through which these latter contents, thus reserved, take on positively "inner" or subjective characters. The control factor present in various dispositional and appetitive tendencies, each determined upon its own specific object, comes to take on the character of personal initiative and inner agency. In this segregation of inward factors, conative and affective processes unite; and the images and other cognitive contents then present in the mind are carried along with the mass of inner stuff thus generated.

The subjective or internal sphere is thus over against the external. The coefficient of the inner attaches to the mass of psychic contents which have the intent or meaning of active disposition and attitude and of feeling. Adopting the terminology suggested in the earlier discussion, we will call this factor, taken as a whole, the "interest." The inner is then to be defined as *the sphere of personal interest*.

Considering this as the first step in the derivation of the meaning of inner reality, we may describe it as the moment of mere presence or presumption, corresponding to the coefficient of mere presence or presumption of the external as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The entire contrast meaning may then be read as *external presence over against present personal interest*. This is the earliest form of the inner-outer dualism.

21. The next stage appears in the development of something in the "inner" corresponding to the coefficient of memory by which the persistence of the external object is discovered. Do the memory processes have a similar rôle to play in the case of the inner?—is there a coefficient of inner persistence as well as one of outer persistence?

There are two movements which reveal the motive of the development here, and enable us to answer these questions. One is the continuance of memory images, together with images of fancy—of all images in fact alike—in the sphere of inner presence or existence, even after the confirmation of memory has been secured. The coefficient having worked to establish a true memory, the distinction still persists between the memory image itself and its fulfilling object. Whatever the conversion processes may have been—whether the image be converted into physical existence, historical fact, mere psychic

presence in an earlier experience—still the image or idea thus converted maintains as itself a thing of inward presentation and meaning.

There is here a sort of secondary recurrence of the memory image as such, an after-image in the sphere of the inner life, apart from the actual recurrence of its prototype, the external object. While the persistence of the external object may be derived from the recurrence of the coefficient of its physical presence, there must be some other ground for the recurrence and recognition of the image itself. In this, I think, we find one of the moments of the inner persistence meaning: the recurrence of the image as being the same is motivated in a sphere different from that of the persisting external object.

22. This we find confirmed by the course of development of the inner persistence meaning on the positive side. While images come and go, recurring as described above, giving a discontinuous series of contents, the dispositional processes which are segregated in the life of interest, have no such discontinuity. The movement from an object to the memory of it, from external opposition to relief and fulfilment, from endeavour against limitation to the cessation of effort and tension—these transitions on the subjective side are continuous. The persistence of the inner is not that of the broken and recurring, as the continuous presence even of the image would indicate; on the contrary, it outlives and underlies all such breakings and remakings. The inward flow of processes seems to be continuing and continuous. This comes to be presupposed in the theory of the inner realm as such, and it is considered as a precondition, in a secondary way, of the persistence of the external also. For it is only by reason of the continuing inner life that the recurrences of the external object are interpreted in terms of continuity and persistence.

Understanding the term interest in the sense explained above, we find the full coefficient of the internal, therefore, as over against that of external existence, to a *present and continuing interest*.

23. The later stages in the development of the inner are in the same manner correlated with the corresponding stages of that of the external; but, as in the early stages, each has its characteristic motive. When the dualism of mind and body hardens into the two-substance meaning, mind becomes a general class of cases of the inner, just as body does for its special cases. And we find that, in the logical mode, when all the contents of

thought are taken up in a single context of ideas, minds become the matter of general concepts, etc., just as other contents do. The function of judgment about minds is to acknowledge or assert, in particular cases, the sort of control that the coefficient of the internal establishes. By any such act of judgment the actual contents found under this control are redistributed in the sphere of mental existence or reality in which their earlier experience defined them. This reference constitutes the act one of mediation of the sphere of mental existence or reality.

Setting aside for the present the special questions that spring up here—questions of the more refined relations of the two spheres, the external and the internal, to each other—we may remark upon the continuity of the entire progression of the meaning of the inner. Whether we are merely aware of our mind, or whether we remember an earlier state of mind, or whether we analyse and describe the mind in reflection, the coefficient or criterion of mind remains the same. By mind we mean *the presence and the continuing presence of an interest* ; it is an affective and conative function. This is the least we may mean.

§ 6. THE MEDIATION OF THE INTERNAL : ITS MODES

24. Looking at the inner, in turn, from the point of view of the interest itself, that is, of the response or attitude which the object excites and also fulfils, we find the case quite correlative to the outer and parallel with it. Yet the difference in the character of the persistence coefficient introduces suggestive variations. When we ask whether we presume and assume existence and reality in the same senses, and from the same presuppositions, in the two cases, certain special considerations arise which lead us into the more refined discussions referred to above. Let us first indicate the lines of safe analogy and concurrence between the two cases, and then take up the more special points at issue.

25. In the first place, it may be said that so far as the content of the inner as such is taken up by an act of cognition and made objective, it is treated just as the content of the external is. The process of discrimination, on the basis of the peculiar coefficient of the inner, is one of cognitive construction. In this respect the two cases are strictly analogous. The self, so far as it is an object of knowledge, is the product of a process dominated by interest, and developed by the accommodations and adjustments of practical life. This construction itself is what is known

as the "empirical" or objective self. It profits by certain movements of give-and-take between the individual and his social fellows, whereby the material of self-hood is assigned to the respective centres of inner life and personality.¹

The mediate character of this process is seen very clearly in the individual's apprehension of other selves, the objective persons of the social environment. The "other," considered as a person, that is as a mass of inner contents, stands on the same plane as other external objects. But apart from the externality of such persons, their content of personality, considered as inner, is mediated through the internal content of the person who perceives them. As objective to him they are, in the first instance, experiences of his own, taking form as objective under the responses of his disposition and interest, in the same way that other contents do. The coefficients are different, of course, and the resulting spheres of existence and reality are correspondingly different; but both are mediated in the same sense. The person thus mediated in an act of knowledge is a content of objective experience, although having the inner coefficient of control; it is strictly analogous to one's own objective self.

26. The self, considered as a known and acknowledged content, passes, as other contents do, through the various modes of cognition. We perceive, remember, acknowledge, classify and argue about the "self"; and the explicit processes of mediation appear in all their variety. In the logical mode, the sphere of personality, the inner life as such, becomes the presupposition of reflection and the subject-matter of theoretical discussion. Minds are cases of a sort of reality. So far the correlation between the two great spheres, the external and the internal, seems plain; in their essential features they are coincident. The peculiarities which spring up in the case of mind are due to the meanings that come to attach to the coefficient itself; but they do not disturb the attribution of reality as mediated in regular form.

27. Furthermore, as thus constituted the objective self of cognition or knowledge excites the attitudes of relative acceptance, assumption, etc., that we find excited by external objects. In the very early stages, there is the same reality-feeling or presumption without question—the attitude of simple acceptance and dependence. The child takes persons, just as

¹ See the writer's *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 4th ed., and cf. McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*.

he takes things, simply as there, directly given ; and the same holds of his knowledge of himself, as soon as the conditions are present for the construction of himself in terms of knowledge. This presumption passes into actual recognition and acknowledgment, both of self and others, and becomes finally a presupposition of personal life and social intercourse. So the real world of persons, a mental and moral order, is established once for all ; and the play of relational meanings, of predicates and worths, is carried on without again bringing this presupposition in question.

So, too, on the side of assumption. The attributes of personality are only gradually discovered. The imaginative rendering goes before the grounding of fact and belief. The progressive development of the content of inner reality takes place by means of the tentative exploring and essaying processes of practical struggle, theoretical hypothesis, logical proposal, and ideal postulation in turn. Just as with the material of external reality, so here ; the methods of advance are the same : new beliefs, presumptions, presuppositions, result from experimental processes of assumption and "schematism."

§ 7. PRELOGICAL DUALISMS

28. Having now pointed out the general parallelism in the development of the two great sorts of reality throughout the progress of knowledge, we may now give attention to the variations which arise to disturb our complacency. These take on different phases according as we deal with the relatively direct forms of mediation present before the rise of reflection or with logical mediation as such. Calling the relation of the two terms of the mind-body contrast a "dualism," we may take up for consideration the forms of this dualism that appear in the prelogical modes.

There are two complications in the movement : one of them due to the association of the inner life with a physical person or body, and the other to the existence of numerically plural and multiple persons. The psycho-physical relation imparts one special *motif* to the development of the meaning of reality ; and the social relation imparts another. These we may consider in turn, again drawing upon our earlier detailed analyses.

29. It has been already shown that the differentiation of existences into physical and mental does not proceed far before embarrassments arise. The child very early finds himself obliged

to recognize his body as being himself in the only sense he can then intend ; but at the same time there develops a reference to another control over against the physical, felt in effort and struggle, which in his own case *identifies itself also with his body*. The progress of the differentiation of body and mind seems, then, at this early stage, to be " held up " by a grave difficulty : the body is the seat of both controls at once.

It is this difficulty and its recurrence again later on that motive certain critical readjustments of contents in mental development and issue in later outstanding dualisms. It is because of the need of assigning certain contents to both of the two categories of control that the final diremption is forced between the two substances. The person's own individuality is found to harbour two different and irreducible meanings.

This, however, in turn forces a divorce between cognitive and conative meanings, between content and intent, which is again intolerable. The content of knowledge requires a complete divorce between the two controls ; while the intent to be a self, to act as a person in the world, requires their union in a single inseparable whole.¹

The details of this new embarrassment have been worked out above, and its solution indicated : the solution that nature herself achieves. The system of contents, *stripped of both coefficients* and made neutral, is set up *in idea* as content of the process of reflection ; and certain ideas mediate on occasion either of the original spheres of fact or reality, as the coefficients present may suggest or the interest may require. The context of thought, the ideas worked into the system of experience, characteristic of the inner realm, are explicitly set up as being first of all in the control of the person's inner life, but as also representing or mediating one or other of the spheres of reality.

30. At each of the critical turns in the progress of the mind-body dualism, important disparities appear in the meaning of the two terms, considered as correlated members of the one contrast meaning. The final complete separation of mind and body meanings as two substances gives a new simplicity to the body term and a new complexity to the mind term.

As to the body term—it becomes relatively fixed and independent, both as a mode of reality and as a meaning for consciousness. The external reference amounts to the simple acknowledgment of a sphere in which all physical bodies are

¹ See " Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. v. § 5.

found. They are separated from minds, and their persistence, after they are once experienced, is guaranteed either by actual recurrence or by the possibility of it. Thus there is secured a relative solution of the ambiguity earlier attaching to the personal body, and a certain simplification.

But for the mind term the result is different. While a relative separation of the two controls was suggested earlier in experience—a separation required mainly for the adjustment of action toward persons—still this could be disregarded in the individual's manipulation of his own body; for he need not detach himself from his body, and he could simply include it in the mass of intent that passed for the "self." Now, however, after the mind-body meaning has become one of the absolute divorce of the two factors, a diremption so complete that the very apparatus of voluntary action is cut in half, the embarrassment reaches its climax. In practice it is not possible to allow one's body to be treated merely as a thing; it always has the mind along with it. The penalties resulting from closing a window on one's finger for example, are convincing as to the lack of finality of such a meaning. But, on the other hand, the contrary interpretation of the body as mental is equally forbidden. The physical blow in fact testifies equally to the falsity of such an interpretation; the body is in the sphere of physical forces and control.

The psycho-physical bond, in short, is a direct refutation of any final distribution of data which requires a *material diremption of the contents of the two opposed controls*.

31. Turning to the social aspects of experience, we find a similar state of things appearing at the level of development immediately preceding the rise of reflection. Here, too, embarrassments arise which require a solution which is not possible in the modes of mediation as constituted up to this point. The conditions, already adverted to, are briefly as follows.

The material of the inner world is drawn primarily from the sphere already established as external: from other persons who are as really external to the perceiver as things. Furthermore, it is as things that, through the agency of the psycho-physical bond, persons come at all within the ken of observation. The distinction between the two sorts of content, personal and impersonal, therefore, finds itself growing up within the external; and the dualism can maintain itself only as the externality of each mind to all the others is acknowledged. This requires a

definition of externality that allows of two species. First, there are the things of a physical sort. These are once for all and always only external to any and every observer. And second, there are those existences which, although characterized as in their nature inner, are nevertheless external to each other. The mental is established, not only as an internal class, but also as a class each of the instances or existences of which is as external to every other as the physical is. My experience is inner to me and eternal to you, while each of us includes, in the realm of the external in which the other is included, the physical as well !

Evidently in this movement externality loses its strict connotation as meaning only contents having the coefficient of sensible existence ; minds also are external. But it is also true that, in this movement, mind loses its internality in the exclusive sense of its first establishing, for others' minds are recognized as external.

32. In this connexion a further complication arises to which we should also give attention. It is that which in our earlier discussions we have noted as pertaining to the "common" significance of knowledge. The inner life is established as a sphere of singularity and privacy. It is circumscribed in the one body, and has phases that become later on the basis of the genuinely private and unsharable. Yet each mind other than one's own, although a centre of inner life, is located in the midst of the stuff of sharable physical experience ; and it is treated just as if it were continuous with this sort of stuff. This, together with the further complications arising from it, adds itself to the embarrassments already pointed out.

33. Suppose now—to give a practical illustration of these difficulties—one should act consistently on any one of these varying meanings of the world and of persons. Suppose I treated my neighbour, *seeing that he is external to me*, as I treat things, say a hat or a tree ! How would I fare ? Or suppose I took the other horn of the dilemma and treated him as pure spirit—say when he sat down to my table to dine ! Or suppose again I made of him a centre of absolute isolation, a life of such inner integrity, that I could not interchange thought with him ! Or yet again, suppose I thought it better to find in him no more than the "common" mass of contents that I could completely discount and interpret ! In each of these cases my social life and, indeed, all my personal experience would be disintegrated on the

altar of my consistency. The one thing that stands out as indubitable, in this flux and flow of meanings, is the fact that the adaptations in the service of which these meanings arise are special and varied. The meanings of mind and body are tentative renderings, serving instrumental purposes. The two substances are but phases of a contrast of controls, which is still to have further development in the growth of experience.

34. In these prelogical movements, in fact, the meaning of reality is not one of presumption, acceptance, fixity alone, though that is the sense in which a retrospective interpretation understands it. This meaning is as often used to suggest a new adaptation as to confirm an old one. Both realities are shot through with assumptions which need to be tested. The question of what reality finally is—is it which I am now disposed to think?—is ever present. So while the opposition is present, and the two great opposing classes are never released from their struggle for new materials of experience, still as classes they are not exhausted by what they already comprise, nor are they inelastic to the pull of newer circumstance. This appears in the great readjustment that takes place with the rise of reflection—a new departure motivated, indeed, by just these complications themselves. The forms of mediation so imperfectly accomplished, each ministering to a special group of situations and serving special and limited purposes, give place to a more general mode by which all the contents of existence are reinstated on the common plane of “thought.”¹

¹ The mode of essential reconciliation, however, that of aesthetic immediacy, is still to be described; see the conclusions drawn in chap. xv. below.

Chapter IV

LOGICAL MEDIATION: THE TRUE AS REAL

§ 1. THE MEDIATING CONTENT: THE SYSTEM OF TRUTH

1. The method and means of logical mediation have been the topics of our detailed discussions under the heading of "Experimental Logic." ¹ We have examined in detail the act of acknowledgment, whereby a system of ideas of reflection or of truths, is set up. It remains now to utilize the results in the working out of the theory of reality considered as a meaning reached in the logical mode.

(1) It may be recalled, first, that we found the logical to take its rise in the act whereby all the established meanings of the earlier modes become elements in a single objective context of thought; while the dualism of control re-establishes itself as between the two great poles of subject and object. The inner control becomes conscious of itself as subjective, over against both sorts of objective content, the external and the internal, and by an act of judgment acknowledges the contents as ideas of its own. These ideas, however, while thus treated by reflection as contents, still retain their meanings as holding in their respective spheres; thus these spheres are mediated. The idea of an external object, while entertained as an idea, has still the mediating reference to the sphere in which it holds true. So of an idea of a mental fact or event; it mediates an inner life or sphere of personal experience. Each of these, by the very act which sets it up, finds itself acknowledged as being, so far as true or real, actually in a sphere of existence or control. There is no content of thought or idea which does not refer back to, or mediate, a sphere of existence; even the most fugitive fancies and absurd conjectures presuppose the mind that produces or entertains them.

Under this general description of the content of thought

certain of its more special characters may be set forth as relevant to our present purpose.

2. (2) The content of thought is always set up as "common"; it is judged to have, for all judgment process, the relational and existential force that the one individual's act of judgment finds it to have. This has been explained in detail in the discussion of the "synnomic" intent of judgment.¹ The common meaning, established in the prelogical modes as relatively "catholic" or "syndoxic," takes on the form of logical generality which implicates not only all cases found eligible for the judgment but also *all minds which are competent to judge*. The common intent of an idea established as true is, therefore, an intrinsic part of its meaning.

3. (3) The content of thought or reflection becomes, in an explicit way, instrumental to inner control and manipulation. The ambiguities which render a consistent interpretation of the mind-body relation impossible, become liable to reflective solution; that is, the entire series of external and internal meanings are alike *reinstated in a common context of ideas* which may be utilized variously in action. The individual judges whether or no it will do, in this case or that, to treat his body as a mere thing; or whether it is to be interpreted as the instrument of inner initiative and control. In the same way, he judges whether, in a particular situation, the inner world of his neighbour is implicated in the external context of events, in which it appears to be actually entangled. In short, the whole system of ideas is interpreted *with reference to the possibilities and alternatives of mediation*, the mere presentation or idea being distinguished from its actual fulfilment, while the latter passes through all the modalities and other logical categories of possibility, probability, and certainty. Logical mediation, therefore, explicitly develops the experimental method; it allows the reinterpretation of all the ideas with their respective controls, with a view to the systematic and reasonable organization of truth.

4. (4) It appears, further, that with this transition the immediate and compelling character of the control reference of a given content—fruitful in some cases, but embarrassing in others, from the point of view of action—is in some measure removed. The setting up of the one context of reflection in idea, remote in a sense from its control, opens the way for the independent development within the system of an inherent criterion of truth

¹ "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. iii. ;

or validity. This development proceeds in ways we have investigated in the earlier discussions.¹ In the judgment process itself the criteria of reasonableness and logical validity are motivated, which attach to the system of truth as such; the legitimacy—the “validity”—of any new step in logical determination comes to be a question of the fulfilment of reflective or logical demands. Thus the epistemological dependence of the separate bits of content, or of the relatively smaller groups of related ideas, upon direct fact, gives place to the logical independence of the larger organized groups. There arise “worlds of discourse,” groupings of contents, each having its own systematic organization, and each in turn having only a relatively remote or mediate reference to the control peculiar to its origin. Logical consistency within the system and logical relevancy as between the systems, become the attributes of thought.

5. The “truths” pertaining to the external sphere hold in their own way; those of the inner world in their own way; and whatever be the sphere of reference in which truth or falsity is established, there is the further question of the relevancy of this sphere to others. We can reflect equally and together upon the truths of mind and the truths of body, the truths of history and those of fiction; but when we carry over from reflection to fact any of the items from one field and apply them in another, the question of “relevancy” is at once raised. The observer of the physical cannot carry over the principles developed in the organization of contents of physical fact, into the world of psychic change with which the psychologist has to do; nor has the psychologist any greater rights. The mediation is, in each case, confined to the recognition of the existential intent of the special material dealt with.

§ 2. THE LOGICAL COEFFICIENT: RELATION

This may all be summed up under a single term which denotes the coefficient of logical content: the term Relation. Relation takes on, in the logical mode, the explicit form of assertion or predication. It is common to all forms of thought, from whatever sphere of existence the content may be drawn. Disregarding differences of view with reference to the genesis of the logical itself, with its mode of relational organization, we

¹ “Experimental Logic,” *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. part iii, “The Theory of Implication.”

may consider relation as the form in which the "real" reference of truth is mediated, and in concrete cases actually embodied.

6. In our description of the first beginnings of knowledge we discovered, in common with many psychologists, that the differentia of the simplest knowledge, of the *minimum cognitum*, was a certain complication, or "relatedness," of the parts in a whole; the sort of simple unity that seems to characterize feeling and conation is lacking.¹ A presented content is always in some sense a "what," never a mere "that"; a something having difference of parts, even though as apprehended this difference extends only to the intent to limit or circumscribe the area apprehended. In this fact of complication or togetherness, we find the genetic forerunner of that relative isolation and union of parts in a whole that appears in the logical acknowledgment of relation.

7. It has also been pointed out² that this earliest "relatedness" becomes more and more prominent and significant in the development of knowledge, since the process of individuation proceeds upon these complexities themselves. The things of the world are individuated by their differences of internal appearance and form. Faces are recognized, for example, by the form of feature, line and curve. The coefficient of relatedness is decisive in the recognition of identity and difference; by it individuality is established. Thus a second stage is reached in the progression, to which the term "relationship" is applied. This does not require the isolation of the part as separate from other parts or from the whole; but merely the apprehension of the whole as being a whole presented with these related parts. There is no relating of terms as such to each other, no cognition of abstract relation as something having meaning apart from the terms which it joins together, no generalization of relation in a notion or concept. The child recognizes a face by its "relationships" without any of this logical machinery.

8. The third step in the development of complication is the cognition of "relation" as such. Relation becomes a positive content, not a mere intent or shading of difference, as between partial contents. This meaning arises only in the logical mode; and involves the act of acknowledging the nature of the complication, and of setting up the related terms separately in thought.

¹ "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. iii.

² See "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. viii. § 10, and chap. xi. § 8.

The movement utilizes the earlier meaning of "relationship"; but it involves the distribution of control processes which constitutes judgment. Relation then, having this full meaning, becomes on the side of content the coefficient or criterion of the logical as such.

9. Let us now return to the question of the mediation of reality. Recognizing the transition whereby the objects known as existing in the prelogical modes are re-established in the contexts of ideas or thoughts, we may ask what effect the explicit development of relation, as itself subject-matter of judgment, has upon the realities acknowledged or mediated. Is the relation "true" in the same sense that the separate ideas are true?—do relations and ideas mediate the same or different modes of reality?—in short, what does relation signify in the entire meaning of the something that is taken to exist beyond ideas?

In treating of this question, it will be well to recall two opposing points of view from which the topic has been much discussed. The interpretation of relation has been a sort of storm-centre in epistemology, and the philosophical issues at stake have taken on somewhat undue importance.

10. In the first place, there is the purely idealistic or rational theory, represented by the writings of T. H. Green and his school, according to which the reality of the related terms is entirely exhausted by the "standing in relations" which knowledge or thought discloses. To thinkers of this school there can be no question of reality except as it appears in the relational issue of thought.

If the attempt is made to interpret this theory genetically, it is found to require the reading of implicit processes of thinking into all the pre-judgmental modes of knowledge, and the interpretation of the earliest complications of content as due to the relating activity of thought. From this follow the further implications which go with such a procedure: the reading of the subject-object dualism, and of all the characters of the logical mode, into the lowest and simplest beginnings of knowledge.¹

11. Besides the fact that such a procedure violates one of the canons of proper genetic procedure,² this view cannot be

¹ Cf. *Outlines of Metaphysics*, by Prof. J. S. Mackenzie.

² The canon which forbids us to consider the marks of later modes of organization as "implicit" in earlier modes, when they are not actually found there. See *Thought and Things*, vol. i. "Functional Logic," chap. i. § 8, sect. 27.

entertained from the psychic point of view. We find that relation, like all other elements of meaning, undergoes real and very transforming changes in the progress of mental development. In the simpler modes represented in early childhood, there are cases of cognition showing no "standing in relation" of separate terms. The isolation of the terms is itself a matter of later individuation, whereby the whole meaning, or "thing," is broken up into parts which are only then capable of separate manipulation and distinct attention.

Only by one of two modes of procedure could the view mentioned be maintained—both of which are illegitimate, considered as methods of reaching the meaning of reality for experience itself. Either we must read a later derived meaning into a mode in which it is not to be found, a resort to the fallacy of the implicit; or we must interpret the whole movement of experience in terms of a postulated principle of thought, a resort to the method of "logicism." It will not do for us, while attempting to adjust the various meanings of reality to each other, and to reach the presupposition inclusive of them all, to start out by so postulating one principle that the claim of all others would be at the outset denied. The logically derived meaning of reality must take its place *only for what it is* in the general scheme of readings of reality.

12. A second point of view lands us at the opposite extreme, a sort of agnosticism in respect to the reality of relation. According to some, the construction of objects in relational terms tends to obscure the original "datum" or reality. This datum is only veiled by being involved in a network of cognitive relations. Furthermore, say others—going beyond the Kantian point of view—the processes of logic build up a system of relational meanings as abstractions, which leave the concrete far behind; the real becomes, in a damaging sense, "remote." What thought actually discloses, therefore, in its relational content, is not reality, "but appearance," "phenomena" systematized for purposes of thought. The "real" can only be disclosed in an experience which in some way either removes or transcends this network of relational appearance.¹

¹ Fundamentally Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, and James, *Pragmatism*, are in agreement as to the damaging effect of relations. Their difference seems to reside largely in the suggested cure. Bradley goes on to seek a higher or more developed mode of reality-meaning, transcending thought; while James would return to a simple "sense-

13. This general view, we find reason to think, is also fallacious. It postulates the sort of reality which is presumed in elementary sense experience, as being in its type most "real." In so doing, it assumes that the construction of relations is in some way a vitiating or concealing process. The relation becomes a third term interposed between the two related terms, and this third term again stands in relation to each of the original terms. This process may repeat itself *ad infinitum*, the system of relations growing constantly more abstract. The real, upon which these relations are superposed becomes correspondingly more hidden and unknowable.

14. From our present point of view, this would seem to be, in turn, open to two principal objections. In the first place, it gives the most evident reality—first-hand given quality—to the sense datum, all relational reality being phenomenal and illusional. The relational coefficient is not found immediately in the datum, but is in some way imported by the process of knowing. It is a screen in front of reality, rather than an original character of it.

But this involves an illegitimate assumption. There is no such original relationless datum ; the simplest object has those marks of complexity upon which the consciousness of relation arises. Seeing that all knowledge is of the nature of a construction, the further question is as to which of the modes of construction—perceptual, conceptual, logical, etc.—is the most available and universal embodiment of the real. One might well say that the fullest process, that which brings out all the relations, best reports reality, instead of saying that the most rudimentary and meaningless datum is the most real.

15. But it is a mistake to say that the content of relation is "imported" into the object ; it is sounder to say that it is "discovered" there. The process of knowledge renders, in terms of relation, the body of complications present in the content itself from the start. At least, it may be said that the same sort of reality attaches to the skeleton of relatedness as to the terms between which the explicit relation is established. The terms are

stuff," uncontaminated by logical and "rational" categories. The "alogism" of Bergson, which James cites as nearer his own, seems, however, to me to be, in its outcome, nearer to that of Bradley, since it is a mode of higher intuition or immediacy to which Bergson makes appeal. The comparison is made difficult, however, by Bergson's special use of the term "instinct," to which intuition is for him analogous.

linked together in sense experience ; as so linked they are developed in the progress of the object up to the logical mode. The relatedness is as real as any other character of the whole content. Terms and relations are correlative meanings at each stage of progress ; and the tests applied to one may also be applied to confirm or to undo the other. The relation expresses the meaning of the terms ; and the terms express the meaning of the relation.¹

Judged, therefore, by whatever criteria we may adopt—those of one mode or those of another—the relation is as real, and in the very same sense real, as the terms which are related ; and the criticism of the relation as being phenomenal appearance holds as well, if it holds at all, of the data which sustain the relation.

16. The extreme conclusion from the facts, as to the relative " remoteness " given to reality by the constructive processes of knowledge, would be one that signalized *the futility of knowledge itself* ; a doctrine, that is to say, of the relativity of knowledge, used as the basis of agnosticism. This is precisely the opposite position to that of the " rationalists " spoken of above, who find in the " standing in relation " the mark of a relational reality, a principle of thought. To one school the relation hides reality, which becomes thus unknowable ; the other treats it as embodying reality, which is in its very essence disclosed only through it.

17. With this critical introduction, we may now pass on to our own position. We are obliged to agree with the position that all knowledge is a construction ; but we must deny both the alternative conclusions drawn from this fact. One school assumes that reality is a content *which we would get if we could rid the construction of all its relations* ; the other that reality is a *principal whose nature is disclosed only in the network of relations*. Both find the real to be some one form of content ; something that would be, if we could get it, always the same, itself, and nothing else. To the one, to know anything about the real is to lose it, for such knowledge replaces it by relations ; to the other, only knowledge discloses the real : the substantive and unrelational is mythical. One says, we must suppose an original unrelated term ; the other, we must recognize the relation as being itself the final term.

The whole development convinces us that this method of approach to the problem is a mistaken one. It is a mistake to take reality to be a " something," a term, rather than a predicate, a meaning which may attach to many terms or things with varying signification. Reality is a relative meaning—relative to the con-

¹ See vol. i. " Functional Logic," chap. viii. sect. 47.

tent to which it is attributed. Any content may *have* reality ; no content *is* reality. The reality is the intent to find the given object confirmed in being that which it is taken to be—that which its coefficient suggests its being—in its own field or sphere.

The reality is the control, not the content ; it is the reference to a world of existence, varying with the thing referred. The very question, Is it real ? is unintelligible, except as we make this fundamental discrimination between the content and the control. The reality would be meaningless for knowledge, whose content might not be in some sense also unreal ; an unreality can only be the failure to establish a positive control, whose establishment would impart reality of some sort.

18. Putting it in another way, we may say that these theories recognize and exploit the mediate character of knowledge, seeming to forget that every sort of mediation presupposes a sphere of control in which the objects exist. The question of reality is that of the character of the spheres thus found belonging to different systems of mediating contexts. The control may be assumed, presumed, presupposed, acknowledged, postulated, according to the attitude the individual finds it well to take toward the content in question ; but what is common to all the cases is just the reference to a sphere, the intent to hold good somewhere. This is the meaning for knowledge of *being real or having reality*.

In any case the fact of mediation is the important thing, not the presence of relation in the context. The assumption of an independent reality of any sort, a pure control, apart from what is controlled, is quite gratuitous.

The relation then is merely a part of the content ; it stands on the same footing exactly as the substantive parts of the context. The whole context, whether perceived with a complex "relatedness," or remembered with a mass of associated "relationships," or judged and thought in "relation"—whatever the mode in which the relational whole is set up—is or is not accepted as a whole. It mediates a sphere of existence. This mediation is a further intent over and above the relations of the content. So the explicit acknowledgment of the relations involved in the whole *in no way changes the reference or alters the reality* ; it only confirms it by an act of acknowledgment. What was before a presumption or assumption of reality attaching to a content is now, by the act of acknowledgment, made a matter of assertion or presupposition in a further process of thought.

19. Again, so far from weakening the existential reference of the content, the assertion of judgment confirms and reasserts it, the reference itself remaining the same in kind. When I perceive a white house, I get a special sort of reality coefficient; when I remember it as being the same house, I do so by a reference to the sphere in which the house existed in my perception; when, further, I assert that either the memory image or the renewed percept *is the same house*, I do not at all change the real reference or impair the reality intended. On the contrary, it is because of further inspection, or of more detailed information and greater ground of assurance of some kind, that I make the assertion, "it is the same house." It is by judgment that the coefficient of existence is consciously identified.¹ My memory or perception is motivated in many cases by mixed doubt and assumption; and it is only on the resolution of this doubt, resulting in full conviction, that I make the assertion in relational form. So far as the intent of "realness" is present in the meaning, it remains the same; but the acknowledgment of the relations of the whole, as holding for my judgment, makes explicit my grounds for confirming the reference. The progress of science consists in the substitution of grounded and confirmed judgments of relation for the superficial and unsafe "opinions" of uncritical experience.

This is the case in respect to every sphere in which an assertion can be made, to every universe of discourse. In asserting a relation, I accept its sphere of existence. In denying a relation, I deny it only for that sphere of existence; I do not deny the sphere, but I presuppose it as ground for my denial of the relation. The relational form of the content, therefore, does not at all remove nor impair the real reference for which the mediation of the context takes place.

20. It may be said, however, that there is actually a certain remoteness of the content from the sphere of its confirmation, due to the fact that in reflection the context is primarily one of ideas, an inner context. Does not this show that reality is now more removed from direct apprehension?—and if so, that it is liable to further variation and greater ambiguity?

This raises a question to which we must return. Here it may be said, however, that whatever effect of this sort the movement

¹ Cf. the discussion in vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. ii. sects. 5 f. and the reference to Hillebrand in the footnote.

² See sect. 28 of this chapter, below.

may have upon the intent of reality, this effect is not due to the presence of relation. The related and the unrelated would alike undergo any change due to the rise of reflection. All the meanings of experience are alike set up in the context of ideas; and the question remains simply as to whether reflection, as an explicit mode of mediation, makes the entire object less reliable by rendering the control more "remote." This question takes us over to an examination of the presupposition of reality made by the movement of judgment—a question already discussed above for the prelogical modes under the heading of "Modes of Mediation."

§ 3. LOGICAL MEDIATION : ITS MODES

21. In speaking above of the attitudes which spring up toward the control presented by one content or another, we found that these attitudes fall into two classes : first, attitudes of acceptance, and second, attitudes of assumption. It was also pointed out that the attitude of assumption or question is instrumental in the movement of experience to that of acceptance. Experimentation takes its rise in those stages of cognition in which practical adaptations are in process of actual formation. The child assumes a form of reality as attaching to his perceptions or images, and forthwith proceeds to test the presumption by experimental action. His action brings into play the coefficients of reality which actually attach to the experience, and thus he converts his expectation into fact. He then accepts the thing as having the reality he had before merely assumed.

This process consists essentially in the reinstatement of a simpler experience, in which the coefficient of some sort of existence is present ; it does not in any sense establish a reality apart from experience as a whole. The reality is *known as being something foreign* ; but this is not to say that it is out of relation to the knower. The only confirmation of an idea, justifying the outgo of belief and acceptance, is that which comes from this movement within experience itself.

This procedure is not altered when we pass into the mode of reflection. A greater explicitness attaches to the mediation of ideas into things, and with it comes the greater explicitness of the corresponding conversion and confirming processes. Experimentation becomes the actual and intentional method of procedure, as we have seen in detail.¹ Even the most refined

¹ "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii.

ratiocinative processes of deductive and analytical reasoning never entirely lose their experimental strain.

22. The context of experience therefore, when set up in idea, retains the same two aspects as before, and performs its mediation in the service of the same sorts of confirmation. Either I believe my ideas and thoughts to be true, or I merely assume them. In the one case, I presuppose the confirmation whereby I can convert the ideas into a simpler experience having coefficients of some sort of reality ; in the other case, I set up the ideas subject to the assumption of reality, which is to be tested in each case by the process of experimentation. In this latter case, the explicitness appears in the development of a deliberate inductive method. The whole body of experimental science consists of a mass of reflective contents entertained as hypotheses in idea or thought until confirmed—or believed to be involved in other confirmations—by experimentation in laboratories, or by some other means of approach to nature. "Nature" is the name given to the first-hand experience : it is the sphere of generalized physical control ; to this the real reference of ideas points.

This process of instrumental assumption, called schematism in our discussion, goes forward in the logical mode, and motives all its progress. The logical proposal or "hypothesis" is an assumption which calls out experimental processes of confirmation, and develops itself by logical implication within the established body of truth.¹ The confirmed or implied items are in turn added to the body of accepted data, and the process is constantly repeated. But the movement occurs within the presupposition of the mode of reality which the entire content illustrates.

23. In the matter of assumption, however, the two spheres of control, mind and body, receive a new adjustment. It will be remembered that we found the "inner" sphere to be also an objective sphere—when the body of inner contents is looked at objectively—and one, therefore, to be presumed or assumed in terms of certain coefficients ; but these coefficients remain those of immediate inner presence. The inner is not only assumed or believed, according to the conditions under which its contents are presented in cognition ; it is also the pre-

¹ Logical implication (see *Experimental Logic*, chaps. x. to xii.) is always of the nature of "elucidation" of what is already believed; its processes of deductive reasoning do not impair the universality of the experimental procedure upon which belief in the system of implications finally rests.

sumption of the whole process of experience to the individual himself. The persistence in the inner world, which is a coefficient of its reality, has this meaning. Unlike the persistence of the "outer," which is based on recurrence, the persistence of the "inner" arises from a certain continuing and lasting presence, not broken by absence and recurrence.

This difference in the two sorts of reality or control is reinstated in the logical mode. The sphere of the inner, presumed in every act of knowledge of reality, whether this reality itself be inner or outer, becomes now the conscious presupposition of reflection itself. The whole body of contents, reinstated in ideas which mediate different modes of reality, is set up over against the self, which is the subject of experience. The dualism is now that between subject and all objects, and the subject is just the persisting inner control, the interest, which is the coefficient of mind. It follows that we cannot say that there is an *attitude toward it* as toward something mediated. On the contrary, it is itself felt as determined *in its attitude* toward something else—toward that which is mediated. Whether the context of ideas or thoughts at the time mediates body or mind, each having its own appropriate mode of reality, in either case the subject is that presence for which the reality is mediated. It is aware of itself as being the agent who adopts the several attitudes.

24. This we have already set forth in speaking of the self as the "secondary" presupposition of thought.¹ The primary presupposition is the existence sphere of the special content employed; but this in turn presupposes the function of experience for which this first presupposition holds good. There is thus an underlying or secondary implication, the presupposition which comes to the consciousness of the individual as the personal self, whose varying attitudes toward ideal contents are immediate and actual.

This leads to the reinstatement of the earlier dualism of coefficients on the higher plane of reflection. Besides the dualism of objective contents—minds and bodies represented in idea—there is now the dualism between the active subject and the whole of experience, considered as a body of ideas or systematic truths. In other words, *the realities of the prelogical modes are reinstated with all their dualistic meanings*; and with this the inner reality reasserts its immediacy and continuing presence, throughout all

¹ 'Experimental Logic,' *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. ii. sects.

the processes of thought. This is of so much importance in our later developments,¹ that it may have a little further consideration here.

§ 4. VOLUNTARY MEDIATION

25. The importance to be attributed to the result just reached appears from the fact that the mediation of the inner world through ideas becomes conscious in reflection ; and the mode of subjective intent becomes that of explicit volition. The function of ideas as mediating context appears, on the objective side, in the developments of the content, that is, in the advancement of knowledge or truth. On the subjective side this presupposes the self as we have just seen. But this self is also the motive principle of knowledge ; it is the interest which pursues its selective course, this interest being the coefficient of the inner life. The two, the interest and the self, are one. By reason of its direct inner persistence, interest appears as the active motor aspect of the entire movement of experience. It is part of the significance of reflection, in the matter of dualism, that the partial motive interests are segregated in the subject, which now finds its ideas instrumental to its conscious voluntary ends.

All objective contexts now become, in short, not only contents for knowledge, but instruments of conscious satisfaction, intents of pursuit, *ends of volition*. Volition is just the determination of the mass of personal interest upon an idea or objective context of any kind, which is thus made instrumental to the fulfilment of the interest. Whether the interest be one of extension of knowledge or of successful practice, of truth or of conduct—whether it be theoretical or practical—the developing content is, through that interest, a means to the advancement of the self, to the furthering of inner control.

26. It should not be lost sight of that this is, objectively considered, not a new moment in the development of consciousness. We have not emphasized it hitherto, since our interest has been centred in the progression of knowledge itself through the differentiation of controls ; but we have had occasion to bring it out in speaking of the process of control through knowledge.² The entire course of mental development might, in fact, be depicted as a movement in the working out of the active dispositional life,

¹ It figures in our final conclusions in "Genetic Morphology."

² "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. xiv.

to which, at every stage, the cognitive content is means or instrument. In reflection, this instrumental interpretation of the object becomes conscious. In volition there is the intent that the object shall be the means of personal satisfaction as well as the medium of the apprehension of reality.

§ 5. REALISM : A REMARK

27. By way of conclusion, I may venture a remark on the subject of realism.

It is evident that each objective meaning found to be, for the process that gets it, in its own sense "real," is *ipse facto real in that sense and for that mode*. A being having perceptual consciousness only, would have its perceptual "real world." So the judgmental consciousness reaches certain spheres of real reference, external and internal ; these are real in the sense that objects thought of as in them are "really" in them. The results are true. So the postulates of the moral and religious life, terminating on realities of the sort that higher personal relations require, give "realities" for this mode of function. Reality for each means nothing more nor less than the sphere of control requisite to the construction of the object found real.

Now to try to go back of these deliverances of experience, and to ask what is *really real*—ontologically real, or real "in itself"—is simply to attempt again to do what each of these modes has already once attempted : *to construe all experience in one mode of the real*. The ontologically, or "really," real is simply that which satisfies interest in the impersonal and detached—the logical or theoretical interest. The practically real, in turn, is that which satisfies the postulates of ethics and social life, whose worth system is entered into by activity rather than by thought ; it is but another resort to a single mode. And so on throughout.

Our method, on the contrary, must be the comparative one ; we must seek to find out all we can about these modes, each working in its own way and setting up its own "reality." What do they signify ? Does experience itself reach any adjustment of their results ? What does this scheme of realities mean—this relativity of reals—each of which so clearly stultifies itself by calling itself "absolute" ?

28. Our conclusion so far is that each of them, despite its pretensions, belongs to one mode of what is a single continuous developing experience ; and each has its instrumental rôle in the

whole. Each makes a valid and real contribution to the whole. The " remoteness " of certain modes of the real, mediated through ideas, is not damaging, since the process of mediation in each case carries its own corrective : the mediation is complete only when there is confirmation. The " damage " comes when the mediating ideas are left in the sphere of assumption—as in uncontrolled scientific hypothesis—or when the control of merely formal process and validity is substituted for that of actual testing by experiment—as in the case of deductive proof and speculative argument. In both cases the possible unreliability of the result is not due to the " remoteness " of the real, but to the failure of the mediating process to reach its proper coefficient of control. When reached, this latter is of the same sort and of the same value as in cases of less explicite mediation ; that of perception, for example, which is subject to its illusions also, and for the same reason.

The further problem is to find the way that experience itself universalizes its partial and instrumental interests—if it does—in a mode that unifies the " realities " of knowledge, will, and self-feeling in a more modest but more significant " absolute." Allowing each mode of psychic function its chance to make out in its own way, what " real " it can, we go on to find that the aesthetic mode of " realizing " achieves the only reality that can be called in any intelligible sense absolute.¹

¹ Cf. the article, " Knowledge and Imagination," *Psych. Review*, May, 1908, *ad fin*, and chap. xv. §§ 5 ff. below.

Chapter V

THE MEDIATION OF THE REAL AS VALUE. THE GOOD

§ 1. VALUE AS MEANING : WORTH

1. The contrast between the development of knowledge as such, through the progressive differentiation of controls, and that of the inner world itself, as a sphere of experience within which interest finds its various fulfilments, is sufficiently striking. It comes to its maturity in the logical mode, in which the inner control becomes the self that judges both facts and worths, truths and values. But it is operative always, as the fundamental distinction between recognitive and selective meaning discloses. If we identify worth in general with selective meaning—that is, with meaning determined under the control of a selective interest,¹ disposition, or volition, which alone gives it “worth”—we are able to bring various lines of our discussion to a focus in the theory of worths.

The theory of worths must, of course, be a theory of meaning. Value, we say, attaches to things; but since things are also meanings, the aspect of the meaning of things which issues in value is designated worth. It will be convenient to use the term “worth” for that part of an entire meaning which constitutes, when objectively or externally considered, its value. “Value” is then an epistemological and logical term; worth is a psychological one.² We say of a thing that it *is* *worthful to us*, and that

¹ “Functional Logic.” See *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. vii. § 2.

² If, as indicated before (vol. ii. chap. xiv. § 6), we follow Urban in adopting the term “axiology” for the theory of value considered as attributed to objects or predicated of them—a theory ranking with the objective or truth reference of epistemology—then “axionomy” may be used for the theory of the rise and development of worth-meanings in contrast with cognitive or recognitive meaning. Cf. Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, pp. 16 f.

it *has value*; the value is attributed to the thing in somewhat the sense that independent reality is attributed to it.¹

2. Understanding, therefore, that our concern is with the development of worth-meaning, we have to consider the relation of this sort of meaning to other sorts, and its place in the final understanding of reality; in this latter inquiry, we should discover the place of what is *worthful* as such in the whole of what is real; or otherwise expressed, the *place of value in reality*.

We have in the presence of selective meaning, and in the further fact that in reflection selective meaning itself becomes object of thought and of pursuit, the two aspects of a continuous movement which we may now explicitly recognize and discuss. If the bare attribution of selective meaning and the mere recognition of an object as *worthful*, be looked upon as unreflective or spontaneous, then the later and more developed reading of worth, by an act of judgment, is reflective. The latter is embodied in what is generally known as "judgments of value." As in other cases, these two stages may have consideration separately.

§ 2. PRELOGICAL OR UNREFLECTIVE WORTH: ITS COEFFICIENT

3. If we are right at the outset in identifying worth with what we have already considered as selective meaning, then we may carry over the theory of the rise and development of the latter at once to the former. We found that selective meaning arises wherever there is a more or less varying and alternative determination of disposition or interest. The aspect of "thatness" which is in theory the limiting case of the objective, we found reason for thinking is never actually realized. The assimilating processes grasp the datum, the mere "that," from the start, and the simplest object is one which always means something. It is what it is *found to be*, not what it *might have been* had the interest been different. This amounts to saying that there is a selective factor in the constitution of knowledge, and this appears in the meaning of the object as variously treated in the whole course of experience. There arises a relatively stable and common "recognitive" meaning, known as the objective thing, on the one hand, persisting as about what it

¹ At the same time, the term "valuation" means the process of discovering and attributing the meaning of worth; there is in English no corresponding derivative of the term worth. In German, the term Wert (with Wertbestimmung, &c.) is used to cover both value and worth.

is, through the series of its appearances ; and with it, there is the further intent or meaning of purpose, worth, etc., which is due to the actual selective processes then and there at work. This leads to the relative distinction between the thing and its meaning ; the thing is read as mere content, which has, acquires, loses or retains, meaning.¹

4. If this be true, it would seem to follow that the coefficient or criterion of a worth-meaning is that aspect by which it fulfils a personal interest or disposition : its capacity of serving as terminus of a movement of inner control. Such a position seems to be, in a broad way, justified. But as soon as we ask what this involves, that is, how this rôle of the meaning can reveal anything in the object itself which may serve as definite coefficient, the matter becomes more difficult. We find, indeed, that the objective context itself, what we call the "recognitive meaning," is such because it too serves as terminus of an interest, the interest of knowing, the theoretical interest ; for the impulse to know, the curiosity of the intelligence, is really operative as a personal motive. On this ground, then, we should have to say that all meaning, and not alone selective meaning, gives personal fulfilments and so has the coefficient of worth.

This in turn we may admit ; but with the added remark, that it is as selective meaning still that such a content of knowledge gets its attribution of worth ; and this requires a fur-

¹ This more colloquial and unconventional definition of meaning has played its part in both logic and epistemology. The confusion is shown in the theory of definition : a term is said to have a meaning which includes both the thing denoted and the relations connoted (both denotation and connotation being, as in our present usage, included in the "meaning") ; but the thing denoted by the term is also said to have the meaning given only in the connotation (meaning being something added to the thing). So in epistemology, we find a content described as mere psychic existence as contrasted with meaning, which is something added ; an idea as such is contrasted with its meaning. But a recognition of the different points of view from which these definitions set out, enables us to see that the distinction of idea, or psychic state, or term, or thing, from its meaning is very partial. The idea, term or thing is itself constituted only as a meaning for the psychic process ; and to treat it as separate from its meaning is to go over to the point of view of analysis which distinguishes two factors in the entire objective whole, the factors called here recognitive and selective. *But both of these are meanings.* A good recent discussion of the subject of meaning is that of Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, chap. iii.

ther consideration of the relation of the selective and recognitive motives to each other.

5. A recognitive context is determined by the character of its content. Wherever a content, an objective context, stands steady in the processes of personal and common recognition, then we call it recognitive. But this defines it quite apart from the method and process of its acquisition. In this latter respect, it stands on a level with all other meaning; it is selectively determined and pursued. So soon, therefore, as we give up the point of view of content, the point of view of the object itself, and pass over to that of the process which the object fulfils—that is, to the point of view of worth as such—we find it necessary to restate our fundamental distinction between the two types of meaning.

This we may do, without prejudice to our earlier discussions, by insisting upon the distinction between content and intent.¹ We found that the content itself, the presented context, considered as relatively stable and common, is accompanied by a more personal intent, which stands for the selective factor of the whole. Within the entire whole, considered objectively, therefore, there is a working distinction between content and intent, corresponding to that between recognitive and selective meaning.

6. But we now find that when we go over to the side of inner control or interest, intent is not coterminous with selective meaning; for even the purpose to maintain a context as purely recognitive and bare of intent is a movement of personal interest—an intent. Therefore, when we consider as intent only the selective part of the whole objective meaning, we are dealing with a special motive within the entire selective movement of consciousness. Allowing that all objective meaning is selective in the sense explained, we have then to inquire into the special distinction whereby content and intent are distinguished as respectively recognitive or truthful, and selective or worthwhile.

The movement is one of great interest; especially so to us, since it gives further force to our general account of meaning. The reading of experience in these two great categories reveals the genetic motive to the rise of cognition or knowledge itself. It is, of course, of extreme value to the agent that he should recognize those items of experience which are recurrent for

¹ See *Thought and Things*, vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. vii. § 1.

himself and for others, those items which are under some sort of external or foreign control, and are thus least liable to the variations and special incidents of individual fortune. To this end there arises, within the selective functions of consciousness, the interest to establish such contexts, such common and relatively stable and "steady" things, as existing apart from the mental life itself. This is done through cognition, with its renewal in recognition, which pursues its own functional logic—having its coefficients, conversions, testing processes, commonnesses, etc., as already traced out in detail—and establishes a systematized body of contents known as the external world and as truth. This is the motive to the relative isolation of recognitive meaning.

7. Its selective value, therefore, as meaning, consists in its intent to be neutral and non-selective. It becomes part of its meaning or intent that it should have no further intent than that of being foreign, external, truthful, and neutral as to the fulfilment of any of the special utilities of the life of selection. So the line of cleavage establishes itself; the two great modes of meaning diverge from a common root; the one dominated by the interest of determining the objective contents as such; the other by that of determining and enjoying their worth.

These general truths being allowed—that the motive of worth determination is selective, and that the coefficient is to be found in some factor that determines the meaning as fulfilling a non-theoretical interest—it is only a further step to the discovery of what that coefficient in all cases is.

8. There is, at the outset, the differentiation of experiences of worth and their distribution under their respective controls. The controls give existence and reality beyond the mere establishment of the psychic contents. In the control, the coefficient of reality appears. This is to say that, in all objective meanings, the worth-moment attaches to the objective content; it is an intent having reference to the sphere of reality in which the content is itself established. The worth-coefficient, then, of an objective content, would seem to be *the same as the reality coefficient of that content, or at least to vary with it.*

In other words, in the last analysis, it is reality in some of its form that satisfies; and reality is the only thing that satisfies. The mere image, the uncontrolled fancy, the imagination of

pleasure,¹ can not take the place of the thing whose worth the excited desire images and craves.

9. It is plain, therefore, that the value to which the worth meaning relates, is in a proper sense mediate. It is suggested by ideas, but its fulfilment is realized only by real things. The image, idea, or other content stands in the further rôle of mediating context ; besides mediating reality as true for knowledge, it also mediates reality as fulfilling interest and desire.

The reality underlying the presumption or assumption of a suggested worth is exactly that which is also mediated through the context as true. This is carried further below ; here we may write down our first conclusion, to the effect that, for the class of worth-meanings which attach to objective contents, the coefficient is that of the reality of the suggesting context. An orange is worth to me just what former oranges have been worth to me. It must have reality and just the sort of reality that oranges have. So of friends, ball-games, heroism, money, art, all the kinds of worths that are set up in connexion with objects.

This first great class of worth-meanings give us what we may call " mediate " values ; values which are mediated by ideas. But we shall see that through them certain more immediate experiences are also secured.

10. When we come to ask, however, just what the value is that is mediated, we have to say that it depends upon the sort of reality then and there presumed or believed in. An orange has sensation value ; a picture aesthetic value ; an act moral value, and so on. The worth-meaning anticipates only the one and peculiar sort of value, although of course many worth meanings may co-exist in the same object.

§ 3. REALITY AS THE GOOD

11. So far our conclusion is to the effect that the coefficient of reality stands, in each case, for two modes of meaning : the true and the worthwhile. The context is true as mediating a reference to a sphere of direct experience. Its intent is also worthwhile as mediating the fulfilment secured by the establishment of the true. If we call this latter, the worthwhile so considered,

¹ The peculiar worths that on occasion one may find in the unreal—the pleasures of imagination, reverie, etc.—involve the recognition of the sphere in which these " things " in turn are found.

the "good," we are in a position to answer certain questions about what is good, and what the good is.

First, it may be asked, what is the nature of the good?—is it a separate mode of reality? Is it only another statement of the actual or true? Is it purely subjective and illusional, imparted to the real only when this is experienced? Is it a relative thing, having no grounding save in some one person's present fleeting satisfaction?—or, on the contrary, is it something more real, more original, than the true?

12. All these questions are pertinent to our topic, and the answers to them may all be comprised in the one statement that *the good is simply and only the selective aspect of every determination of the actual*.¹ By the good is always intended, in other words, that aspect of the actual whereby it fulfils or terminates a personal interest. In so far, then, as an objective content mediates an actual thing, it also mediates its goodness or worth.

This general proposition may be left here, with the mere statement, since this is just the state of things which confronts consciousness itself when it first asks questions of this sort. This is to say that consciousness finds the ambiguities of the good and the actual always confronting it; and the solution for consciousness—as for us—comes *in the rise of reflection as further mediation*. The good becomes reflective, just as the true does.

Let us see, then, before we discuss the subject further in our theory, how the good is treated in what are called "judgments" of worth or value, judgments, that is, in which consciousness issues its decisions after reflection upon its objects as being good or bad. What does reflection itself make of worth-meanings when it uses them as predicates of objects?

§ 4. LOGICAL OR REFLECTIVE WORTH. JUDGMENTS OF VALUE

13. When we look into the rendering of the worth-meaning in judgment, certain truths appear which we may, for convenience of discussion, state in explicit terms, proceeding afterwards to explain them in further detail.

(1) In the rendering of an objective content, all aspects of the meaning are available as content of judgment; hence the attribution of value to an object is a relational rendering of certain of the elements of the meaning of that object, as any other relational predication is. In judgments which attribute

¹ Or, as will appear later on, of the ideal, apprehended as if actual, that is postulated.

worth the object is judged to be worthful, value is attributed to the object : as in "the sugar is sweet."

(2) Worth, however, even when made a term of predication of the object, does not lose its character as a meaning of fulfilment or satisfaction. On the contrary, this meaning is rendered *not* as a predicate of *de facto* existence, *not* as a content of recognition of independent fact, but as an intent of appreciation and fulfilment. We do not attribute the worth to an object as part of its separate existence, but as part of its meaning for experience ; not as recognitive content, but as selective intent. In "the sugar is sweet," considered as a judgment of appreciation, I intend to say that sugar is good ; not merely chemically sweet, but enjoyable to my taste.

(3) It follows that the judgment of worth is one that renders the *relation of mediation itself* : it asserts of an object that the content is fit to mediate a fulfilment in experience ; that besides being a mode of reality, it satisfies a personal purpose or interests. It presupposes, then, the inner control to which the reality is worthful. The judgment, "the sugar is sweet," presupposes my inner sphere of interest and appreciation.

14. Summing up these three points, we may say of this judgment, as of all others, that (1) it has the coefficient of logical content, relation, that (2) it preserves the essential character of the meaning of each of the terms of the relation, and that (3) it renders its entire content under the presupposition of the sphere in which judgment sets up the dualism of subjective interest and objective fact, the sphere of reflection itself.

15. (1) On the first of these points, there remains very little to be said. If a judgment of value implicates the whole conceptual meaning, "valuable object," and if the whole is stated in the form of explicit relation, then we must apply to it all the rules of logical implication, reasoning, etc. The entire body of logical doctrine applies, simply because that doctrine, and the logical procedure which it describes, applies to judgments as such, apart from differences of content. When, therefore, a meaning of worthful intent is related, as a term, to a content or thing, it becomes once for all part of the system of logical implication in which it takes its place. A judgment of value is true or false, and its truth or falsity is tested by just the same procedure that any other judgment of truth or falsity is tested.

It is, accordingly, not in the relational character of such a judgment that its peculiarities are to be found ; it is rather

in those further marks of logical meaning which we bring out when we speak of their reference to existence, and their control in a body of reflection. That is, it is not the validity of the judgment of value that distinguishes it, not its truth or falsity, after its sphere of reference is once determined; but the sphere of reference itself, and the sort of existence to be given to the worth predicate. Accordingly, we will not dwell upon the relational character of the worth judgment; but pass at once to the further points of the discussion.

16. (2) When we ask the question what sort of existence is involved in the acknowledgment of a worth meaning, certain new conditions appear. It is evident that the worth of an object is not a mark or character in the same sense that the presentative qualities and the relationships of parts are. These latter are already cognized; and their isolation results from motives of intellectual discrimination. The different nature of worth predicates appears from the mere inspection of the object, whether it be one of sense or one of higher and more varied relational parts. We can not find any portion, or element, of the content making up the context or thing that may be set aside as "value." The value is something which attaches to it as a whole, as a thing or object, when put to some personal use.

Then, too, we can not find any mark of conversion of worth as such, any coefficient by which it may be reinstated in direct form, as a content, apart from the objective thing to which it attaches. We find it necessary to convert the objective or recognitive meaning itself into an original direct experience, and then we find that the worth is also reinstated with the thing.

In other words, value seems to be a sort of accompanying phenomenon, a relatively separable and variable appendage to the content that is found worthful. It cannot be acknowledged as independently existing; it requires the acknowledgment of the existence of the objective thing itself. Value exists wherever an object exists; it arises *ipse facto* in and with the determination of the objective data.¹

This accords, of course, with our finding that worth-meaning is of the nature of selective intent, not of the nature of presented content; it arises in consequence of our personal dealing with the object, not in consequence of its mere existence as external and relational.

¹ Cf. the brief but suggestive treatment of judgments of value by Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, chap. iv. pp. 121 ff.

17. (3) If this is the case with the worth-meaning, in its rise and development, we see at once what it is that the judgment of value acknowledges and asserts. It asserts that the existing object is found to be *worthful*, that it is determined as the terminus of a personal interest. The *worth-predicate* is an attribution of what the mind intends the object to be, as fulfilment and satisfaction, and not merely what, as a bit of *recognitive content*, it actually and commonly is. So the assertion of the value is part of the assertion of the full meaning of the object—its meaning not only as existing, but as fulfilling the processes of selective interest. It is plain that the motive, in carrying over the existence meaning to the intent, may be to construe the existence of the content as instrumental to the intent: to look, that is, upon the truth of the thing as a means to securing the good of it.

18. We find here, again, the interesting fact that the two sorts of mediation, described as “control through knowledge” and “knowledge through control,” are both present. The development of knowledge through control is motivated by the recognition of the thing as being what it is apart from selective interest and intent. In this movement the idea as true mediates the fact. Along with this, however, goes the other mediation, the development of control through knowledge: that is, the development of personal interest and purpose through the increased fulfilment and satisfaction afforded by knowledge. The existence of the objects and their representation in idea, become the mediating terms, the means to the satisfactions of the inner life.

19. The judgment of value, it now appears, asserts this latter type of mediation—control through knowledge. It takes up the aspect of the whole objective meaning in which its intent of interest or purpose is embodied, and relates it to the content, as part of the entire conceptual whole. It says in effect, “by knowledge of the true, I secure the good.” It declares, “this knife is useful,” meaning that the knife is not only a thing of this shape, colour, etc., but also a thing of this or that use, and that it should be conceived as serving this use, if it is really a knife. Knowledge is developed by recognition of the physical properties of the thing, its external control; but selective interest and purpose are developed by experience of the worth found in such a thing.

“Knowledge through control” and “control through know-

ledge " are then inseparable aspects of the mediation. Judgment may render either sort of relation : that whereby fact is mediated, giving a judgment of truth ; or that whereby value is mediated, giving a judgment of worth. And when existence is acknowledged, *the one coefficient of reality subserves both assertions ; the value and the actuality are acknowledged and asserted of the same reality.*

20. Allowing this, we come to recognize again the sort of presupposition of reality that the act of judgment makes. A sphere of reality is presupposed which varies with the original mode of existence of the content ; this is the reality mediated. All judgments of truth have such a presupposition. And we have seen also that when this presupposition is of the sphere of inner existence, there is the acknowledgment as real of just the circle or sphere, the mental, within which the act of judgment is itself performed : *the sphere of reflection reasserts itself as a mode of reality.* This "secondary" presupposition is present in all judgment, but comes to actual recognition when the process turns in upon itself to discover its inner content.

Now in judgments of value, this presupposition becomes itself part of the intent of the predicate term. The satisfaction or fulfilment of interest, occurring only in the inner life, is what is asserted. It is asserted, it is true, as a predicate of the thing ; but the thing is brought, by reason of this presupposition, into the inner world of experience. In other words, the coefficient of the thing found worthful is not now read as establishing merely an external reality, but as establishing the meaning of that reality when brought again into relation to a personal interest and purpose. My declaration, "this is good," means, "I find this good *for me.*"

The existence sphere of the object—what it would be judged to be if it were not embedded in experience—is also presupposed ; but the further presupposition of the very experience from which such a meaning in vain tries to free itself, comes back for acknowledgment. When I say "the picture is beautiful," I presuppose the world of existence of the picture, as separate from me ; but I now by implication negate the intent of the object to remain apart from my experience. My statement amounts to saying, "the picture satisfies my aesthetic interest" ; a fulfilment which finds the picture again embedded in my experience.

21. We have here, in my opinion, a motive of genetic importance. Its importance will become more evident as we proceed

with our exposition. It means, however, as we may explicitly point out, that while in the early stages of knowledge the circle of the inner life does not recognize itself—but, on the contrary, the dualism of inner and outer is one of mutual exclusion and the external has an insistent trans-subjective reference—yet when judgment is reached, the inner life is reinstated as presupposition of the dualism itself. The two meanings of existence, inner and outer, are found to presuppose the knowledge relation by which they are constituted.

This becomes more emphatic when the process of knowledge as cognition, proceeding by the recognition of two exclusive controls, is seen to be correlated with the process of worth, which reunites the disparate factors, in a world of reflective purpose. The further strain is imported into the development of the meaning, that reality is not merely existence of varying sorts, of which the inner is but one, but it is existence *of whatever sort, fulfilling an interest and having its worth in the experience of a self.*

How far the final theory of reality will be altered by the recognition of this turn of development, this return to the presupposition of the inner life, remains to be seen. But its final report will have to deal with the fact that reality is *worthful* as well as *true*, that the same movement that establishes different external controls over knowledge also re-establishes the more fundamental pre-supposition of the personal life whose interests motive all the processes of knowledge and practice.

Noting then that this is the outcome of our present discussion, we will now turn to the modes of mediation of reality apprehended in the form of worth or value.

§ 5. THE MEDIATION OF VALUE : ITS MODES

22. In respect to the *worthful* aspect of reality, the aspect mediated in the acknowledgment of things as having value, we may ask again certain of the questions we have already propounded in discussing the mediation of truth. Among these questions is that as to the attitudes which may be taken up towards an actual or prospective worth. Here we find the same state of things as in the earlier case. A worth may be presumed or acknowledged ; and it may also be merely assumed or postulated. In each case, however, the mediating context or object remains in its critical place between the inner control and the fulfilment in value. The question arises then—one whose discussion was post-

poned until now—as to just what is presumed or assumed in the attitude of appreciation of value as real.

We have here an interesting and complicated problem. Is the belief or assumption of the existence of the object the whole of the existence meaning that the judgment of worth implies?—or is there the acceptance or assumption of something else in which the value of the object consists? If the latter, does the simple attitude of appreciation require both or only one of these presumptions or assumptions?

For example, when I say, “this thing has worth,” is it sufficient that I accept the existence of the thing, or do I also accept the worth of the thing as something existing in addition to its existence? A horse-buyer accepts the existence of the horse standing before him; but he may or may not think him worth the price asked, or worth anything at all. Does it not seem, then, that he must accept the existence of worth in the horse, as well as the existence of the mere horse?

23. The answer to this question will serve to sharpen further our distinction between content and intent, or between the cognitive and selective aspects of meaning. If, as we saw to be the case, the thing found to exist is determined in the development of a selective interest, then the entire meaning is not of the thing as a mere thing, a thing bare of interest and worth, but a thing that fulfils interest and so has worth. The interest of finding a mere thing, a something simply given, existing just the same whether or not it be of any interest, is only relatively successful; and the motive to find it is itself an interest which is fulfilled in this partial success. It is only as we consider the external coefficients alone that things seem to stand in such isolation from the personal and social motives with which our interests are identified.

So we see that a thing can not be known, can not be taken up in a process of knowledge, except by the actual development of an interest, either practical or theoretical; this interest imparts to it, in every case, a worth for the particular movement which the object furthers and develops. Even the intellectual or theoretical establishment of an objective event—a fact or physical law—has the worth of furthering the interest in the development of a system of truths. Its nakedness of further interest and selective meaning is just the mark whereby it fulfils the cognitive interest, and shows its worth for theoretical selection. The object, therefore, not only exists, but always exists as fulfilling the interest which motives its apprehension.

This will appear clearly if we attempt to separate the objects, as mere externally existing things, from their setting in a context of developing interests and purposes. Such a mere existence would not be worthful ; but it would also be beyond apprehension. The attribution of existence requires not only possible presence, but also the attribution of worth. The existence of the milk bottle has no meaning to the child, save as it represents an object present to him ; and this objective meaning carries with it at the same time the worth meaning.

24. The sort of existence or reality, therefore, toward which the appreciative and acknowledging attitudes go out, *is one that fulfils as well as exists*. There is the presupposition of immediate worth underlying all represented worths, just as that of existence underlies imagination. The attributed worth is part of the meaning of the experienced object ; the context is what it is only as it furthers and develops an interest.

This we may certainly say in all cases in which there is a process of mediation at all : that is, in which the worth is not immediately and directly given or experienced, but is assumed or believed in.

The answer to our question then is this : there is not a further something called " value," over and above the thing ; the value is but a part of the complex set of experiences which go to make up the thing. The horse is not " this horse," except as some more or less definite value attaches to him—possibly merely that of eating so much oats. When further worth is attributed to him, he is then not the same horse, to my full experience, that he was before. For new elements of interest and fact enter into the thought of him.¹

¹ It might be brought out here that the principle of " difference of discernibles," formulated in an earlier place (*Thought and Things*, vol. ii., " Experimental Logic," chap. xiv. § 8), has its best illustrations in this matter of the identification of things as valuable. " Distinguishable experiences are read as different things," is the principle—correlative to Leibnitz' principle of " sameness (as things) of indiscernibles (indistinguishable experiences)." The redetermination of the worth of an experience may so change its whole meaning that it is read as a new objective thing. A woman may scorn a would-be lover until a single heroic action, or a sudden revelation of character, makes of him " a different man " to her ; just as, in the opposite case, no amount of objective change can remove from her affections one whose value is fixed in her estimation. Objective trivialities become enormous differences—circumstances alter cases—when personal interest and purpose are involved. The old carriage horse is worth, to his youthful and affectionate master, more money than any strange steed in the market.

With this general truth, go the corollaries which we should expect from the variety of possible attitudes toward reality. We may presume value, assume value, acknowledge value, presuppose value, postulate value. We *presume* it when we rely upon the honesty of our neighbour ; we know his general mental character, and we presume that aspect or intent of it which fulfils at the time our moral interest. But we *assume* his gentlemanly training, not knowing his antecedents. We *acknowledge* both these things, when we see him acting well in trying circumstances ; but we *presuppose* it, when we have once or twice confirmed our judgment of value in respect to him. These attitudes to be positive and forceful, require not only knowledge of the existence of the man, a human being with a mind, but sufficient experience of him to arouse an interest in his conduct. This depends upon the factor of selective intent, in our apprehension of him, which grows with the actual fulfilments supplied by our intercourse. What I presume or acknowledge to exist, at any time, is not the mere man, but the *worthful man*.¹

25. This means, in brief, what we have already seen, that the selective aspect of reality is always present with the recognitive aspect ; it is the former that our appreciations intend. The movement whereby the recognitive or merely existential is separated off tends to eliminate appreciation from the theoretical interest, save that of this interest itself. With the development of this divorce, the existent thing as such, or the idea of it, becomes the mere means to the development of further interests, by becoming the mediating context of the establishment of worth. The issue is then a dualism of *means and ends*, which is the characteristic distinction of the voluntary life : we may call it, wherever found, the “ dualism of appreciation.”

§ 6. THE DUALISM OF APPRECIATION : FACTS AND ENDS

26. The mere existences, the realities of the recognitive system, in the world of fact or truth, *are the means* ; the fulfilments, the values to be reached by the use of this system of means, *are the ends*. The ends are pursued through the means—facts are

¹ The final “warrant,” however, for the judgment of value is experience of worth, affective, and not merely cognitive, in character. This seems to be overlooked by writers (e.g. Pillsbury, *loc. cit.*) who emphasize the interplay of objective factors in the derivation of judgment and belief.

instrumental to values—the true mediates the good—the “is” the “ought”—*here* is the dualism.

The apparatus of means and ends, which is the apparatus of volition and of the development of plans of action, is now laid bare. The distinction between recognitive and selective meaning is taking up into reflection, and intentionally made use of in the development of interest and purpose. A thing is recognized in its full meaning: that is, as both existing and worthwhile, as external and as good for something. The realization of the aspect wherein it is good for something depends upon getting the presence of the thing as fact. While the thought of the thing presumes or assumes its existence, it still does not guarantee its presence. We say, “yes, it exists, and if I could get it I should find it good”; or “it exists and has value, but its presence is necessary to convert its presumed value into a present good.” The good thus desired, the value presumed or assumed, is the “end.” It is mediated by the idea or presence of the thing.

Facts or truths thus mediate the unfulfilled and prospective ends. The interest that was fulfilled in the original constitution of the thing, goes out again for its reconstitution; and in consciousness itself the distinction is made between the thing of fact or idea realized in the world of its proper existence, and the worth of it, to be realized again and again in the world of experience and desire.

The dualism is a sharp one, and one that is never resolved. The whole system of truths is charged with the selective meaning or intent of ministering to the development of the inner life. The self, identified with the mass of conations and interests, has control of its worths through knowledge as means. This progression of “control through knowledge” therefore, as now clearly appears, *issues in its own inevitable dualism*, for the contrast between external and internal appears as now a dualism within reflection. It is a dualism of explicit mediation. The fact or truth is judged worthwhile, and through the knowledge thus entertained the actual return to external existence and also to real gratification is made possible.

27. *In its interpretation of the real*, volition proceeds by the selection of what mediates or secures satisfaction; while *in its interpretation of the real*, knowledge proceeds by the resolute elimination of selection, preference, and will. Their common ground and meeting-place, it is plain, is the context of ideas, by which the realities of both are mediated. It would seem that,

if any final reconciliation is to be effected, it must be by some new reading of the meaning of this context.

Before taking up the question of reconciliation, however, we must point out a motive which carries the opposition still further, by strengthening the hands of one of the opposing controls, the inner. This motive is that of Idealization, which we have seen already at work in the domain of postulation.¹

§ 7. IDEALS AS WORTHS : AND THE IDEALIZATION OF WORTHS

28. We have seen that the ideal aspect of a meaning is the intent of that meaning to be read as more advanced or richer than its actual content at the time justifies.² This advance reading reaches forward in the line of the actual organization of the content, and so discounts the further legitimate advance. It is, however, of the nature of assumption or postulation, in its implication of reality, for the grounding that justifies belief does not extend beyond the actual content.

29. So considered, the ideal intent is of the nature of a worth-meaning. It signalizes the further worth of the extended or completed construction which is already going forward in the content. We may say, then, subject to our further explanations, that all ideal meaning is of the nature of worth-meaning. The intent goes *just so much further* in the fulfilment of the interest which the actual development of the object stimulates and sustains.

For this reason, *ideals are always of the nature of ends*. The ideal worth meaning is pursued through the medium or mediation of the content to which it is attached. It may be cited as a case of the mediation of a value for interest or volition by means of a context of ideas.

30. When we ask the correlative question, however, whether all worths actually have the intent of ideals, certain distinctions have to be made. A worth in the present, a worth-meaning secured by the presence of the fulfilling thing, is not of itself ideal, although it may become so. The present worth is accepted, acknowledged, presupposed, or asserted in judgment as a fact. It is asserted of the object as predicate term of the relation of direct appreciation. "This apple is good" expresses an existential judgment ; it asserts a matter of direct experience. In this, there

¹ "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. v. ; see also above, chap. i.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. "Functional Logic," chap. x. § 8.

is not of necessity any reference to a further apple experience which would go further toward ideality. The object in this case is not separated from its worth ; the experience gives a whole meaning of which the worth-intent is only a relatively distinguishable part, capable of being taken up in judgment and predicated of the thing.

But now let us consider the apple to be absent, the present fulfillment unsecured ; the further movement which gives to worth its ideal character then appears. We may still say, " the apple is or was good," with a reminiscent and factual meaning, turning the entire judgmental subject-matter into an objective content. But on the other hand, we may say " the apple is a thing to be desired," in which case the idea of the apple serves to suggest a desirable or worthwhile experience which the actual apple would mediate. The worth intent *now becomes an end*. It is something unfulfilled. The apple meaning is *read forward to completion*. The idea now suggests a complete and, in its way, ideal experience, in which the movement would issue if the end were realized.

31. In this latter case, the added factor is just that of mediation of the sort described above as that of " means and end." It is an anticipatory advance of the inner control gained by the use of knowledge, or of an ideal content. As soon as the further realization comes, it loses its ideal meaning, becoming a realized fact, as is true of ideals generally. The setting up of presentative and representative contents therefore, it may be said, furthers the movement toward the correlated worths ; these latter function as ends or as ideals of appreciation.

32. There is, besides, in the case of worths actually realized, a movement of idealization analogous to that already described for contents generally.¹ We saw that all objects, notably persons objectively considered, are subject to the process of idealization ; and we are to see that there is also an " affective " idealization as such.² Objects are charged, through the urgency of the interest at work in their construction, with a meaning of further growth and advancement toward completeness. So worths may also be charged with further worth. We suppose further pleasure would be more pleasurable ; we fancy it rid of its elements of pain or disappointment ; we imagine it carried on to perfection. Our very thought of worth enhances it. This leads to our making the further worth our end ; we use the present worth as means to

¹ Vol. i. " Functional Logic," chap. x. § 8, sect. 41.

² Below, chap. viii. §§ 3ff.

its own completion. The present worth, as fact or idea, mediates its own greater fulfilment.

There is the idealization of worths, therefore, as well as the idealization of other things for the sake of their worth. Ideals are worths,¹ worths may be ideals, and worths may be idealized—these are the three statements. Over against all three, we find the worth-meaning read simply as fact like other facts.

§ 8. RÉSUMÉ : TELEOLOGICAL MEDIATION

33. We have now gained a fairly exhaustive outline description of the modes of mediate worth consciousness, and the meanings which it entertains. We may sum up the discussions of the topic in certain general statements.

(1) The mediation of values takes place through the rise of worth-meanings attached to objective contents.

(2) These worth-meanings become ends of interest, pursuit, and volition, for the attainment of which the objective ideas or things are means.

(3) This extends all through the development of knowledge, since there is no meaning entirely free from the selective intent which embodies worth.

(4) It becomes logical in the judgment of value, in which the worth of an object is made predicate of a relational assertion.

(5) The entire movement is throughout correlated with that of the mediation of fact or truth, also through ideas. The movement of knowledge under controls of different sorts, is correlated with the utilization of that knowledge for the development of interest and purpose; this means the development of inner control by the use of knowledge.

34. So far as the discussion throws light upon the problem of reality, its main points are as follows:—

(1) The worth-meaning of an object *mediates the same reality* that the truthful or factual meaning does.

(2) A dualism of inner and outer is established in the form of the duality of *fact or truth, working as means, and value or ideal, working as end.*

¹ That is, they are actual concrete worths—ideals of *something*—not merely abstract rules or absolute prescriptions. The ideal becomes the control, the limit and end of the movement in which it arises (this is brought out below in the discussion of the origin of the practical reason, chapter viii.) ; but it always has its genesis and growth in the imaginative function. It is not an *à priori* form nor an “absolute” control imposed *ab extra*.

(3) The reality of the subjective inner life, for which all meanings are found worthful, is clearly implicated.

(4) The entire movement, considered as one of mediation, may be described as "teleological"; for it is, for consciousness itself, *one of means and ends*.

35. In the above discussion, it will be remembered, the cases of immediately present worth were not included in the statements regarding mediation and idealization. The question becomes pertinent, however, how far they are really exceptions. We have found that primitive cognition contains the germ of mediation; inasmuch as its postulated "datum" is never, as such, directly and immediately apprehended. How far, on the other hand, is this true of the other great factor of experience, the affective-conative factor, which we have called Interest? Is it considered as content, also always mediate, never really immediate?

The proper answer to this question requires a somewhat detailed examination of the actual movements of the active and emotional life, analogous to that which we have already made of cognition. To this we may now turn, making use of the expression "Logic of Practice," for the entire progression of Interest. The result will show just how far the immediacy which we have found to be absent from the cognitive¹ life is present in the affective.

¹ Our main problem here, it should be remembered, is epistemological, the approach to reality through the active functions. For this reason we are not under obligation to develop a detailed theory of valuation; yet in the two determinations of the logic of worth—its modes of mediation (in this chapter and in Part III) and its conditions of immediacy (in chaps. xiv. and xv. and in later discussions, vol. iv.)—the foundation is laid for such a theory. The discussions of the systematic works on value by Meinong, Ehrenfels, Urban, and others, rest upon these fundamental questions of the nature of the worth meaning, whose solution involves such topics as "Primary and Derived Worths," "Personal and Impersonal Worth," "Private and Public Worths," "Transformation of Values," etc.

*PART III*¹
THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE

Chapter VI

AFFECTIVE REVIVAL AND CONVERSION

1. The discussion of what is usually described by the terms "practice" and "activity," from the genetic point of view, might, of course, be very long. It might comprise a genetic account of the development of the entire active life; for the rules of practice or conduct were not born in a day. They go back to the beginnings of the mental life; they are to be traced through all the stages through which the function of knowledge has also passed.

But such a detailed research is not our purpose. We are concerned only with the larger movements of the active life which implicate reality: that is, with what we have called practical epistemology.

If a genetic account of the epistemology of the practical reason is possible at all, it must be based upon the active phenomena of life—emotion and sentiment, accommodation and adaptation—which belong to the development of consciousness as a whole. We accordingly entitle this division of our work the "Logic of Practice." It gives an account of the movement of the factors of activity, in their successive stages of organization, up to their issue in the norms of Practical Reason, whose origin it will be one of our problems to explain, in connexion with the larger question of the epistemological rôle of feeling and will.

¹ Being Part X of the entire treatise on *Genetic Logic*. The substance of this Part (chaps. vi. vii. and viii.) has already appeared, in French translation, in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, July and November, 1910, and March, 1911, under the title, "La Logique de l'Action."

§ 1. THE PROGRESSION OF INTEREST : PRACTICAL CONFORMITY

2. It will be profitable to recall here the method found useful in the discussion of the genesis of "theoretical interest" in the realm of cognition. We proceeded by first showing¹ the processes by which there arises, both in individual acceptance and in social usage, a body of truths accepted and enforced by all or many, which passes from the position of mere "aggregateness" or plural acceptance, to that of a "syndoxic" body of data, i.e. *held by each as common to himself and others*. After that we inquired² how this body of data, now actually prevalent or "customary" in a group of persons or a social community, could become "synnomic," i.e. so wrought into the personal life of each individual as to be rendered by him *as the outcome of his independent judgment, while preserving its force as being fit or appropriate for the acceptance of all*. This latter had to be derived before we could give any account of necessity and universality; but with its derivation, we had reason to conclude, these attributes had also been sufficiently explained.³

3. A similar method will be appropriate here, for the conditions seem to be somewhat the same. The characters of the most developed practical meanings, the rules of the "practical reason," are those of an autonomous and self-sanctioned system of regulations, uttered by the individual, it is true, in his personal right, but on the other hand, also, in their force to the individual *common and binding for all*. Like the intuitions of the theoretical reason, the norms of the practical reason are personal in their formulation, but common or social in their force.

It should be clearly understood, however, that in the case of the practical the matter is not cognitive, but regulative: it deals

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. vii. and vol. ii. chap. iii.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. x.

³ The details of that discussion can not be repeated here; the important elements of the solution are as follows: the "theoretical intuitions" are (1) principles at first socially and experimentally established ("syndoxic") which (2) have become formally universal and necessary ("synnomic") through experience of situations of cognitive "*limitation*." Through limitation, the logical principles of contradiction and excluded middle emerge and the system of logical implication is developed. Such theoretical "intuitions" are (3) transmitted socially and have possibly also become native to the individual by processes of selection. See vol. ii. chap. xi. § 5. Cf. the remarks in the Preface on M. Lévy-Bruhl's distinction between the logical and the prelogical, based on the consideration of the mental processes of primitive peoples.

not with things, but with the aims, acts, and attitudes of persons ; with *conformity* rather than with *validity*. The selective, emotional, and conative attitudes—the interests, in short—of the person are to be traced in the movement by which the contents of knowledge are grasped and utilized in growing active experience. It is the body of interests and purposes whose progressive organization we are now to describe, with the resulting rules of conduct ; and whether the processes are analogous to those of the organization of knowledge—whether abstraction, generalization, judgment, etc., are operative within this material—is a pertinent question.

4. It will be of great interest to follow out the analogous development of the two aspects, theoretical and practical, of what is usually called, with some lack of discrimination, the "Reason." The application of this term to both the movements is more than justified by the results of our investigation, as will appear presently. The closeness of the connexion may be shown to the eye in a preliminary way by the following table, in which the principal problems—dealing with the characters of the two bodies of meaning respectively—which come up for discussion in the two realms are set forth. We find that the theoretical reason, the organ of theoretical intuition, sets up its body of implications as valid in respect to two sorts of common acceptance or "community," as already distinguished in the volume on "Experimental Logic."¹ There is (1) the validity measured in terms of the actual acceptance of the persons *by whom* it is held, and (2) validity as holding for all, answering the question *for whom* the truth is valid. The practical reason sets up a body of rules of personal conformity having the same two references, conformity of those *by whom* the rules are actually observed, and conformity required of those *for whom* the rules are prescribed and legislated. And under both these forms of commonness, common *validity* of the theoretical and common *conformity* of the practical, the same genetic stages or modes, "aggregate," "syndoxic" and "synnomic" appear—to use the terms already employed for the theoretical.

Analogous terms are readily found for the corresponding modes on the side of "conformity" of interest and action. Corresponding to the "syndoxic" character of knowledge, we have the "syntelic" character of the interest of conformity—actual

¹ "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. ix. sects. 38 ff.

commonness of end among individuals. For the "synnomic" character we may employ this term for both, in view of the actual identity of the two in force, both being immediate or intuitive, as our discussions will show. The interest, however, in the pursuit and attainment of *universally binding or synnomic conformities* we have called in an earlier place "pragmatelic" interest.¹

With these points understood, we may construct the following table :—

REASON

	
<i>Theoretical</i>	corresponds to.....	<i>Practical</i>
(Intuitions)		(Norms)
<i>Community</i> (of Implication)		<i>Conformity</i> (of Action)
<i>Syndoric</i>		<i>Syntelic</i>
(Pre-logical and Social)		(Pre-moral and Social)
<i>Synnomic</i>		<i>Synnomic</i>
(Logical and Personal)		(Moral and Personal)

5. The mere neatness of this correspondence should not blind us to its essential character. The parallelism shows more than we may at first be disposed to find present in it. The rules of conformity in ethics, and in practice generally, must of course be binding upon all—must be synnomic—whether they be actually recognized by all or not. This truth is as old as the moral sciences. But that the same is essentially true of knowledge also, and that the two are genetically developed in the same movement—that is unexpected.

It also has a consequence for the rules of conformity established in the sciences of practice. If the intuitions of the theoretical reason are interwoven with the rules of practice—showing the same characters and stages—then we should expect a theory of the experimental and developmental origin of the one, the theoretical, to hold in somewhat similar terms of the other also. A high presumption, at any rate, arises for the view that the rules of the practical reason have been developed, as the principles of the theoretical reason have been, in the exigencies of social intercourse and practical life.

6. There is a further and more novel consequence also. We find that the movement on the side of the development of inter-

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. i. sect. 9.

est¹—the movement in the sphere of practice—can not be entirely independent in its working, in its “logic,” of that of knowledge. The relation of knowledge and practice being an organic and vital one²—both proceeding by mediations which, as we have seen, utilize the same context of ideas—it is to be expected that the formal modes of meaning developed would be somewhat the same for both. The great characters of logical meaning, such as “quantity,” “quality,” “relation,” “modality,” no less than “community,” might be expected to appear in some form in the development of the active life also; and the modes of process by which these distinctions are accomplished—generalization, abstraction, inference, etc.—should show themselves operative upon contents of the motive or affective-conative order, as well as upon those of the cognitive order. It is reasonable to anticipate this, and our results, as given below, indicate its partial confirmation. There is an active or “motive” logic—a logic of interest—showing itself in the development of the motive³ principles of feeling and will, of which our investigation enables us to sketch the outline.

With these preliminaries, which may serve the purposes of orientation, we may pass on to the discussion of the development of the active life which terminates in the Practical Reason.

§ 2. THE COMMONNESS OF COMMON INTEREST

7. It has often been pointed out that a sort of commonness of intent arises in different minds from the mere operation of common

¹ The identification of interest with the mass of affective and conative processes by which cognitive contents are selectively determined, has been justified in the earlier discussions, in which the factor of interest, on the one hand, and that of the objective datum or content, on the other hand, are found to be correlative in all knowledge (*Thought and Things*, vol. i., “Functional Logic,” chap. iii.). For a general account of interest, see Arnold, *Attention and Interest* (1910).

² “The presentation gaining attention is also an interest gaining control, and a conclusion reached is an interest fulfilled,” Wodehouse, *The Logic of Will*, p. 74, a book in which the general analogy between cognitive and active processes is presented in detail.

³ In this use of the term “motive” to cover the active aspect of both feeling and will, we are following the old and convenient distinction between “motive” and “cognitive” operations inherited from Aristotle, and prevalent before the Kantian division into “intellect, feeling, and will” became current. A generation ago, the “Motive Powers” were distinguished from the “Cognitive Powers,” as in the titles of the volumes of the *Psychology* of James McCosh. In German, the unity of the active life, as a whole, is expressed by the term *Gemüt*.

tendencies and interests. Animals do many things instinctively in common, and they, no doubt, become vaguely aware of the common character of their acts. There are among men certain subtle and vague sorts of contagion and suggestion which develop in the process of common action, and these are reflected in mutual sympathy and commonness of emotion.

So far as we are able to bring out any clear lines in what is, at the best, a vague picture, we may say that there is a commonness of emotional intent, due to the action and reaction of different minds upon one another.¹

8. Corresponding to this, on the intellectual side, when presentation and imaging are in operation, we find what has been termed a "dialectic"—a give-and-take process of mind with mind—resulting in a common apprehension of things and events. In it all, it is impossible to determine the respective limits of the cognitive and motive elements. The cognitive content is determined by actions and interests more or less selective and adaptive; and the actions are, in turn, determined under the guidance of experience and associated knowledge. There results a mass of common "apprehension" among different individuals, a mass of tendencies to feel and act together, which goes far beyond what is justified by actually common knowledge on their part.

There thus grows up spontaneously a body of joint and common interests, due so far as our terms enable us to describe it, to the presence of the common mass of active tendencies, motives, dispositions, etc., which constitute the crude "self" of the creatures involved.

In the rise of the faculty of imaging, however, as we have just intimated, we find processes which minister directly to the growth of common content: the processes of "Revival" and "Conversion." We may now inquire as to the value of these processes for the development of common Interest.

§ 3. THE REVIVAL OF INTEREST

9. There is no doubt that the development of knowledge, through the processes of revival and confirmation from mind to mind (conversion) is accompanied by a development of interest. As we grow to think in common, our interests take on a common strain also. Probably it might be said that the two grow together

¹ It is no doubt part of the value of the gregarious instinct that one animal's emotion, such as fear, should stir up a similar state in others of the same species.

and proportionately with each other. So the question arises as to how this is possible: how the common character of a cognitive content can pass over to the affective intent—that is, to the personal tendencies which give the content its emotional and conative interest. Here theories begin to diverge, and we have to choose between two alternative points of view.

10. (1) The older or “intellectualist” theory considers the interest as a function entirely dependent upon the objective content. The character of the interest is personal, and it changes with the change in the object which stirs it up. What we call a “common” interest is, for this theory, really a personal and private interest, which, however, belongs to a content that is common to oneself and others. We have common interest, it is said, only because and when we have common ideas.

The ground of this theory is the view that affective and conative states—the states which enter into our interests—cannot be directly remembered, revived, imaged, or converted from one mind to another; for all these purposes such states, we are told, must await their objects, or they must themselves first be imaged by symbols of some kind; they must be turned into cognitive content, made into objects. When I feel with you, I must in some way think of or image your feeling or its object; and then my own feeling springs up in consequence of this thought or idea. All modifications of interest can come, it is said, only through the modifications of knowledge; which produce in the knower’s mind a change in his emotion and conation.

On such a view, it is evident, no “logic,” no independent and continuous development, of interest is possible. It is in all cases simply a personal product, a subjective effect of the growth of knowledge. The contagion of feeling and action becomes simply the index of the presence of a common mass of images or other contents of knowledge. Each stage in the development of interest depends upon a corresponding stage in that of knowledge; and beyond the theory of this latter development, there is nothing further to be said. The affective-conative life, the life of interest, has no continuous progression of its own.

11. (2) In opposition to this a second view may be cited, a view in accordance with which there is a mode of affective memory and imagination; feelings are said to be directly remembered and recognized. It is not in place here to cite fully the evidence upon which this view rests; the literature is full and recent, inspired largely by the original researches of Ribot. Instead of reciting

the varied and convincing facts upon which it rests, I shall assume its general truth, and pass on to the further development of what has been called "affective logic"; only taking space to state the fundamental ground on which I accept the affective interpretation of the facts.¹ The following pages will then present some considerations which may serve to show the possibilities resident in this very striking and novel departure in psychological theory, which we owe largely to French writers.

12. The possibility of the direct revival of emotional and conative states of mind—that is, without the intervention of cognitive images—requires, I think, a functional and dynamic theory of all kinds of revival. This must take the place of the more static and structural view. Many authorities look upon images, ideas, cognitive states generally, not as fixed and given things or data to be held in the mind and utilized on occasion, as Herbart supposed, like cards in a pack, but as *functions*, whose reinstatement is accomplished by the stirring up of a mass of more or less habitual active processes. It is this stirring up of habits, dispositions, and interests that accomplishes the revival of the cognitive images and ideas with which they are connected. What has been called by Urban a "dynamic constant"—a relatively habitual body of affective-conative processes, a mass of motives or interests—is set in motion in appropriate circumstances; and the determination of the objective contents of knowledge or idea, in this case or that, depends upon the particular "constant" that is actively operative.² We have seen in detail, in the consideration of the formation of percepts, how dependent the object of perception is upon the direction and character of the interest of the moment.³ We have found it necessary, it is true, to combat the view that the interest constitutes the entire content; but we found it equally true that the interest is the selective and determining influence in the object's constitution. If it is through the grasp of selecting and determining interest that an object or idea is constituted what it is, and revived in memory and imagination, is it not reasonable to suppose that the movement of interest, the dynamic and effec-

¹ See the present writer's article on "Affective Memory and Art," *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1909. A late statement, with citation of literature, is that of M. Ribot in Chapter II of his book, *Problèmes de Psychologie affective* (reprinted from the *Revue Philosophique*). See also below, chap. xiii. § 4.

² Cf. the writer's article cited in the last note.

³ See "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. iii.

tive function in it all, should reveal itself? Is it likely that the interest, or its affective and volitional constituents, while bringing the objective content to consciousness, should itself be completely concealed in the process?

13. In my view, therefore, the theory of affective revival and of a logic of interest is involved in a thorough-going analysis of cognition itself. The final unit of synthesis is not the cognitive image, but the motor function; not the mere datum or content, but the selective interest. It is through this that continuity and progress are possible, not through the objective contents as such. So throughout all the processes of objective construction, in the development of the mind, this is the *modus operandi*. The dominant interest, having become more or less habitual, asserts itself from time to time, and the contents available, as terminus of this interest, are reinstated in obedience to it. This underlies the association of ideas which, though superficial, remains operative.

14. We should expect, if this be true, to find at the various stages of mental development, states of mind which represent, on the affective side, certain of the movements of revival, recognition, generalization, etc., which are so characteristic of the advance of knowledge. Yet they would appear in the form of functional attitudes, of personal and individual intent, along with the objective and ideal contents. It is for this reason that they are so vague and so difficult to make out by introspection.

Furthermore, we may quite legitimately surmise that it is for the purpose of definition and articulation that the cognitive function as such has been evolved. The content, representing the actual thing, the externally controlled object or situation of life, is outlined in an image, which is relatively distinct and revivable in relative independence. On the other hand, the affective ingredient, the interest, stands as the matrix; the personal habit of action remains relatively plastic, accommodative, and indeterminate in respect to conscious definition.

15. Yet recent discussions have made it plain that this latter element is capable of actual revival, recognition, and generalization. We do remember an emotion or a state of feeling without necessarily reviving the object that caused it. We do recognize such a state of mind *by itself*, not by first recalling its object. We do have generalized sentiments and dispositions which we use as class-meanings for varied experiences of the conative and affective order. There is here, therefore, at hand, the requisite basis

for a fairly comprehensive theory of the logic of interest, defined as we have defined it, as the body of affective-conative dispositions or " motives " which 'go to determine an object, and with which the " self " is more or less completely identified.

16. Our theory then, reverses the intellectualist view according to which the interest appears only after the cognitive image has arisen to give it its *raison d'être*; for we find, on the contrary, that the interest selectively determines the object or image at its every reappearance. It is true that the injection of an idea or image from without into consciousness, the entrance of a suggestion, may stir up a mass of interests; but this is only when the connexion between the two has already become habitual, and the interests then suggested are those normally present with the suggested contents. This case does not exhibit the usual genetic process, but presupposes it.

Assuming these results, therefore, the revival of the emotional and conative basis of interest, directly—and not merely indirectly, as after-effect of the cognitive revival of images—we may pass to the question of the possibility of the " conversion " or substitution of interests in any of the modes of conversion¹ which we have found operative in the case of knowledge.

§ 4. THE CONVERSION OF INTERESTS

17. In the discussion of the operation of what is called " social conversion "—the resort to some other person's experience or its equivalent, to confirm one's own—we found two cases which seemed at first sight quite distinct, but which, later on, were proved to be, for the development of community of meanings, in principle actually one. What is called " secondary " or " social conversion " is the resort to the experience of another person instead of, or in addition to, direct confirmation—called " primary conversion "—by resort to the actual objective thing. In this sense, as involving another person's states of mind, it is " social." If the only resort, on the contrary, is to one's own earlier memories or subjective states, we have " psychic " or " tertiary " conversion.²

¹ By " conversion," it will be remembered, is meant the turning of a state of mind into some other state of mind by which it may be confirmed or for which it stands: such as the conversion of a memory-image into the perception of the real object; see the detailed treatment in *Thought and Things*, vol. i., " Functional Logic," chap. iv., where many illustrations are given.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. chap. iv. § 5.

For example, I establish the record of a past event, possibly, by getting your memory of it to confirm my own ; but I find my memory on this occasion already confirmed by my own earlier recurrent revivals of the event. These two cases of conversion, called "secondary" and "tertiary," have in common the fact that it is to revived experiences, those confessedly of the inner life—experiences, that is, not immediately controlled by facts, events or things as such—to which the appeal is made. In the case of an event of the past, such conversion into one's own and others' memories may be the only confirmation to be reached, since the external conditions of the event available for direct or "primary" conversion may have disappeared. "Testimony" may be the only resource.

We found that these two modes of procedure are not really distinct from each other. For advance in certain directions, it does not matter whether the experience used for confirmation be one's own or some one's else. Of course, it does matter for actual belief whether I merely appeal to my own memory or get confirmation from you ; but such a discrimination involves a relation of judgment, which distinguishes the other's experience from my own, and attributes a further value to the former. When this is not the case, however, the determination is of the object as simply in a twofold experience ; and the confirmation by an appeal to a second experience amounts to the same, whether that experience be one's own or another's.

As regards the further intent in which it enters, one's own former experience may stand for, or be substituted for, that of another. What is really significant, genetically, is the recurrence of the same meaning in experience, not the further fact that this meaning recurs in one consciousness rather than in another—provided the two spheres of experience can be knit into a common whole. "That is a picture of your father," is a statement I may make equally upon your identification of the picture with the original and upon my own ; the intent of the meaning is the same, apart from the question of further confirmation, which requires a direct conversion of the memory of either or of both of us into an experience of actual fact.

18. The difference between these two modes of confirmation turns upon the difference in the final appeal by which the experience in question is confirmed. Your experience and mine agree between themselves, and my former and present experiences also agree between themselves. But in the one case, that of final agreement

between two persons, it would seem that an actual object or event, confirmatory of the agreement, is presupposed. Both of us must know the thing we are talking about, and be able to identify it in common. In the other case, that of continued identity or agreement as among one's own experiences only, this is not available. The successive memory states of a person may agree in their reports, although first and last the reports may be more false than true. In this latter case, the result remains more subjective and personal ; while in the former it is common, social, and more reliable.

In the conversion processes of knowledge proper, we find this difference reduced by certain further genetic devices or motives. So far as a content takes form in visual or other sense imagery, by means of which it can be actually reproduced and made fact of apprehension by others, the commonness of social conversion is secured. This is one of the great genetic utilities of cognition as such ; it puts meanings in presentative form, which secures for them common apprehension and conversion. And this is carried further in the same direction by the development of symbols—such as, *par excellence*, the symbols of language—for fixing and rendering socially available a body of personal meanings.

19. We seem then to reach some such conclusion as this : when your experience is substituted for mine, or used for the confirmation of mine, we assume a common nucleus of direct experience for the final testing of the result ; and on that ground we trust our common understanding of the matter in hand. But my own recurrent experiences will not serve as well without yours ; the confidence born of commonness is lost, and with it the sense of the final testing which that commonness in a measure guaranteed. There is a wide range of cases in which the continuity of the one person's mental life serves to give identity to, and to control, the matter in hand ; but it is felt to serve the purposes of the one person primarily, and it is more liable to error. In short, to put the matter concisely, in the one case, a control of an external kind is assumed to secure the persistence and identity of the common object. In the other case, the control is through a continuous psychic process merely, by which the meaning¹ does not secure full confirmation.¹

20. The question to which this excursus is preliminary, now comes up—the question as to whether there is any genetic process of conversion whereby the contents of affective and conative

¹ Of course, this does not fully apply to logical processes, which carry their own common force.

revival can become common ; and if so, whether they have also a reference to a further experience beyond the mere conversion itself. For example, can I confirm my state of hope by yours, and also confirm both by reference to some simpler state which is fundamentally common and to which both in common point ?

The importance of this question is great. Its answer practically sets for us the limits of a logic of emotion and interest. If we find that the only conversion or confirmation is within the individual's recurrent experiences—recurrent states being held together only by the continuous process of the one inner life—then it will be difficult to discover any actual system of common contents established in the sphere of interest, analogous to the system of logical contents or truth. The commonness of practical norms would then have to be considered as a postulate, a demand or ideal of the social and personal life. If, on the contrary, we find that emotion and conation, and the interests which incorporate these, are rendered in the form of contents in some measure subject to common recognition and conversion from mind to mind, then practical norms would seem to stand on somewhat the same plane as theoretical principles ; and the question arises as to the nature of the differences between the two systems.

21. At first sight, the answer to the question seems to be in a certain sense negative. We do not find either the mechanism or the results of social conversion, from mind to mind, in the case of concrete affective states. Indeed, it is cognitive images that comprise the more distinct and steady presentations given by all the senses. They furnish a content sufficiently definite and true to type to be used for such conversion ; and it is not likely that such a rôle could also be played by affective contents. Furthermore, it is not with the presentations of external things, properly speaking, that we have here to do ; but with those more selective and personal elements of meaning which are attached to things only by our appreciation or interest. These factors are not strictly objectified, even in the one individual's mind.

To examine the matter more closely, however, let us look at certain concrete cases. Let us take for examination a relatively pure state of feeling, a relatively pure state of conation, and a compound state of interest, in which both feeling and conation are plainly involved.

22. (1) Suppose the statement is made to me that my friend H. finds the taste of figs disagreeable. In what way, we may ask, can he confirm the disagreeableness of the taste of figs

by my experience? I may say that I find the same to be true—that figs are disagreeable to me also. Then the question is, can we in any sense ascertain that my disagreeable experience is qualitatively the same as his?

If we close in upon the experience from the cognitive side, we read off, first, the actual presentative features by which we identify the thing, the fig. Then we read off certain common sensations accompanying the taste of figs; we not only agree that we are both tasting figs, but we confirm this by resort to the presentative elements whose commonness we have already established, as described in the discussion above. Even here, however, the confirmation begins to be a little remote; but it is sufficient for practical purposes, since we are still within the domain of what is actually objective. The experience is subject to repetition and common confirmation through presentations.¹

But now suppose we try to communicate to a third person who has never tasted figs our common experience of the unpleasantness of the taste. We find that beyond the mere descriptive term "unpleasant," we have no means of agreeing upon the meaning which we wish in common to communicate. The affective quality of the sensation is well established in each single mind by the repeated experience itself ("tertiary conversion"); but the net result of our effort to communicate it to the third person is only the request to eat figs and tell us whether or not they are disagreeable to him: if so, then we suggest to him that this is the "disagreeable" which we also mean. But it is clear that there has been no actual establishment of identity of feeling beyond the sphere of the single mind.

The continuity of the inner process for each person maintains the personal interest, and with it the character of the affective experience; but the growth of the duality of personal selves, as between you and me, has tended to separate our subjective experiences from each other. So far as the self, with its interests, is constituted as a subjective function, the experiences that pertain most intimately to it are not converted with the objective content, but remain private.

23. (2) So much the more is this the case with conation as such. To say, "I do not like figs and I shall avoid them hereafter," is to enter a step further into the citadel of the subjective

¹ This includes our knowledge that, our sense organs being alike, we probably get the "same taste" from the same object.

life, and to go a step further away from the commonness of objective content. For it is not the objective marks of figs, nor the mere presentative accompaniment of the fig-taste, that excites my conation and leads to my decision to let figs alone. This decision is determined, on the contrary, by the *disagreeableness* of the experience, which, as we have just seen, lacks common confirmation. The resolution to refuse figs is a determination of personal interest; it involves the union of the motives of preference and feeling in an interest of avoidance. This is of the very essence of the inner control process, by which the limits of the private life are determined.

We find here, therefore, no reason to allow that there is any such nucleus of common meaning as would justify one in saying that the experience of concrete conation as such can be common in the sense that knowledge is. The experience seems to lack just those factors which contribute to the success of the cognitive conversion process.

(3) Coming now to the consideration of the larger whole of affective and conative elements which go to make up an interest, in a given case, we may put the question in the same terms. We find, however, that complications now arise which make the answer much less simple and decisive.

§ 5. THE ORGANIZATION OF INTEREST

24. Employing the same illustration as before, we may suggest at once that the interest one takes in the experience goes a step further in certain well-marked directions. It has greater remoteness from the immediateness of the direct affective experience of taste; it is also more organized on the conative side than the simple resolution to let figs alone. It is of the nature of an organization of affective and conative factors in a relatively stable and persistent form, which tends to become habitual and to show itself under varied conditions. Associations spring up in which figs and fig-taste are suggested; personal participation in dinner parties recur to mind; and Mr. A. and Mrs. B. figure in the larger whole upon which the fig-interest overflows. Professional cares come up in the mind of the gardener; refined gustatory comparisons in that of the gourmand; questions of location of tracts of land and problems of irrigation occur to the geographer and the capitalist; while the philosopher discusses the fig *per se* or the fig taste *per accidens*, and the religious sceptic points his ridicule with the exclamation, "In

the name of the Prophet, figs ! " We find here, therefore, a new set of conditions ; and we have to ask whether such a relatively complex organization of the factors in a larger interest alters the conditions in respect to the common availability of the experience.

25. It may be said, at once, that no new elements of direct cognitive experience should be introduced into this organization ; nothing should come in from external sources to change the fig-object ; if we would preserve in the illustration the affective character of the experience. If any new common meaning is derived, it should be due to the factors intrinsically present in the development of the interest itself. Under this condition we should expect to find here at work any motives of conversion that experiences of the affective and conative order actually possess. In fact, assuming the reality of the revival and recognition of affective states, we now discover certain results of these movements in the derivation of commonness as attaching to affective meaning.

26. It is no doubt in the processes of organization and consolidation that we should expect to find a strain of common meaning taking its rise in the case of affective and conative motives, for we have found this to be the case in the sphere of cognition. It should be remembered that the earliest knowledge does not have more than the commonness arising from a certain sameness of function ; but that, at the other end of the scale, in the logical mode, practically all knowledge is common. Between these two extremes there are modes in which some degree of generality is secured, and with this generality the various degrees of commonness are also attained. To the degree, therefore, in which we find a tendency to generalization in the life of interest, or in its motive factors, we may also expect some form of commonness of meaning to spring up.

This inference does not, however, imply an exact correspondence between the two cases, since the final ground of the commonness of cognitive meaning is objective ; it requires different cases of the same object showing common marks which are open to the inspection of all. Now we have shown that this is not the case with the meanings of the affective life ; its states are identified only in the inner world, and are very variable in their reference to the objective. But enough of the force of the analogy remains to lead us to ask whether, within the inner control in which the affective and conative experiences

are organized, anything corresponding to generalization takes place. If so, then such a process may be found to contribute *in its own way* a strain of commonness to the resulting mass of dispositions and interests.

27. It is possible here again to cite the recent studies of affective logic, in which cases are pointed out that can be explained only by appeal to a motive of affective generalization.¹ The sentiments and moods are states of mind which have each its own more general character, while being at the same time illustrated by a series of special cases—feelings, emotions, impulses, preferences—falling under it as particulars. Musical and other art enjoyment illustrates this perfectly: we experience first a mood or sentiment or active interest, and subsequently there arise in the mind a series of illustrative experiences, each having a more special emotional quality.

This is true even of the intellectual sentiments. The attitude of belief, for example, extends to a wide series of special states of acceptance and conviction. Judgment itself is a generalized attitude; each act of judgment is a redetermination of the factors of the inner control process in a way which illustrates the wider state of interest attaching to the context of thought as a whole. I am interested in the whole of truth; but on this occasion or that my interest is determined upon a special item of fact or proof. So, indeed, throughout the entire life of feeling and will, the case seems to be in this respect analogous to that of cognition: first, there is a broad determination of the self in a general interest, and afterwards the more special determination of the particular or singular attitudes of feeling, impulse and desires.

Within this wide characterization, justified by the special researches of many, the question arises as to how exactly this generalization secures commonness, how one person's sentiment can be utilized for the identification of another's emotion. The answer to this question involves a special movement which carries the matter further in the direction of a logic of affective and conative organization, or a "Logic of Interest." This movement will occupy us in the next chapter under the heading of "Ejection."

Our results, therefore, so far, are to the effect that there

¹ See Ribot, *La Logique des Sentiments*, and *Problèmes de Psychologie affective* and cf. Urban, *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, chap. 5, and the references given by him.

is no direct conversion or confirmation of feeling and conation in their simple ungeneralized form ; the requisite objective units of identification are lacking to these qualitative experiences ; but that, so far as we find an organization of these states in larger wholes of disposition or interest, a certain motive of generalization appears, which gives promise of securing commonness in its own way.

28. Gathering up our discussion so far, we may describe the point next to follow as a *third*, in addition to the two so far stated. We have seen, *first*, that all objects of cognition are selectively determined by motive processes of interest ; and *second*, that affective states have their own revival and recognition, while their conversion is limited to recurrence in the one individual's mind ; it remains to show, *third*, how there arises an "affective general" which, by the process of "ejection," especially evident in the life of sentiment, is progressively organized in a mass of common interests. The self—to anticipate the conclusion—embodied in such a mass of general interests, *ejects itself semblantly or imaginatively into other selves*, and so establishes meanings of common interest, conformity and practice.

Chapter VII

AFFECTIVE GENERALIZATION AND IMPLICATION¹

§ I. THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF GENERALIZATION

1. A view of generalization now widely held considers it "motor" in its nature. The movement whereby a meaning takes on "general" character is largely one of practical handling and treatment. The earliest moulding of objective contents into individual objects is accomplished by the union or synergy of motor processes which serve to receive and classify the data of sensation. This is motivated also by the practical embarrassments and rivalries which lead to further accommodations and adjustments in the active life. Thus great classes are formed in experience, each correlated with habits of action, with organized practice, the integrity of which is necessary for the constitution and persistence of the objective classes. In this way the great function of generalization proceeds. Our earlier discussions have supported this view.²

It has also been held in our discussions, that the motor attitudes, which represent the habits of the individual, are used to anticipate further experience. They constitute an intent of schematic assumption, employed for the reception and reduction of new and unfamiliar details. The familiar class-meaning is held ready, and the event which seems on the surface to fall under it, is at once welcomed as familiar. This establishes a sort of anticipatory or "as-if-general," which is revised and rectified as the new fact induces a new act of accommodation.

¹ This chapter has already appeared in abridged form in French in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, November, 1910, "La Logique de l'Action."

² See *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. xi., and *Thought and Things*, vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. x. §§ v.-vi.; also Ribot, *l'Évolution des Idées générales*, chap. iv.; and Royce, *Outlines of Psychology*.

The true general is then established by a modification of habit, as a re-reading of the schematic as-if-general, this latter having been, before this, of the nature of assumption.¹

2. This brief *résumé*, presented in outline for our present purposes, enables us to isolate the factor to which the general intent is always due : it is due to *the synergy of active processes*. The fact of relative habituation in a certain direction shows itself in the organization of cognitive details in wholes of practical availability. This makes possible the general reading of the particular cases. The generality does not belong to the thing ; it is our mode of interpretation of the relationships of likeness and difference, when the thing is taken with other things.

This general intent cannot be considered to exhaust the recognitive context that makes the thing a single individual ; on the contrary, it leaves out those aspects of things which make them, as individuals, distinct from one another. It selects and intends only those aspects which, being common to different things, enable us to treat them actively in common ways.

3. While thus recognizing and enforcing the fact that it is the active processes of adjustment and reduction that impart general meaning to a cognitive content, we must still carefully distinguish between the two aspects of this process just indicated. There is the use of an earlier class-meaning as a "schema" for the anticipation of new cases ; this serves to secure the confirmed meaning by which the object is finally understood. As we have seen in the earlier discussions, these two stages are, from the point of view of belief, to be sharply distinguished from each other. Embarrassing ambiguities arise if we disregard the distinction.

In the cognitive rendering of a content as general—when once the object is accepted and classified—the aspect of true generality is attributed to the object and considered part of the entire objective meaning. The organization of motor processes takes form in certain objective categories—sameness, identity, and difference—which makes possible further acts of abstraction and judgment. The factors of the general meaning which can be read as constituent parts of the objective content are carried over to the object. This objectifying tendency indeed is so strong that even our appreciations of the object—its practical utilities and worths which arise only in the course of its selective

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. x. §§ 4, 5, and vol. ii. Appendix, sect. 5.

handling—tend also to go over to the object as very unstable objective predicates.

4. In the very close relation holding between the subjective and objective factors of generalization, there is still a certain reserve on the part of each. The more subjective movements of action and appreciation, while entering into the interpretation of the external object, are still operative also as factors of the inner life. They are felt in the form of dispositions, conations, and interests; and by the movement of habituation by which the object gets its general meaning, the segregation of active factors in larger interests is also advanced. A new habit not only gives new meaning to the object or situation in which it operates; it also carries further the organization of active tendencies which make up the self. The organization, for example, of a series of judgments in a system of logical implications, carries with it the development of the theoretical interest; and with this interest, as with others, the self finds itself identified.

The essential difference between the two aspects of active organization shows itself in the contrast between true generality and schematic assumption. It is clear that the mere motor habit and disposition in which the subjective interest shows itself, cannot in itself give to the meaning of the new fact its final form. This is determined by the new case itself; the habit is modified and controlled by the fact. The true general reading comes only after the fact; it supercedes the special and personal meanings at first read into the object. With reference to the new details of experience, therefore, which are still to be interpreted within a larger interest, the general notion employed reverts to the status of instrumental hypothesis or assumption.¹

¹ We have here, indeed, in the relatively organized and habitual processes of feeling and conation—in relative interest, in short—the basis of the mode of meaning called “schematic” throughout the entire course of our work. It underlies the instrumental aspect of all our knowledge, and shows itself in personal expectation, question, and proposal, over against settled conviction and the elucidation of accomplished and confirmed proof. The true general is always the retrospective and static meaning attaching to contents as organized. The as-if-general, on the other hand, is the dynamic constant of interest, which anticipates the new experience; it is the prospective reading of contents in terms of habitual practice, but always subject to further confirmation and revision. The single method of establishing the true general, as well as the correlated interest and habit, is that of schematic assumption with active experimentation or “trial and error.”

5. We find in interest, therefore, a fundamental mode of organization which has the force of generalization in the active life. My interest, at any time, is an active disposition to find things as I have before found them, to recognize new cases as fit to call out old feelings and actions, to take satisfaction in the reduction of new situations to the accomplished forms of practice.

But in this very broad delineation of the basis of the generalization of dispositions and interests, we begin at once to see its limitations ; and its positive characters can perhaps best be brought out by noting these limitations.

6. The first and most important limitation upon generality of the active type, appears in respect to that aspect of meaning which we have discussed above under the term "commonness." Since a general interest arises from the organization of affective and conative processes, it cannot be converted into facts of outer existence or control ; nor can it be illustrated by them. It is subject to the defect pointed out above, as found in all cases of affective revival, namely, that it *lacks the nucleus of fixed cognitive reference*, by which the experiences of different minds can be checked off and controlled in common. I cannot confirm my supposition that your interest in art, for example, will be satisfied by just the works of art that satisfy mine. For it may be that our respective art interests have been fed upon different sorts of æsthetic experiences. A common objective measure is wanting.

It follows from this, also, in the second place, that this sort of generality, arising from the recurrence of similar experiences in one mind only, represents the conformity of only one person's acts and tendencies to the general type, not the social acceptance found in the generality of cognition.

It remains to ask, then, whether under these limitations, which confine the force of affective generality, in its origin, to the interest of the one mind—whether there could still arise a meaning of social community or conformity which would, in some more restricted way, involve other individuals also. How are we to account for the actual fact that we do expect to find, and do find, considerable agreement among ourselves in respect to the general force of our sentiments and appreciations.

In order to reach an intelligent conclusion on this point, we should inquire a little more closely into the actual processes of affective organization ; to this we will devote the next paragraph. It is preliminary to the further question of affective commonness and universality.

§ 2. THE NATURE OF AFFECTIVE GENERALIZATION

7. A striking feature of the organization of interests appears in what we have called affective generalization. It is due, as we have seen, to the synergy of affective and conative factors in larger wholes, which stand as classes under which specific practical tendencies take their place.

The analogy with cognitive generalization holds with respect to the relation of the particular tendency to the general interest. The interest is the outcome of the partial tendencies which enter into its organization. The growth of habit proceeds by the constant inclusion of detached and isolated motor tendencies ; and the simpler tendencies are, in this sense, subsumed under the larger habit or interest into whose composition they enter.

8. Coming, then, to inquire into the relation actually subsisting between the broader interest and the more special tendency, impulse, or other affective motive subsumed under that interest, we hit upon one of the essential characters of the practical. The relation is a dynamic one, one of movement, of synergy ; it is not, as is the generalization of cognition, one of mere recognition of accomplished facts and static relations. When a general interest is in mind an adequate illustrative act may not be ; when a single act is performed, a general interest may not be realized. The active life is the theatre of all sorts of detached and capricious performances, which are in striking contrast to the fixity of cognitive notions, when once these latter are formed. We may have in mind a rule of general action, and with it the starting of the act requisite to accomplish it ; but a caprice, an instinct, a desire may arise and carry us away by its imperious force, destroying for the time the unity of the larger whole, and leaving the proper act unaccomplished.

This is, of course, recognized by the reader as the familiar field of the theory of motive and volition. We are here simply resuming the results of the psychology of the active life. Yet the meaning of the facts for the theory of the logic of practice is well worth working out.

9. It is the inclusion of the more partial dispositions in the larger interest or act which gives rise to the quasi-general force of the latter, and establishes a correlation between it and the general of cognition. The issue of the latter, the cognitive or logical, is the general and particular relation, a meaning of theoretical validity. The meaning of the former is *teleological* ; it is

that of a habit of practice showing itself in the single act of conformity. One gives the "must" of logical necessity, the other the "must" of practical impulsion. It appears, however, that there are two distinct cases here, as the analogy with the corresponding cognitive process would also suggest.

§ 3. MODES OF PRACTICAL CONFORMITY

10. First, there may be conformity to an established habit merely; this corresponds to the relative agreement, as to an item of knowledge, among the opinions or beliefs of a number of persons. It raises the question, in the sphere of action, of the relative *catholicity* or prevalence of an interest or act. It is here that the act reflects, more or less closely, the established social code on which the individual's habit is modelled. This relative conformity of the individual's acts to the established and socialized habit, suggesting the relatively catholic or syndoxic character of knowledge, we have designated above as the "syntelic" force of the intent of action.

11. Beyond this, however, there is a second possibility. In the sphere of knowledge, we may recall, we found it necessary to distinguish clearly the merely "syndoxic," or relatively catholic, force of a meaning from the "synnomic" force, as being appropriate for all, whether they actually accept it or not? We find here, in the case of practice, a similar state of things. Habit is a sort of generalization, in the sphere of individual and social practice; but this of itself does not give necessary or imperative force to the rule of conduct represented by the habit. Further question then arises as to the derivation of this latter, the true synnomic force, as we find it in the maxims of ethical conduct.

It is of great importance that this distinction should be made clear. The practical life has its two sorts of commonness, its two modes of conformity. As in theoretical things, mere *acceptance by all* is not enough to establish *validity for all*; so in conduct, mere custom or *conformity by all* does not establish law or *right for all*. The mere reflection of custom, in the individual's intention to conform, does not in itself carry with it universal and imperative force. This latter, when present, indeed, may directly antagonize the prevalent custom or habit. The individual may say, "I will conform, although I do not need to"; or, "I will not conform, because I know I ought not to."

12. We touch here upon one of the great controversies in the history of theories of knowledge and morals. The question is

that of the derivation of the force of universality attaching to the individual's intuition. We found it necessary, in the case of theoretical intuition, to go beyond the social processes which produce common opinion and belief, and seek an intrinsic motive for the universal or legislative character of the principles of theoretical reason. This motive we found in the movement of experience on the formal side, issuing in the principles of limitation and exhaustion of classes, both empirically derived in the individual's thought.

So now in the practical life. The division of moral theorists into two great camps has turned upon the derivation of the *universal* and *imperative* force of moral rules, as holding for all. The idealists have contended that the mere prevalence of actual social custom, and the acceptance and embodiment of this in the individual's habit, are not enough; there must be, they say, an imported or *a priori* element.

13. With the first part of this position we find it necessary to agree. The empirical moralists have generally stopped short without recognizing the force of the difficulty. Mere practical conformity, founded in habit, as in the animals, issues in the sort of general agreement which we have described as syntelic. The acts of different individuals have a common end, and are recognized as being performed in common; this corresponds to the syndoxic force of what is intellectually catholic or prevalent. But the character of moral rules, whereby they enforce their imperatives upon all, whether, as a fact, all accept them or not—their synnomic force—this is not sufficiently accounted for.¹

¹ It is indeed, just here, I think, that such classics as Darwin's *Descent of Man* and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*, together with the recent work of Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, fail to establish the derivation of the moral sense from animal instinct and social custom. They stop with the individual's training into conformity with the prevailing custom, and make the relation of his acts to a general of conformity that upon which the moral judgment is passed. This to my mind is quite insufficient. It stops with the syntelic force of conformity, and gives no account of its synnomic force: it fails, that is, to show how mere *acceptance by all* can pass into the *imperative for all*.

As an instance in point, the important article of M. Durkheim in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Nov. 1909, carries the social development of intuition up to the point at which social usage shows itself in the laws of thought and the rules of personal conduct. But it is then assumed that this social derivation sufficiently accounts for the necessity and universality of the individual's categories of reason. On the contrary

The idealistic criticism is, in so far, justified; current sociological and evolutionary theories do not fully meet this point.

It is not necessary, however, to go over to *à priori*sm. It remains only to show that there are additional motives at work in the life of practice—motives in the genetic logic of conduct—which do account for and justify this practical universality. As we are to see below, there are processes which issue in the necessity and universality of the practical norms of conformity, just as those we have pointed out issue in similar marks on the side of the theoretical. So far as this difficulty goes, recourse in either case to *à priori*sm or dogmatic intuitionism is unnecessary.

14. Let us then look a little more closely at these two meanings attaching to practical conformity: its meaning as merely syntelic, due to custom and habit, and its meaning as synnomic or universally binding. The point at issue is the passage from the former of these to the latter.

As to the first, the force of custom to the individual, we have seen in what way it rests upon the social character of our general interests: upon the commonness of interest secured by affective and conative generalization. It remains to point out the movement whereby the entire body of interests, making up the self, is objectified in a meaning which is general and common to all. This will take us another step in our general theory.

§ 4. THE SELF AS COMMON INTEREST

15. The step by which we pass from interest to the self is already familiar to our readers. It is the organization of interests which constitutes the established inner control process; and inner control is only another name for the progressive movement of what is felt as the subjective life or the self. The mass of subjective interests is no more and no less at any time than the subject or self. What the individual has in mind when he is conscious of self, is the movement of processes which embody his interests. If we are right in making this identification of organized interest

the psychologists and moralists who accept the social account as valid should find here only the beginning of their task of showing how, in the individual's actual experience, the habits and impulsions of custom can pass into rules of logical validity and personal moral obligation. When the sociologist has shown the operation of the social factors—which is as far as his data allow him to go—the psychologist takes up the task of showing the internal processes by which the social factors are organized in the experience of the individual.

with the self, then the questions of the commonness and generality of the self resolve themselves into those of the commonness and generality of interest.

When so much is said, we are able to avail ourselves of what has been discovered in social psychology about the personal self, and about the common bond which unites it with other selves.

16. It is held by many, and with right, I think, that one's reading of another's personal inner life is, in broad outline, a re-reading of one's own. So far as we differentiate between the contents of another's mind and that mind itself—considered as the owner and knower of the contents—we apprehend the latter almost entirely by an ejection into him of our own sense of inner control and subjective process.

If now we omit from our present discussion the contents of knowledge held by each as belonging in the sphere of common cognition, we have left the question as to how far the subjective process, the intent of "inwardness," can have a recognized common character. If it does have such a character, its commonness must reside in the interplay of motives of a selective and affective sort; for these subjective factors are those which are not apprehended in presentative form.

Furthermore, if we have been correct in saying that the affective and conative movements as such cannot be directly converted from one mind to another, then such actual commonness as there is must arise in the process of affective generalization, that is, in the organization of interest with which we have just had to do.

17. The consequence follows of itself from these premises: the mass of generalized interest is ejected by each into all the others, and by this process it becomes both a common self and a common interest.¹ The affective and conative factors which remain, each for itself, private and unshared in their intimate quality, have when

¹ This process of ejection, considered as producing a common self or "socius," is treated in detail in the volume *Social and Ethical Interpretations*. The step of advance now taken appears in the position that it is the "affective general" of interest or practice—an inner control factor—which is thus ejected as the self.

Once admitting the reality of affective revival, we do not have to resort to images to serve as "bearers" of the motive factor; but as one may feel something as having been in his own mind before, so he can feel it as being or having been in another's mind. (Cf. the note on the apprehension of immediacy below, chap. xiv. § 6.)

This has the result, as will appear below, of securing a certain common necessity for the rules of practice.

organized, a general form, which thus becomes common to all the selves. I cannot attribute to you my special hope or fear, my impulse or desire ; but I can attribute to you the state of hope or fear, impulse or desire ; and I then assume that you have particular emotions and conations which illustrate these general states, just as my own do.

18. We seem to have, here, therefore, a point of advance. The sort of commonness which attaches to the organization of interests arises through the ejective processes by which the self which these interests embody is read as common. So far as the particular interests I feel are those of a self, of myself, they are capable of being your interests also ; for you are, like me, a self. As a matter of fact, they may be yours as well as mine, since the outlines, the essentials, of selfhood extend to all the centres of subjective life. Any purposive process, any process of interest, any movement of the actual self, may be assumed to take place likewise in any and in all, when conditions justify it ; that is, such a movement may be syntelic. It is a matter of observation to determine whether, in this case or that, it is so.

In the act of "ejection," therefore, essential to the growth of personality, we find a signal forwarding of the process of affective or motive logic. The result of the organization of interests in modes of general conformity is read in an inter-personal sense : in a sense that amounts to a mode of social conversion. I expect you, as a person, to have all the great motives of personality which I find represented in the organization of my own interests. The meaning of self-hood, of mental personality, is a "general" of affective or subjective intent. We cannot find presentative data to exhaust it ; we cannot image or "present" cognitively all of its essential features : yet it is truly a "general," for it applies, in a real and vital sense, to all persons as such. We utilize it daily in our intercourse with others. I expect good or bad news to affect you as it does me, in proportion as we have common interests. I plan a surprise, I plot a scheme, I anticipate an expression, I condole or sympathize with you, despise, or praise you, and in a thousand other ways measure your mental life by the standards which we have together come to consider applicable to personality.

19. That this process is utilized for purposes of conversion or mutual confirmation is seen in the results. We find our anticipations realized in proportion as they are general. If they fail, we ask what more special motive can have come in to alter the case ;

and we are prepared to interpret the exceptions also in terms of mental factors natural to ourselves.

In particular cases, we proceed upon signs of some sort—a physical expression, a vocal intonation, a direct verbal communication, or an act whose motive seems clear. Any of these, and other even more indirect and frequently very subtle signs, may stand for the psychic processes of neighbour or friend. By these we illustrate our ejective interpretations of the normal person. When we find ourselves quite wrong, we call the man a “crank,” a lunatic, a deceiver, or say that he conceals his emotions well; or finally we consider his conduct inexplicable.

20. It will be said that these processes are indirect and in a measure inferential. So far as we seek to reach the concrete experience of another, his actual feeling or conation, this is quite true. There is no such thing as direct conversion of a singular affective experience; this we have seen. But we now find that this limitation does not apply to *the general meaning of personality in which the single and private motives and interests are organized*; it does not apply to the whole of organized interest which stands for the self, for *this is convertible through ejection*. While we cannot reach the actual feeling of a person, we can reach his personality, and say of him “he might have such or such a feeling,” or “he has feelings which we can in detail only surmise or conjecture.” The mass of meaning which the psychic or inner process as such involves, is read in general terms, as illustrated in a variety of persons or centres of personality; this is accomplished by the ejection of the results of affective generalization. But within this, each person has all the variety of a private inner life.

21. We have here, then, in my opinion, the *third* fundamental principle of the logic of interest; that of *the ejection of general interest, in terms of the common self, by all the individuals mutually*. It carries forward the motive of affective revival in personal experience, which we found to be the *second* step in the logic of the active life—following upon the fact of the presence of motive factors in all knowledge, which was for our theory the *first* step.¹ The second and third of these principles may be thrown into succinct form for the purposes of later citation; they constitute the foundations of our theory of affective logic.

¹ See above, chap. vi. sect. 28, where the three steps are indicated in order.

(1) There is a real revival and generalization, within the one progressive experience, of affective and conative processes, taking form in dispositions, sentiments and moods, which constitute the organized "general" interests of the self.

(2) These generals of interest are carried over to other individuals by ejection. This gives a real process of "conversion" or mutual confirmation as between the larger interests of individuals. If we use the term "teleological," or end-seeking, for the meaning established under the first of these processes—affective generalization—then the common result, as holding for other individuals in the understanding of each, may be called "syntelic" (having common ends). The individual's purpose or interest carries the force of *having an end in common* with the purpose or interest of others.

We have thus advanced in our discussion of the derivation of the rules of conformity of the practical reason, to the stage represented, on the side of cognition or theoretical reason, by the "syndoxic" force of knowledge. In the case of knowledge or theoretical meaning, it is reached by direct conversion of contents from mind to mind, subject to actual confirmation by the things or events to which they refer in common. On the side of action and feeling, we find this to be impossible; but in its stead an organization of personal interests goes forward which is read, by ejection, as actually present in the minds of others also.

§ 5. THE CORRELATION OF PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL INTERESTS.

In view of the results now reached we may point out certain features of correlation between the two modes of generalization and conversion, in which their very intimate relation becomes apparent. It should be remembered that we are not dealing with two distinct movements, but with one; that the progress of knowledge marks progress also in purpose, and that the development of specific purpose is always conditioned upon the development of knowledge.

22. In the first place, it appears that the factor which imparts general meaning to the general idea and to the generalized interest or disposition, is the same for both alike. It is the synergy of active processes, by which the details on both sides are reduced and organized. The sensory items are held in the organization of habit; and the same habit, appearing in the rôle of interest, takes

form as an affective or active general. The intent of generality in all cases, cognitive and active alike, resides in active processes and attitudes. It is a functional intent.

The contrast between the two appears, however, when the differentiation of inner and outer control factors begins. In the case of external objects, the outer control coefficients hold the intent of generality to the particular case. Thus the active processes become instrumental to the larger interest of external discovery and theoretical validity; and the interest terminates in the recognition of a more or less static and neutral common context of knowledge. The meaning of the active general processes, however, is not exhausted by this sort of interest; they retain their integrity in the progressive organization of the inner life itself, and issue in a self in which all the interests, theoretical and other, are organized. The theoretical interest is indeed part of this, but it is not the whole; the whole is the inner principle of control to the full intent of which the interest to know and the interest to do are alike essential.

23. It results from this relative duality combined with unity that the entire objective content becomes a context of ideas, a system of thoughts, which by being set up in a certain isolation or remoteness from both controls, may serve on occasion to mediate either of them. The general intent of ideas serves this purpose. When we wish we use general ideas to mediate knowledge, to aid us in exploring nature, to serve as premises for argumentation; but when we wish, we also use them for the attainment of ends—as means of conduct, as instruments of desire. Both the theoretical and the practical interests are thus forwarded by the same mediating context. In the one mediation, the general force has the objective reference to a system of external things or truths; in the other, it has the subjective reference to the control processes of the inner life.

24. If this is the case—it may be asked—why the enormous development of one of these processes and the apparently slight development of the other? Why is it that the “discursive” operations, those of inference and argumentation, are operative only in the sphere of cognition proper, in that sphere of general reference which attaches to fact or truth? Why are there not processes of inference, argumentation, and implication in the realm of the generals of practice, for the development of teleological meaning?

Admitting that there is a difference in the extent of such pro-

cesses in the two cases, we find apparent the reason for it.¹ It is because the final control is not so remote in the case of the processes of the inner life ; and also because the data are not to the same degree common to different individuals. The limitation residing in the lack of commonness has already engaged our attention. The other difference is as real and as vital. The testing of things in the world of external fact is less direct, since the points of reference are more remote and the processes of reference more complex. In the world of ends the control resides in the mental life itself. It is easier to judge a taste good than it is to discover its objective conditions. It is easier to discover that one is pleased with an event than it is to discover the cause or ground of the event, or to say whether others are also pleased with it. The whole movement constituted by reflection or thought, presupposes the inner world, and this we have always with us. On the other hand, the outer world, or the world of truth in general, presupposed by the cognitive reference of ideas, is not present in the same sense to the mind, but can be reached at times only by means of discursive processes of argument and implication. In the latter case I must avail myself of premises and draw inferences, sometimes very complex, before reaching full conviction. But in the world of desire and ends why need I do this, when I can go direct to my feeling, to my appreciation, and ask, " Is it good ? "—" Is it worth my while ? "

25. The force of this last consideration is increased when we remember that the machinery of thought is available also for affective contents, so far as these can be thrown into cognitive form. This takes place in the logical mode where the generalized dispositions, moods, sentiments, etc., take on the forms of intercourse. A system of symbolic renderings, linguistic and other, springs up—as we have already intimated—by which general meanings of all sorts are made available in the social life. We

¹ See below, §§ 7-12 of this chapter, for the inquiry as to how far the logical attributes do, in fact, find application in affective organization.

It is possible to conjecture, that intrinsic rules might be discovered in the development of the life of volition and purpose—rules of a quasi-formal character—if we could isolate them. The logic of *planning* may be as well developed some day as the logic of *thinking* is to-day. There must be steps of *effective* procedure, in passing from means to ends, and from less remote or general to more remote or general ends, and also faults due to mistake ; just as there are steps of *valid* procedure in the logical process, and fallacies due to error. See the remarks on " Practical Inference " in § 12 of this chapter below, and cf. Appendix A.

have not only general terms for concrete objective things, such as "horse" and "man," but also for the abstract meanings of subjective appreciation, such as "virtue" and "beauty"; and in the sphere of verbal symbolism, where it is the general meaning and not the single case that these terms express, this is as effective for feeling as it is for knowledge. When I speak to you of "humility," for example, you are quite right in supposing that you get my meaning, although a very different series of concrete cases may arise in your mind to illustrate the meaning.

The means of common representation, therefore, in the realm of generals, is always the same, and it is available for both sorts of meaning alike. It is possible to argue about "taste," provided we preserve the qualification contained in the word "about." We can and do argue with sufficient common understanding and with fruitful results *about* taste, *about* morals, religion, sentiment, all the intimate affairs of the personal life of feeling and disposition—*about them*. But all the while we cannot give a single illustrative case, a single actual experience in any one of these realms without danger of misunderstanding and misrepresentation. We agree, for example, upon principles of aesthetic criticism; but when we come to illustrate them, we find that beyond the principles we did not agree; the agreement held for the general and formal intent but not for the appreciative content of actual experience.

We must recognize the fact, however, that the logical categories do circulate through the life of appreciation, play about the citadel of the active life, so to speak, and render the general aspects of this life in their own forms. Terms, propositions, syllogisms, implications, grow up in the sphere of worth; and language is their instrument. Thus the need of the development of a separate and different system of common symbolism for the communication and use of meanings of the teleological order becomes less necessary. So long as we confine ourselves to talking about our moods and sentiments, all goes well—if not very far!

§ 6. PRACTICAL NON-CONFORMITY

26. The truth of this outcome becomes apparent in connexion with the negative aspect of practice: the fact of practical non-conformity of individual action, in the presence, perhaps, of actual agreement in general sentiment as to the rules of conduct. The well-known antinomy of conduct—practical disagreement as to the actual demands of a situation among people who agree on

the principles of conduct, and who are equally conscientious—appears here. The old distinctions between “form and matter,” “mental furniture and empirical data,” “intuition and mere instruction,” are all more or less verbal and dogmatic renderings of this antinomy.

We are now able to explain it ; for, as we have seen, we attain agreement as to the general, the sentiment, the interest, because that can become common and can be rendered in common symbols. But we cannot completely agree on the illustrative case, the particular feeling or act, because that is a matter of immediate affective experience.

This aspect of the matter is of importance for our main problem. We are inquiring as to the derivation of the conformity found in practice and formulated in the rules or norms of the practical reason. We find that a certain difference appears between the generalized interest and the single affective experience. It is here—where the generalization leaves off—that we should expect actual non-conformity to begin. I can agree with you, for example, in my general line of conduct, in my patronage of good things, and in my condemnation of what we in common find to be bad ; but I cannot undertake to find the same specific acts or events good or bad that you do. There are many ambiguous cases, many cases of complexity in which “insight” rather than argument is required. In these cases we find, as we should expect, the widest range of *conscientious non-conformity*.

27. This lack of conformity is not due to lack of information. If it were, individuals might strike a balance and agree each to give way in a proportion of the cases and so, in the long run, pull effectively together. But we cannot resort to any such compromise ; our attitude is “conscientious”—a word that brings out a vital aspect of our conclusion, the aspect from which we recognize the universality of the meaning for the individual's own mental life. There is a generalization of concrete cases in the one person's recurrent experience, a uniformity due to the inclusion of the experiences of worth or utility under the general attitude or interest. This, taken together with further motives¹ which are still to be described, issues in a sense of practical obligation. There is a legislative force attaching to the meaning of conformity in this realm of personal ideals and rules. For the present, it may be put in this way : there is here not merely the recognition of cases as

¹ The motives by which—in the terms of our further problem—the conformity passes from syntelic to synnomic form (see chap. viii.).

coming within a common class, for our observation or for that of others ; but there is also a personal attitude or active tendency, which enters into the essential organization of the interests of the self. The larger interest is to be fulfilled by the performance of the single act ; and it cannot be denied without division and inhibition in the active life. To conform merely to the behests of another is to vacate one's own personality, without being able to enter into his.

We find thus enforced the conclusion according to which the individual must conform to his own larger interests, whether in particular cases agreement as between individuals be possible or not. Personal consistency or conformity may require social non-conformity and disagreement.

§ 7. AFFECTIVE IMPLICATION

28. It remains to ask whether there is any movement of the nature of "implication" in the active life, the life of interest ; whether there is any further organization of active motives serving the end of inference, as logical argument serves in the realm of the cognitive as such. Is there any such thing as *affective implication and inference* ?

In answer to this question, we may now cite certain aspects of the life of sentiment and appreciation, in general, which show processes at work more or less analogous to cognitive inference. I shall discuss them under the headings of Affective Implication and Inference. This will furnish us further data for the theory of the development of interest toward its final terminus in the norms of Practical Reason.

It will render our quest more direct, perhaps, and also possibly more intelligible, if we still keep in mind the theory of cognition as outlined in the traditional logic, where one recognizes such distinct logical attributes as "Quantity," "Quality," "Relation," and "Modality," to which we have found it necessary to add "Community," or Common Force. It will be of interest to raise the question of the applicability of each of these concepts in the domain of affective organization.

29. In all that follows, however, we must abide by the conclusion reached to the effect that certain restrictions upon affective generalization exist. Such generalization is restricted to the recurrent experiences of the individual for its illustrative cases, although the general intent is read ejectively as common to different individuals. I am sure, for example, that you have hopes and fears

like mine, and that you would agree with me in the general line of distinction between hopes and fears ; but for the identification of this or that case of hope or fear, I can proceed only by those processes of control by which the classes of my own interests and dispositions have been established. I cannot appeal to you to confirm my sense of the immediate value of the individual case.

This restriction, it now appears, sets limits to the development of teleological meaning in a system of implication, since it essentially modifies the intent of commonness. The "general" of active interest is not in the same sense common as is the theoretical general ; and this difference shows itself in all the developments of the former type of meaning.

§ 8. CONCEPTUAL QUANTITY IN THE SPHERE OF PRACTICE

30. The problem of quantity in logic is peculiarly one of generalization. It raises the question as to how many cases are intended, together with that of the body of intensive marks which determine the limits of the class meaning. In respect to the place of the first of these, extension or quantity, in the effective life, the restriction indicated above at once appears.

In case of the cognitive general, we are able without difficulty to identify the particular and concrete cases. We go for the single object to the control in which the general meaning is determined. Actual existences, reached by direct conversion, confirm the general meaning.

But we now see that, in the case of practical meanings, such as worths, purposes, etc., such an appeal lacks finality. It lacks also confirmation from the concrete experience of others. The control at hand is that of immediate presence in the inner world which is confined to the one individual's recurring experience. Single cases can be identified only so far as they are events of one's own life.

31. We have to distinguish, accordingly, in the result, in quantity as attaching to general attitudes or dispositions, two relatively distinguishable motives. In the first place, we find a true generalization of cases within the individual's experience, a quantity in the extent to which the general sentiment or interest has illustrative cases, recognized as such and made common by ejection. And second, there is the more or less insecure and vague assumption of identical intensive marks in concrete cases of the experience of others. The former establishes the limits of true extensive quantity ; the latter seeks, by an assumptive or sche-

matic reading, to extend the confirmation, on the side of intension or quality, over to the feeling of others. The extension or quantity rests not upon identifiable qualitative marks, but upon an ejective reading of the general interest itself.

Illustrations of this from the actual life of feeling and interest have already been given. We remark of one another that our aims are the same, that certain classes of our experiences are mutually pleasant or painful, that certain qualitative marks attach to this or that mood or sentiment—being sure, that when expressing ourselves in these general terms, we will be understood. The general is common. But so soon as we pass to the actual state of mind, or to the act which should illustrate the intensive marks of the common aim or of the enjoyment in common of an emotional experience—the concrete descriptive marks of appreciation—then infinite differences spring up. We are more or less sure, each for himself, what concrete states of mind we include. Each can confirm his expectation for himself by new cases, or thinks he can. But when he goes beyond this, using his quantified general interest to interpret the experiences of others, he is confessedly in the domain of hypothesis and assumption. This latter sort of meaning is problematical. My friend says to me in surprise, “you don’t call *that* beautiful, do you?”

32. A similar uncertainty attaches also, in fact, from the nature of affective experience, to the individual’s own generalization; the affective general is more stable than its illustrative cases. So fleeting and subjective are these experiences, so liable to cross currents of feeling, to influences of suggestion and contagion, to movements of obscure subconscious passion; so unaccountable is the sharpening or dulling of interest, that only the larger attitudes, the wholes of interest and habit, remain fixed. The general meaning only has relative constancy. The application of the general to its particulars is, even for the individual, in many cases very uncertain, and in others impossible. We use such phrases as this: “I have a certain feeling of disquietude,” “I feel both hopeful and anxious,” “it is agreeable, but withal too suggestive of trouble.” These and an infinite variety of other such expressions show us the mind itself unable to make exact and reliable use of its own categories of emotion and interest. The ebb and flow of sentiment conceals an enormous stretch of submerged territory, which is not staked off in definite plots as belonging to this or that constant interest. We speak of types of experience, each having a relative steadiness of interest; but

the classes are not mutually exclusive, and the subjective characters are not well defined or clear.

This answers the question of logical intension also. The relativity and fluidity of the intensive marks of sentiment and mood forbid any rigidity of qualitative distinction. For this reason the classification of emotions has always been found difficult. It is hard to find, for the affective classes, differentiae sufficiently constant to hold for any continuous purpose. The classes "agreeable" and "disagreeable," "exciting" and "depressing," for example, are fairly clear; but the illustrative cases are excessively ambiguous.

33. Our conclusion, then, is that the organization of feeling and action issues in larger interests, which embody general or class meanings, having quantitative force; but that these are not of the definiteness and steadiness of the "classes" of cognition. They are lacking both in social availability, through the failure of social conversion, and also in definite applicability, by reason of the qualitative relativities and ambiguities of the feelings themselves.

§ 9. CONCEPTUAL QUALITY AND OPPOSITION IN THE SPHERE OF PRACTICE

34. As to the question of logical "quality" and opposition, in the life of feeling and interest, certain indications follow from our general point of view. Neither negation nor affirmation can have, in the affective life, the force of commonness which attaches to logical opposition. We expect, in a broad way, a certain agreement in predications of taste and feeling, both positive and negative; but these are not specific and concrete. Yet within these limitations, as already indicated, there are certain more subtle movements, due to the relatively primitive place of opposition in the active life.

Affective assertion or denial, being in a personal and private sphere of reference and confirmation rather than in a common sphere, is of the nature of an active and appreciative response. It is not an act of judgment in the first instance. It seems to embody a more primary acceptance and rejection,¹ motivated by immediate interest rather than by the movement of reflection which logical relation involves.

¹ The difference between "acceptance with rejection," on the one hand, and "affirmation with denial," on the other, has been fully discussed in *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. viii. § 11.

35. Accordingly, we find affective affirmations and negations to be more of the nature of attitudes expressive of inclination and disinclination, welcome and aversion, taste and distaste. They do not seem to have that reference to objective existence by which a relational content is defined. Of course, an inner sphere of existence is presupposed ; but this is of the nature of an unquestioned "presumption," a "datum" of privacy and immediacy.

The attitudes of affective affirmation and denial are best expressed by the terms "consent" and "dissent." I do not, for example, assert that sugar is agreeable to me or musk disagreeable on the ground that I theoretically assent to this, or even because I am convinced of it. I do so, on the contrary, because my personal reactions to these sensations have been positively or negatively made. The musk-interest is organized as one of avoidance, the sugar interest as one of welcome and pursuit.

36. Affirmation and negation proper, therefore, are relatively undeveloped in the logic of affective states and interests. The motive of limitation, so prominent and fruitful in the logic of relation, is here conspicuously weak. This is due both to the directness of the movement of appreciation, which, as we have seen, does not recognize fixed distinctions of extent ; and also to the relativity of the qualitative marks which bring out the active response. We cannot say that a sour taste "limits" a sweet one, in the strict sense that the extent of one coloured surface limits the extent of another, or that the class of black men limits the class of whites. It is not generally quantitative extension or numerical division upon which the interest here goes out. The case is usually simply one of this or that positive personal reaction or attitude.

Negative interest is, therefore, of the nature of avoidance, not of the nature of distinction ; it is a rejection, not a denial. It cannot be said to be, like logical negation, the failure of an attempted positive assertion ; although, of course, it may become so when the meaning is thrown into logical form. In this aspect of its force, it is practical and *alogical*.

37. Another striking difference between affective and logical negation is seen in the place held by the motive of "privation" in the two cases respectively. Interest or preference does not proceed by the denial of rival premises and systems of proof ; it simply grasps its object and appropriates it to its own purpose ; and in so doing rejects or excludes everything else by an act of privation. "Nothing else than this interests me just now," I

may say ; and one does not care what the excluded "else than this" may comprise.¹ The interest is at work in a way that shuts out other things simply by its own positive movement. In this sense the interest is always to a certain extent exclusive : it excludes all but what is at the moment fitted to gratify it. But there is no determination of a *non-B class* ; there is simply the *exclusion of everything but B*.

38. Our conclusion, therefore, in the matter of the negative of interest, is that there is real rejection in the affective life, going forward with the development of class meanings ; but that this rejection, so far as purely affective, is *alogical*.² It proceeds by active appreciation and preference, and denies largely by privation. The organization of positive classes of affective experiences determines many cases of rejection ; and many are due to the positive interest of avoidance.³

§ 10. RELATION AND MODALITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST.

39. In our earlier discussions, we found these two attributes of propositions to be very closely related. Relations known as categorical, disjunctive, and conditional belong to the subject-matter of judgment ; and the modality of acceptance or denial, as assertorial or problematical, belongs to the attitude of belief. Besides the determination of the relationships of content, there is also a determination of the control to which the related content is referred by the act of belief.⁴

40. In respect to the presence in the affective life of these two marks of logical organization, relation and modality, the distinctions made above will again serve us. In the matter of control, there can be no question ; affective meanings can have only one control—that of the inner life as such. From the nature of this control, there can be only one modality in affective logic, the

¹ That this is the character of negation by privation we have shown in detail in an earlier discussion (*Thought and Things*, vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. x., §§ 4, 6).

² Of course it is not alogical to those who reduce logical negation to privation or active rejection. It is alogical to us who hold that logical negation is of the nature of the failure of an attempted assertion to establish itself. See "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., chap. viii. esp. § 5.

³ This case is discussed in the chapter (ix.) on "The Bad."

⁴ *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. ix. § 5.

assertorial.¹ The interest of appreciation is either gratified or not gratified ; in either case, we make a categorical predication of goodness or badness, or we directly presume these predicates without discussion and with no uncertainty. The movement of the interest at work, in making its selections, specifies the object as of value or as lacking value for that interest.

41. There is a sense in which meanings of this sort—meanings of utility, value, interest—may be hypothetical or problematical ; but it is in the sphere of relation, not in that of modality. There is no doubt or uncertainty, as I have just said, when once the determination is accomplished in the inner world. But the sort of worth for emotion, conation, or interest which a given experience is to have may be, before the experience is complete, problematical and schematic. This means that the general of practice, the affective general, may be used with relative indefiniteness, as an instrument for the discovery and determination of further worths for the interest. We constantly vary our experiences, seeking changes of stimulation, cherishing hopes of novelty, indulging the restlessness of desire, exploring the world of interesting and promising things. All this seems to be very analogous, on the side of practical interest, to the movement of logical schematism which carries forward the theoretical interest and becomes its main engine of discovery. In the present case, we find the personal activities, interests, preferences, reaching forward for new gratification ; the general type is determined, but the way is open for novel phases of fulfilment and worth.

42. This will come up again when we speak of the movement of idealization—a point of view from which all the results here secured are to be supplemented—but it would appear that we have here differences in the application of the generals of practice, similar to the differences of logical relation. Our anticipation of experiences as about to fall under larger interests or dispositions, may be decisive and categorical ; but things may also have a toning of uncertainty which makes the event in effect disjunctive or conditional.

The conditions under which an affective meaning is in this sense disjunctive or conditional would seem also to be those of the analogous logical cases. There is a disjunctive appreciation, due to alternative interests, when an experience is not sufficiently strong, clear, or long-continued to determine a definite or exclusive active tendency, sentiment, or mood. And an affective mean-

¹ See vol. ii. chap. ii. § 5.

ing is conditional or contingent when the interest in a larger whole is checked or inhibited by some unrealized partial motive.

We say of a person, "I do not yet know whether I like him or not." This is a disjunctive appreciation : we feel the two stirrings, and only fuller experience can decide which of the interests is to be finally developed. Later on, the mood becomes one of "contingent" interest or appreciation, as when I say, "if he continues to act like that, he will certainly win my friendship." The interest of friendship is *en train* ; but the final classification of the case is contingent upon the working out of this motive, which is not yet fully released. It would be an inviting task to work this out more fully ; here I can only suggest the outlines of the theory.

§ II. "COMMUNITY" OF INTEREST AND PRACTICE

43. A further property of conceptual meaning which properly belongs to logic, is that of "community." It is a fruitful theme, although formal logic does not usually concern itself with it at all. It is pertinent to our present topic, since the principal distinction we have found it necessary to make between affective and cognitive generalization turns upon the difference between them in respect to commonness of meaning.

So far as our discussion has yet disclosed, the community of practice extends only to "conformity" on the part of the individual to *his own generals of action and interest* ; actual conformity on the part of others cannot be predicted or confirmed from the standpoint of one's own.

An ejective reading of our moods, sentiments, and interests is possible ; but this is in detail merely assumptive, and remains impossible of confirmation. Affective "community *for whom*" extends to practical conformity only in the one individual's successive experiences and activities ; "community *by whom*" is limited to the conformity actually observed in the conduct and interests of others.¹ This is only to repeat that we find in the operation of affective logic, so far as we have now gone, the motives of aggregate and syntelic interest, but not those of synnomic interest. We have not so far discovered the motive which gives to the individual's generals of conduct or interest any legislative or

¹ These abbreviated expressions, as already explained, stand respectively for the sorts of commonness by which the questions "for whom" and "by whom" the meaning in question is intended to hold, are answered.

normative force for others than himself. The matter may be left at this pending the discussions of the next chapter.

§ 12. PRACTICAL INFERENCE

44. The system of logical or formal implication is usually considered relatively independent of facts. A series of inferential or deductive processes, which elucidate the relationships of the whole, develop themselves by formal rules or principles. Identity or consistency, contradiction, excluded middle or exhaustion—these with certain movements of subsumption and substitution—give validity to the series of dependencies which constitute logical argumentation.

The pertinent questions then arise: is there such a thing as affective implication, analogous in some sense to logical implication?—and if so, what are the laws or principles of affective inference and argumentation?

45. If we would answer this question to any profit, we should recall, in the first place, the nature of theoretical implication. The presence of logical contradiction is essential to it; and it is by such contradiction, with its mutual exclusions of classes, that the deductive systems take the place of mere inductive identities and classifications. When the limitative classes, *B* and *non-B*, exhaust a given sphere of existence, and in consequence no third alternative is possible, logical opposition arises, and this serves as the basis of all deductive inference.

This process, found to be essential to formal inference, is not present, in any strict sense, in the affective life. Affective negation, as we have found, proceeds not by limitation, as between two mutually exclusive classes, but by rejection and privation under the progress of a positive motive; not by contradiction, but by relative inclusion in a dominant interest. It is the play of interest that determines the whole of the affective content, over against all else. There is no determination of a limited *non-B* class, which, taken with the *B* class, exhausts the sphere of a determinate sort of control or existence. From this two results follow which are important for our present topic.

46. (1) There is *no principle of excluded middle in the life of interest and sentiment*. Affective classes are not mutually limiting and exclusive. Two contrasted affective classes may both be included in the interest that establishes a larger whole of satisfaction. Qualities which for logical inference might take on the form of contradiction and exclusion, may in the

life of feeling, unite in a fusion or synergy of action. We may find ourselves, for example, both hopeful and fearful, as different tendencies and interests struggle within us. Since there is no objective control upon these subjective movements, no rigid "datum" serving to prevent alternative interests from utilizing the same partial experience, the active life issues in the greatest variety of combinations, and shows broader or narrower groupings of motives. Affective classes and their appropriate interests overlap and fuse: the illustrative case, the single experience, may represent more than one of our interests at the same time. We may take intellectual or moral pleasure in suffering physical pain; and we recognize in a dominant mood, incongruous and mutually intolerant factors. The rigidities of cognitive and logical classification—the incompatibilities, inconsistencies, and exclusions of formal logic—give place to the continuous outflow of interest, issuing in this or that practical result.

47. (2) From this it follows that *the sort of universality attaching to logical implication and deduction is lacking in the results of affective organization*. We do not demand that others shall feel as we do, nor that we ourselves shall feel the same always in the same circumstances. It is only after the general interest or sentiment has sprung up, that we identify it and find the present experience appropriate to it. We often complain that things lose their interest, that our moods change the value of experiences, that expected gratifications fail, that pleasures pall. This all testifies to the subjective character of the interest, and the relativity of its object. The reason for it has just been indicated; it is found in the absence of those formal elements of organization—limitation and exclusion—which give stability and rigidity to the relationships of the contents of thought.¹

¹ It may be asked, however, whether this is not inconsistent with our earlier position (see *Thought and Things*, vol. iii., "Experimental Logic," chap. xi. § 6) according to which all contradiction resides in conflict of motor processes. If this be true, how is it that in the essential movements of the active life, now under consideration, we deny that contradiction appears in the organized results? The answer to this is evident. In the case of knowledge the control is in the outer or stimulating conditions under which the object is constructed. The motor processes in question are those stirred up in reaction to the object, and organized in interests which the objects thus objectively controlled serve to gratify. Contradiction arises when two of such systems, each held to its objective data, cannot proceed together: they inhibit and interfere with each other. Here, on the contrary, it is not the objective data

48. In the more detailed processes of inference, the subsumptions and mediations of deduction proper, the same differences appear. The movements of selective interest determine the range of their objective contents ; and only under an artificial and unreal assumption of identity of terms do the classes retain fixed relations to one another. We cannot take an affective class as given, and infer a particular case from it, since the case may, with the shifting of interest, no longer illustrate it, but represent another and different interest. It is plain that with this lack of constancy of meaning, syllogistic processes are very undeveloped in the domain of feeling.¹

§ 13. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSION

49. We have now completed this sketchy and very general survey of the conditions and extent of affective implication. We see its narrow range, but withal its reality. In respect to commonness of acceptance, to universality of force, to negation, and to positive implication, affective differs from logical inference.

It has its mode of generalization, and its syntelic character for the personal life ; but it does not secure the force of synnomic or legislative meaning through the modes of judgment which alone give to logical implication its standing as the universal instrument of reason.

The affective life does not reach out beyond the individual mind by formal implication, as the cognitive life does, holding all to the conclusions of one, by virtue of the *universality of the*

with their appropriate motor processes with which we are concerned, but the active processes which, under a variety of conditions, contribute to consciousness a habitual interest or sentiment. Such an interest may be organized in a typical way, while the greatest variety of objects may illustrate and satisfy it. From this point of view, the object does not excite one set of actions and one only, one interest and only one, but, in addition to its objective standing, which is rigid and subject to contradiction, it also serves the purpose of a variety of interests. It is this ebb and flow of organized interest, over and around the object—that we have called its “selective” meaning or intent—that we are concerned with at present. In so far, in short, as the motor processes are held to a determinate control of external fact, so far contradiction may ensue ; but so far as they are organized in systems of interest, mood, and sentiment, they become states of the self which are not subject to this formal principle.

¹ That is, syllogistic in the strict sense of formal logic. As I have intimated above, there may be formal rules peculiar to affective organization itself (see the footnote to sect. 24 of this chapter). Cf. Appendix A.

relations of content. This shows that implication and inference, in the logical sense, *are not its weapons of universality.*

This does not prove, however, that the rules of the affective life, the rules of practice lack universality ; it only proves that their universality is *not achieved by logical processes.* It remains to ask whether real universality, synnomic force, is secured to the rules of conduct by *any other more intrinsic process.*

50. That there is such a process and that it resides in the nature of practical meaning itself, in the movement of interest, is now to be shown. In considering it, we are introduced to that aspect of affective organization which we call " Ideal."

Chapter VIII

THE IMPERATIVE OF PRACTICAL REASON ¹

1. The important question remains as to the relation of the conformity of custom and habit which we have now derived, to that which is accompanied by a sense of obligation. We have seen that the former arises by the formation of habits and interests of a general character in the individual, through the recurrence of experiences in which the customs of society are embodied. We have, indeed, dwelt upon the rise of these "general" interests in the individual mind up to the point at which they acquire common force in a larger or smaller social group. On the social side, the operation of common functions in the group, the influence of suggestion, the requirements of obedience and of legal sanction—all these things are presupposed; and the account of them usually given may be in its general outlines accepted. Assuming that the imperative force of the practical reason has its roots here, we will now set forth a little more explicitly the sort of preliminary impulsion which the individual feels through what we may call the "rule of habit."

§ 1. THE RULE OF HABIT AND THE INTEREST TO ACCOMMODATE

2. The organization of the interests of the individual takes form, as I have pointed out in detail in another place, in two contrasted attitudes.² If we identify the individual's "self" with this organized mass of interests, we find what may be called the "self of habit" and the "self of learning or accommodation." Assuming this contrast, detailed illustrations of which are given in the work mentioned, we may now summarize the results from the point of view of interest.

Continued practice and habit in a social *milieu* beget attitudes

¹ Much of this chapter has already appeared in French in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, March 1911 ("La Logique de la Pratique").

² *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. ii.

of compliance, obedience, readiness to take up with injunction, example, and custom. This tendency or attitude shows itself in what we may call the "interest of custom." It exhibits, on the one hand, the larger factors of personality already organized in the direction of the social conformities which have become habitual. In this it sets store by the observance of what is already more or less habitual; conformity to what is *common to social requirement and personal habit* is its rule.

In contrast with this, however, we find present to a marked degree in the child, and also in the adult, an attitude which, while terminating in conformity, represents for the individual *not habit but accommodation or adjustment*. It is the attitude of reception, docility, adaptation, whereby the further lessons of the social life are assimilated. It brings about, through imitation, absorption, and trial, the progressive modification of personal habit in conformity to developing social ends. This organized intent may be called the "interest of learning."

Whatever the final difference in these two attitudes may be, it is still true that each of them involves the determination of the self, through one of its interests, with reference to *the relation it sustains to its social milieu*. Together they embody the response to the social whole which all personal development requires, and issue in a progressive organization of personal motives in social lines.

3. Of these two attitudes, it is evidently the former, that of habit as such, together with the interest of maintaining custom, that we have spoken of in the foregoing discussions. The common meaning of our practical ends is due to actually common life, to the recurrence of active experiences in which accord has been established between each self and its social fellows, between the ego and the alter selves. It represents throughout certain *faits accomplis*, due to the processes of social sanction, injunction, and command, securing co-operation and obedience.

4. But the whole process of give-and-take between individual and society may be looked at in another way: no longer *retrospectively*, for the interpretation of results, but *prospectively*, for the anticipation of further lessons in conduct and life. And it is here that the other great attitude of the self appears—the interest of learning, of acquiring, of initiating, of trying-and-trying-again. The self looks forward as well as backward;¹

¹ I have elsewhere pointed out the radical character of this contrast: see the article "The Origin of a Thing and its Nature," *Psychological Review*,

novelties are as essential to its life as customs and habits are.

5. In this we find the further working of a genetic motive to which we have already given an important place: the motive which shows itself in the "semblant" or imaginative¹ reading of what is already given—whether by playful assumption or by serious hypothesis—with the further intent to anticipate and discount the future. We have to recognize that the *imagination is operative in the organization of emotion, disposition, and interest*, no less than in cognitive construction.

The movement of imagination is of the greatest importance in the development of knowledge; it is the method of all genuine advance. We now find that it plays a corresponding rôle in the organization of interest. Indeed, we come here upon the fact that the sort of meaning known as ideal, due to an imaginative *feeling-forward*, has an essential place in the development of the affective life. The entire movement of cognition and feeling alike has not only the interest and intent to conserve its data and preserve its habits, but also the interest and intent to achieve, to learn, to adapt, to acquire, to *feel-forward*. This latter, the prospective interest, operates by a certain imaginative idealization of affective and motive factors, which carries forward the movement of practical conformity. To this we are to return.

§ 2. THE CONFORMITY OF CUSTOM

6. Looking still at our earlier results, especially with a view to the historical discussions of the derivation of the practical reason, we are able to see what the conformity of custom means. It is the recognition, on the part of the individual, of *what is*, and of his need of conformity to the things that are; it is not a sense, on his part, of what *ought to be*, nor of his duty to live up to rules that are ideal. This distinction—which is that between the "syntelic" and the "synnomic"—is still to come in his feeling. A conformity due to the compulsion of custom might be reached, and in individual cases often is, without the realization of the need of conformity to an imperative ideal of conduct. This is only to say that strong social impulsion may be felt without a sense of personal obligation.

Nov. 1895, reprinted in the work *Development and Evolution*, chap. xviii. See also Urban, *Psychological Review*, Jan. 1896.

¹ The movement described throughout our work under the terms "schematism" and "schematic assumption"; see the Introduction above, and also "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. i.

7. Such is the situation actually realized in animal companies ; in them we find the impulsion to conform to what quasi-social tradition and custom they have. Their social habits must be reflected, as Darwin showed, in the mind of each, with a certain force or impulsion toward common conformity. The animal no doubt feels a sort of determination due to the habits of his race and kind, whether these be actually inherited or merely traditional. And no doubt he feels as well the penalties of isolation, or of violation of the habits of family and kind. In his mind, we may suppose, there is a certain dislocation of interests when his conformity is not perfect or cannot be so.

We find the same state of things in the child and in primitive societies. There is a stage of individual growth and of racial progress alike at which the sanctions of social life, the legalism of conformity to what is customary and enforced, is prevalent and effective. It is a state of actual catholicity of aims and desires, of actual co-operation, with knowledge of it. With the child, as with the animal, at this stage of development, and with the savage standing in the same relation to society, there is a dislocation of factors and a relative disturbance of interests when any lack of conformity disturbs the established community.¹

8. But a further and more difficult question is still before us. It is the question as to whether this conformity of custom is all that we must recognize in the imperative, legislative, ought-erecting intent of the practical reason as reflected in the maxims of morality. The criticism usually directed against empirical theories of the social type, which go only so far as the above derivation, is that they do not exhaust the meaning of the moral ; that certain aspects of that meaning remain unaccounted for ; that even if in this account we are on the track of full morality in its beginnings, in the animal, savage and child, we are still not in the presence of the rules of ethical conformity as enforced by the practical reason. This criticism takes on several forms.

9. (1) It is said by certain critics that the conformity required by the moral imperative is a conformity not to the social as such, but to the ideal, *whether it be socially realized or not*. The individual seems to have within him a law of personal isolation as much as one of social community ; for when once he decides a moral question, he must stand alone, if necessary, in its observance

¹ See the remarks in the Preface on "prelogical" processes as described in M. Lévy-Bruhl's *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*.

and enforcement. He may be sensitive to the social custom and feel uncomfortable when he finds himself at variance with it ; but this is very different from his feeling when he violates his sense of right. Indeed, often enough the two sorts of discomfort or of the correlated satisfaction arise together, and are quite distinguishable from each other. The heroes and geniuses of the moral life are as genuinely singular and isolated as those of invention and knowledge ; and the great moral and practical movements of history testify to the renovating character of the opposition which the moral protestant makes to the habitual observances of his time and group. It is impossible to admit, therefore, that in showing the actual and normal conformities of individuals to the rules of social life, we give a sufficient account of the derivation of the rules of the practical reason.

This criticism is, I think, quite valid.

10. (2) Again, it is said that the syntelic or " customary " force of a practical intention does not seem in itself to be universal or legislative for all.

There are differences in the moral codes and practices of different groups of people, when these are objectively considered, and there are also evident differences among people who are at different stages of development and culture. Each has its normal morality corresponding largely to the set of social usages current in it. But while these differences are recognized in our theories and in the classification of the objective facts, they are not recognized in the minds of the actors of the several societies themselves. Each system of morality is exclusive and intolerant ; each finds the legislative character, *for all*, necessary to the type of conformity which it sets up and enjoins. Each actor must believe that his rules are the only correct and adequate ones ; he can recognize in others, so far as their rules diverge from his, only moral barbarians and heathen.

This is the sort of universality possessed by the practical reason : the universality of conformity to an ideal which though rooted in the social situation, seems to be valid behind and beyond it. The conformities thus demanded are not those merely of social habit, but in some sense those of social and individual ideals. And as the individual must erect his rule and enjoin it possibly single-handed upon his fellows, so a tribe must perforce erect its ideal and enjoin it upon other societies.

The individual feels the distinction between his obligations and his mere engagements, between the things of duty and those

of mere arrangement. He has his field of *devoir*, and his field of *laisser faire*. In the latter, alternatives are possible to himself and to others ; in the former, they are not possible for himself, nor for others unless these claim a different sense of duty.

This criticism seems also to be valid ; at least so far as the distinction we are now enforcing is concerned.

11. (3) It is also objected that the social account of the origin of morality makes it too simple and spontaneous, in the sense that mere conformity to custom may not involve processes of self-determination and judgment. One must distinguish the mere compulsion of instinct and impulse, together with the mere impulsion of habit, from the obligation of deliberate conduct, due to reflection and choice. We do not attribute responsibility, either legal or moral, to acts of mere compulsion. We seek, in each case of real morality, to determine the motive which moved the will of the agent. This is an important difference. It would seem to be necessary that there be a certain setting up of an ideal course of action and decision of will, with reference to which the actual act or decision is in some sense valued. There is the feeling that the deed might have been better. This would seem to require something analogous to an act of reflective judgment, something quasi-logical in character,¹ which a full and correct genetic account should lay bare.

This, too, has proved a point of essential difference among ethical theories ; the idealists find this requirement unfulfilled in the empirical and social theories.

I think we must admit the force of this criticism also.

12. These points of criticism, very current, specially the first—not to dwell upon others that might be cited—lead us to refuse to accept as adequate the current social theory of the practical rules of morality.

Are we, then, to go over to an un-empirical, formal, intuitive, or rationalistic account ? That does not follow. It is possible that the current social theory does not exhaust all the empirical factors, does not recognize all the genetic motives, either on the side of society or on that of the individual. It may be that we can point out additional motives, which, in actual experience

¹ It is interesting to note that Darwin recognized this requirement, and suggested that, in true morality, there was a comparison of present with past action (Darwin, *Descent of Man*, chap. iv.). But, as he also intimated, the idealistic criticisms are usually so mixed up with formal and dogmatic distinctions, that it is difficult to estimate their real force.

and life, *carry on the organization of the practical intent and meaning into true universality and legislative force*, and issue in a meaning of conformity to an ideal, rather than to a mere convention. The collective and syntelic force of the practical intent may, like the collective and syndoxic force of the theoretical content, pass over into an individual force which is legislative and synnomic.

§ 3. THE RISE OF THE IDEAL

13. The nature and characters of what is known as ideal meaning have had our attention.¹ We have found that it is the rôle of the imagination to seize upon an idea, thought, or other content, "seemingly," in the pursuit of a special interest; to treat it as being *more than it is*. This is seen in the experimentation or schematism of the development of knowledge, in the "make-believe" of play, in the self-projection or *Einfühlung* of the aesthetic; and now it appears in the development of the interests and organization of the self. All the more special forms of idealization usually carry a motive of "personalization"; they require a reading more or less in terms of the inner life; and the question arises as to whether all idealization does not carry the suggestion of the movement of inner process by which the imagination itself is carried forward.

We must give explicit recognition to this movement of idealization in the affective sphere. Here it comes most vitally into its own—in the sphere of the development of the inner life itself. In the organization of affective and motive factors, it is the self, the inner control principle, that is in question; and the imaginative advance of this organization in the way we call "ideal," presents one great side of mental growth, as that of cognitive organization presents another.²

14. In proceeding to this inquiry, we should remember that it is the meaning of the ideal simply with which we now have to do. We assume the account given above of the organization of the interests of the self, so far as they issue in general classes,

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. x. § 8.

² See chap. v. of M. Ribot's very complete study *Essay on the Creative Imagination*. "The ideal, he writes, is the principle of unity in motion . . . its life is a *becoming*. . . . It is a construction in images belonging to the sketchy or outlined [schematic] type. It is the motor tendency of images in the nascent state. . . . The inventor cuts out, sifts, etc., according to his *interest*" (*loc. cit.* pp. 81-2, Eng. translation).

and so far as these classes find themselves illustrated by special cases. We have found a generalized body of interests and tendencies, felt as the self ; this is ejected into the social fellows, and is illustrated in each of the more special exhibitions of sentiment, mood, and disposition which the individual experiences, these are partial exhibitions of the self, determined as habit and adjustment to social conditions require. All this, I say, we may read off as *not in itself ideal* ; it exhibits the real, the actual, the active self, considered generally and seen in action in the conduct of the individual. Socially considered, it is the self of habit, custom and convention.

15. The additional motive which now concerns us is the imaginative furthering of this actual and established self, whereby its progressive organization goes beyond the given and habitual and *anticipates further results characteristic of selfhood* ; the further movement of inner control, fed by the satisfaction of interests and the fulfilment of needs. There is a drift, a set-onward, a feeling-forward, a tendency toward further results—a movement which is prospective, as the reading of what is already accomplished is retrospective. The content becomes a net, a schema, an intent, set up for the interpretation of personal experience in anticipation of the reduction of the experiences in a further understanding of what personality means. It carries with it the continuing assumption of a completed self, a person who can always understand and adapt his conduct to the situations of life. It erects the ideal of personality it is true, in terms of the present elements of knowledge and feeling, as organized in the actual self ; but these elements do not exhaust the ideal. The good self, the ideal person, the perfect lawgiver, the deity, the disinterested spectator, is assumed—terms all used in theories of knowledge and ethics to mark this aspect of the meaning of obligation.

16. There arises, indeed, early in the development of the child's mind a shadowy presence, an indistinct reflection in the inner chamber of the self, of what its own ideal meaning is to be when the contradictions and hindrances of the active life are overcome.¹ It is objectively embodied in the greater self of

¹ In another place, dealing exclusively with the development of the self-thought, I have illustrated this movement in detail by concrete and actual cases drawn from childhood (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. i. § 3). The interpretation given in that place is the same as that recorded here.

parent, teacher, priest, God. Appeal is made to this self, of greater wisdom and skill, to resolve the embarrassments of the social and moral life. It is by nature all-wise and all-powerful, since it is an idealization of the actual motives of knowledge and will. It presents standards for the decision of disputes, for the reconciliation of contradictions, for the final solution of those moral mysteries which embarrass the seeker after truth and goodness. At the same time, it cannot be completely understood or realized; for that would be to have already attained the ideal. It forever eludes pursuit, while imposing its presence and prescribing its rules upon the more fragmentary selves which it seeks to organize.

17. Of this ideal of the personal life, certain more exact statements may be made, which should be read in contrast with the points already made out for the development of the corresponding movement in the contents of knowledge.

(1) In idealization the factors of inner control are utilized, the personal tendencies, interests, affective-conative dispositions, etc., which urge themselves forward for satisfaction.

(2) It proceeds by the imaginative organization of these motives of the affective life, being an ideal reading of what is actual in the life of habit and interest.

(3) It reflects and embodies the social life through all the processes by which the self of habit is trained in custom and social usage and disciplined by social sanctions.

(4) It is a meaning essentially of the selective and affective type, anticipating in a semblant or imaginative way satisfactions akin to those rendered in judgments of appreciation.

(5) It affords a type of meaning in which the movement of appreciation is turned inward upon the self; the actual self, embodied in an act or disposition, is appreciated *as in so far fulfilling or failing to fulfil its own ideal*.

The last two of these points require fuller explanation. They seem to have little analogy in the life of cognitive idealization. They mark a departure in which the core of the practical reason, considered as a body of legislative and imperative rules of practice, is, in my opinion, laid bare.

In view of our long and somewhat involved exposition, it may be well to state at once the result at which we are now to arrive, and then explain it in some detail. It may perhaps find its justification, without much further discussion, in the mind of those who have followed the foregoing with care.

§ 4. THE OUTCOME OF PRACTICAL MEDIATION

18. I find the following conclusions to be justified by our discussions. There are two cases of mediation : that of knowledge and that of appreciation, that of truth and that of worth. Both proceed by the imaginative use of a mediating context of revived states, ideas and feelings. One uses these revived states *as tools of discovery*, the other employs them *as means to personal ends*. One movement is *theoretical*, the other is *teleological* in the sense of *purposive*.

The former of these processes, the cognitive or logical form of mediation, issues in a system of independent implications. The ideal of the theoretical interest is a body of independent and self-evident principles of knowledge. All control external to the system and necessary to its confirmation may be abolished ; and the final reading be found just in the system of relational contents itself, considered as self-consistent and valid. This result is reached by the complete detachment of the body of mediating states which are erected into a system having the force of independent and absolute validity.¹

19. In the other case, in the teleological or practical movement from means to ends, *the method is reversed*. The mediating content, the means, is *neglected in the interest of realization of the worths which it mediates*. The issue is a system of "pure goods," so to speak, of ideal values, finding its control solely in the development of the self which is thus advanced. The ideal is that of a system of appreciations, satisfactions, realizations ; as that of the theoretical is a system of logical validities.² In the theoretical an item of truth is held by its implications in a rational system ; in the practical, the individual act or intention is held to the ideal of a system of values.³

¹ See *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. xi. §§ 5f. The motives of this detachment are, as intimated above, limitation and contradiction, both arising in actual experience.

² As an end of pursuit, truth is also teleological ; but as *taken to be* an absolute system of rational principles, the theoretical is independent of personal interest and pursuit. We have pointed out also in an earlier discussion (vol. ii. chap. vi. sect. 21), certain respects in which such principles have an intent of hypothesis or postulation.

³ As the following discussion does not attempt to adjust its results to those reached in current ethical discussion from other points of view (as ably expounded and criticised for example by Simmel, in his *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*) it may be said here : (1) that the result accords

In the one, *the end is lost in the means*; in the other, *the means is lost in the end*. *Each thus attains its normal ideal.*

20. This contrast will appear to be the natural one, if we consider the origin and development of the two sorts of meaning. The theoretical proceeds throughout by the suppression of the factors of selection and preference; its results are embodied in a system of relations in which such personal motives have no place. The development of selective and affective meaning, on the contrary, is by a series of personal worth-experiences and choices; the interest of the pursuit of ends motives the selection of means. The result in this case, then, is that the factors of action and self-realization sweep forward beyond the means—which apart from this use are indifferent, and for this use are variable—and postulate an ideal of completed striving and accomplished purpose. The traveller dreams of the port, forgetting the rig of the ship that brings him to it.

Each process seeks to issue in an immediacy as the outcome of the process of mediation; and in each case the immediacy is of the type in which the motives proper to the process are terminated and fulfilled.¹ With the one, it is the immediacy of theoretical intuition or pure reason; with the other, it is that of practical reason or moral intuition.

21. Let us now take up in more detail the consideration of the movement of idealization in the active life, and see whether the outcome is what we have just stated it to be.

There are two essential marks of theoretical and practical

with a theory of "self-realization" of the empirical or genetic type: the progressive organization proceeds literally by "stepping stones of dead selves to higher things"; (2) it falls in with the theory of a single ideal or end—the ideal self—only from the point of view of theory, since in each act of choice, it is not the ideal self that is chosen, but the ideal act, and this act is ideal only in reference to the elements then in course of organization: it is a preference for one alternative as being the more ideal; (3) it does not require a formal or logical comparison of worths *inter se* or with an absolute standard, and a judgment of preference; on the contrary, it is the issue of an intrinsic movement of affective conative process—of inner control—in a new synergy and self-status, in which all the alternatives are organized. See Urban, *Valuation, etc.*, chap. xiii., for a discussion of "Synthetic Preference"—that is, of the conditions under which a value of one order or grade is preferred to others. Such preference raises the problem of the comparative morphology of values, to which we are to return.

¹ Called below (chap. xiv.) immediacy of "transcendence."

reason alike, bearing the same names in the two cases, "necessity" and "universality." We will conduct the further discussion with reference to these two marks.

§ 5. PRACTICAL NECESSITY : THE RULE OF THE IDEAL

22. The recognition of the ideal is of that to which one *ought* to conform, both in what one is and in what one does and intends. We have a sense of obligation to the ideal, showing itself in response to what is called, on the more objective and social side, the "necessity" of the ideal itself. This ideal imposes itself upon us by a moral necessity, to which the sense of obligation is the personal response. It is "necessary" that we obey, that we conform. What relation now, we may ask, does this practical necessity bear to the logical necessity of the principles of theoretical intuition or of logical implication in general?

23. In the derivation of logical necessity there is, as we have seen, a sort of subjective impulsion—the necessity of the movement of personal belief—arising from repetition and recurrence in a single mind. This was long ago intimated by Hume and Mill. The uniformity of habit becomes the "uniformity" of nature. The recurring thing or event is identified as the same through the necessity of the repeated function.

This feeling of necessity is subjective not in the sense of being merely personal, but only in the sense of issuing from a mode of personal or subjective function which may be common to several. It is in this sense that we say that it is "necessary" that I experience the same event as the same, and that you and I experience it also as the same. This necessity of habit and common function is correlated with the relative stability of the objective, with any germs of inherent necessity its behaviour may show.

It is clear that such necessity as this attaches also to affective meanings. We have pointed out a process of generalization in which a general attitude or interest stands for a variety of experiences of the same affective order. This goes far to supply a relatively constant and quasi-objective basis of uniformity, a phase of which, generated in reference to our inner attitudes or interests themselves, is felt as necessity. Each fearful experience *must be* a fear, just as each horse *must be* a horse. This in turn is enhanced, in this case as in that of external objects, by the reading of the affective contents as common to myself and others, who also feel the necessity of acting as their and our common habit and disposition require.

24. There is, then, probably, in the simpler stages of habit and feeling, a certain "impulsion," a certain sense of urgency, a certain quasi-obligation arising from the growing conformities of personal and social life. It is reflected in the individual's intent to act in consistency with his own tradition, and in union with others. It is the early form of the force of habit which we have already noted as recognized in the current Darwinian and social derivations of morality. It is, of course, enormously enhanced by the enforced conformities of social life; by the operation of the various sanctions of the pedagogical, conventional, and religious orders, all of which represent to the individual the behests of society. The social sanctions produce in the individual a habit of deferring to external law and order, which represent what is necessary and obligatory.

25. It has already been pointed out that this merely conventional and "customary" sort of impulsion, due to habit and social conformity, is not in itself that of moral obligation. It would seem that in such a direct response to habit within and to authority without, we have to do with a mode of self-determination in which the ideal as such does not materially figure. The individual finds a certain impulsion attaching to his habitual actions, and also a certain need of obedience to the sanctions of the social order; what is needed, further, is the transfer of the authority to the inner life itself. The inner authority must become superior to the external; and with this there must be the identification of all the partial personal selves with this inner authority. For the moral agent may say to himself, "It is true I have acted merely from habit, and also again merely from obedience to another; and I *condemn myself* for not having followed the behests of my own moral insight, which might not have endorsed either of these prescriptions. My actions and motives should have been revised and unified in conformity to my sense of the moral ideal. Even though I do not see how I could accomplish this, still I feel sure that I have not acted rightly, and that a wiser, a more ideal, self than mine could explain to me the better way. This necessity I am under—the necessity to follow an ideal law and to strive for an ideal conformity—even though no one may agree with me that the course I adopt represents the deeper insight."

When we ask as to the source of such a further necessity, we see that mere agreement of wills *inter se*, as a fact, is not sufficient. The fullest social conformity is often the gravest sin

from the point of view of self-approval. What, then, is the further motive, the added movement in the development of personal life which brings in a new and fuller necessity?

26. In the first place we may say, negatively, that it is not the same as that which generates the necessity of the logical or rational as such. For when we come to compare the two modes of meaning with each other on the higher level of reflection and judgment, we find great discrepancies existing between them. Logical necessity, the necessity of judgment and of all meaning organized in systems of valid implication, attaches to relations. It arises by processes of contradiction and limitation or exhaustion. This makes it possible to look upon an organized system of relational meanings as self-maintaining in a given sphere. As such the implications as a whole are logically necessary. But the condition requisite to this, it is evident, is the establishment of the whole in the world of ideas, in the world of reflection as such, and its positive separation from any further control by fact. So far as it becomes formal and logical, a body of theoretical intuition ceases to be material and experimental, a body of growing and inductive knowledge. The mediating body of ideas is taken to be a detached and self-sufficient system of absolute truths.

In this respect, the contrast with the necessity of the moral life or the practical reason could not be more marked than it is. So far from being relational in its content, this latter is characterized by such a lack of fixed relational form that its precepts cannot be formulated at all. The moral ideal does not present rules of consistency; it has no fallacies of irrelevancy and contradiction; it recognizes no principle of excluded middle, as we have already seen. Instead of a body of relational contents, there is an attitude of will, a motive of personal choice, a movement of determination of the self upon a practical problem which allows alternative solutions.

We have here, in other words, an affair of the organization of affective and motive factors in the larger whole of personal interest. This organization does not proceed by the processes of limitation and exhaustion of contents, which serve as ground and foundation of the structure of logical implication; but by the restatement of affective motives in more and more ideal terms.

27. So far again from being detached or "lifted," so to speak, from the control in which its values are established, it is, on the contrary, an affair almost exclusively of the movement of this

control itself, the personal life. A truth of the theoretical reason is, as we say, intuitively recognized as holding for any data whatever which may become subject-matter of judgment. "A is A" is simply a rational identity; "every cause has an effect" is a necessary principle apart from the particular sphere in which we may find illustrations of it. So extreme, indeed, is this tendency to release the rational system from all the accidents and embarrassments of experience and practice, that we come upon the theory which attributes to the mind itself a body of rational or *a priori* principles by which experience is said to be organized.

In the case of practical reason, on the contrary, there is no "loosing" of the control proper to the meanings of selection, appreciation, and value. The emphasis is held upon the inner movement, the vital identification of the agent with the meanings he achieves. It is always "my choice," "my enjoyment," "my selection," "my love," "my selective and exclusive interest." And this is not by a secondary reading or appropriation of the results; but by the necessary implication of the selective motives of personality. The organization of the interests of the self is present in the act of choice by which an ethical decision is reached, and nothing so soon destroys the genuineness of the meaning, its moral character, as any intrusion of the nature of compulsion which destroys the spontaneity of the personal movement of choice. We say in morals and in law alike, "he is irresponsible, since it was not fully his act; his intention was not realized; or his choice was not free."

The progress of the moral life, therefore, and the rules in which it issues, are matters of the intimate organization of the active processes themselves, in relative neglect of the more objective and relational data which constitute the means of realization.

§ 6. MODES OF PRACTICAL NECESSITY

28. We have now traced the meaning of practical necessity up to the point at which it merges into the moral, properly so called. We have found a certain impulsion attaching to the urgency of mere function, when it has attained the force of habit; a necessity of the self of habit to be regularly and effectively what it is. The presence of inhibition, conflict, and embarrassment in the active life reveal the urgency of habit; and this is

felt as a certain need of conforming to the more established sorts of action. Its violation is accompanied by restlessness and discomfort. This is no doubt the germ of the more developed forms of inner impulsion and obligation.

Another factor appears in the fact that action of a personal sort is practically always social; it has some form of commonness, and thus grows to be knowingly "syntelic." The accommodative and imitative tendencies are brought into play, and the need of being social is felt as habit. The individual finds himself *en train* to make his personal action conform to social models; and this is enforced by all the sanctions of education and social constraint. Thus action is socialized. The impulsion of habit is fused with the force of custom.

But the limits of this sort of conformity, with the necessity it imposes, are quite apparent. It is at the best conformity to what is, to a factual situation, to a "rule of custom"; it is not a prescription of conformity to an ideal which is of personal and super-social force. Granted that the roots of moral conformity are social, and that its contents and standards are socially derived, still the reflection of this into the individual's practical ideal involves new and different factors.

29. These non-moral modes of necessity have appropriate names. In the realm of the logical, necessary propositions are called "apodeictic"; they are categorical propositions in which the meaning of necessity is expressed as a relation between subject and predicate, irrespective of personal preference or choice, as "every event must have a cause." Construed objectively, they connote the metaphysical necessity of the real.

30. As soon, however, as departure is made from these logical and metaphysical modes of necessity, by the inclusion of a strain of selection, the imperative mood begins to appear. In all the range of problematical and hypothetical statements, in which the varying modes of modality allow a moment of selection, the attitude of preference appears in a form of the quasi-imperative "let it be": as in the statements "let it be blue, if I may choose," "let us go home, if you are not averse to it," "let it rain, for all I care."

These are statements which involve the entrance of the motive of inner control or choice into the realm of objective determination, but under conditions that recognize the essential objectivity of the sphere in which the result is still to be worked out. It is a sort of invocation to nature to be what we wish,

while at the same time we recognize that nature may not obey our behest.¹

31. A most interesting case of this appears when the sphere of determination of the result in which the preference is to be rendered is itself social; when, that is, the matter at issue depends upon the will of others in whole or part. The individual will or preference is not directly decisive, but it may influence the will of those who do determine the issue. We have already discussed this case in speaking of the "will-to-believe,"² and distinguished it from purely objective determination. Here the range of necessity seems to be actually limited by the decision of a social group in common; the "let it be" is changed into "let us do," or "pray obey." It seems to mean a certain state of contingency, in which the necessity of the objective sort is not yet fully replaced by the subjective necessity of obligation.

32. The motive of inner determination or selection gains headway, however, as the erection of ideals of practice supersedes both the mere recognition of the rules of custom and the variations of temporary choice and mere caprice. The force of the ideal succeeds to the impulsion of habit and the constraint of custom. The meaning thus derived is expressed in the morally necessary: "I must, because I ought." This is the true form of the categorical imperative of the practical reason.

33. Looking at all these forms of necessity from the point of view of the practical life, as rendering modes of meaning in the logic of practice, we may distinguish three cases.

First, there is the case in which the sanction is objective and unconditional, which we may call "objective necessity": "I must do this, for you compel me," is its form. *Second*, the case of personal selection and decision within a whole of objective and possibly social sanctioning, giving the "hypothetical imperative," "I should do this, in certain circumstances." This in turn passes over, *third*, into the "moral necessity" of ideal conformity: "I must do this, for it is right." If we confine the term "necessity" to the case of purely objective sanction, and use the term "imperative" for the cases of inner impulsion and obligation, we have the following scheme:—

Objective necessity, as in, "I am compelled to do this."

Hypothetical imperative, as in, "I should do this, under certain

¹ This may be called the "indicative imperative," in contrast with the true imperative. Cf. vol. ii. chap. ix. sect. 36.

² *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. viii. § ix.

conditions"; "I am impelled by prudence, etc., to do this."

Categorical imperative, as in, "I ought to do this."

34. In this movement, viewed genetically,¹ we see *first* the progress of conduct from dependence upon fact to dependence upon ideas; from things as conditioning conduct, to *ideas as means*; from objective necessity to the hypothetical imperative. Instead of the command "do this," the injunction becomes "do *this*, if you wish *that*."² *Second*, the further step is taken from ideas, as means, to *ends and ideals considered as directly attainable and immediate worths*. The compulsion of fact having passed into the impulsion of ends conditioned upon means, this in turn passes into direct obligation, which is free from all conditions. The means become hampering conditions, and the ideal end refuses to recognize them. So the "must" of objective necessity finally passes over into the "ought" of inner necessity.

The mediating context thus *drops out altogether*; the ideal becomes self-maintaining and absolute. This is in sharp contrast to the development of the theoretical system, in which the personal worths and ends are dropped out, and the system of mediating ideas becomes self-maintaining and absolute.

§ 7. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

The positive characters of the sort of necessity embodied in the categorical imperative are especially marked, in contrast to those attaching to the necessity of external law and to that of logical implication. Both of the latter are objectively necessary. The moral law, on the contrary, in which the ideals of the practical reason are embodied, has the marks of subjective value or inner appreciation. In reciting them in more formal order, we are able to gather up our results.

35. (1) "Necessity," in the sphere of moral ideals, is that of a *postulated system of worths*, not that of a *demonstrable system of implications*. The necessity of logic is due to the hold which a series of logical terms have upon one another in the larger whole: "If A then B," is the form of statement. The necessity of morals, on the contrary, is due to the holding which satisfactions, attainments, achievements, have upon a self or agent in whose

¹ Genetically, that is, in the large sense of before and after in mental history; the inner control and sanction gradually take form in self-determination and personal initiative. It is not meant that in any one case the meaning of necessity goes through these stages.

² See Appendix A for illustrative syllogistic forms.

imagination the postulated worths are depicted. The "correctness" of valid deduction is superseded by the "fitness" of personal motive or act. Even the relative contingency of fact is disregarded in the sweep of the movement toward the postulated ideal. I cannot be content with saying, "I will be as good as you are," "I shall do as others do," or "we need not pursue shadowy ideals"; all these are hypothetical and incomplete. They represent the union of fact and worth in which the external control is active, and the ideas and facts employed as means have not been completely merged in the ideal ends. The ideal of a further conformity to the pattern of a complete and perfect self, hovers over consciousness; and the compromises and prudential concessions to the demands of custom, convenience, and utility take on the meaning of moral cowardice and surrender. The world whose rewards we must pursue is that of an order of completed worths and realized ends—not yet realized, in fact, it is true, but postulated *as if realized*. The system of conditional means is no longer in play.

36. (2) Moral necessity, it follows, is not that of fact in a system of established relationships, but that of *fitness in a world of ends*. "This act is not befitting a moral agent who feels the force of the ideal," "I myself am not fit to enter the kingdom where the rule is that of a moral order"—such are the utterances of the practical reason, in the presence of acts and attitudes which do not minister to the development of the ideal self. There is here, therefore, a necessity of adaptation, of synergy, of organization, of the type that we have found present in the growth of interest. The facts only restrict and embarrass; they prove to be hindrances to moral achievement, limitations upon personal endeavour. The means become confining barriers to the attainment of moral fitness. The bad act is one that impairs the fitness of the agent's habit and attitude with reference to a more ideal life; it is mediated by a wrong intention or by an unworthy thought. A good act is one by which one attains the sense of enhanced fitness and participation in the ideal—the means, ideas and facts, being overcome and abolished. In every moral decision we burn the bridges behind us.

37. (3) Moral necessity, again, is due in a sense to the inclusion of a particular case under a more general meaning, but not in the sense in which this is true of logical necessity. In the latter, this inclusion is due to the established identity of a meaning of the relational and cognitive type. We say correctly, "I

this be a crow it *must* be black, for all crows are black." This is logical necessity. But in the moral realm this type of meaning does not exhaust the case.

There is, however, a general of interest and, objectively considered, also one of custom, under which single acts are subsumed. We say, "such an act is not proper," or, "this is the prudent course," recognizing the force of habit and the sanction of social constraint. But such cases are illustrations of the hypothetical imperative, not of the categorical. They have the common force which comes from being actually realized as motives in different minds at once; but this does not produce moral necessity. It is merely prudential.

There is in the realm of the moral a projection of interest imaginatively beyond the general meaning; it goes on to invoke the ideal. It is to this that the attribute of necessity found in the categorical imperative attaches. The sense in which the new act is a case under the ideal is in its intent dynamic and prospective. It serves to *depict the new ideal, not merely to illustrate an old concept*. Its personal force resides in the active life, not in the mere reading of the act as similar to others. The progressive unification of the active motives and tendencies, in the larger interests of the self, presses forward to completion; and it is in this movement, in which the partial act or motive is drawn upon, that the "ought" meaning is induced. "I who might act in this case selfishly," one may say, "or generously, according as I choose one course or another, feel nevertheless that both sorts of action may be wrong. I must act so that my best insight into the nature of ideal conduct will be realized, *whether from other points of view the act appear selfish or generous*." It is in this respect that morality is reflective; it supersedes the *spontaneous outgo of impulse and habit*. It represents an affective general end, at the same time giving it an illustration in the direction of the ideal. The worth depicted is not, like truth, dependent upon the correct mediation of a general meaning by a particular experience, or the reverse; but it postulates a genuine universal worth or ideal which the particular case, taken as fact, serves to make conditional and hypothetical. On the other hand, the single case, read in the light of the ideal, becomes of unconditional worth. Here we see again the passage from dependence upon means to the direct intuition of ends.

38. We will return to the discussion of the universality of the moral imperative. Here it will suffice to note that the two

attributes "necessity" and "universality" go together in this higher unification of interests. The obligation to act morally involves bringing the single act or intention under an affective rule or law; but that rule is not, like the general of cognition, a classification of facts or particulars; it is, rather, of the nature of a postulated sphere or order of interests in which actions are ideally organized. It proposes a further dynamic outcome whose force is felt in advance. "Be ye perfect," we are told by the Jewish seer, "even as your Father in heaven is perfect." Of course, we cannot be perfect; but what little way we go toward it, we go only by identifying ourselves with the feeling and purpose of perfection.

39. The general conclusion, therefore, would seem to be that in the organization of the affective life, the motives of inner function and control take form in the larger interests of the self. As this develops it holds together the partial motives and interests in two ways. First, it organizes them in a mode of "generality," analogous to that of logical implication: the single act conforms in its type to a general sentiment, mood, habit, or custom. Second, it proceeds further by erecting imaginatively an ideal interest or self, to which all the partial acts and intentions, both single and general, must conform. It is this latter demand for ideal conformity, this need to be ideally complete, that is felt as moral necessity and is called the categorical imperative. It is the need of the developing inner principle of control to go on to completeness, and to bring into subjection all the acts and attitudes with which the self allows itself to be identified. This forbids the toleration of the "ifs" and "buts" of conditional and partial worths; the conditions of all sorts, the means, *are finally abolished*.

§ 8. PRACTICAL UNIVERSALITY

40. We have now seen how, in certain important aspects of its meaning, the practical reason tends to *abolish the means and pass directly to the end*, the postulated ideal; while knowledge proper does the reverse, abolishing the mere end and reifying the means, the related system of ideas, as absolute truth or reason. The self of the perfected moral order is a self to which the value of right conduct and intention is immediately revealed. We will now see that the same result appears from the consideration of the universality of the norms of practical reason.

41. The universality of the meaning of "right" attaching to an act, resides not in its application to a series of illustrative cases, realized in fact or idea, *but in the direct worth of the single case*, in which the self finds itself advanced. In this conclusion, which is justified below, we have further evidence of the general thesis to the effect that the ideal of the practical reason is one of worth or end rather than one of implication or content.

Coming to consider the meaning of the universality which attaches to the norms of the practical reason, we find again a superficial resemblance to the corresponding theoretical case.

42. *First*, there are types of action, analogous to logical classes, which we recognize as good or bad. We make out certain classes of the virtues, such as veracity, moderation, and loyalty; and we also recognize the vices under certain headings or classes. This shows the presence of the general attitudes or interests which we have already discovered in the affective life.

Further, we take the particular act or feeling to represent what is common to it and the other cases of the class. So far, this is analogous to that aspect of the theoretical which we describe when we speak of the applicability of a general to all the particulars or cases which fulfil its definition. In this respect, the classification of virtues and vices is retrospective and recognitive; it takes account of the particular case as fulfilling an established class-meaning.

43. Moreover, *second*, we find that the moral rule is one which, like the theoretical universal, admits of no exceptions when once its applicability is determined. To be sure, it is here that the distinction between form and content becomes most useful to the casuist; in systems of casuistry it is fruitfully applied to the advantage of departures from the universal. The casuist declares the formal universality of the moral rule, but finds frequent cases which only apparently fall under it, not really. But the rule itself, apart from the empirical determination of the case, is always universal in form; it declares every case of an act—properly described as such an act—to be right or wrong. The hypothetical element resides solely in the difficulty of definition, due to the fact already pointed out that the logical principles of exhaustion and excluded middle do not hold in the realm of affective meaning. This aspect of universality, therefore, either requires the acknowledgment of the case as one already defined in terms of the rule in hand, or it goes over into the mere tautology and formalism of an abstract and empty prescription.

44. *Third*, it is in respect to this formalism, however, that the striking differences between theoretical and practical universality begin to appear. In the theoretical realm, the formal rule or law is relatively independent and self-subsisting; it does not depend at all upon the determination of further single cases of the general meaning. For example, I identify an animal as a horse, and say that, being a horse, it must have mammalian characters; this does not require me to go further and discover the marks of the single and particular horse, whereby I know him to be my horse "Joe." The meaning of logical universality terminates and exhausts itself in the inclusion of the case as a particular under the general. It cannot, indeed, as I have pointed out above,¹ concern itself with the marks of the singular case, for it is these marks which by virtue of their resistance to generalization give the case its singularity.

45. When we look at the universality which attaches to the moral and practical, we find, up to a certain point, a similar state of things. To the degree in which feelings and actions show a movement of the nature of generalization, they become formal in the sense that theoretical meanings are. The general of interest or sentiment applies to its particulars as particulars; and in this regard it does not require the exhaustion of the marks of singularity in any one case. We describe a state of mind as hopeful or fearful, or of some other general emotional tone, without in so doing attempting to convey its intimate and immediate quality in distinction from other experiences of the same class.

When we recall the conditions of affective generalization, we see why this is true. The affective state is generalized only by successive repetitions of experiences sufficiently alike to be taken—largely for purposes of communication—as the same. But this does not mean that the single case does not have marks, each time we experience it, which make it singular. We note variations indeed in our most uniform experiences of an emotional and affective character. We say, "I do not enjoy this as much as usual," or "I am not in the right mood," or "it grates on me," or "I find it stale and insipid"—all characterizations within the sameness of the experience considered as a recurrent event of life. It is in its quasi-logical or general character, therefore, that the universality of a practical meaning takes on the formal aspect from which the direct and intimate differences of singular states are negligible.

¹ *Thought and Things*, "Functional Logic," vol. i. chap. x. § 6.

46. But now comes the striking difference between the two cases. Unlike the theoretical, which is unable to construe or include the singular as such, *the practical finds its complete fulfilment, its appropriate realization, only in the singular.*¹

Let us ask, for the sake of concreteness, when it is that the universality of the moral really comes home to the agent—when it is that the mere assent to a formal and tautological prescription, the platonic attachment to rectitude, passes into the intimate personal sense of moral approbation and love of the ideal—when it is that I know the meaning of right or wrong and assent to its real universality, admitting that it can be only what it is. Is it not *in the very act*, in the doing of the deed, in the choice or personal intent to commit myself to a singular experience?

47. It would seem that consciousness is explicit on this point. The entire difference of point of view between the casuist and the active moral agent is here. It is the latter only to whom the imperative has an immediate and personal force. He says, "here it is that my morality defines itself; here I know the rule *in action*, and the violation *in fact*. I praise myself when I find the action good, I feel remorse when I find it bad; and each of these is the testing of what was before but an assent to a distant, formal, and intellectual reading of tradition, custom, legal formulation or example. Only now is it an experience of moral worth.

Many of the embarrassments of the moral life reside here. We make up our minds, after extended debates with ourselves or with others; we find excuses for lack of knowledge and reasons which pose as illustrations of insight; we come duly prepared for the act, ready to confront the public, to refute the wise, to confound the sages of ethical philosophy; all seems to be clear. But when the act itself come upon us, *the heart speaks in the singular*. The self, in presence of the moral situation, rises in its personal fullness and utters its word. The reaction of personality is overwhelming; all our formal rules and ready-made resolutions fall back before it. I act; and I say, when asked why I acted as I did, "Simply because I had to, it was right."

48. The point to note is this: this is not a mere sentiment,

¹ It may be said that cognition does also; that full knowledge extends to singulars. But it has already been shown that just here one of the limitations of knowledge appears, in that cognition, proceeding by generalization, renders only the objective, not the immediate, marks of singularity. See *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. xiv. § 4.

a caprice of the sort usually attributed to the movement of feeling ; it is, on the contrary, a determination of the profoundest motives of interest and conation in an essentially new and more advanced form. It is the outcome of all the affective organization which has been woven by successive acts into the constitution of the self.

Psychological analysis of motive and choice has shown that there are both clear and obscure motives, both well-defined ends and ill-defined "affects"—the latter constituting the ground swell or fundamental, a tide of process which breaks in the crest of the single decision. In this single choice or act, the conation takes on its ripest form ; and it cannot be accounted for either by mechanical forces or by purely logical processes. We cannot say that the motives *cause* the act ; nor that the motives are *the premises* of the act. Both statements are essentially misleading and false. We can and must say that the motives—all the earlier movements of the active and cognitive life—*condition the act in the way characteristic of affective organization.*

49. I wish to insist upon this because it is here that the meaning of obligation shows itself in the universality and necessity of the moral law ; *and it is here alone.* The characteristic differentiating mark of the moral resides not in custom and habit, not in logical rule, not in external sanction ; but *in the intimate quality of the single act of choice.* It is an affective unification. In this act, the momentum of the progress of the race and of the development of the individual finds its outlet ; and in this the racial sword of Damocles falls upon its victim, the unworthy self or the immoral act. If, as we have seen to be the case, the single affective experience escapes the forms of logic and fails of cognitive reading, yet it does not by that fact fail of meaning to the agent himself. For him, on the contrary, it passes beyond the modes of content, the forms of things, and the accidents of social situations ; these are but the means of his identification of himself with his ideal. He says to himself, "Here is what I need, let me embrace it, and by living in it, realize my better self. 'Here I stand, I can do no otherwise, God helping me.'"

50. In this we see once more the truth of the statement that the means is lost in the end ; reversing the intellectual movement of theoretical intuition, in which the end is lost in the means. In the latter the personal, single, intimate worth is abstracted from, and an impersonal set of logical implications—which have arisen, indeed, only as personal means—is erected as if it were indepen-

dent of every one's active life and interest. So in colourless reason the intellectual reaches its apotheosis. Here, on the contrary, the life of feeling and action asserts its claim. It sees in ideas and things only means; and by the erection of ideals it goes beyond the means to the attainment of the ideal end, the complete and final good. Here the self is dignified and vindicated.

51. Finally, we have to remark upon the continuity of this movement with all that has proceeded in the development of the affective life. At each stage of growth there is a restatement of the factors of inner control in a way that makes the self and its interests more explicit and more complex. Every act of self-determination is a new statement, a reconstitution, of the affective factors in unique and singular form. 'The only source of moral insight is moral action; the only means of discovery of the meaning of moral obligation is concrete obedience to it. The advance is continuous only to him who plays the active rôle; for the demands of the ideal only become apparent as the ideal itself comes more and more to constitute itself in the consciousness of right.

Instead, therefore, of a set of static norms and rules, the moral life is a series of personal insights, fed by single acts. Looked at historically and retrospectively, we classify actions and formulate rules of virtue; and this is all very well for those more general aspects of conduct which we find it possible to enforce as being socially useful. But when the moral Seer comes among us, when the voice of the Prophet is heard in the land, all these rules show themselves to be formal and ineffective. We learn the new lesson of love and justice, of brotherhood and mercy, from him; but when again the new insight is crystallized in legal maxims, it invites the same fate as before. The race, like the individual, learns through the object lesson of the single case. The ideal meaning, unlike the logical, moves forward with the rising and setting of the sun.

§ 9. GENERAL RÉSUMÉ

52. We have discovered a progressive organization in the active life, a genetic logic of feeling and action, or of *Interest*.

This organization proceeds by processes of Revival, Generalization, Ejection, and Idealization of affective and conative states. It is through revival that affective states are recognized and generalized; it is through ejection that affective generals are made socially common or "syntelic"; and it is through imagina-

tive idealization that these general and common meanings are re-interpreted in terms of personal worth ; that is, as ends. By the movement of idealization, the general rules of practical conformity, established through habit and custom, pass from the status of mere social prescriptions ("syntelic" in force) to that of the categorical imperative, which is necessary and universal, in the sense of being imposed by each moral agent upon all ("synnomic" in force).

The entire movement is intrinsic and *sui generis*, since it proceeds by the continued pursuit of personal ends and the postulation in such ends of absolute ideals ; while knowledge, on the contrary, proceeds by the reverse process—by the neglect of personal ends, and the attribution of absolute validity to the system of ideas which for the active life are merely means. Theoretical intuition finds reality in a neutral and impersonal body of rational principles, developed in the pursuit of the cognitive interest, and embodied in *formal universals* ; practical reason finds reality in the ideal of worth for the self, developed in the pursuit of the selective interest, and discovered anew in *every voluntary act*. Each in its own way seems to reach immediacy as the outcome of a process of mediation, to come face to face with reality.

But the meanings of reality which they reach have the marks of their origin. One is the postulated reality of value in which the inner control process completes itself ; the other is the reality of systematic truth, external control, neutral and disinterested, from which all intent of preference has been stripped.

Before attempting further to deal with the situation thus created,¹ we must inquire into the types of possible immediacy, and also admit the candidacy of another mode of function, the æsthetic, which may be found to have an equal right to consideration with these two, as a revealer of the real.

¹ See chap. xv. §§ 4, 5.

Chapter IX

THE BAD

§ I. ACTIVE REJECTION

1. In several of our discussions we have found light to come from the consideration of the negative modes of meaning; indeed, we have consistently made the negative part of our problem, seeing the important place it plays in the development of the logical as such. In the description of the forms of negative meaning, at the outset,¹ two great motives of negation appeared which constantly recur: the motives of rejection and denial, corresponding respectively to those of acceptance and affirmation. We found reason to think that logical negation does not originate in rejection, but has its roots in a denial due to the failure of a positive proposal.² The motive of rejection, however, comes in, as we saw, in those forms of statement in which the control of a meaning is in question. The content is rejected from a control or sphere of existence. Various shadings of rejection were found in privative and selective negation.³ In the consideration of the meanings of the active life, we will discover more explicit instances of rejection.

In general, we may say that wherever there is a movement of acceptance, due to the rise and development of an interest, in the sense of our foregoing discussions, there may also be one of rejection. The reason for this appears to be that there is as much an interest of rejection and avoidance as there is of acceptance and welcome.⁴ Without going further with general statements at this point, we may still say that rejection, together with the content rejected, is a matter of selective meaning, as denial is a matter of recognitive meaning; and hence that what

¹ "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. ix.

² "Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. viii.

³ See also above, chap. vii., § 9, on "affective opposition."

⁴ Both being rooted, objectively considered, in the fundamental active tendencies of life; cf. the writer's *Mental Development, etc.*, chap. vii.

is rejected belongs in the same class as what is accepted. Both rise by the movement of selection. If we call the contents in this sense selective, "good," in the aspect in which they are satisfying, we may likewise call them, in the aspects in which they are dissatisfying, "bad." The bad then becomes a co-ordinate topic for discussion with the good; and most of the questions asked about the good may also be asked about the bad.

§ 2. THE UGLY AS BAD

2. A concrete case is seen in the ugly, to the brief discussion of which below reference may be made.¹ The ugly is found to be more than the absence of the conditions which constitute beauty; such a case would be non-aesthetic but not necessarily ugly, for the denial of beauty is a statement of relational fact due to the failure of the predicates of beauty to establish themselves in the given case. This mere denial is described below as "the aesthetic negative." Thus it is logical; it is not rejection.

The ugly, on the contrary, involves, as we are to see, the presence of factors which interfere with or forbid the process of beauty, whatever that may be. Its marks come in a sense in conflict with the aesthetic interest; it cannot be selected for aesthetic purposes or ends. As such it is positively distasteful; it excites the interest of avoidance, and gives rise to the attitude of rejection. Here there is not the logical denial of relationships merely, the assertion of the absence of certain predicates, but the excitement of an interest directed toward the removal of certain positively objectionable marks. It is not the aesthetic negative, but "the negatively aesthetic." The ugly object, far from producing no aesthetic effect, produces a bad aesthetic effect. The ugly is the aesthetically bad, and as such furnishes an instance of bad value.

§ 3. BAD VALUES

3. If we take the aesthetic as a representative case of value, its satisfactions being those of a selective interest, we may find something analogous to the foregoing in other cases. There is a morally bad: that which is rejected by a movement of avoidance in the moral life. It is not merely the failure of ethical predicates, but the presence of immoral, or morally dissatisfying, marks. There are bad ethical values as well as good ones. So, too, in the domain of utility: there are destructive as well as

¹ Chap. x. § 6.

constructive values, economically bad as well as good values. In the domain of physical disposition and interest, the bad is a property of things no less than the good: many things have bad values. They are not merely worthless, they are negatively worthful, below zero on the scale of actual values.

4. If badness, then, is a mode of value, we have to recognize the important fact that selective interest does not work exclusively in the positive sense of securing contents in which a positive fulfilment is found—the aspect from which it is usually considered—but also in the negative sense of avoiding contents which are in some sense dissatisfying. I say “in some sense,” since further description of the possible “senses” is not now intended. The essential point is that it is by reason of actual marks, real characters, that such contents are found dissatisfying, and that the interest is determined in the sense of rejection.

There is accordingly a series of what may be called “rejection-values,” as well as of “acceptance-values,” running through the entire life of appreciation; and a large class of “bads” has this origin. They are bad because they are “good-to-reject.” Badness as a property of things seems in this sense to stand on somewhat the same plane as goodness. It is a sort of fact, a condition, giving rise to an intent of appreciation over and above the content of recognition. The badness is part of the selective meaning of the thing.¹

The consequences of this might be brought out with the detail of our discussion of the good; but this is not necessary for our present purpose. The bearing of the topic upon the pre-supposition of reality, however, is of sufficient importance to warrant a further word.

§ 4. THE REALITY OF THE BAD

5. It would seem difficult to avoid the conclusion that the bad presumes reality in the same sense that the good does. It is the thing, the situation, the person, the act, in this case or that, that determines an attitude of approval and welcome or

¹ It is of the nature of what is called in the theory of value “condition-worth,” but negative rather than positive (see Urban, *Valuation, etc.*, p. 30). It may also be called the intrinsically bad, in contrast with the relatively bad; for there are all sorts of relative “goods” and “bads” due to the comparison and transformation of values. A good is bad in comparison with a greater good (a better), and a bad is good in comparison with a greater bad (a worse).

one of disapproval and avoidance. Both alike go beyond the mere experience as such to the underlying real thing in which the satisfying or dissatisfying qualities reside. Both alike, then, and in the same sense, presuppose the real.

This is clear for all cases of value attaching to the known, the fact, the true. We may say of the bad, as we have of the good, that so far as it is a factor of meaning additional to that of the mere thing, it mediates the presence and reality of the thing. The sphere of existence or reality of the bad thing is also that of the badness of the thing. There is present only one presupposition of objective reality, that given in the control of the thing. Goodness and badness in the abstract are general predicates of a further and more logical mediation, which nevertheless, although more explicit, is still that by which existent objects, things, and truths are established as real.

6. When we come, however, to consider the aspect of value which arises when the good is pictured or imagined as a further unrealized worth of the nature of ideal meaning, certain special features appear. In what sense can we say that the bad becomes, when considered as set up as the end of the interest of avoidance, the ideal-to-avoid of that interest? Is there an ideal bad-to-avoid?—a *summum malum*, or more properly expressed perhaps, in *infimum malum*, a veritable infernal? And if so, in what sense is it real?

7. In a certain sense we have to admit that there is such an ideal. The various bads as well as the various goods may be thought of relatively, comparatively, and their degrees, damaging aspects, bad effects, estimated with more or less definiteness. Each of us distinguishes the "very bads" from the "not very bads," the "faults" from the "crimes," the "peccadillos" from the "sins," the "venial" from the "grave"; and one would say that in avoiding the lesser when one might have avoided the greater, the ideal of the interest of avoidance had not been fulfilled. In practice, there is a vague but influential ideal of badness-to-avoid, with reference to which the values of avoidance are ordered. This order may be as inconstant and irregular as you please, but in the particular case, one has a sense of relative worth; he apprehends with which of the alternatives the greater badness, the ideal-of-avoidance, is identified.

8. But on the other hand, it is just here that a rather subtle but very real difference appears between the two sides of the life of appreciation. In the case of the ideal good, the interest

is one attaching to positive presence, to a reality whose existence is the presupposition of the worth; the reality must be postulated with view to the satisfaction of the interest. But with the bad this is not the case. The interest of avoidance desiderates the absence, the non-existence, not the existence and presence of the bad object. As actual, badness requires an existing object; but as fulfilment of the ideal-to-avoid, it requires its non-existence. The presupposition of an existing thing would secure and fix the bad instead of removing and banishing it.

In other words, the conclusion, succinctly stated, is that the postulation of the ideal-to-avoid is negative in the sense that its fulfilment goes to reinforce the postulate of the good, or at least to remove those conditions which, in the world of fact, inhibit or prevent the realization of the good.

When we come later on ¹ to consider the modes of reality reached by the postulates of value, this difference becomes of importance. The bad has a presupposition of reality: it presumes real bad things. And it apprehends actual degrees of badness, which may go on to a supposed "great-bad." This is actually, no doubt, the meaning of the devil in religious mythology and folk-lore. In dogmatic theology, it is embodied in forms which make it all but infinite, all but almighty. In this sense, there is the imaginative assumption of the ideal-bad—the ideal thing-to-avoid. It is the limiting meaning of bad reality.

But this is not to say that such a "great-bad" is a postulate of the life of appreciation, in the sense that the ideal good is. For this meaning of bad-reality arises through an interest of avoidance and negation; it is the ideal of rejection, not of acceptance. There is no positive movement of postulation of the content of the infernally bad as there is of the ideally good. The positive and dynamic motives to realize the ideal do not operate in the content of negative, as they do in that of positive, appreciation, proceeding in advance of and being prophetic of constantly closer approximations to their end; but the ideal bad-to-avoid so-called is simply the concept of the greatest bad existence possible, greater than those actually found to exist.

9. This may be illustrated from the domain of the moral ideal. What we call the "categorical imperative" arises, as we have seen in the last chapter, by the movement of idealization by

¹ See the preliminary statement of the problem in chap. xv. § 3.

which ends, which are meanings of worth, are postulated as absolute values, the means being dropped out at the limit as unnecessary terms. Hence the force of the ethical postulate : it is the limit and outcome of a real movement, a developing interest ; its content is a revelation of actual positive values achieved more and more fully and appreciated more and more highly by the agent.

But this is not the case with moral evil, the ethically bad. It is the domain of fact in which the development of the positive moral ideal is resisted and negated. Its cases may be arranged in a series of negative worths, culminating in a most-bad ; but there is no intrinsic movement in the series of avoidances which would set up the greatest possible bad as real. If we should suppose a race of demons to exist, whose ideal of achievement would be that of being as bad as possible, for them the postulate of an existing "ideally bad" would no doubt be helpful.

In other words, the moral ideal issues in a postulated value whose normal force for realization requires the acceptance of its reality ; the greatest moral evil, on the contrary, imagined as the ideal of avoidance, is ideal only in the negative sense of something whose non-existence would further the morally good.

This result, carried further in a later connexion, applies to the relation of the good and bad generally. While fully justified in theory, it is also sufficiently edifying for practice.

PART IV

SEMBLANCE AND THE AESTHETIC.¹

Chapter X

SPONTANEOUS AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

I. Our treatment of what is called, in a large sense, aesthetic experience must be selective. We are to take up those aspects of the aesthetic which have some quasi-logical or epistemological bearing, and which lend themselves finally to the discussion of the problem of reality.² It will be necessary to look into the following subjects. First, the demarcation of the sort of function or mode of meaning properly called aesthetic; this will throw light upon "The Characters of Aesthetic Experience" wherever found. Second, the movement which determines the aesthetic meaning, the problem of the "Aesthetic Interest." These two questions are treated jointly in chapters x. and xi. Third, the objective content involved: the problem of the aesthetic construction or object, the "Work of Art" (chap. xii.). Fourth, the more objective factors, personal and social, operative in the movement: the problem of the "Springs of Art" (chap. xiii.). Having gone over these necessary topics³—a procedure adopted for each of the modes of psychic function, cognitive, affective, etc.—we will be in a position to take up the further questions of the nature of mediation and immediacy (chap. xiv.).

¹ Being Part XI of the entire treatise on Genetic Logic. This Part (chaps. x. to xiii.) appears in Spanish as a Publication of the School of Higher Studies of the National University of Mexico.

² At the same time I make the discussion fairly complete as an exposition of the genetic motives involved, as in the case of each of the other great modes already discussed.

³ The literature of all these topics is very full. Cf. the select references given by Tufts in the arts. "Aesthetics" and "Art and Art Theories" in the author's *Dictionary of Philosophy*. A good recent introduction to the subject is *The Meaning of Art*, by P. Gaultier (3 ed., Eng trans.).

The claim of aesthetic immediacy to reveal reality can then be weighed, with those of knowledge and practice, in the final discussions of "Genetic Morphology" as suggested in chap. xv.

We will now turn, therefore, to the characterization of aesthetic experience as having meaning for the individual, a topic generally covered by the phrase "aesthetic appreciation."

§ I. THE AESTHETIC AS SEMBLANT MODE

2. The first feature of aesthetic meaning that strikes us is one that our preceding discussions have prepared us to find; it is the feature on account of which we characterize the movement as fundamentally one of semblance. Whatever we may find it necessary or possible finally to include in this, it is evident that the least we can say is that the aesthetic is not merely a meaning of reproduction or revival. It is rather one of portrayal. It does not merely imitate or repeat facts or relations; it renders or interprets them. It is a mode, therefore, in which there is something more than the exact reproduction of things as they are. Art is not photography, though photography may become art. Were art mere reproduction, only beautiful originals would be beautiful (if the aesthetic quality attached to the object), or all reproductions would be in some sense aesthetic (if the aesthetic meaning arose from the function); in either case, all distinctiveness would disappear from the aesthetic as such.

We have to say, then, that the result, the meaning issuing from the movement of aesthetic experience and characteristic of it, is not merely factual. The merely historical or local, whether thing or event, is rendered or depicted in a construction that has the semblance of the actual, while distinguished from it. It presents the actual, but its meaning is not that of actuality; there is a further intent of *appreciation*, over and above the intent merely to *see*.¹

3. This we have fully discussed in the treatment of the "lower semblant" or play mode,² where we found the motive of "make-believe" assuming so pronounced a rôle. The character or situation set up playfully is treated *as if actual*, as if confirmable through tests of the real, of whatever sort it be; but yet it is manageable, changeable by the player. The player has a certain

¹ The function and character of the image in the aesthetic experience, as distinguished from the real thing, are admirably discussed by Prof. J. A. Stewart, in his work, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*.

² *Thoughts and Thing*, vol. i., "Functional Logic," chap. vi.

sense of irresponsibility, of non-compulsion, a "don't-have-to" intent, which lifts the whole construction out of the thralldom to the actual and serious. He indulges in the illusion of actuality ; but it is his indulgence ; it is a conscious and voluntary self-illusion, a *bewusste Selbsttäuschung*, as the German writers word it. Be it as close an imitation as it may, it has the added meaning of being an imitation, a semblant thing.

This motive of relative freedom of interpretation and treatment, even in the act of close portrayal, goes directly up into the higher sphere of art as, for example, in portraiture. However we may find it necessary to qualify and re-define this motive later on, we will still have to recognize the fact that this intent of relative detaching or "lifting" from the actual, always enters into the meaning of the aesthetic object. It is not merely what the actual is that is important, however closely it may be copied ; what the actual thing means in the way of make-believe or semblance is what counts.

4. Whether this goes to the extent of voluntary "make-believe" or not—a real "mensonge"¹—whether there is the same freedom, the same intent of "don't-have-to," in art as in play, is a matter for our later discussion. The personal freedom, like the object, has to be reconstituted in the way characteristic of higher modes of psychic life. Here we go only so far as to claim the motive discovered in connexion with play ; saying that it operates in its proper way in art also. A sort of rendering or portrayal which is not merely repetition or memory, but something more personal and free—to which we apply the term "semblance"—is found in both art and play ; in the latter it allows the full movement of make-believe, with all the personal selection and variation that playful dramatization shows.

5. Second, we find in the imitative character of the aesthetic content the limits of the freedom of semblance of art. Expressed broadly, this statement means that all art, to be appreciated as art, must *mean something*—must, that is, present, render, or depict things, situations, events, relations, which are at least so far possibly real as to be understandable. It is clear that the body of meaning cannot be quite novel ; it must render, with greater or less fidelity, what is in some degree

¹ The term used by M. Paulhan in *Le Mensonge de l'Art*. See also on the aesthetic illusion, the recent able work of K. Lange, *Über die Methode der Kunstphilosophie*.

familiar and suggestive; it must reinstate, in an imitative way, enough of the situations of life and the truths of things, to have a claim to verisimilitude, however vague and recondite this claim may be.

This, again, we have found to be very pronounced in the play consciousness. With all the liberties the player takes with the things and persons of real life, his imagined situations must have *semblance of reality*. The absolutely grotesque and unintelligible—the mere ink-spot or the mere noisy crash—loses interest, whether in play or in art. The element of suggestion or meaning in each is of the nature of reproduction; and all reproduction takes place essentially by processes of inner imitation.

This, too, will require closer treatment in the sequel; but in this, again, we may utilize the characterization of the play mode. We must understand that in this respect also, the meaning is made over in the movements of the particular mode or stage in which the aesthetic object in question arises—whether it be perceptual, conceptual, logical or sentimental. But, as in respect to aesthetic freedom, we have to say that in this respect, also, aesthetic appreciation¹ involves “semblance.” While the intention is to set up a merely semblant thing, and not an actual thing, still it is *semblance of the actual* that is intended. *The actual* is not given in the work of art, but *something actual* is depicted or interpreted or suggested by it.

6. These two factors both enter into the meaning of semblance. The characterization so far made, however, leaves room for a certain ambiguity. Allowing that the aesthetic object is always a semblant one, that is that there is the semblance rather than the actual presence of the thing intended, the further question arises—semblance of what? If it is merely the re-instatement, in semblant form, of the thing imitated, with no further intention, then its motive would seem to be after all merely a loose sort of reproduction. If, on the contrary, the semblance includes something more, then the question arises as to what it is that motives the deviation or departure from the

¹ And aesthetic “production” too. In the writer’s view the two points of view, “spectator’s” and “producer’s,” so often sharply distinguished, are at bottom but one. While in the work of art, the producer’s semblant construction is already carried out for the spectator, the latter must also carry it out for himself in his own imagination—perhaps very differently—and so become in turn a “producer.”

original. There is, in fact, a sense in which the semblance—especially in play—is not of that of which the content is imitative, but of something else. A stick of wood becomes a soldier and a lamp-post a priest! “Why this?—and how?” The question of the motive and interest of art, as of play, is here in question.

§ 2. AESTHETIC INTEREST AND MOTIVE

7. In approaching this topic it will be well to cling a little longer to the concept of simple “semblance,” and with it to the analogy presented by play. In play, as has just been indicated, the movement of departure from the meaning of the real thing, to one that arbitrarily makes the thing serve some other intent, is very marked and obtrusive; it may be well to ask whether anything similar takes place in the aesthetic.

In play there is, indeed, a remarkable freedom in the matter of rendering or interpretation. The stick of wood, as well as a real person, may become the soldier. The question then arises, even in respect to play, and becomes very urgent in respect to art, as to whether the setting up of the content has its motive in this further interpretation; or whether the reverse is the case, the interpretation being motivated by the nature of the thing set up.

8. Here we come upon one of our critical questions, the answer to which justifies us in giving the aesthetic its separate place and function. It is the question of the interest in which the aesthetic construction and appreciation have their motive. Is the interest by which the selection of the content proceeds, and for whose fulfilment and termination the object is set up, a special one?—or is the aesthetic merely a phase of the determination reached in the pursuit of one of the interests described and designated variously as theoretical and practical? Put more generally the question is, what is the sanction of aesthetic pursuit and enjoyment?—is it truth, utility, pleasure?—or is it something that can be described only in terms of the requirements of the aesthetic interest itself?

This question is, of course, not a new one; the literature of the subject is full, especially as dealing with the end and aim of art. “Art for art’s sake,” is the familiar shibboleth of the view that the aesthetic interest is *sui generis*; that aesthetic satisfaction is self-sanctioned and autotelic.¹ The aspects of

¹ M. Gaultier's *The Meaning of Art* (Eng. trans.) presents this well.

the case which come into view from our approach from the genetic side, however, and from the tracing out of the motives found at work in the actual meaning of aesthetic objects, enable us to put the matter in a somewhat novel light.

9. (1) In the first place, we may take positive ground as to the attempt to identify the aesthetic interest with the theoretical, with the interest to know or to attain accurate representation and a truthful system of ideas. It is evident that the motive of semblance is itself different from that of strict accuracy and truthfulness of idea. The aesthetic representation is not held to the impersonal and neutral re-statement and repetition—a merely photographic reflection—of the original, to the maintenance of the disinterestedness or neutrality which is the motive of knowledge.

So also of the interest of discovery and of the extension of knowledge, in an enlarging system of ideas or thoughts. It is plain that although the motive of discovery may preserve its rôle in the preliminary treatment of the content, still it does not motive its final form. The sanction of the aesthetic may include consistency and relative accuracy, and the logical dependence of parts and whole; but it is not exhausted by these. There is, in the aesthetic rendering, the presentation of the relationships of knowledge in forms of semblance, for a further motive and with a different interest. The aesthetic appreciation leads to the construction an intimate meaning and a personal form.

We may, therefore, write down our agreement with many of the important writers on the subject, to the effect that the aesthetic interest is not to be identified with the theoretical interest.

10. On the other hand, however, we should look at the reverse side of the shield. It is true that the aesthetic construction is not merely one found correct or true; but it is also true that it must have a content that is or might be true or correct; it is "as if" true. It is "semblant" of something. The extreme vagaries of fancy do not lend themselves to fruitful aesthetic interpretation. The limits of aesthetic impressionism, in the sphere of the vague, are as real as are those of realism in the sphere of fact. In the latter, the aesthetic is lost in the mere interest of recognition; in the former, it is lost in the barrenness of the uninteresting. I see a street sign too far off for recognition, and as I advance I read the familiar "Charles Street"; in the whole series of states of gathering interest, from vacuity to full familiarity, there need be no suggestion of aesthetic mean-

ing ; but if such a meaning does arise, it must appear somewhere between these two extremes.

We may say, then, that there is and must be a nucleus of knowledge—idea, image, imaginative reproduction—interpreted as if actual at the time, rendered as suggestive of reality. The rendering holds us to the essential realism of art. The aesthetic interest presumes a modicum of suggested actuality, existence, reality, truth. In so far, there is a certain incidental satisfaction of the recognitive or theoretical interest. But the suggestiveness of the work of art, its full intent—what is called in aesthetic literature the “symbolism” of art—goes beyond this. The semblance differs from the actual in permitting the invocation of an ideal ; it depicts what might or should be, not what merely is.

This latter motive, that of “idealization,” is discussed further below ; it is a pregnant and interesting topic. Here let us be content with the negative conclusion that the mere impulse or motive to know, with the interest in the known, the factual and true—the theoretical interest—although present, is not dominantly or exclusively at work in aesthetic appreciation or production. Art enjoyment is not motivated by curiosity.

11. (2) Taking advantage of our earlier discussions, in which the cognitive or theoretical motives and interests were set over against those which determine the object as in some sense useful or good for something—viz., the practical—let us ask whether the aesthetic is to be included in this latter group ; whether, that is, the aesthetic motive and interest are concerned with the furthering of the practical or active life. A little later on, when we take up for explicit discussion the question of the control of the aesthetic object, we will sharpen and define the distinction between these sorts of interest by putting it in terms of means and ends ; and we may anticipate that form of statement here. Granting the point that the end subserved is not, as with the theoretical, the furtherance of knowledge, we may ask whether it is the furtherance of action, or the attainment of “good.” Does the aesthetic interest look beyond the object, the beautiful thing, for something to be gotten out of it, or by means of it ? Is art the means to further practical ends ?

12. This we must answer with just as decided a negative as we did the corresponding question as to the pursuit of fact or truth through art. The aesthetic interest, while able to utilize the practical meanings which the object may suggest or the

ends it may subserve, nevertheless does not find the object beautiful because of these meanings or ends.¹ This appears from what we have seen of the semblant character of the aesthetic object. If it were determined in the pursuit of practical good the material would be chosen and shaped directly with view to the suggestion of such utility. The objective content would sink to the level of means to ends dictated by the restricted practical interest in operation at the time. There would be no motive, in short, for the resort to semblance at all, which in so far allows the violation or disturbance of the relationships by which the utilities of the content are wrought out. As we have seen, worth predicates attach directly to the things of fact or truth; these things are instrumental to the worths or values. The consistent, and indeed the usual, method of securing the value is to retain the true inviolate, and to run down the factors in the meaning which are capable of serving as means to practical ends.

But it will be said, it is the depicted good, not the actual, upon which the aesthetic interest centres. If so, the reply is, then the aesthetic enjoyment resides in the depicting, in the semblance, not in the actual utility. Why limit the depicting to the good? In fact, art depicts anything—the true, the imaginary, as well as the good—and the identification of aesthetic interest with practical interest in any case fails.

13. The relation of the aesthetic to the practical interest appears from two related but separable strands of meaning attaching to the aesthetic whole. One of these is the relative detachment which the objective content undergoes when it is taken up into the sphere of semblance. The work of art is, in a peculiar way, isolated both from the truth-associates and from the worth-associates which the object depicted actually assembles. To detach it from these and make it a thing of variable and imported semblant meaning, is in so far to lessen its availability as instrument of the furthering of these associated meanings.

Again, the goods or utilities to which the object ministers would themselves be vitiated by the disturbance of the setting in which they normally arise. The pleasure of fulfilment always requires the pursuit of the object to which it is incidental; it does not allow the veiling of that object in a mode of semblance

¹ The place of utility in art is suggestively discussed in Groos' *Der aesthetische Genuss*, pp. 108 ff.

which impairs the full force of the normal coefficients of reality.¹

For example, a building as presented in idea may have both the factors of associated meaning, truthfulness and utility. The idea is truthful since it recalls and represents a real building ; and it has the suggestion of utility since the real building subserves a utility. But to depict the building aesthetically, is to interpret its meaning in a way in which both these features may be superficially impaired. The treatment of the building with aesthetic semblance or idealization may diminish the truthfulness the idea had before, and make remote and pallid its suggestion of utility. It is the actual building that is real and useful ; the semblant building includes and suggests these ends only as part of the larger purpose of art. The effective way of realizing the full suggestion of truth or utility would be to assume or presume the actuality of the content, say by means of a photograph, rather than by serving up a semblant variation upon it in which personal selective motives are at work.

This appears to be more emphatically true of the practical, since the judgment of utility, or of means to ends, is, in fact, a judgment of truth before it is a judgment of good. The truth of the utility of the original building is assumed in the suggestion that this utility is to be preserved in the semblant object.²

14. If we are right so far—and our later discussion will

¹ It is not said, of course, that aesthetic experience may not be sought because it is pleasurable ; but that in order to get the pleasure, the aesthetic state must be pursued for itself, that is, the aesthetic interest is presupposed in the constitution of the aesthetic state, and the pleasure is incidental to the state.

This is true also of the "utility" of art ; it is incidental, a result, not an end. It is true that art, like play, is in its origin a thing of personal and social utility ; but it does not follow that this utility is conscious and enters into the aesthetic end, beauty becoming only means. This confusion between the *utility* and the supposed *utilitarianism* of art is very common. The utility of both play and art, as semblant functions, follows from their *disinterestedness* ; without this the player becomes the worker and the artist becomes the artisan. But the "springs of art" discussed below (chap. xiii.) indicate the high utility of art considered from the objective point of view.

² See the further remarks on utility in chap. xii. § 2. It will appear that our view suggests the *inclusiveness* of art activities, not their *remoteness* from those of life and knowledge. The view which would substitute a quiescent and perhaps "decadent" aestheticism for the "strenuous life" has here no support. The most virile art of any time is the organ of the fullest culture of that time. The art of "sickly sentimentality" is that of decadence ; see chap. xi, sect. 20.

add further confirmation, by showing the presence of a factor of positive aesthetic idealization—we may say that aesthetic experience does not lend itself directly to either of the great modes of mediation, “control through knowledge,” or “knowledge through control.” We do not control the world of things, or handle our embarrassing situations, or solve our difficult problems, better by reason of our aesthetic enjoyments; nor is it our intention to gain in these ways by our indulgence in art. The lever of control does not rest upon the fulcrum of the beautiful.

On the contrary, the semblant character of the constructions of art renders them unsafe as positive instruments of action, conquest, and knowledge. The realities of a harsh world do not yield in practice to the demands of the artist; but he is frequently referred to as a sentimentalist, idealist, or visionary. Nor is knowledge advanced any more. We do not make discoveries, either physical or mental, by constructing symmetrical pictures of law and order. The control of fact and truth requires that we keep true to what we already know, and rest our further constructions upon that, as literally as possible; we do not expect to realize our castles in Spain, however beautiful they may be, when we start out on our journeys of scientific exploration. The dualism established in the development of the two modes of mediation is so radical, and their respective methods are so exacting, that only the rigid adherence to actuality gives to each its effectiveness.

15. With the elimination of these alternatives, there remains but one other.¹ If it is not a mediate interest of either sort—either of knowledge or of practice—that motives the aesthetic, then it must be, in some sense, an immediate or direct interest; if it is not a further end that fulfils the interest, then it must be the thing or object itself that is the end; if it is not an extrinsic interest, one that passes over the object and alights elsewhere, then it must be an *intrinsic interest, one that stops at the semblant construction and resides in it, taking it just as it is.*

This conclusion is that which our more reasoned outcome later on confirms. It is here stated simply as a suggestion, reached by the negative process of exclusion. It leaves the

¹ It would be interesting, were there space, to take up for examination certain of the more special theories which fall under these two headings—intellectual and practical. But this general refutation of the parent doctrines must suffice.

matter subject to a more searching investigation as to the mode of control actually seen in operation in the aesthetic construction. In addition to finding that the mediations of truth and worth are both unavailable for the interpretation of the aesthetic object, we further find that this latter shows a mode of control which may in a proper sense be called immediate.

§ 3. THE CONTROL OF SEMBLANT OBJECTS

16. We may begin with the general question of the sort of control found in semblant constructions generally—including play as well as art—in order that we may avail ourselves of the results worked out in the preceding discussions. We have already gone into the question of the control of the semblant object,¹ reaching conclusions which may be cited here in abbreviated form.

“A fruitful character of the semblant object, implicated in the inner nature of the entire construction, is that called in the later German literature of aesthetics, *Einfühlung*. I shall here render it by the term ‘sembling.’ It is the making of any object into a thing of semblance or ‘inner imitation,’ with the added character that such an object has a greater or less degree of subjective control attributed to it. There is a certain *feeling-into* the given object (*Einfühlung*) of the subject’s own personal feeling: an attribution to it of the inner movement which its construction requires. . . . There is no doubt that there is this sembling of an object when we play with it. . . . The suggestion I now make is that it is simply the full reading of the semblant object itself: the reading of it, not only as an inner construction, but also as under the form of relative spontaneity which inner constructions must have. Their control is in a peculiar sense subjective, characterized by ‘don’t-have-to’ consciousness, the reserve sense whereby the self begins to stand apart from its content. It is now considered as also inner for its own self, as having inner determination or self-control. The Doric column of Lipps’ illustration seems to spring upward, by the sweep of its lines, because just by thinking it as a semblant object we give it the self-stimulating spring of action by which our own function springs up. It is only the factual column, not the sembled thing of inner imitation, that stands set and rigid in all its lines. . . . This means that any such bit of sembled psychic stuff has two contrasted meanings: that on

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i., “Functional Logic,” chap. vi.

the one hand, of object pure and simple, existing under the coefficient reinstated by the semblance; and that on the other hand, of a self-determining whole, free from these coefficients so long as it itself does not terminate its freedom, and fulfilling its rôle simply by being in this vibrating semblant mode."¹

"The character just mentioned, which has led us to adopt the term 'sembling'² for the process which includes *Einfühlung*, has been held to be an essential ingredient in the experience of the appreciation of art. It has, however, a singularly marked development in the play consciousness also; and its presence there serves to give additional justification to the theory which connects these two psychic modes with each other under the common term 'semblance.' . . . Broadly understood, the process of 'sembling' consists in the reading into the object of a sort of psychic life of its own, in such a way that the movement, act, or character by which it is interpreted is thought of as springing from its own inner life. We have considered it as showing the psychic tendency to consider the object as detached from the external, and thus as under inner or subjective control. This leads to the thought of the object as itself having inner control or a spring of action and initiation—in short, a psychic life—of its own."³

"The semblant object asserts its individual character and essential privacy by an inner impulse and determination of its own. Play may be dramatic and approximate the drama of life; but after all, it is drama and not life. Art may be realistic to the breadth of a hair, but if it be photographic, it is not art. The impulse to idealization, the impulse to be a private self, is the final and effective protest of the semblant consciousness against the generalization of meanings that turns them all into the sort of public property we call facts."⁴

As thus described, the general process of "sembling" would seem to have a striking illustration in aesthetic constructions. We may formulate, for further discussion, two of its principal features, asking wherein they do or do not have full

¹ Vol. i. chap. vi. sect. 19.

² Both Titchener and James Ward have suggested the term "empathy" as English translation of *Einfühlung*. The great confusion that reigns in the German literature of the topic makes it seem desirable to postpone the final choice of an equivalent until the concept itself is better defined.

³ Vol. i. chap. vi. sect. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.* chap. vi. sect. 26.

application in the aesthetic proper. In this way we will be able to distinguish finally between play and art.

17. (1) First, we are convinced that semblant constructions as such, in their first appearance as play, are motivated by interests of a peculiarly inner sort; they have a spontaneity and arbitrariness which illustrate personal initiative and control, rather than submission to what is outer and resisting. This is illustrated both in the selection and in the development of the materials of play. The freedom of personal choice, both as to the details and as to the indulgence as a whole, is marked and emphatic.

18. (2) The whole construction is "sebled" with a personal life and movement. Beneath the more superficial sense in which the object is semblant of a real situation or of real characters or symbolic of this or that truth or fact, there is the reading into it of a personal life and inner control of its own. In this reading or feeling-in we have an important motive of the construction, since if this be removed—this intrinsic quasi-inner control—then, in the absence of actuality with its external checks or its real purposes and practical ends, there would be no control at all; there would be merely the lawless and fugitive processes of fancy, playing themselves out without rhyme or measure.

Let us now ask whether these points thus stated give us also a sufficient characterization of the control operative in the aesthetic; whether, that is, play and art are in these respects co-extensive.

§ 4. THE CONTROL OF AESTHETIC OBJECTS

19. It would of course be profitless to discuss such a question as this from the point of view of any preconceived definition of the aesthetic. We may with greater profit proceed simply by tracing the motive of semblance into the higher reaches of mental life and noting the changes its essential meaning undergoes. We will find it convenient to distinguish, as we have before, the sort of semblance that characterizes the late pre-logical or quasi-logical modes of construction, and then in turn that of the logical; thus we shall be able to point out any new shadings of meaning by which, in the sequel, the aesthetic may be defined.

20. (1) The first departures from the purity of the play consciousness, as described above, seem to be those which modify the freedom of the personal motive, and with it reduce the arbi-

trariness of the selected content. We have noticed this already in the detailed consideration of the development of knowledge from the mode of play to that of experimentation,¹ from mere capricious fancy to the more systematic and controlled imagination. We should investigate this movement more closely with especial reference to the control factor.

In the play of imagination—giving that name to the function of cognition in its forward-reaching aspect, as setting up contents beyond what is entirely guaranteed in knowledge or practice—we find the function of experimentation showing itself in connexion with both the two great modes of mediation. The further discovery or extension of truth takes on the form of hypothesis, in which the knowledge in hand is tentatively and schematically made up with a view to its wider extension; this sort of experimentation furthers the mediation of fact or truth. Over against this there is another kind of experimentation, in which data of knowledge are rendered as having a worth which is not yet fully grounded; this sort of experimentation in turn furthers the fulfilment of ends through the other great mode of mediation, the erection and use of knowledge as means. In both cases, the contents employed are set up beforehand by an exercise of imagination. Imagination thus understood becomes the schematizing, anticipating, function through which each new suggestion of mediation, of one type or the other, is brought to the issue in its own sphere of control. Fact or truth controls the one; experience of good, fulfilment of ends, establishes the other. The one is commonly known as the “scientific imagination”; the other as the “practical” or instrumental imagination: one makes discoveries; the other works out inventions, as we have already explained in the Introduction to this volume.

21. Both these sorts of experimentation are in positive contrast with the exercise of imagination as seen in the function of play. They both anticipate and reach forward to a confirmation which will give the content a permanent place in the body of knowledge and practice. But this is not true of play. Play is, it is true, experimental as to its results; but not in respect to its motive. As soon as play begins to have reference to a further end, either of discovery or of practice, it lapses into one or other of the methods of actual control, and loses the interest peculiar to it.

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i., “Functional Logic,” chap. vi. § 4.

If now we ask as to the place of semblance in the higher stages of development in which experimental imagination of these two sorts has come into operation, we find that certain modifications take place. Play, to be sure, is indulged in ; but it persists in denying any experimental reference, either theoretical or utilitarian. The function retains the freedom of playful caprice.

So the question arises—is there any mode of imaginative construction other than play, in which full value is given to the method of experimentation within what is still essentially the mode of semblance ?—a function, that is, in which all the meanings of the more developed modes become semblant, *including experimental confirmation and fulfilment*—is there such a thing as semblant experimentation ? Such a mode of imagination would be experimental in meaning, though not in result, with respect both to the actual and to the good—as in play we find experimental results without experimental intention. It would prophesy its own control and completion, at the same time that it would not submit to the actual controls by which its completion could be secured. Although semblant and not serious, it would *take itself seriously*. It would utilize the resources of knowledge and value, each developed in its own proper control and application ; and it would interpret them experimentally, with a sort of quasi-real experimentation, looking forward toward the systematization and extension to which their serious methods and purposes pointed. But it would be a return to semblance, a resort to the inner life with its relative freedom of control over its own contents, but with all the imagined limitations of possible mediation and confirmation that the actual material requires. It sets up semblantly its own control and its own freedom.

22. Is there such a function ? Certainly, there is ; we have come upon such a mode of meaning in another connexion ; it is that known as *Ideal*. It is the general character of the *idealizing imagination* that we have just brought out. Idealization is the furthering of meanings—truth and worth meanings alike—by the projection forward of actual contents. It takes up the content into the inner life, and by a forward reading, a free movement of further inner control, carries it on to perfection. This we now find in the movement whereby the semblant construction is reconstituted on the higher plane of contents otherwise more organized and “dualized.”

23. Here then is a first distinction between play and art, between the playful and the aesthetic consciousness. Play does

not idealize ; "any old thing" will do to play with, and any old purpose may be played out upon it. But art is not so. The material of art must have its relative organization, as true or good, or both ; and in the semblance in which it clothes itself it must serve the ends of idealization. This leads, as will appear again at a later stage of our discussion, to two important restrictions upon the function of art, one having to do with the internal organization of the work of art, and the other with its end-fulfilling or selective character.

24. With this go further differences. It is evident that the freedom of play—the freedom of relative caprice—is not present in art. This difference shows itself in various more refined ways. I may refuse to play a game and so shut myself out entirely from the sportive meaning that the play affords to the players. But I cannot break the bubble of beauty in this cavalierly fashion. Once given the aesthetic meaning in any degree to which I myself discover and intend it, I cannot disillusionize myself with respect to it. It represents an ideal ; it is not merely a creature of imagination. The situation taking on this idealization is not merely an irresponsible imitation of reality. Even in its aesthetic aspect it is the legitimate and quasi-experimental extension of the real. The new interpretation is not imported into the system of truth or worth ; it is suggested and supported by the actual. In it all there is the intention to see and realize more than the mere creatures of a sportive imagination. Who takes himself and his work more seriously than the artist ?

25. This restriction upon the freedom of art appears, moreover, in the restricted irresponsibility and privacy of the agent. I may play as I please, only my own whim setting limits to my freedom ; I may see hob-goblins in my tobacco smoke, and ask you to play with me that they are there. But I cannot, either for myself or for you, call anything I please beautiful. To do this, we must distinguish the shapes of hob-goblins, and reach some sort of agreement as to their beauty. This agreement is not that reached by actual common verification of our verdict, through experimental tests ; that we have found to be impossible for single affective experiences : *but the semblance of such a testing is present*. I must at least be willing to appeal to you, suggesting, if not requiring, that you agree with me in the result of my idealization. There is, indeed, a real return to the personal and private motive ; all idealization and all semblant imagination requires this ; but there is, along with it, when play gives place

to art, the assumption of the common verification, as if it were secured.

This is part of the ideal force and intent. Art, its devotees may say, must make a show of commonly recognized principles, to justify the appeal its creations are to make. Let the public meaning, the common suggestion, be as slight as you please, yet we must have some quasi-serious intention, something more worth while than the "creations" of the child playing with his pigments on the nursery floor.

26. (2) The same line of discrimination suggests itself, at least as a problem, with respect to the other great character of the control found in play, that of the sembling or *Einfühlung* in the object of a mode of inner life. This movement, as it takes place in the play consciousness has already been described; and the description has in a measure anticipated the application to the aesthetic experience as well. We have found that the relative loosing of the bonds of a specific control—either direct as in actual perception, or indirect as in other forms of mediation of the actual—leaves the semblant simply in the form of voluntary self-illusion. It is a self-developed illusional whole; its inner constitution being, however, that of actual existence in that or this real place or sphere. The result is a tendency to the assumption of personal form, to a participation in the development of the inner life itself. If the object is to have any development, if it is to attain a meaning, a dramatic working out, if, in short, it is to be more than the imitative repetition of what in fact it was and is, that further development must be motived in the sphere in which it is now erected. Its semblance then gives to it an inner movement and life of its own, which of course must be, in its carrying out, due to the actual inner life of the person in whose interest the semblance takes place. There is, then, first the attribution of an inner life to the object as its own principle of growth, and second, the identification of its life with that of the observer.

In play, the former of these two aspects of the personal reading is certainly found in full, and possibly exclusive, operation. If we call the whole personal reading of the semblant object "personalizing," then we may distinguish in this movement mere personification of the object from personal identification with the object. Personification is the reading of an object as, or as if, a person; personal identification is the merging of the object's personality with one's own. In play, there is certainly much

personification ; objects of all sorts are read as or as if personal. They have, that is, the semblance of personality ; this is part of their selective interpretation. But the further question arises whether play also issues in personal identification.

We found in the earlier discussion, that there is at work in play a motive that gives opportunity for personal identification. There is, in the working out of the drama of play, a tendency on the part of the player to "live the part," and to live each part. But when this is done, it becomes doubtful whether the bounds of play are not overstepped. "Earnest" seems to come in as the interest passes from mere indulgence in the game to participation in a situation in which actual personal interests are invoked. The player may make the game a situation of persons, but they are and must remain "play-persons." The identity with his own or any other's real self must remain that of make-believe.

27. When, however, we come to the later modes, in which the distinction between the inner and the outer worlds, as being mutually exclusive, is sharply drawn, we find the identification motive at work. This goes beyond mere personification, the mere attribution of personality by vague analogy ; the object is individuated as being actually a centre of psychic life. This involves a process of ejection, which finds its materials only in the actual concrete life of the observer himself. The process may remain in the more primitive stage of mere personification ; it may be mere play or myth, according as it is semblant or not ; but if it does go further and develop into the aesthetic, then the inner life attributed to the object must be that of the thinker himself. This gives us a second distinction between play and art.

Apart, however, from this attempt to account for it the fact is undeniable. In aesthetic appreciation, when given time and chance to establish itself fully by contemplation, there is a notable movement of identification of the observer's own inner life with that of the object. The act of sembling has this intent. It has been described by various authors in terms which throw emphasis alternatively on one of the two factors or the other—the establishing of a self in the object by a movement of sympathetic feeling, or the taking up of the object's life and movement into one's own. In the one, we sympathize with the object as with a person, and do imitatively what it seems to do ; in the other, we take it up into our own life and carry its impulse forward in our own.

Different arts bring out these two phases of aesthetic enjoyment. The drama carries us with it ; the picture enters into our life ; in the landscape the very parts—the tree, the brook, the cattle—share the meaning of the human situations through which we have lived in their presence. I sympathize with the bare leaf-stripped oak exposed to the storm, shivering for its suffering ; and I ask the bird with his song to express my emotions of joy or sorrow.¹

28. We find it necessary, then, to distinguish aesthetic semblance from that which is merely playful by this criterion : the further development in the former of the personalizing motive into that of identification. This takes place in remarkable intimacy and forcefulness in fully developed aesthetic contemplation. Any of the elements of the inner life may serve as medium of the ejective processes which carry this experience forward. Sensational, intellectual, active, emotional, sentimental material—any and all of the elements which constitute the aesthetic object—may be used in this symbolic rendering of the spirit.²

Without stopping, therefore, to go into the details, which have been worked out very fully in recent publications, we may state that the two features which distinguish the aesthetic experience from play, show that in the aesthetic the semblance is of a sort only possible in the stages of mental development in which certain motives not involved in play are maturing. Art is, in a sense, quasi-logical. The new motives are first, the relative limitation of inner freedom and caprice, due to the intent of the possible experimental confirmation secured by knowledge at the corresponding stage ; and second, the greater definition and identification of the material employed in the personalizing movement.

¹ Both of these movements have been covered by the term "aesthetic sympathy," as by the term *Einfühlung*, the emphasis being laid now on the one aspect and now on the other. Groos, Lipps, Volkert and others, however, who have worked out the topic with great care, have made a careful distinction between them. See especially the systematic work of Lipps, *Asthetik*. Late and competent discussions of the subject are to be found in English in Mitchell, *The Structure and Growth of the Mind*, and Urban, *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*. Mitchell uses the term "fellow-feeling" for one's "sympathy" with the aesthetic object ; it is a good equivalent of the German *Mitleben* (Groos). The entire theory of *Einfühlung* or *Beseelung* (term preferred by Volkert) is trenchantly criticised by Ch. Lalo, *Les Sentiments esthétiques*.

² In Prof. Groos' *Der ästhetische Genuss* is to be found a patient and careful analysis of the character and combinations of the material which may be used in the aesthetic construction.

The first of these restrictions issues in the idealizing intent of the aesthetic ; the second in the fusion or synergy as between the objective and subjective personal factors called above identification. Both of these take on further interesting phases when we pass into the mode of aesthetic judgment or reflection. Reflective art is more sophisticated than spontaneous art, just as aesthetic semblance, or art as such, is more self-conscious than play.

29. Before we go on, however, to discuss reflective aesthetic appreciation, it will be well to sharpen our results with reference to the problem of control. It may be asked, how then is the aesthetic object, or the construction of it, controlled ?

Clearly what we have said of semblance applies, in the first instance, to art as well as to play. It does not mediate a direct and exclusive reference to fact ; this would reduce its product to what is actual simply and not imagined. Again, it does not mediate practical ends in the sense of having the interest of personal gain or loss ; this would likewise forbid the indulgence of the imagination on the affective side. Further, it has not the licence of play ; for its semblance extends to the tests both of fact and of worth : nothing false or unworthy—in either direction “ unfit ”—can be found aesthetic. It does not deny the theoretical and practical motives ; on the contrary, it recognizes and idealizes them. Again, it does not exclude the movements of the inner life ; for its object becomes the instrument of the most intimate embodiment of these ; it is identified with the very spirit of the observer.

What we must say, then, is that the aesthetic seems to present a more profound rendering of the motives of control than the bare dualism of knowledge and practice, truth and worth, brings out. It suggests a protest against the divorce of the theoretical and the practical, against the radical separation of fact and worth. The purblind knower and the weary and stumbling doer alike find their immediate relief and their prophecy of completeness in art. One finds in the aesthetic a meaning that one's whole being welcomes, not merely a part. The observer is on a summit of contemplation, of intuition, from which he may at any time retire and become again merely the seeker after relations and conclusions or the striver after personal gain.

For the control under which this result is secured, there is no special name. To itself it is simply *realization* through the object, the enjoyment of an undivided self-conscious life—a function

that finds its justification simply in its own immediacy and autonomy. It recognizes all of the special controls because it unites them all. In this sense it is autonomic.

30. In this conclusion as to the control, we have further illumination with respect to the nature of the aesthetic interest. To say that the interest is "intrinsic" may mean very little; it may mean simply the absence of reference to something else, either fact or good, which if present would make the interest remote or extrinsic. But we do not wish to stop with such a merely negative view. The aesthetic has a positive content, and the interest, to be pure and genuine, must find its active and positive fulfilment in the contemplation of the thing of beauty.

It is therefore the positive characterization that has especial interest. Positively it includes truth, because the sort of semblance is not that of mere fancy or play; it is that of an idealization of the system of truth. It also includes the good; because it is an actual embodiment of worth for the self, the fulfilment of the motives of inner control and realization. The interest then is intrinsic from its *inclusiveness*, not from mere barrenness or emptiness.

§ 5. THE AESTHETIC NEGATIVE : PRIVATION

These positive aspects of the aesthetic control and interest appear in full relief when we attempt to understand the aesthetic negative, the sort of exclusion that the positive aesthetic determination carries with it. This we may take up first with reference to the general limitations or exclusions that positive aesthetic predication involves; and then consider the cases of the "negatively aesthetic" as such, or the "Ugly."

31. In considering the intent of negation that attaches to aesthetic constructions, we have at the outset to rule out contents that are simply, for the time, unaesthetic or non-aesthetic. The mere absence of the aesthetic point of view, together with the non-aesthetic character of the contents which may then occupy consciousness, is not our topic; nor is it the modes of negation by which no aesthetic force is conveyed. We are here concerned with the suggestion or intention, involved in the aesthetic meaning itself, either to exclude this or that possible content from the grasp of the present aesthetic movement, or to assert the positive ineligibility of a content for any aesthetic treatment. The former of these cases considers the aesthetic

control, in its particular exercise, as defining itself so as simply to exclude what is not then and there intended. The latter goes somewhat further, since it turns upon the attribution to the object of qualities opposed to the aesthetic, or inconsistent with it.

32. We may call the first-mentioned aspect of meaning the "aesthetic negative." It will be recalled that in certain of our earlier discussions it has already been touched upon, under the heading of semblant negation.¹ We found that the movement by which a content is rendered semblant involves its relative isolation from the body of its actual relationships, in this world or that, physical, social, etc. The playful selection of an object and its utilization in the scheme of sport, for example, involve its detachment from its context of related actual things. It is taken up in the movement of the play interest, and made to bear a meaning peculiar to itself in the operation of the playful purpose.

It has been pointed out that this involves a very peculiar and interesting negative force with reference to any element of content that is *not taken up by the interest*; it is excluded by the very nature of the interest which is privative and exclusive. The things that are not chosen are not excluded because of characters of their own; they are simply passed over and neglected by the terms of the positive selection. All but the semblant whole is negative to the present interest, simply in the sense of being left out. This we have called in the preceding discussion privative exclusion. It is not the mere "left-over-ness" of simple cognition, which is limited in its span—the negative force of mere limitation—but it is rather the "left-out-ness" of what an exclusive movement of interest does not choose or select.

33. With this description of semblant privation in mind, we may now go on to inquire as to the form of privative exclusion that is intended when the semblance becomes positively aesthetic. When the semblance becomes that of idealization and personal absorption in the object and identity with it, what is then the intent of negation, if indeed there is any such intent?

Of course, we have to say that the intent of exclusion is present here as in all cases of exclusive interest; and that it is not peculiar so far as the movement is merely indeterminate.

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i. chap. ix. § 6, and vol. ii. chap. viii. § 9.

As a matter of fact, the exclusion should become broader as the interest becomes narrower and more exacting. The aesthetic would exclude even those contents of the semblant mode itself—the merely playful—which its positive interest did not select. The artist at the piano might say, “let us stop drumming, I will compose something”; the mere haphazard playing is succeeded by the selection of notes for the construction of an aesthetic whole. Looked at negatively this means that the interest excludes all but its own selected contents; these it isolates and interprets. The intent of privation remains. The actual inclusion is the important thing, the recognition of the positive aesthetic value of the thing selected. This we are to consider further later on in the treatment of the aesthetic object, or the Work of Art.

34. While this is true of the indeterminateness of what is left out by the intent of selection, yet the determination of what is not left out becomes of interest, even in the interpretation of the exclusion itself. If it be true, as we have found, that there is always the movement of personalization, either as absorption of self in the object or as self-identification with it, then in any case the personal self, the intimate subject whose inner life is thus involved, *cannot be excluded*. The exclusive interest is the vehicle of the self and the aesthetic interest embodies the self.

The appreciation of the aesthetic object sets, therefore, this remarkable limitation upon the privative force. The subject of the experience must say in effect, “I shut out everything *but the object and me*. The object is not beautiful without me. Not merely that I must be here to discover and appreciate its beauty; not at all: the reason is much more profound. I must be here because in its beauty it reinstates my mental life, and only in my experience can it be carried forward to its aesthetic completeness. The ideal character it has it owes to my idealization; its personal life it owes to the inner movement by which I live it as I live myself.”

The privative movement has, therefore, this intent: everything is excluded except that which is at the time showing the semblance of an inner life which is the spectator's own. The content is “lifted” and isolated in the grasp of a sympathy that identifies the object with the self. It refuses either to know or to appreciate anything save the object of its present and personal interest.

§ 6. THE NEGATIVELY AESTHETIC: THE UGLY

35. In the "ugly" we have more than the mere absence of beauty, more than the mere passing-by of the aesthetic interest, with the accompanying privation just described. We have the actual presence of a negatively aesthetic quality, a quality that forbids or opposes the movement of the aesthetic interest. It is suggestive in the present connexion, not as coming up for detailed discussion in its own right—for it is not our intention to compose a full aesthetic theory—but as illustrating the positive side of the aesthetic criterion or coefficient. It brings out the difference between play and art in an emphatic way. Play does not recognize the limits which the aesthetic finds in the ugly. We can play with anything; anything can be selected to take on the playful sort of semblance. But with art it is not so; the ugly is not beautiful, and nothing can make it so; it embodies materials in which the sort of semblance operating in the aesthetic cannot go forward. Some materials are always ineligible or unfit for aesthetic or artistic treatment. Let us use the term "ugly" to cover all cases of this—to include all objects which are positively unaesthetic—and inquire why they are so.

From what we have already found out, we may give two principal reasons that the ugly is and must be pronounced ugly. Under these there are a variety of constructions and of things that have the mark of ugliness in varying modes and degrees.

36. (1) Things, facts, objects, that *cannot be idealized* are ugly. This is the first difference between art and play. It matters not what character or feature it is that prevents idealization. It will appear later on that certain formal qualities—relations of space, proportion of parts, rhythm of movement, combinations of tone are necessary to give direction to the idealization. When these conditions fail and the object resists the movement, it is pronounced "bizarre," "grotesque," "inharmonious," "unbalanced," "asymmetrical," "dissonant," "unrhythmical," etc. All these are forms of ugliness. They are positive marks, which restrict and prevent the movement of aesthetic appreciation in part of its essential intent. Practical maladjustment and unfitness of means to ends, no less than relational defect, have this force. Unfitting conduct as well as the unfit combination of colours, misfitting clothes as well as inconsistent reasons are ugly. All these things, different as they are, present meanings which do not further the movement that would

carry on to its completion a continuous process of idealization, but inhibit it. They are all positively unaesthetic, negatively aesthetic, ugly. They arouse a positive attitude of negative appreciation or aesthetic repulsion.

37. (2) The other principal reason for ugliness is *lack of possible personal meaning*. The persistently impersonal, the stubbornly objective—that which antagonizes all sympathy and repels all humanizing—is ugly. We have found that the semblant, both the playful and the aesthetic, embodies a movement of personalization. It must be possible—if not consciously still spontaneously—to interpret the relations of the object as lending support to a movement of inner control and psychic life. The material must show not only an imitative organization, the sort of systematic development that further idealization would produce ; but this idealization must permit the transfusion into it of the interest to find or to be a spiritual life, no matter how crude. If the mode of organization is quite incomprehensible or quite lacking in any analogy wherein the symbolism of fellow-feeling may be discerned, it ceases to be aesthetic. So, too, if the mass of material be unformed, chaotic to the extent of excluding the symbolism and suggestion of an active sympathy, or antagonizing them. The muck-heap is ugly because it is personally repulsive ; the harsh noise, because it is disorganizing to the symbolism of the life of sensation.¹

38. These two requirements are both essential, and lack on either side is sufficient to determine ugliness. The moral disorder of a criminal personal record is ugly because it symbolizes a disturbed and chaotic inner principle, whose rule of ideal development is broken and destroyed. Distracting noises may be ugly because they render the orderly movement of attention impossible ; so may capricious vagaries and chaotic dreams : they represent or symbolize interruption and discontinuity in the developing inner control. The passion of the individual and the violence of the mob are equally unaesthetic ; they stand for personal and social confusion and arbitrary processes of impulse and suggestion.²

I venture to say, without stopping to give further proof of

¹ It should be noted that mere disagreeableness is not ugliness. The harsh noise may become positively aesthetic when made part of a larger whole—as on the stage—of which it expresses something of the entire meaning, or to which it adds something.

² Cf. chap. ix. on "The Bad," especially § 2.

the statement, that all sense of ugliness—every form of aesthetic repulsion—can be traced to the positive violation of one or other of these requirements of the aesthetic. Here in its violation the positiveness of the positively aesthetic stands out clearly.

§ 7. SEMBLANT FEELING AND THE FEELING OF SEMBLANCE.

39. It is a notable fact that emotion may be semblantly excited. We will see below, in considering the "springs of art," that the aesthetic effect of music is due largely to the revival of emotional states.¹ It is an interesting question whether the musical imagination of the composer does not largely utilize affective material.

The drama is the art that makes direct use of this resource. But other arts, as sculpture and painting, present emotional and sentimental states by their respective methods. An interesting question arises in connexion with such emotion, suggested as actually present in the characters of the play or work of art, the question as to the relation of the emotion semblantly aroused in the observer to the aesthetic feeling which accompanies this emotion, considered as the latter must be as content of the semblant consciousness. For example, one stands before the famous Laocoön at Rome and gazes upon the signs of intense terror, feeling in himself something of the fright and horror of the serpent; how are we to distinguish the aesthetic ingredient as such in the complex emotional state?

40. It is evident that the depicted emotion becomes artistically effective only as it is entered into and lived actively by the observer. This we have found to be necessary for aesthetic consciousness. It is then *our own emotion semblantly excited* that serves as content of the imagination, or a fusion of the emotional factor of the suggested situation with our own incipient feeling. It is this, organized according to the rules of affective revival and idealization, to which the aesthetic response goes out. We may imagine a child so overcome by terror at the sight of the Laocoön that his real emotion would dominate, while the imaginative factor disappeared. The emotion would then be no longer aesthetic.

Good illustrations are also to be found in the acting of emotional dramatic or comic rôles. The actor when learning the part, endeavours to make his emotion seem real to the spectator; and it may become very real to himself. But for the aesthetic effect, for one or both of them, it must nevertheless be

¹ Chap. xiii. § 4.

understood to be acting, to be semblant, engaged in for the purpose of the play. If the actor himself goes over to the actual emotion, living the part too seriously, it ceases to be artistic for him, although it may remain so for the spectator *who still accepts it as mere acting*. But again, let the spectator believe the actor to be seriously the jealous husband, or the villainous murderer, or let him, the spectator, himself be carried over into a serious consciousness of emotion of the same type, and in either case the aesthetic factor is destroyed for him also.

41. The conclusion then is that emotions—states of feeling and sentiment generally—may serve as matter of art, as aesthetic content. But they must be presented by the semblant imagination under the general conditions of the artistic. The aesthetic state as such is the response to the semblant emotional whole, just as in the case of presented content of the cognitive order. The mere reinstatement of emotion, its vivid revival, is not aesthetic; it must take on more or less organized semblant form.¹

¹ Of course, it may be remarked, this is a case of genuine affective revival, or may be. See the discussion above, chap vi. We cannot say that the ideas suggest a real emotion and this, itself made over into idea (the idea of this emotion), then suggests the revived or semblant emotion. There is really no such machinery!

Chapter XI

REFLECTIVE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

§ 1. AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

1. We have now come to an understanding as to what the aesthetic experience is in its spontaneous or unreflective form. It is an imaginative function of the restricted sort known as semblance, and it is still further defined by the presence of processes which idealize the content and embody the agent's inner life or self. It takes its rise in the same epoch as conscious play, which is also a semblant function ; but it is not co-extensive with the latter.

Let us now attempt to trace the aesthetic motive and interest in the later periods in which the mental life becomes reflective. To this end it will be necessary to recall briefly the characters of the period of reflection.

2. In general, reflection involves the setting up of the entire range of inner happenings as being for the subject its own experience, that is, as being a context of ideas or thoughts. So considered, three aspects of the mode become apparent¹: first, judgment is present in the act of acknowledgment ; second, relation is present as the form in which the contents or ideas are acknowledged ; and third, the dualism of self and not-self is present in the form in which the self is the " subject " of the entire process. All these three aspects or criteria belong essentially to the mode of reflection. Whatever is possible in the way of a semblant and aesthetic experience, therefore, in this mode must involve these factors.

3. As to judgment, we have no hesitation in saying at once that there are aesthetic judgments. When we say that a thing is beautiful or ugly, we render such a judgment. How is this possible ? In what sense can the aesthetic content become

¹ See *Thought and Things*, vol. i. " Functional Logic," chap. xi. § 8.

subject-matter of a judgment?—and under what conditions can judgment render the aesthetic experience?

These questions at once suggest a distinction which is of the first importance in any consideration of aesthetic judgment. We must distinguish between the meaning rendered in the judgment—its content or subject-matter—on the one hand, and the act or function of judging, on the other hand.

4. As to the latter, the function, we may say that aesthetic judgment as such, the acknowledgment of the aesthetic quality of an object, is like any other judgment; it is not a semblant or imaginative function, but one of mediation of truth or worth. When I say "that is beautiful," I intend to acknowledge a fact or to predicate a truth. The ground on which my assertion proceeds may be more or less adequate; but in the judgment or predication, I refer to the more original sphere or ground of actual appreciation in which the present statement finds its support. While, therefore, the meaning is taken up and rendered in the judgment as aesthetic, still the setting forth of this meaning in the form of acknowledgment or predication is not aesthetic; it is factual or truthful. I state something that has to be confirmed by a more elementary and direct experience.

This appears without question in cases in which I intend the statement to convey the results of reflection as such; that is, when I intend to give reasons for the acceptance of the thing as beautiful. This is the case in judgments about art, judgments in which the canons or rules of art are in question, and their application is attempted. This case is clearly one of predication about the work of art, not one of direct appreciation of the beautiful.¹ The meaning of the judgment in such a case is given in some such form as, "this is artistic," or "I find this beautiful, ideal," etc.

5. The more doubtful and difficult case, indeed, is not the one just mentioned; but the case in which the pronouncement as to the aesthetic quality seems to be spontaneous, and to express a direct appreciation in the presence of the object. The judgment "it is beautiful" made during the contemplation of the work of art is of this sort.

This case, too, *so far as there is a real judgment*, falls under our statement as to mediation. So far as the judgment renders or states the experience in a form that is at all descriptive, general, or common, it is a statement *about the experience*. It generalizes and communicates what is common to it and other aesthetic

¹ See chap. xii.

experiences. It is on the same footing, as to the aesthetic predicate, as the corresponding judgment of acknowledgment of the object itself is as to any other predicate. For instance, the judgment, "the picture is square," asserts in judgmental or predicative form a property of the object discovered in experience; so the judgment "the picture is beautiful," acknowledges another quality—that by reason of which a meaning of appreciation attaches to the object.

We may say, therefore, that aesthetic judgment so-called, in so far as it is an acknowledgment or assertion of fact or truth, is an assertion *about the aesthetic*; it is not a direct rendering of the aesthetic, nor is it itself an aesthetic function.

6. There are, however, two limiting cases which bring up other aspects of the mode of reflection. Suppose that in order to illustrate the clear case of judgment as mediating, or being "about," the aesthetic, we select a statement rendered *in the absence of the thing* to which reference is made. This is clearly a case in which the aesthetic worth of the thing is mediated along with the thing itself. Then let us take the case of *direct contact with the object itself*, succeeding upon and confirming the judgment by a new direct experience. We may then ask whether the meaning in this latter case is still one of mediation, or whether we may now call it one of aesthetic experience as such.

This raises the question whether, in fact, in the logical mode or in the midst of reflection, there may be a reconstitution of the object in an imaginative or semblant way, over and above the rendering of the same content in the form of explicit mediation. That is, can the appreciation of a thing as beautiful take on the form of a judgment of acknowledgment while at the same time it is a direct or immediate experience?

Evidently, there are again two cases, either of which may serve us in answer to this question: either first, confirmation of the judgment may terminate the mediation; or second, the attitude of judgment, thus mediated and confirmed, may *be taken up in the continuing imaginative function, becoming itself a part of the semblant meaning*.

7. Both of these possibilities are realized, it would appear, in actual life. One may, in acknowledging aesthetic quality, merely presume and accept the entire objective meaning, including the aesthetic intent, simply finding it and living in it; in this case, the process by which the aesthetic meaning becomes content of judgment disappears; the mediation is not necessary.

This simply amounts to a return to the spontaneous type of aesthetic appreciation of which we have given an account in the preceding chapter. The element of judgment that seems to survive is a sort of vibration between the direct experience itself and its reflective acknowledgment.¹ All sorts of associations and analogous instances come forward to give generality to the experience, and to disturb or enhance the effect ; and the form of judgment often serves for mere description or indication to other persons—a means of pointing out the object intended. In most cases, indeed, of our spontaneous appreciations there are such personal and social accompaniments. But we may still hold that, in all these cases, there is a moment of aesthetic experience as such, which is often impaired rather than furthered by such processes of acknowledgment and description. The entire effect is to be distinguished from the aesthetic effect proper ; or in the words of Groos, the “*aesthetisch Wirksam*” from the “*aesthetisch Wertvoll*.”

8. The other case has elements that carry us further in our analysis : the case in which the judgment is itself taken up in the aesthetic construction, and, by adding its motive of acknowledgment to the movement, reinforces the effect of confirmation and personal absorption. If it is possible to reconstitute cognitive contents in semblant form in which their original force, as perceived, remembered, etc., is preserved under the cloak of a conscious self-illusion, why may not this extend to judgment ? Why may not the object have both the force of a presumed or assumed reality—although known to be imaginatively set up—and that of an acknowledged and established aesthetic reality ?—a reality that has been found to be true and beautiful and acknowledged as such by an act of judgment ?

There is no reason that it may not ; as a matter of fact it does. The mature contemplation of a work of art has the force not merely of perceived and remembered data, but also that of a system of proved and acknowledged truths and values. The relationships of various sorts are not only depicted, but depicted *as being of known truth and worth*.

In this way, the aesthetic object becomes, for the reflective consciousness, one that allows all sorts of “as-if-judgments” to be passed upon it, judgments of semblance in respect to truth or worth. The aesthetic whole will not admit the charge of

¹ See chap. xiv., § 6, on the “Apprehension of Immediacy.”

being either erroneous or unfit. The intent to hold good, both for knowledge and for action, which we found characteristic of the spontaneous mode of semblance, holds also here; but it is now subject to the interpretation given to the mode of reflection. Its tests, from the point of view of the partial interests involved, include both those of perception and memory, and those of rational thought and deliberate good, all capable of being rendered in the form of judgments.

9. We have, then, three clearly distinguishable senses in which the term "aesthetic judgment" may be used. First, it may designate the judgment that renders the fact or truth of the attribution of aesthetic quality to an object. As judgment, this is not really aesthetic at all; it is merely the form of predication which locates the aesthetic quality. The judgment, "that is a work of art," may be made apart from any truly aesthetic experience. Second, there is the judgment about objects as being fit to excite aesthetic appreciation or as actually exciting it: as in "I can tell you the ground of my appreciation of this picture." Third, there is the mode of meaning in which the processes of judgment are included or assumed *as part of the whole semblant content*. The judgment is itself semblantly at work, in a way that lends to the object the force of judged and acknowledged truth or worth. In this last, the fitness of the object for critical or appreciative acceptance is part of its eligibility for aesthetic treatment. The interest is enlarged to grasp truth and worth as elements in the aesthetic whole.

In this we find the aesthetic re-established in its own way in the mode of reflection. It confirms and establishes its materials by an act of conscious acknowledgment. It is a transition stage to the further mode in which the requirement is made that the object shall actually be organized with reference to its fitness for aesthetic appreciation; that is, in which the canons of art production are consciously applied. This we are to return to in a later chapter, as I have intimated above.

10. The general result is that the judgment—so far as it is not merely "about" the aesthetic, but really enters into it—both enriches and limits the experience. It enriches it by including, in the meaning of the semblant object, the general requirements of rationality, both theoretical and practical. But this is also a limitation, since this demand is added to that of mere sensuous and perceptual order. Indeed, there is sometimes a conflict between the lower and higher orders of aesthetic experi-

ence. So marked is the contrast in art generally, that theories are called "sensuous" or "intellectualist," according as one or other of the two is made more fundamental. From such a choice our genetic point of view, of course, saves us. We see that the process that accounts for sensuous beauty, requiring the assumption of applicability of sensuous tests of correctness or good, continues in play on the higher plane of reflection, where a similar requirement—that of the sort of confirmation to be found in judgment—is introduced. The tests become those relevant to the demands of reason and sentiment. This will receive further comment in our treatment of the work of art as such ; here it may suffice to point out that *judgment and belief are pre-supposed and semblantly reinstated* in this higher exercise of aesthetic imagination.

§ 2. HIGHER AESTHETIC SEMBLANCE : THE CONTROL

11. Another of the criteria of reflection comes to light when we ask as to the relation of the self, the inner control principle, to the content set up. We have found, in the mode of reflection, the dualism between the "subject-self" and the entire body of its thoughts, both the not-self and the "object-self." The question arises as to what part this more refined dualism plays in the movement of higher or reflective semblance.

Here we come upon a remarkable movement of the constructive imagination, which finds itself released from the bonds of fact, free in the sense of proceeding with intentional selection and elimination of materials. The inner control principle not only becomes consciously the subject of the mode, but finds for itself therein a definite artistic calling. Let us look into the working of this principle of control at this higher stage and see whether the restrictions which the spontaneous aesthetic construction places upon the freedom of play, still hold here. What are the precise limitations, under which the aesthetic imagination proceeds, when it becomes the instrument of intentional art ?

12. (1) In the first place, we note that the material taken up by the imagination must not only submit to the tests which its spontaneous aesthetic construction required, but that other tests are now added. The former requirements we found to be substantially those of "real" control submitted to in semblance though not in fact ; the material is "fit" for knowledge or use. This embodies, as we saw, a restriction upon

the capricious creations of the playful fancy ; it has no longer the freedom of wilfulness and licence. It selects what might be actual and reads it as if it were so.

This further takes form, it will be remembered, in the movement of aesthetic idealization. The imagination moves forward in the sense of interpreting the content prospectively and ideally. This idealization proceeds by the process of reading a given content schematically both to extend its meaning in itself and to find in it the fulfilment of the ends of personal control and embodiment.

In the mode of reflection, none of these restrictions upon the freedom of the inner control principle is lost ; they are all reconstituted in the form that reflection makes possible. The entire body of objective meanings is now set up in idea. This body of ideas mediates the real ; and in this sense they are " true " : or the good ; and in this sense they are worthwhile. The mediating context is still held in semblance to the external references and controls by reason of this twofold mediation.

13. (2) But to this there is added the further requirement, peculiar to the mode of reflection, which the attitude of acknowledgment imposes. We have just seen that the acknowledgment or assertion found in judgment is taken up into the semblance of the aesthetic, when this is truly reflective. This means an additional limitation, since not only must the construction be fit to undergo the tests of fact and worth of the simpler sort found in sensuous experience, but also to face the tests of judgment as being true or good. The idealization of the inner life cannot operate to select or accept that which would be seriously judged untrue or unworthy.¹

These limitations extend in spirit, if not in fact, into the realm of the ideal. The constructive imagination, even when consciously semblant, and not actually scientific or practical, is still only within these limits free. The control of the inner life found in reflection, while reinstating the entire body of ideas as thoughts within experience, and so giving them a subjective intent, still constructs with reference to the ideals of the spheres of truth and worth. The rules of organization peculiar to these spheres remain in play. The characters of truth, seen in relational consistency, logical validity, etc., and the grounds of practical worth, seen in deliberate adoption of means to ends,

¹ This consideration is given further statement in chap. xii, § 2 ; see also the lecture " L'Art et la Morale " in *Conférences de Foi et Vie*, 1910.

are operative with semblant force, and nothing can be called aesthetic which violates or ignores them. What these rules and requirements are, as found in art construction, cannot be fully discussed here; we return to the subject when we take up for consideration the work of art as such.¹

14. While all this is true, however, the aesthetic state is still one of imaginative semblance, not one of mere fact or mere worth, or of both. The aesthetic interest differs both from the scientific and from the practical. In the whole, the rules of truth and worth are not violated, but still this whole is not constituted for the sake of truth or worth. It is *semblant*, although semblant of truth and worth. It is imaginative, but imaginative of what might be found to embody consistent logical implications and worthwhile practical utilities. The mediations of both sorts play through it; but they are present in the idealized form which only the forecasting selection of the thinker himself can produce. The initiative, the continued selection, the construction in systematic form, the checking off of the results as suitable and fit—these reflect the working of the inner processes of control.

When we come to look at this aspect of the case from the point of view of the dualism of reflection—the dualism of self and the objects of experience—we find the relation of the self to the aesthetic construction analogous to that which holds in the realm of spontaneous imagination. Any of the meanings which are already possible under either of the two great modes of mediation may be set up in semblant form, while the whole is in the mode of organization which the development of a system of ideas takes on. The control is that of imaginative semblance, but it is now recognized that the sphere of the entire experience is the inner life itself. Just as one may play with his own ideas, as well as utilize them; so he may set them up imaginatively for the sake of aesthetic appreciation, as well as hypothetically for the sake of testing their truth or utility.

The fact, however, that the whole construction is now recognized as being in experience, as being, that is, on the platform of ideas, gives opportunity to a motive which we have already described as present in spontaneous imaginative constructions, and which we now find taking on very significant form; I mean the motive of personalization: the reading-into the aesthetic whole of an inner life of its own.

¹ See chap. xii., where the third requirement of the logical as such, a relational content, is also found to be operative.

§ 3. HIGHER AESTHETIC SYMPATHY (SEMBLING)

15. The conditions of the spontaneous movement of sympathetic projection, involving the attribution of inner life and movement to the aesthetic object, will be recalled. We saw that the movement takes place within the restrictions of imaginative semblance, both as to the rule of objective construction and as to the sort of freedom attaching to the inner control. The wider personifying tendency is succeeded by a movement by which the object is identified with the self. Not only is there a sense of sympathy with the object, but also a reverse movement by which the object is taken up into the intimate self-process of the observer. If this is a general mark of the aesthetic experience, we should find it present also in the stage of reflection. But we should expect it to take on the tone of the mode, and to become itself in some full sense reflective; particularly since in the process of reflection the dualism between the self and the objects of experience is reconstituted in a definite form.

This expectation is fulfilled in both of its bearings. There is an identification of the self with the aesthetic object in all enjoyment of art; and so far from finding this process losing force when the elements of the self become more refined and reflective, we find, on the contrary, a new willingness to go with the thing and submit to the illusion of union with it. The intent to identify the self with the movements suggested by the work of art becomes a more or less conscious part of the aesthetic effect. We seek for analogies from life and mind to justify what we feel, and for symbols to make concrete the meaning of inner control taken over from the thing. The movement of personal sembling is here in its essentials; and it seems to gather a sort of reinforcement from the general conditions of reflection. When we recall the motives at work, we discover certain reasons for this.

16. (1) In the first place, we should expect that certain more negative motives to aesthetic sympathy would still be operative. There is the motive found in the loosing of the direct controls, which occurs when the object is merely semblant and no longer real. With this goes the attribution to the object of the control which the semblant or imaginative process itself requires. These motives work still, and with increased force, when the whole process is, in its meaning for consciousness itself, one of inner organization. To take over the entire context into the inner life of ideas, and to recognize that the rules of the

organization are those of this life—although the whole process may mediate an actual reference—this would itself tend to free the personalizing movement from some of its inhibitions and limitations. It is easier to imagine truthful and useful combinations than it is to discover them ; and it is easier to hold to them when we consider them the result of our own thought and belief. The semblant reconciliation of the opposed controls becomes more acceptable and more final now that it is removed a further step from the actual tests of fact. The glamour of logical argumentation thrown over a feat of the imagination or over a dream passes muster as long as it rests in a state of mere acceptance, mere superficial reading, and is not put on the defensive by any extraneous appeal.

There is here, then, the same tendency to take on personal form that we find in the spontaneous sembling imagination, and the same tendency to read this personal form in terms of the observer's own inner life.

Over and above these more negative reasons for the personalizing of the object, due to the mere absence of any other control than that of the psychic process itself, we find, when the mode of reflection is reached, two motives which enter to advance the movement in the same direction. One of these is the reflection in the judgment of a control which is social in its origin, and the other is the universalizing of the ideal end of the movement, which gives it personal form. These operate together to advance the aesthetic meaning.

17. (2) The movement whereby the social tests and standards of belief and truth are reflected in the individual's judgment have been already discussed in detail.¹ The meaning of all judgment is common in the sense that it is held to be "synnomic," or suitable for all judging minds. This quality of judgment is a form of community, as we have seen, that no longer waits for the actual acceptance or catholicity of the matter asserted, but finds its own rendering and acknowledgment adequate and sufficient for all. This commonness of meaning has its origin, of course, in the social training of the individual, whereby he not only learns the matter of tradition and social belief, but also has his judgment trained to be an organ of independent interpretation. The processes by which this competence of judgment is secured need not be again described ; but we will now note certain results of it which bear upon the question in hand.

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. ii., "Experimental Logic," chap. 3.

If, as we have seen to be true, the judgment as a function may be implicated in the constructions of imaginative semblance, if its confirming and acknowledging force may become part of the illusion of the matter set up, if the object is taken *as if* deliberately believed and valued—then the object would also be intended as if judged by all observers. Its force *both as common and as individually rendered* would be preserved in the semblant meaning—as individually rendered but still as synnomic and appropriate to all persons who have the same data in mind.

In the movement of the imagination, as it operates in aesthetic semblance, these conditions are strikingly fulfilled. There is not only the intention to erect something as-if-real for personal contemplation, but also the intention to accept it as if socially believed for common contemplation. The judgment is as-if-exercised for the ends of personal and social belief, while, however, it is explicitly understood that this is not the end of the process, and that it is not to be submitted to the tests of truth. The synnomic force becomes semblant with all the rest of the meaning. It is intentionally indulged in as part of the self-illusion. The social justification of the construction is found in the assertive processes of individual judgment.

In this we find a further reason that the object should take on personal form. So far from requiring external and social confirmation, the semblance of judgment replaces it. It is "synnomic"; it fulfils the whole law. So the movement of judgment in and through the object makes it at once valid and also personal. So marked is this feeling with reference to the personal ingredient of the work of art that the artist calls it his "creation," his expression or embodiment of himself, even while calling upon others, by reason of the continued common or synnomic force of the construction, to appreciate its objective meaning as he does. "It is my very life," he will say; "but it is universal: come and see the meaning of it with me." The social agreement is presupposed, sublimated in the judgmental process by which the individual becomes the organ of society; and all of this is set up semblantly and thus made matter of aesthetic rendering.

18. (3) A further significant aspect of the entire aesthetic movement appears on the side of the idealization which it requires. The movement of idealization must be present, and must extend to the entire body of meaning. Now in the stage of reflection, the idealization is carried over to the side of the inner life and

proceeds by the process of valuation. Ideality, perfection of any sort, is a form of worth ; in reflection it is consciously so. The entire intent of the ideal which the aesthetic object has, is now read as illustrating the inner control, the inner movement and life which the thing itself, as mere thing of fact or truth, would not have but for its treatment in the forms of subjective appreciation.

We have remarked before—in our first discussion of the character of ideal meaning¹—upon this suggestion of a developing self-intent in the ideal. It appears very marked when associated with the other motives of personalization present in the aesthetic content.

Certain of these factors in the general effect will be brought up again later on ; here they are presented as together furnishing the motives which conspire to the effect we are discussing. The aesthetic object means *a* mental life, and embodies *our* mental life, whether that life be merely spontaneous or consciously reflective. We now see why, in the peculiar movement of imaginative semblance, this should be so.

19. It should be emphasized, however, that all these factors, both those of semblant reconstruction of truth and worth and those of personal self-realization, are positively present. The conscious work of art, as we are to see, meets the requirements of fullness and richness of content as no other object of thought or purpose can. In the first place, it has the *meaning of universality* ; it is of common force in that it reconstructs judgments of truth and value which are synnomic in meaning. In the second place, it has the *meaning of singularity* : it is both a personal creation, and one in which a single personal life is taken up and carried forward. In the aesthetic, experience itself holds in a sort of liquid solution the elements that the reagents, known as knowledge and practise, disclose only as solid precipitates.

We have now taken up two of the great aspects of the mode of reflection and shown in what way they influence the imagination in the construction of the aesthetic object. The other, the third of our criteria of the logical mode as such, concerns that object directly ; it raises the question of the actual cognitive character of the work of art, as appreciated in the relational terms of judgment. This requires more detailed consideration, and may be taken up in a separate chapter.

¹ *Thought and Things*, vol. i. "Functional Logic," chap. x, § 8.

Chapter XII

THE AESTHETIC OBJECT : THE WORK OF ART

§ 1. THE ARTISTIC

In the pages just preceding, we have described that mode of the aesthetic meaning which arises when the processes of reflection take on semblant form. The self as a subjective control principle charges the object set up with its own vital movement. The process of mediation in which the object of reflection retains its marks of truth and utility, is found to survive in the entire suggestion that the aesthetic object makes. In both respects the genuine gain accruing to knowledge through the movement into the logical mode is not lost ; both truth and worth take their place with the sensational and other contents in the entire semblant meaning.

1. It now remains to inquire whether the third criterion or mark of the reflective as such, the mark of relation, organization, systematization, which is so remarkably developed in the logical mode has also a place in the æsthetic object.

It is from the point of view of the character of the object as an organized and objective whole that we speak of such an object as a work of fine art. Art is the sum of the products of the aesthetic motive, a body of objects differing from those of logical truth, the objects of science, and from those of utility, the things of practical value. It is, therefore, the work of art, the more or less well-marked composition called beautiful—whether created by man or found in nature—that we have now to consider. It is appropriate to speak of the cases of beautiful things which are simply found, not made, as works of art, since we are here dealing with the processes by which the spontaneous appreciation of beauty passes over into the reflective judgment or acknowledgment of the thing as beautiful. The experience of “ finding the beautiful ” requires the relatively full imaginative process

of aesthetic appreciation, and the natural object becomes "artistic" in the same sense that the artist's creation does.

§ 2. AESTHETIC INDIVIDUATION: THE DETACHMENT OF THE
WORK OF ART

2. The sense in which the aesthetic object is individuated as one thing and nothing else, is the first large question that comes before us. Other modes of individuation have already concerned us. We have found out the motives and limits under which things are set up as separate objects for knowledge, for reflection, for action. What are the corresponding conditions of the individuation of the thing as beautiful, of its isolation by the aesthetic interest for contemplation?

3. It is to be remarked, at the outset, that it is here in the movement of aesthetic individuation that the most marked and fruitful character of the work of art shows itself. For it is just here that, in the pursuit of its own interest, the aesthetic movement runs athwart the lines drawn by individuation under other motives. The distinction of a thing of fact, established for knowledge as a single thing—a table, a chair, a face—and the distinction of those contents which contribute to its utility as an instrument or tool—these distinctions may be obscured when the thing is apprehended with a view to its beauty. We say of the table, that its lines must be reconstructed; it is too big here, too thin there, etc.; or of the face that some of the details must be left out or changed if it is to be judged beautiful. So also with its useful parts or properties. The spurs on the cock have their use, but they give awkwardness and lack of symmetry to its form. An angry countenance has its uses and so has the dentist's probe; but the very suggestion of the utility in such cases destroys any degree of aesthetic meaning we might be disposed, from a different point of view, to attribute to the thing. The aesthetic "thing," therefore, the individual thing of beauty, does not coincide in its defining lines with the things of knowledge or of use.

Both the nature of this difference, and its limits, are clear in the light of what we have seen of the movement of imaginative semblance itself. Anything may be aesthetic which can be treated semblantly in the imagination; treated, that is, as if it were an independent thing or meaning having a certain fitness for immediate contemplation. This shows itself in the marks of the work of art.

4. (1) There is an actual detachment of the content from its setting in the relations of knowledge and practice. This appears in the unity and isolation of the aesthetic object as a whole. The interest proceeds by the positive selection of the material as embodying an idea or meaning, and by the equally positive exclusion of all else, however closely the excluded items may be actually joined to the bit selected by bonds either of fact or of use. A landscape, whether real or imaginary, is aesthetic when it leads itself to detachment from the rest of the scenery¹ or from the further contextuation which the pursuit of information or of use might justify. This involves relative inhibition of the theoretical interest, or its restriction upon the elements given within the selected whole. Within this whole, the principles of valid and relevant organization hold; but outside, in the world at large, the whole need have no actual place or logical tie.

In a dramatic play, for example, the unfolding of the plot, the grouping of the figures, the relative apportionment of space and time, etc., all these must submit within the whole to rules of consistency and proportion; but in order to awake and further the aesthetic interest, the whole must not merge into the actual relations of the control in which it is exposed to view. The landscape is put in an isolating frame and hung on a blank wall; the group of dramatic figures is arranged on a bare wooden stage; the social situation depicted need not be true in the belief of the persons who appreciate the artistic rendering.

This means, of course, that the semblant character of the construction is essential; it will not submit to any reduction to the level of fact or truth, however exacting the criteria may be within the organization of the isolated whole itself. We smile at the child who asks: "But did Hamlet kill himself?" or "Did Romeo marry Juliet?" We are not shocked at the passage of the stage hand in working clothes across the operatic stage at the critical moment of the *dénouement*; and we pay no heed to the art critic who complains that the consistencies of time and place should hold beyond the confines of the story itself. The art interest *depicts* truth, but does not *teach* it; it pictures what

¹ The writer was informed by an artist in California that the Sierra Nevada mountains of that State, so beautiful as a whole, were not frequented by artists because they found the lines so long and sweeping that it was difficult to discover smaller views suitable for separate pictorial treatment. In Switzerland, on the contrary, the abruptness and "jaggedness" of the scenery give it high artistic value.

might be, but does not prove it ; it sets up an organized whole for what the imagination finds it suited, but it does not attempt to sanction the whole in any sphere of actual or obligatory control.

5. The same is true of what may be called the moral side of the work of art. If we enlarge the meaning of utility to embrace the entire range of practical life, of fitness for use, conduct, morals, we must then recognize the detachment of the work of art from this whole body of interests. Social and individual utilities, moral laws and sanctions, religious duties, may of course, be depicted by art. Their requirements, within the situation chosen to embody the aesthetic meaning, may be worked out consistently and with the intent to set forth a fit and worthwhile scene. But this depicted worth is not the aesthetic value ; it is only its semblance that the aesthetic recognizes. The whole meaning must be uprooted from the sphere of the actual situations, individual or social, which may call for serious solution. The character in the play must be depicted as responsible to its requirements, not to ours ; to his fellows, not to us. The requirements of his situation are set forth as if actual ; but as soon as these requirements are carried over into the world of actual personal obligation their æsthetic lesson is lost ; the envelope, the circumscribing semblance, is punctured. Practical morals then succeeds beauty ; and the work of art gives place to the sermon or the homily.

6. This requirement, on the side of the practical intent of art, appears in two aspects of the current teachings about art : it must be disinterested, and it must have an elevating and ennobling influence. The former suggests the immediate intent of the aesthetic to hold itself aloof from the personal and specific interests of the onlooker. Art must not be hortatory or homiletic, for this would serve to stir up personal interests and excite to the pursuit of severely practical ends. Hardly less apparent is the corresponding requirement, on the theoretical side, that the work of art must not be didactic or merely expository.

On the other hand, art is indirectly ennobling and elevating, since the moral no less than the theoretical validities are preserved within the semblant unfolding of the theme. The great lessons of the Greek drama—the lessons of fate, providence, retribution—and the no less impressive modern lessons of brotherhood, charity, resurrection of character, are indirectly but powerfully enforced by art. These are the legitimate outcome and impressive meanings of the motives recognized as operative

within the sphere of human life, when, as carried forward in the semblant idealization of the artist, it is depicted as actually in course of development.

This is part of what is often called the "objectivity" and "universality" of art. Art is objective, not personal; it must be exclusive of the capricious movements of the interest of any one person. It is universal in that, within the whole semblant construction, it admits and requires the organization of its material with reference to the "ideal." This point will be taken up again below.

7. It may be well to place a word of further emphasis upon this point, this intent of art to maintain a disinterested and impersonal meaning; for art is often made the instrument of a propaganda, moral or immoral. Whether moral or immoral in its purpose, this simply debases or destroys art as such. It is true that a beautiful thing may be produced by one whose motive in the production is utilitarian, moral, or social. But its beauty, its aesthetic success, is not due to this motive but comes in spite of it. Both to the producer and to the spectator the meaning as aesthetic is fuller and purer when this suggestion is banished. When the Creator looked upon the work of his hands and declared, as we are told, "it is very good," he may have meant, "it is useful, well-adapted to its purpose, theoretically very complicated and well organized." But this would have been an interested and personal point of view, a point of view in which, let us say, Satan might have disagreed with him. The writer of the passage may have meant this, but we may suppose he meant more: that he meant that the Creator found the work of his hands good to contemplate, good because ideally complete, aesthetically good—quite apart from his personal achievement of making it or from his wisdom in understanding it. It satisfied the productive imagination, embodied the creative energies, and fulfilled the divine interests.

The motive to teach a lesson is foreign to art, as is also the motive to do good. Both of these alike reinstate the context as true to fact, and destroy the freedom to reach the ideal which the semblant movement allows and invites. The beautiful is its own sufficient justification.

8. (2) Another aspect of the detachment of the work of art appears when we look at the negative side of the aesthetic intent, the manner of exclusion of that which the work of art does not mean to include. We have already pointed out the

privative character of aesthetic negation. It is not specific exclusion ; not the denial or rejection of any determinate thing. It is the sort of privation which comes from the operation of a positively selective and exclusive interest. When we find one thing beautiful, we do not deny that other things are ; nor do we explicitly prefer the thing we select. Our attention and interest are simply held enthralled by what we actually and positively take up for appreciation. Its meaning is exclusive of *everything else*, not of *each thing else* ; of every other thing, not of this or that other thing. The positive absorption in the semblant meaning simply leaves aside all but just the one selected object. For the moment, *there is nothing else*.

This means detachment or isolation of a very peculiar sort. It does not proceed by finding reasons for excluding this or that, which, but for these reasons, might have been included ; it is therefore not negation in the sense of the logically negative. It is not the failure of an attempt to make a positive assertion. There is no such attempt and no such failure except, in a certain sense, in the case of the ugly. The privative movement is simply one of neglect of the whole world of other things.

Thus isolated, the object of aesthetic interest does not even require the recognition of any other things beyond its own object. Its negative intent is negative only from a point of view somewhat alien to its own. The "might-have-beens," the "other candidates," may not come to mind at all. The work of art is a whole of inclusion and inner organization ; the absorption in it is one of self-identification and self-realization. For the aesthetic interest what is not included is not simply not included, it is for the aesthetic purpose non-existent.

§ 3. THE COMPLETENESS OF THE WORK OF ART

9. It remains to follow out the further restriction of the mode of semblance found in the aesthetic, the restriction, namely, that the movement must be one of idealization. It is called a restriction since the unaesthetic form of semblance found in play is not so limited. The difference is interesting because in its development the play-object does not tend to become a finished or completed whole as the aesthetic does. In play the situation may be developed and extended *ad libitum* as long as the impulse to play continues. The dramatization may run out in this direction or that, knowing no limitation or rule, and seeming to have no ideal, no growing form. All this has been remarked upon as

showing the difference between playful semblance and that of art. Aesthetic semblance always idealizes.

This shows itself, we may remark in the first instance, in two prominent aspects of the whole aesthetic meaning : first, in the actual body of formal relations in which the material is organized ; and second, in the extension of the meaning of this organized body of material in the direction of further ideal intent or meaning. The former comprises the whole mass of presented or represented data—sensations, memories, associated ideas, etc.—involved in the scheme or plan of the aesthetic whole. The organization of these data must obey certain rules. The other factor is one of more explicit idealization, since it involves the intent to carry forward the formal scheme, to treat it as symbolic of a completed or fully idealized whole. There is in every work of art a completeness of form or of organization, and also a completeness of suggestion or of ideal meaning.

§ 4. THE FORMAL UNITY OF THE WORK OF ART

10. The formal completeness characteristic of the aesthetic object shows itself all through the progress of the arts. It is equally evident also in the productions of the spontaneous aesthetic consciousness. It seems to be motivated in the need of selecting for semblant construction something having fitness for further idealization ; this fitness residing in the organization already embodied in the selected bit of content or meaning. Thus considered, the criterion of aesthetic fitness becomes formal, schematic, relational ; apart from this, the material presents no fitness and no unfitness. The real source of its ineligibility, if it be ineligible, resides in its lack of form.

11. The answer to the question as to the principles of organization of the aesthetic meaning is suggested by the foregoing. Any principles of organization which normally characterize mental constructions may be operative. The perceptual organization of sense-data, notably in space and time form, as in geometrical figures and colour combinations, and in rhythmical sequences, such as those of sound and of muscular movement in the dance, all these exhibit the aesthetic motive operative in the simpler modes of the mental life, and reaching the sort of unity and completeness of meaning that such materials allow. Sense data are more or less loosely joined in spacial or temporal form, or more or less closely united or fused in wholes of perceptual significance. The cases of such relatively simple organization are legion ; they

have been worked out by writers on aesthetics.¹ The important thing to note, however, in it all is that it is not to the merely agreeable quality or affective colouring of these sensations or of their combinations, that the aesthetic value attaches ; it is rather to the semblantly organized whole meaning, fit so far as it goes, and more fit as its progressive organization advances, to embody the interest of idealization. As a fact, there is always the beginning of the relative isolation or detachment of the whole from its context of real things and uses, and this allows the contemplation of it as being intrinsically what it is and as promising what it foretells.

This is, of course, too "forward" a way of stating the intent of the primitive modes of aesthetic consciousness. But what we have a right to say is that there is the beginning of an imaginative rendering of the content, beyond the mere perception of it, together with whatever this difference may mean when the positive aesthetic motives are germinal and undeveloped. This factor is absent in cases of mere sensation or feeling, and with it the aesthetic also vanishes. There is a certain "formal unity" in the simplest experiences which have the right to be called aesthetic.²

Later on in mental development every possible form of organization may be cited, in turn, to illustrate the possibilities of aesthetic construction ; hence the richness and variety of art. Utility brings its quota ; association, relation, argumentation, all play their part, each suggesting its own rule of organization for giving completeness to the whole into which it enters. Whatever may be set up in the imagination, whatever may be semblantly depicted, whatever may be made the instrumental scheme of the embodiment of a progressive idealization, is grist in the mill of art. The requirement is always a relative completeness, a relative formal unity.

12. When the theorist inquires, therefore, as to the rules of aesthetic construction, he finds the answers as various as are the possibilities of form. Yet certain requirements have become historical in aesthetic theory : variety in unity, harmony, balance, symmetry, proportion, consistency, rhythm, move-

¹ See for example, Groos, *Der aesthetische Genuss*.

² We have here, I think, the criterion of the aesthetic in limiting cases such as simple colour shades, pure tones, etc. At their simplest these sensations vary in agreeable quality ; but our spontaneous preference for certain of them cannot be called aesthetic.

ment within limits—all of these, together with the sorts of meaning that take on figuratively the same names in the higher reaches of conceptual and ideal process. If we use the term "completeness," as we have above, for the general requirement of unity and wholeness in what is as a whole detached and isolated by the aesthetic interest, then all these special requirements fall under this term. Spacial organization requires proportion, symmetry, balance ; temporal organization requires regularity of recurrence, rhythm ; qualitative fusion requires absence of discord expressed in harmony, synergy, etc. Even association admits of the selective development characteristic of the working out of a single motive in a progressive movement—unity of meaning with variety of detail—the associations being selectively determined with reference to the artistic motive of the whole. An associational clash, no less than a spacial or temporal disproportion or disharmony, impairs the formal completeness, and with it the aesthetic value, of the work of art.

13. The same is true in the higher reaches of logical and sentimental meaning. A consistent logical development, no less than a well-balanced geometrical one, is beautiful. There is an architectonic of relations no less than one of building materials. The development of character by the observance of moral rules is as beautiful as the progress of a musical composition.

These modes of formal completeness are by no means disparate as to their aesthetic effect. The essential motive of formal unity being the same, the various creations of the arts may be employed to reinforce and supplement one another. Poetry lends itself to musical rendering, all sorts of human relations may be aesthetically rendered by both of these ; and life, in all its complexity of motive and interest, may have its modes of completeness conveyed through the pictorial, plastic and dramatic arts.

The scope of art is indeed of the broadest. Its only limits are those we have already stated : unfitness of form and lack of promise of ideality of any sort. Whatever is in any way complete, a unit, the embodiment of a free and unimpeded movement of organization, is fit to be found beautiful.

14. We have before us here the province of what is known as scientific or experimental aesthetics. This science determines by observation and experiment the combinations and arrangements of different sorts of material which give aesthetic pleasure

both in themselves and relatively to one another. The complications in which discordant elements enter to disturb the aesthetic movement, as well as the combinations of different aesthetic movements in larger or smaller wholes, may be experimentally determined. All this is quite indispensable to the progress of aesthetic knowledge; and it is quite consistent with the general formal requirement here laid down. The general requirement that any content, in order to become aesthetic, must be fit to be taken up in the grasp of imagination as a detached and relatively complete semblant whole, does not determine at all the actual groupings of contents in this mode of experience or that, which do find themselves most fit. Each of the great types of aesthetic experience, represented by what is called a "fine art"—pictorial, plastic, dramatic, literary, musical, etc.—should be experimentally investigated, and the rules of construction of the peculiar material to which the aesthetic meaning most readily and fully attaches, thus made out. There will thus arise a true science of aesthetics, in the sense suggested by one of the first advocates of experiment in this field, Fechner. With the actual progress already made along such lines we can not now deal; its consideration belongs not to the logic of the aesthetic meaning, but to the determination of facts within this logic. Here we are concerned only with making out those general criteria which attach to all aesthetic experience and so determine the nature and limits of fine art.

§ 5. THE IDEAL SUGGESTIVENESS OF THE WORK OF ART : ARTISTIC SYMBOLISM

15. We have already pointed out the further requirement of the aesthetic experience, that it should embody and fulfil the motive of idealization. The two ways in which this motive works itself out have also been suggested. First, there is the progressive movement of the construction, the progress of the factors already involved in its organization; each mode of organization moves towards its own ideal of fulfilment. Second, there is the movement of personalization, whereby the whole, whatever its mode of organization, takes on personal form.

It is to these two characters of the aesthetic experience that we should look for the further differentiae of the work of art. First, its meaning should be one suggesting the further working out, and the progressive idealization, of the organization already

imaginatively set up ; and second, the whole must be read back into experience itself ; that is, it must be taken for a movement both psychic in its control and identified with the personal life of the observer. We may consider these two motives under the headings of " general idealization " and " personal idealization."

16. (1) The work of art is always suggestive of more than its actual organization, its bare schema, conveys or warrants. In this we find the difference between the mere recognitive rendering of facts and the artistic rendering of the same facts. Art always has its symbolic meaning, which proceeds by the further development of the motives present in the content or material. It is part of the intent of the imagination that the organization shall go forward to its consummation.¹ Art discounts the further possibilities. In seeking for unity and completeness, and in selecting its material with reference to a further outcome, it commits itself to the development toward a certain finality of result. In the presence of a work of art, we feel the tendency to be drawn away from the present concrete meaning of the data or scene before us, to pass beyond it to those more recondite and vaguer meanings which we take in by way of suggestion. The relative freedom of the constructive processes from restraint or foreign control of any kind shows itself in a drift forward, a movement onward, to an outcome which anticipates the complete fulfilment of the imaginative process itself.

17. Accordingly, we find the symbol, the actual thing depicted, more simple, elementary, and unformed than the meaning symbolized. The straight line symbolizes various abstract qualities, such as directness, simplicity, truth ; the circle, fulness and organization, the cosmos, the horn of plenty, the achievement of success. The naked tree symbolizes the autumn, the approach of the hardships of winter, the pessimistic point of view ; the green leaf, the awakening of life, the healing sun, the return of hope.²

We might go through a wide range of cases of artistic sym-

¹ Accordingly, when we say that the lover "idealizes" his lady in finding her beautiful, we give the true and sufficient explanation.

² Hence the relative simplicity of great art, as well as the value of simplicity in the aesthetic everywhere. The range of suggestion is wider, the freedom of imagination is greater, the feelings given play are more voluminous and profound, if not hampered by the presence of decorative or other details. From this point of view, Giotto's Tower is more impressive than the Milan Cathedral.

bolism to illustrate the point; but the result would be the same. The suggestions given in the contents present are read forward toward a more figurative and sentimental intent. We find it difficult, if not impossible, in any particular case, to dwell simply upon the given meaning, however rich its contents and organization may be. A question put to the observer will bring out the line of symbolic suggestion that the work of art stirs up in him. The beauty of a complete and symmetrical geometrical form is enriched by the play of further suggestions for developing its internal organization, for reading its spacial or other associations, or for filling in its outline with emotional and sentimental meaning.

18. It is this truth, indeed, that gives force to association theories of art. We must of course admit that most of these suggested and symbolic elements are due to the association of ideas. But that is not the important fact to note. Mere association is by no means in itself aesthetic. The important thing is the development of a psychic system to its completion, the working out of a consistent motive or interest; what we have called the idealization of a bit of organization once begun. This is a character of the aesthetic which the working out of an associated system may well serve to illustrate. The renewal in the imagination of an earlier series of associated events may supply the conditions requisite to this sort of interest; and the carrying out of the system in the imagination may serve the ends of aesthetic idealization. The completeness of the system becomes the ideal of its imaginative reinstatement, and the suggested whole is symbolized in the parts actually present before the observer.

In this tendency to symbolic completeness, in this general idealization, the motive of utility also comes in, both through association and more intrinsically through the laws of the reinstatement of meanings of worth as already discussed above in the treatment of the logic of interest and practise.

§ 6. PERSONAL IDEALIZATION IN ART

19. The movement of idealization, considered simply as the working out of an interest to its completion, is complicated and transformed by a second great factor of the entire aesthetic movement, that of aesthetic personalization or sympathy. It has been shown that this is a vital moment in the aesthetic effect.

It shows itself in the two ways already pointed out : the absorption of the spectator in the work of art, in such a way that he reads a psychic or inner meaning into its scheme of organization ; and the taking up of the work of art into the personal life of the spectator, in such a way that its psychic movement seems to become his. One is a sort of sympathy with the object read personally ; the other is a sort of claiming of the life sympathized with, as one's own. "Fellow feeling" for the object passes over into personal identification with it.

It will appear at once that, if this movement is essential to the aesthetic, it must show itself in the idealization that the aesthetic object undergoes. The two motives would indeed seem to limit and transform each other. If all beauty takes on a personal and psychical meaning, and at the same time forwards an idealizing interest, then the systematic idealization of art must itself take on the personal form. That is, the end-states, finalities, consummations which works of art intend are personal in the sense that they are charged with an inner movement, in which the psychic character of the interest that motivèes them is embodied. The process of idealization, whatever the specific direction of its development and whatever its special material, is psychic ; it is a mental movement. There is the assumption of the mode of inner control. In its ideal aspect the mode of organization must be that of an inner life.

20. But to read the object as actually psychical, as really alive and active, would be to destroy the semblance and with it the personal character of the entire construction. There must be the reservation that it is after all my imagination, my semblant interest, that is throughout at work. With this avowal the personal factor is free to return into the movement ; the spectator's own world of inner experience absorbs that of the object.

21. It is impossible entirely to disentangle these two partial renderings of the motive to personalization. On the one hand, the work of art is objective and external, however fully the development of its motive may involve the reading-in of a subjective interest. On the other hand, there is no way possible to develop this interest save on the assumption of the indwelling of the spectator's own personal life in the work of art. The result is a unification of these two requirements. The essential development of one's own life is embodied in a mode of construction which is objective in the sense of being imaginative and sem-

blant, but to which the tests and controls of the external are not applied.

22. This, it is plain, adds another phase to the meaning of art-symbolism. The symbols become those of a personal and spiritual, rather than those of a purely objective and impersonal set of ideals. The whole range of symbolic representation tends to be humanized and personalized. Indeed, while illustrating just above the tendency of art constructions generally to show idealization, it was found difficult to find cases in which the human and personal symbolism was not prominent. The line becomes symbolic of a vital movement, the circle of a well-rounded and completed act. The objective and lifeless thing symbolizes death or torpor; and the forces that play upon or within it symbolize the awakening of life and feeling. The shape of cloud, tree, mountain line suggest grave, gay, or passionate emotions; and the scheme or outline as a whole, the fulness of a living experience. Rhythm symbolizes the dance, succession the regularity of pulse and breathing, slow movement the pathos of sorrow or grief. The whole gamut of human experience finds its symbolism in the relative unity and variety, completeness and detachment, quickening and deadening of the factors which embody and extend the organization of the beautiful thing.

23. It is possible, also, to bring some degree of order out of the multiplicity of detail of artistic symbolism, if we remember that, in each case, the beautiful object embodies the special motive of a given type of organization. It is not merely an inner life, a self, that the aesthetic whole embodies; it is, on the contrary, a specific movement of interest and a limited sort of fulfilment. Just here we have to recognize certain limitations upon the general use of the principle of sembling, as seen in the writings of some of its expounders. It does not do to say simply that "a self" or "the self" is read into the aesthetic object. That is much too comprehensive and also much too vague. It lends itself to the charge of smuggling in a metaphysical principle of "self," and of turning aesthetics into ontology. Certain writers on *Einfühlung* are open to this charge¹; they subject themselves to two lines of criticism.

First, the "self" becomes a principle whose definition is philosophical, and in the name of which one's personal views,

¹ Cf. the incisive criticism of M. Ch. Lalo, in the work *Les Sentiments esthétiques*.

a prioristic or other, may be imported at the expense of the actual empirical factors respectively involved in definite modes of the aesthetic. Everything is once for all explained.

Second, it so generalizes the aesthetic personalizing function that it includes all modes of personification, anthropomorphizing, vitalizing, etc., and the specific criteria of the aesthetic mode are lost. We are then forced to revise our determination of the differentia of the aesthetic.

24. Such procedure is quite unwarranted by anything we have discovered in the analysis of the actual process. The mode of personalizing is much too specific to permit of any such use of the abstract principle of the "self." What we have is the springing up, in each case of aesthetic appreciation, of the sort of psychic reading of the content that it would have if, being what it is, it were going on in a consciousness. A physical movement becomes a muscular movement, and such a movement as I might make ; the spring of an arch upward symbolizes the upward spring of my vital activities, a definite group of organic and muscular experiences ; the aspiration symbolized by such an arch is that which these physical activities suggest in a consciousness of a definite grade and manner of self-feeling. It is then in each case only the passing of the process of organization actually going on at the moment over to the life of mind or self ; not an injection into this organization of a principle foreign to its essential movement. The organic remains organic or sensational ; the intellectual remains intellectual, with its suggestions of sentiment and feeling ; the moral becomes the personally active, taken over into the sphere of the spectator's own conduct.

What we find, therefore, is that the factors actually present are absorbed under the sort of inner control that they suggest each for itself. The content not being held to actual facts or foreign control, is projected in a mode of semblance or imagination ; and the inner movement of control charges itself in and through whatever form the content takes on. The relative completeness of the beautiful thing, together with its suggestion of ideal completeness and value, are readings in terms of a continuous organizing and idealizing experience.

25. This limitation, then, we are obliged to make upon the use of the principle of the self. It is not a philosophical principle ; it is merely the subjective and experiential reading of a growing and ideal organization of data. While thus restricted,

however, and empirically determined, it is very real and constitutes a fundamental criterion of the work of art.

Inasmuch also as it is an aspect of control, not of content, it does not in any way interfere with or render unnecessary the scientific investigation of the actual factors involved in the aesthetic construction. As we saw above, such empirical investigation is urgently needed; by it a positive and scientific aesthetics will be built up. It still remains to determine what combinations and modes of organization are possible or requisite for one sort of material or another. The properties of the materials—colour, marble, language, etc.—set limitations upon the possibilities respectively of the arts built upon them; and the modes of idealization, both general and personal, which are productive in each can only be discovered by analysis and experiment.

Chapter XIII

THE SPRINGS OF ART ¹

§ 1. THE AESTHETIC INTEREST AND THE ART IMPULSE

1. Art-production may be considered from either of two general points of view, the subjective or "psychic" and the objective or "psychological." From the former, the psychic point of view, the artist's own interest in the thing he produces, together with the spectator's interest in contemplating it, are considered. In the latter, the psychological inquiry, we turn away from these psychic interests to the fundamental motives that lie back of them in human nature—to the "springs" of art. This is the point of view from which the movement of the aesthetic imagination is considered as part and parcel of the development of mind as a whole. What is the place of art appreciation in our genetic account of mind, and of art itself in the development of racial and individual culture? ² From what simpler, perhaps non-aesthetic, impulses does it spring?

2. Taking a broad and general survey, we may say in the first place, that the motives of art must be in some way those by which the imaginative functions of cognition realize themselves. Art production falls by common consent in the class of imaginative constructions. We have found reason, however, on closer scrutiny, for saying that it is not all imaginative cognition that issues in art or affords aesthetic pleasure, but only a certain restricted mode of it. So far as the imagination is simply a function of imaging, whether it mediates facts on the one hand or suggests utilities on the other hand, it is not in itself aesthetic.

¹ This chapter has been published in substance as an article under the same title in the *Philosophical Review*, May, 1909.

² With this last topic, the subject matter of the History of Art and of Archaeology, we are not here concerned. Dr. W. D. Furry, *The Aesthetic Experience, etc.*, has pointed out the place of the aesthetic category in the history of philosophy. On the side of anthropology, see Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, and Grosse, *The Beginnings of Art* (Eng. trans.).

There is a limit, also, at the other extreme—in the production of merely fanciful and fugitive images. Mere memory, with its more or less fixed instrumental value for knowledge or practice, is not of itself aesthetic ; and fancy, with its lack of instrumental value and of all systematic direction and control, is equally unaesthetic.

We must find the springs of the aesthetic then in the production of what lies between the actual and the fanciful ; in the restricted sphere in which the sort of imaginative construction styled in this work *semblant* has its origin. It becomes our problem to make out the genetic sources of this type of individual and racial productiveness.

3. On this point current analysis seems to throw considerable preliminary light. We have found the subjective criteria of aesthetic construction to reside not in the material of art, but in the form into which the imagination organizes the material, and in the control in which the organized material is held and interpreted. In each of these suggestions we find a valuable clue for the objective understanding of art.

First, we find the form of organization to be that of the original sphere from which the material is drawn, the reinstatement of it in the “ *semblant* ” mode being “ imitative ” or representative.

Second, we find that this imitative product is charged with ideal and personal meaning. If now we read off the idealizing motive as belonging to the constructive imagination itself, in all its operations, then we have left over two great motive springs in which the movement of art production as such takes its rise and has its continued support. These we may formulate in somewhat dogmatic form, for the purpose of discussion, as follows :

(1) Art arises and is carried forward by the impulse of imitative representation ; it involves the imitative or *semblant* exercise of the imaginative functions.

(2) Art arises and is carried forward by the impulse of finding and embodying—in a large sense of the term, of “ expressing ”—the personal life ; it involves the use of the imagination for exhibiting and advancing the self.

Putting these two general points together, we may say that the springs of art as such, assuming that the function is imaginative, are Imitation and Self-exhibition. That is, art is due to the imagination as it determines itself through the impulses of

imitative representation and self-discovery and expression. These two motives may be examined in turn more closely.

§ 2. IMITATION AND THE REPRESENTATIVE ARTS

4. The imitative character of much art is superficially in evidence, and what is known as the "imitation" theory of art is very old. In its extreme statement, this theory finds in imitation the sole spring of artistic creation, whether merely for itself, for representation as such, or for the embodiment and expression of various sentimental meanings. We may at the outset allow that for a great series of art productions, imitative representation is the evident and essential instrument; the limits of its operation being only those necessary to allow the recognition of other actual factors. So true is this that there is justification for calling a very large number of arts and their products "imitative" or "representative."

The imitative arts are those in which the content is imitatively derived in both a narrower and a broader sense, according to the meaning given to the term "imitation." In the narrower sense, imitation means a conscious copying of a model or "copy" externally set up; in the broader sense, it means the achievement of results modelled after a "copy," whether or not that copy is external to the mind. In this latter case, all forms of "self-imitation"—from auto-suggestion to the shaping of a psychical process upon self-erected models, standards or ideals—are included in the one term "imitation." There are facts and considerations which indicate that art is imitative in both these senses.

5. Apparently it is in the more restricted of these senses that the term imitation is used in the anthropological discussions of the origin of art. It is claimed that the arts, racially considered, have copied nature; that is, that the artistic impulse has been directed to the reproduction and representation of natural things and events. Detailed attempts are made to discover fundamental imitative processes to account for the selection of the material and the development of the products characteristic of each of the arts. The imitative motive of music is found in certain emotionally expressive vocal sounds, that of drawing and design in the actual forms of nature, animate and inanimate, that of the plastic arts in the imitative reproduction of things in three dimensions, and so on.

There can be no doubt that this more external interpretation

of the imitative motive carries us a great way, especially in the earliest stages. If the material of art-production is in a large way imitative, we ought to be able to point out the specific models that have served in the progressive history of this art or that. There would seem to be only one reservation necessary—apart from cases in which the presence of imitation at all is not too evident—that there are cases in which it does not carry us far enough. Direct reproduction of nature does not seem to exhaust the motives or methods of art. Is there, it may be asked, no more sublimated and subjective form of the imitative impulse, the models for which are not merely the actual objects of nature, but the imagined and ideal forms that arise to the mind of the artist himself?

6. That this question is to be answered in the affirmative as to the facts there is again no manner of doubt. Whether "imitation" covers the facts, is the question. We have either to broaden the concept of imitative function, or to account for the ideal aspirations and products of the artistic imagination in some other terms. We must allow for the more inward and subjective factor that an artist calls his "inspiration." The problem resolves itself then into that of finding, in more objective terms, something corresponding to the subjective idealization of the material of art which, on the subjective side, we find to reside in the formal and progressive completeness of the aesthetic meaning, and its further advancement, in the mode of reflection, by a conscious and deliberate application of standards and ideals of beauty.¹

7. This problem has had its statement in somewhat similar terms in recent psychology; in discussions of the nature and function of imitation. It has been found impossible to restrict

¹ These standards and ideals are, however, as we have seen, themselves functions of the organization already secured under the motives of truth, utility, etc. They are formal statements or felt intentions of *more finished* results taken as if they were realized. The alternative would be a view which would invoke some sort of *a priori* or formal "universals"—in this case ideals or normative principles—which are, once for all, imposed upon the materials. This issues in a form of absolutism in art, as it does also in the theory of knowledge; a view that does not lack able advocates, of course. As opposed to this, I hold that the ideals of art are of gradual development, of progressive transformation; and that this development is secured by processes of the imitative sort. The artist sets out to produce the best he can conceive, and this—his ideal—is itself a function of his actual achievements in imaginative construction.

the rôle of imitation—however the term be restricted—to its more external and directly social operation. The term “self-imitation” has come into use to describe the operation of processes, distinctly of the imitative type, within the personal growth of the individual. There is a transfer of the motive of imitation from the pursuit of external models to the development of experience itself after internal models; the “idea” or “ideal” becomes the model set up for imitation, that idea or ideal being one erected by the individual himself, although perhaps of social origin. In this sense all the moulding of experience into better conformity to an ideal, is “imitative.”

Holding that this transfer from the external to the internal type of function, takes place by a continuous series of processes, we find no reason to deny ourselves the resource that this affords us in the interpretation of the work of art. We accordingly find ourselves carried over to the larger definition of imitation, considered as a spring of artistic production.

8. On this view, the sphere and scope of imitative art is enormously extended. The artistic impulse proceeds in the direction of ideal forms by a series of imitative reconstructions of meaning, working upon the content as defined by the semblant imagination. The inspiration of the artist and its successful embodiment depend upon his power of imagination and his skill in moulding his materials to the form of it. All art—leaving apart certain questions of limits—is imitative; that is, all art invokes an ideal model, and springs, in one at least of its essential motives, from the impulse to realize this model concretely in a work of art. The art that merely copies an external model—allowing that it is at all aesthetic in its appeal—is principally skill of execution; and much of the admiration it gets is admiration of deftness of hand and brush. It is the art of the virtuoso. The transfer of the model to the realm of the ideal—the more perfect form that might be realized with the same materials—turns the slavish imitator into the creator, the copyist into the artist.¹

The limitations just referred to, however, at once suggest themselves; they arise from the possibility of aesthetic experience which does not involve imitation at all, even when the

¹ In this we are getting back perhaps to Aristotle's use of “imitation,” which included the idealization of natural models; cf. Tufts in the writer's *Dictionary of Philos.*, articles “Art Theories,” and “Classification of the Fine Arts.”

term is thus broadly defined. It may be suggested that there are two modes of such experience, both seeming to lack the imitative factor. One is that which has in its objective product no suggestion of organization that can be supposed to imitate or represent any real form or actual pattern; the other is that thrill of art effect which seems independent of any organized material or content, but is still called aesthetic. The first of these may be illustrated by purely decorative effects—a patch of paint on the person, a fleck of cloud in a clear sky, any bit of ornament having no “design”; the second by the emotional thrill of music felt when there seems to be in the mind no suggestion of any scheme of presentations or ordered content to give it imitative or representative significance.

These illustrations are presented to state problems whose consideration will bring into range the second great spring of art formally announced at the beginning of this discussion: that of the embodiment and advancement of the self.

§ 3. EXPRESSION AND THE DECORATIVE ARTS

9. It has been abundantly shown by recent writing on aesthetics that the motive of personalization—the discovery and embodiment of some form of self-hood or personal life, of which we have already taken account—is rooted in very profound psychological impulses. It is seen in the various forms of “personification” of the primitive consciousness, in the “animation” of the forces of nature, in the “ejection” motive in early religious development. Anthropologically considered, it seems to be grounded in very important social and biological processes. Socially there is the motive of “self-exhibition,” showing itself in a sort of personal “bluff.” The warrior finds it important to create and sustain a personal repute, for the sake both of his standing at home and of his prestige abroad. He “makes-believe” at being this, that, or the other sort of imposing and authoritative self. This is one of the weapons of social rivalry and selection. The marks of social identification, so far as individually adopted, are those which put the best foot forward; the signs of the self are those which make conspicuous to others the possessor’s virtues, abilities, and rank. Further, all this has its outward symbolism. It takes form in the various modes of crude and in itself perhaps meaningless decoration of the person and of the owner’s personal possessions.

The social utility¹ attaching to this is very evident. Personal decoration takes forms that attract attention and excite wonder, admiration, and fear. And as social life advances, the personal and family arms or symbols become the decorative signs of office, rank, heredity, and caste, which both indicate and secure social prestige.

10. Something analogous is found in the biological world. Darwin based his theory of sexual selection upon the impressiveness to the mind of the mate of decorative plumage, colouring, etc., displayed by the male bird or beast. The highly coloured cock has means of making a striking display of himself ; this display attracts and excites the hen. Later theories while minimizing, perhaps unduly, the importance of this factor, on the biological side, nevertheless recognize the facts as important when the psychic side of the animal's habits is taken into account. The creature's gregarious life requires mutual recognition on the part of companion and mate ; and in the organization of animal companies there are remarkable cases of personal prestige and authority maintained by individuals. Even in the mere instinctive equipment of the animals, we find notable and sometimes ludicrous self-exhibitions, which can only be accounted for as having the utility of personal display. The antics of the courting birds and animals, the puffing-up of pigeons and turkey cocks, the pea-fowl's spreading of tail and wing, the crowing of the rooster and the mating cries of many animals, seem to say to the discriminating fellow creature, at least, if not to the naturalist, " See me, how fine I am ! "

11. It is not our part here to discuss the origin and extent of this self-exhibiting impulse. It undoubtedly has its roots in the biological conditions present in the quasi-social organization of animal families and companies. It shows itself in the impulse of primitive man, rooted no doubt in the more instinctive functions of animal and family life, to display the best and most imposing self that he can get his fellows to accept. Its social signs are those of striking personal decoration as in the case also of the birds and animals. The head-dress displays the warrior, and the particular head-dress the Great Boar himself. The patch of colour like that on the head-dress proclaims the ownership of

¹ The objective utility attaching to art in its origin and history cannot be questioned, however we may differ as to the special impulses involved. But it should be recalled (see chap. x. sect. 13 footnote) that this does not commit us to utilitarianism in respect to the aesthetic end.

Great Boar in all his possessions, and also in those he covets and steals ; and the patch of paint on the chest of squaw and papoose announces the protection and vengeance of the great warrior himself. So decorative symbolism develops. The claims of tribe or clan are symbolized in grotesque shapes of bird and beast, in formless masses of colour, in nodding plumes, etc.—all serving the one end of maintaining personal and tribal identity, self-respect and social glory.¹

12. It is not difficult to see the place of semblant make-believe in all this. There is a sort of bluff in it. It is not the true self that it is most advantageous to show off. The defeated warrior shows the scalps he has once taken, not his own shorn poll. The red patch on the warrior's chest symbolizes the blood of his enemies, not his own. His very name anticipates from his infancy the glory of his coming exploits.

It would seem, then, that we have here a movement that would go far toward fulfilling some of the requirements of aesthetic production, with apparent disregard, too, of the formal requisites to which we have hitherto attached so much importance. Certainly it goes very far toward fulfilling the demand that there be the embodiment of a sort of life or self in the aesthetic object, and also that this self or life be not the true self but one having the character of make-believe, semblance, or *Schein*.

13. Before we come to any decision on the point, however, a certain distinction should be made ; its consideration will throw light upon the actual development of the decorative motive. It is the distinction between decoration as such and decoration which has evidently the intention to emphasize or exploit personality. Decorative art often does show a skeleton of design, in which the principles of formal construction seem to have a very decided place and rôle. The decoration of plane surfaces, as illustrated in plateresque ornamentation, in the rococo architectural style, and in pottery, and that of time intervals in musical ornamentation, seems to embody the same canons of construction and distribution of parts that the imitative arts also illustrate. The recurrent unit of decoration is generally, if

¹ I have pointed out elsewhere, with illustrations (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. vi.), the element of self-exhibition in the young child's bashfulness. He runs away, but returns with new devices, often those of grotesque and "impressive" decoration of himself, to attract attention. He does naturally what, later on, he learns to do intentionally. M. Paulhan, *Mensonges du Caractère*, finds this sort of "deception" everywhere.

not always, itself subject to the requirements of symmetry, proportion, and other rules of formal completeness. It is only at the limit, therefore, at which the element of form apparently disappears in the mere affixing of irrelevant structures or appendages, that the conditions of strictly non-imitative decoration would seem to appear.¹

It is, however, in apparently non-imitative decoration—decoration that merely *impresses* the observer—that the self-exhibiting motive seems to be at its best.

In this state of things we might hold either that the non-imitative cases, if they exist, do not excite truly aesthetic emotion, or that the motive of self-display may so override the imitative or representative motive that the latter loses its place entirely. If we accepted this latter alternative, we should have to recognize two fundamentally different modes of art, springing from different impulses; if the former, we should recognize as aesthetic only those cases of decoration which showed at least the rudiments of imitative form.

14. There is, however, a point of view from which we are not driven to accept finally either of these alternatives, although the distinction current between decorative and imitative art seems to have so much justification. It is the point of view from which the impulse of self-exhibition may itself be construed as essentially imitative—imitative, that is, in the sense of the projection of an imitative and semblant self into the object. This indeed opens the way to an essential reconciliation, and preserves unity in our theory of art. Besides the interest it awakens from the point of view of such unity, it suggests the further recognition of the line of psychological investigation with which we have been concerned above in the development of affective logic.

The point of importance attaching to this idea is that it recognizes a movement in the affective or emotional life akin to the imitative reinstatement of cognitive states, and so allows us to read an essentially imitative and representative motive into the lower and more primitive stages of art.

§ 4. AFFECTIVE REVIVAL AND ITS AESTHETIC RÔLE

15. M. Ribot, in a recent summary of the discussions of

¹ There is also much imitation in the symbolism of purely social decoration: as the symbolism of blood by red, of power by size, of craft by figures of cunning animals, etc.

affective memory,¹ states the case in the following words : " The only legitimate criterion of an affective memory is *recognition*, and . . . neglecting all others, I divide such cases into two groups : those in which a comparison is established between two affective states that co-exist or succeed each other very rapidly in consciousness ; and those in which the affective memory first appears in a vague form and then completes itself by the addition (*adjunction*) of intellectual elements."

Neglecting the first class of cases mentioned by M. Ribot, let us dwell a little upon the second class : cases in which a vague but quite recognizable feeling or emotion comes into consciousness by a process of revival or suggestion, and develops itself by acquiring a positive intellectual body or content. It is not necessary to prove the existence of such cases, as other writers have already done so ; but we may apply the point of view to certain problems of art construction, especially those which concern what is known as the emotional or expressive functions of art.²

16. Writers on art have often made a rather fundamental distinction between " representative " or imitative arts and " expressive " arts, the latter including those already mentioned as involving the decorative motive. But the class of " expressive " arts is broader than that of the merely decorative. It includes, in principle, all the arts whose fundamental spring or motive is the embodiment or expression of feeling, especially when this motive seems to work itself out independently of the representation or imitation of actual things ; that is, without any revived cognitive content or system of images. Besides some of the purer forms of decoration, the arts of architecture and music are cited as being " non-representative," and in motive largely " expressive."

It will be seen at once that this is only a different way of dis-

¹ See Ribot, " La Mémoire affective : nouvelles remarques," *Revue Philosophique*, Dec., 1907, p. 589 f., for a résumé with citations of the French writers. The papers of Urban (*Psychological Review*, May, July, 1901) and his book *Valuation, its Nature and Laws* (1909) give important developments in the direction of the wider applications, carried forward also by Ehrenfels, Witasek, and others. M. Ribot's essay is reprinted with others in his volume *Les Problèmes de Psychologie affective*, already cited above, chap. vi. sect. 11.

² Certain more detailed points on the place of affective memory in psychology and art are made in my article, " Affective Memory and Art," *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1909.

tinguishing between the two great springs of art we have discussed above under the terms "imitation" and "self-exhibition," provided the latter be understood in a broad way to include all forms of "expression," as imitation is taken broadly to include all forms of cognitive reinstatement or representation. Expression, broadly considered, is self-revelation or self-exploitation; and its embodiment can be traced back to the elementary forms of personal and social self-exhibition and appeal. These are developed in the interests of intercourse and art. Thus understood, we have a broader statement of the distinction between the two great motives or springs of art: the imitative serving to convey an intellectual content and meaning, as seen in the representative arts; and the self-exhibitive serving to express feeling and emotion.

17. I state the antithesis in this way both because it embodies the usual distinction, and also because it must be so stated if the common theory of revival as exclusively cognitive is to be upheld. If feeling as such cannot be revived, then we must hold that art products which do not have intellectual or representative content must have some quite different origin and spring from those that do. We cannot call effects representative which "represent" nothing at all. The sharp differentiation of the arts into two classes, representative and expressive, would then necessarily follow.

But if on the contrary, affective and conative states, feelings, and attitudes, not in their nature cognitive, also have some sort of revival in memory, then the concept of representation can be broadened to include affective revival, and unity be brought back into the theory of art.

It is just this sort of unification and synthesis that the recognition of affective memory enables us to make. Forms of art product whose principle spring and whose main appeal are "expressive," do nevertheless fulfil the laws of revival and representation, although in many cases of this class the revival is primarily affective, and only in a secondary way becomes cognitive through the "addition," as M. Ribot says in the citation made above, of "intellectual elements."

18. If this be true, the consequences for our theory are evident. It means that there is no sphere of art from which an "imitative" or "representative" motive is absent, and hence that there is always present the *semblance and detachment from the course of actual or serious life* which the imagination

produces. The art that is most expressive—the pathetic strains of a subtle musical phrase, or the martial rendering of a patriotic *motif*—however “real” the emotion it arouses, never arouses emotion *of or for the real*; it reflects the imaginary, not the actual; ideas, not things; ideals, not facts. It is always symbolic, semblant of the real. And we now see that this is as true of “non-representative” and emotional aesthetic experiences as of those produced by the most direct processes of realistic copying.

It follows that in any case of appreciation of art, even in those seemingly most emotional and least intellectual in character, there are two leading questions to be asked: first, what representative elements are there in the art-content which may be classed as intellectual or cognitive; and second, what elements are there which, while clearly affective or emotional, are nevertheless also in some degree revivals of earlier experience through which they get representative and with it artistic meaning? For an emotion is not aesthetic unless it be in some way interpreted or felt as part of an imaginary and semblant whole.¹

19. When we come to such an art as music with these questions in mind, we find it possible to analyse the aesthetic value of a composition. We find the affective and volitional revival processes so prominent that the question arises whether there is any element that is clearly and unambiguously cognitive. The architectonic unit, the motive or phrase, and even the single note, seem to have a certain emotional suggestiveness, due to sensational qualities of pitch, timbre, and intensity, or to combinations of these in rhythmic or other formal groupings. This latter, as instanced in rhythm, would generally be put down as the criterion of “music” as distinguished from merely agreeable tones and combinations of tones. But if the latter also be considered emotionally suggestive, then the two are equally fit to produce the aesthetic effect. Considering then both classes of elements, tonal quality with harmony, and rhythmic or other form, let us inquire whether they are purely “expressive” or in part also “representative.”

¹ It has been shown by Witasek, Urban, and others (as I have indicated above; see also the article last referred to) that even in so-called simple sensuous effects, such as those of a coloured surface, a simple tone, etc., there is a “dynamic constant,” a more or less organized motor revival, by which a larger sentiment or mood is excited, which thus becomes representative or symbolic, and may be for that reason aesthetic.

There are clearly complications of simpler elements in both these effects. In compound notes, in chords and harmonies, both consonances and dissonances, there is a certain complexity which may be made the basis of analysis and might be considered evidence of a sort of crude cognition. In both cases, however—the temporal succession of rhythm and the co-existence of elements in harmony—the suggestiveness for emotion seems to be immediate and not due to the recurrence of these obscure cognitive data. It seems rather to reside in the suggestion of emotions experienced in varied situations that have something in common, or in an immediate effect upon the nervous processes involved in native emotional expression.

20. If now we admit the fact of affective memory, it all becomes clear. The thrill of musical effect is first of all a nervous or sensuous tumult. It is fundamentally emotional in its character in so far as, racially considered it is, or in the experience of the individual has become, involved in the expression or physical basis of emotion. The striking of the nervous combination is then at once a setting up in incipient form of the organic processes and dispositions of typical and well-marked emotional moods and sentiments. This is the "dynamic constant" for a variety of specific emotions. The cognitive form is not developed into knowledge; and only later, in the persistence of the emotional mood, do appropriate cognitive images come in to support the general tone in this direction or that.¹ These vary with the habits and interests of individuals; and may well have in common those larger indications of meaning which the relational framework of the stimulus allows. A quick lively rhythm becomes a dancing faun, a bounding ball, a babbling brook, etc., all different ideas, but all consonant with the mood suggested by the rhythm, and all supporting the particular emotion revived in the hearers' respective minds. A slow rhythm, on the contrary, means what is heavy, dignified, impressive, mournful. The essential point is that the general mood or emotional tone is not due to ideas, but is a sensuous effect taking form in a specific revived emotion, and the ideas come to give mood and emotion a definite direction and meaning.

¹ It has been suggested by Urban (*Psychological Review*, 1901, p. 366 f.) that in music the emotional progress is in a sense from part to whole, as the motive develops in time; while in the pictorial arts, in which the spacial whole is presented all at once, the movement is the reverse.

This is supported by the theories generally held—and justified by considerable experimental evidence—that the variations in the effect of rhythm show themselves in organic and muscular processes. A quick rhythm goes with a lively dance and a merry mood ; a slow movement with a funeral march and a state of despondency. There is indeed a direct reflection of the great characteristics of organic and emotional change in the variations of musical rhythm. How artificial to say that this immediate correlation is not reflected in the recall of a specific emotion when the general tone or disposition excited by the music favours it ; but that an adequate “ idea ” must intervene to produce the emotion ! The emotional revival furnishes the representative factor in the aesthetic effect, and there is no need to “ intellectualize ” the music.

21. The case is made stronger still when we come to consider the suggestive effects attaching to simple tones and to variations of key, pitch, and timbre. Whether these effects are considered aesthetic or not, they certainly enter into the general effects of music, and contribute to its suggestiveness. In these cases there are no elements of representation fit to serve as basis of cognitive images. Moreover, these effects—such as the variations as between a dull low tone and a sharp high one—do not seem to require repetition, but arise directly from the stimulus itself. The only way to account for their feeling value is to suppose that they stir up processes which enter, to a greater or less degree, into the nervous conditions of larger emotional dispositions or moods. When they are struck there is an incipient stirring up of these latter. In cases of the simplest sort there is probably a partially instinctive basis for the correlation between sound and mood.

It is not necessary to discuss the mechanism of these processes in detail ; my intention is only to show that there is a revival, or an original awakening equivalent to revival, of an emotional mood or disposition which does not depend upon the revival of representative images. The emotional element in the aesthetic meaning of music is due to an immediate and instinctive affective response, or to one that includes elements of earlier experiences of feeling.

22. In architecture, the case is plainer. While the architectural form may not be imitative in the sense of representing natural forms, still it does afford a relational scheme which the imagination finds available for the “ semblant ” suggestions of com-

pleteness and ideal unity. The suggestions both of utility and of special design, whether they are intellectual, affective or conative, are utilized by a supplementing imagination¹ which is representative in character. The motive of expression as such is much less prominent than in music. Yet in contemplating the simplest lines of architectural construction and design, one has the sense of personal implication and inner movement, which reveals the motive of self-advancement at work through the operation of the semblant imagination. The feelings of active movement are aroused in the spectator, and by an incipient "inner imitation," in the words of Groos, the life of personal activity is felt to be advanced.

§ 5. CONCLUSION ON THE NATURE OF ART

23. We are accordingly justified in holding the two impulses mentioned to be the springs of art: "imitation" and "self-exhibition," both operative in the content set up by the constructive or semblant imagination. The work of art is a construction of an imaginative character, embodying, either through explicit revival or through the direct establishment of emotion or disposition, *an ideal of completeness or worth*; and this is transused with the *significance of an inner life* common to the work itself and to the spectator.

But these two springs do not produce different sorts of art. *They are both present in all fine art.* The variations in their relative force are to be accounted for by the limitations found in the material conditions under which the art work is produced. In the graphic or representative arts proper, the motive of imitation has its opportunity in the formal and intellectual models after which the material is formed; here self-exhibition, the more personal and expressive motive, is less in evidence. In certain forms of decorative art and in music this relative emphasis is reversed. The emotional and personal suggestiveness of the material, and the affective mode of revival, lend themselves

¹ The aesthetic value of what may be called the "architectural imagination" has not perhaps been generally realized. Besides its direct use in architecture, it is an accessory in painting and sculpture as valuable as it is rare. The placing of a statue with reference to its architectural setting is often of capital importance for both, as was realized by the architects of the great Gothic buildings. As to the use of architectural imagination in painting, have we not the extraordinary lesson of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel?

to the direct embodiment of personal striving and individual sentiment. These arts are therefore more expressive and more sentimental ; at the same time that they must be more variable, more vague, and less intellectual.¹

It is only a step to the further position, to be developed later on, that these two springs of art embody respectively the two "controls" or spheres of reference of psychic process, the external and the inner ; and that in their union the aesthetic, reducing this fundamental dualism of knowledge, *issues in an experience of intrinsic immediacy*.

¹ The suggestion that these two springs of art are operative—and also the manner of their union in the semblant imagination—was made briefly in the work *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. iv. § 3 (1st ed., 1897 ; 4th ed., 1906). The main object of that discussion, however, was to show that "self-exhibition" introduces a social reference into art which serves to control the judgment and imagination of the artist. A social sanction is reflected into the aesthetic judgment—as into all judgment—to give it both social competence and self-confidence. The further point made out here is that the impulse of self-exhibition continues operative throughout, showing itself in that essential reading of the object in terms of personal feeling which has had so much attention lately in the literature of *Einfühlung*. While art is "social" in its "springs" and universal in its appeal, aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is individual and immediate. Cf. the references given in the work just cited, and see Tufts in *Dict. of Philos.*, article "Art Theories," and E. K. Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience*, pp. 63–86.

PART V.¹

IMMEDIACY

Chapter XIV

MODES OF IMMEDIACY

§ 1. MEDIATION AND IMMEDIACY

1. We have already made out a tentative distinction between the modes of experience characterized respectively as mediation and immediacy.² We found mediation, when reduced to its lowest terms, to consist in a "reference" of a content away from its own mere presence, to some other experience or bit of meaning. The latter is said to be "mediate," or "mediated," inasmuch as its direct or immediate presence and coefficient are not given and present, but are only in an indirect way referred to or meant by that which is given and present. Ideas mediate realities in this sense; they refer to or mean or intend them. Ends mediate values in a somewhat different way, but still in the same sense; they stand for or mean those experiences which do present values or valuable things. This definition of mediation and the mediate serves also to define the "immediate," for the first and more superficial connotation of the latter is negative. The immediate is the experience which is not mediate, which does not come forward as referred to or suggested by something else, but is what it is in its own name and right.

2. This will do for a preliminary distinction. But it is evident that it is easier to define mediation in general terms than it is to set limits to it in a way that will serve to describe the immediate. When we speak of the "reference" of one content to another, of one experience to another, we are evidently

¹ Being Part XII. of the entire treatise on Genetic Logic.

² See chap. iii. § 1.

speaking of the *meaning* of the first, in some of its ramifications. "Reference" can only be meaning; and it is easier to deal with meaning as having ramifications, than it is with meaning as not having ramifications. The question of what is called "reference," therefore, and with it of mediation, brings up the entire theory of meaning. We have to ask whether it is the mediating content that has the meaning we call the reference, or whether the reference meaning resides in the content that is mediated. This is an important question, because it involves the further inquiry as to what we are to call immediate in cases in which this sort of reference meaning is absent.

We should ask also what kind of meaning is embodied in the reference accomplished by mediation, not merely what sort of contents can mediate others and what sort can be mediated by others. This again appears important, since the kind of meaning that cannot serve in one rôle or the other might come up with a claim for recognition as immediate.

Before we attempt, therefore, a more positive characterization of the immediate, let us come to closer quarters with the interpretation of mediation, as illustrating the theory of meaning; and in order to do this, let us ask the questions put above in the order there suggested. First, we will consider the question of the incidence, so to speak, of mediation—the question, "where is the meaning of 'reference' actually to be found?"

3. If, at the outset, we recognize that there are two relatively distinguishable items of content, or factors of meaning, involved in a case of explicit mediation, we may say at once that mediation as a mode of meaning must comprise them both. Like judgment, mediation has two terms; it involves a greater or lesser intent to recognize a relationship between meanings which are, by this movement, taken to be separable terms or contents. When I say, "my dog is fierce," I make a judgment which mediates the existence of the dog; his existence is the presupposition of my belief in his fierceness. This comes out explicitly in the declaration made when there is occasion for it, "the dog exists, or is real."

These two elements, then, are present in the entire meaning which the mediation sets forth; we say of this duality of terms, that one mediates the other. The question then is, which is which?—which is mediator and which mediated? Or is the relation a reversible one? The idea dog mediates the external sphere of existence; can the reverse hold?—can the meaning

called a sphere of existence be used to mediate the contents that are in it?

4. So far as the general fact of mediation is concerned, evidently it can be so used; any sort of meaning may mediate any other sort if the appropriate interest is at work. A general intention may mediate its concrete instances; a thought of existence, its realization in things; an act may mediate a thought, as well as a thought an act. But an earlier distinction, made out in discussing logical mediation, will help us here: the distinction between the mediation of a control by a content, on the one hand, and the mediation of contents among themselves, on the other hand. The latter, as in the mediation of the conclusion by the middle term of a syllogistic process, illustrates the case of any meaning mediating any other; one is taken for logical purposes as having in its entire meaning the suggestion of or reference to the other.

But under this general heading, the other case of mediation mentioned—the mediation of a control by a content—seems to be more special; it is the case in which the terms involved in the mediation are held to more specific rôles. A content taken without question for what it is—presumed, assumed or judged to be existent or real—such a content mediates its control, its sphere of reference, in a sense that would not hold if the terms were reversed. This will appear if we restate briefly the relation of these two factors of meaning.

5. The control aspect of a meaning is not given in the objective relational content, but is a part of the selective intent of acceptance. The object is accepted as holding in this or that sphere, as being under this or that control. Now in whatever processes of development or contextuation such a content may be involved, this intent of control, this existential reference, remains constant. This has appeared in our detailed consideration of the "external reference" of ideas.

This case of mediation, then, is special in its type. There is a "harking-back" to the *relatively simple and primitive experience, in which the coefficient of a certain sort of existence was present* in the objective meaning. This coefficient is not lost as the process becomes more relational and also more subjective, but it seems to become more remote, as alternatives arise and questions of reference to different types of control require solution. Alternative mediations spring up. We have here, therefore, in the case that especially interests us, a mediation of a

particular sort of meaning. The mediation is of the original existence meaning of the object which is now set up in idea.

The question as to the adjustment of the terms of the mediation to each other need not have a general answer—although we have intimated one to the effect that any meaning may mediate any other—but we may confine ourselves to this particular case. In discussing the mediation of existence or reality, we deal always with the reference of a given content to that primitive control which gave it, *in the first instance*, its intent of existence.

6. The same result, or rather the result of the same restriction, appears in the other case of mediation with which we have had to do in the preceding chapters: that of values as mediated by ideas to which worth-meanings attach. Here again the meaning mediated is of the order of selective intent: the satisfaction given originally in a direct or primitive experience of control. This is the mediated term throughout all the developments of the worth consciousness. The first-hand worth, the fulfilment found in actual presence—whether later presumed, assumed, or judged—is what is mediated; and the idea or thing is always the mediating term; it serves as mediator or means. *The means mediates the end.*

7. We may say, therefore, in answer to the question of the incidence or location of the meaning of mediation, that in the cases before us—those of the mediation of existence or reality and of value¹—there is no ambiguity. The mediation as such requires two distinguishable moments or factors of meaning, but these are always held in the same relative position. The content takes on, in its development, a relative remoteness or abstraction from its original sphere of control; but it still stands for it, refers to it, intends to have it—*mediates it*. The meaning of primitive and direct control is mediated through whatever stages of contextuation, association, etc., the cognitive content may pass.

8. If we adopt this result, it will give us a suggestion as to the true answer to our second set of questions—those which concern the “immediate,” considered as a mode of meaning in which the intent of mediation is absent. When the suggestion of remoteness of the content from its primitive control is absent, in what more positive sense can either of the terms which might enter into such a mediation be said to be “immediate”?

¹ These exhaust the cases of “epistemological” as distinct from “logical” mediation.

§ 2. MODES OF IMMEDIACY

Stating briefly the general conclusions to which we will come, before discussing the cases that justify them, we are able to describe the following different types of immediate experience, distinguished with reference to the meaning or intent of existence, or reality, the epistemological intent.

9. (1) *The immediacy of primitiveness*: the intent of existence or reality that attaches to primitive or first-hand experience, or to experience that takes itself for direct and primitive. This is the immediacy of a cognitive content that is not discriminated in any clear way from others nor apprehended as having dualistic suggestions; the present coefficient of existence is not distinguished from any other that might be present, or from its own case when mediated through more developed contents. The immediacy of "sentience" and that of hypothetical "pure experience" or feeling fall here. It covers cases of mere presence, "awareness," etc.

10. (2) *The immediacy of completion or "transcendence"*: so-called as arising at the consummation and accomplishment of a control process, at what is taken for or intended as its completion or limit. The immediacy of mystic ecstasy, and that of completely fulfilled purpose, for example, come in here. It is the immediacy which is the ideal of mediation itself.

11. (3) *The immediacy of "reconciliation,"* illustrated by those modes of experience in which the meaning entertained brings to a termination the oppositions and dualisms of positive mediation, such as the dualisms between truth and value, means and end, self and the external world. This is the great rôle of the semblant or imaginative functions.

§ 3. THE IMMEDIACY OF PRIMITIVENESS

12. The suggestion of primitiveness, as attaching to a state of mind, is in so far negative; it cites the relative barrenness and emptiness of a state of mind in respect to meaning for itself. It has, however, for the observer, a forward look, a look toward a further state of derivativeness or unfolding. Such an experience would seem, therefore, to have a certain positive character, according as it is fit to be the starting place for one or another form of process. If we look at such a state from the point of view of mediation of the kind seen in later knowledge and appreciation, we may well characterize its immediacy by the term "indeter-

minateness." There is, in the content presented in such a state, no start toward the mode of determination which its positive development would exhibit. Experience of the purely "projective" sort, already described as the limit of cognition in respect to primitiveness, would illustrate this; from the point of view of cognition, it is immediate. The data of sense are for consciousness barren, empty, indeterminate as to meaning of one sort or another. The immediacy is that of the primitive; from it meaning is still to be derived. The internal "complication" of parts by which the first presented data are characterized does not yet mean anything; it is simply there.¹

13. Immediateness, in the sense of indeterminateness or absence of meaning, does not attach to cognitive data alone, though in our theory we find that cognitive data do seem to approach this limit. There is the more evidently primitive experience which we call feeling. The affective is sometimes thought, indeed, to monopolize the claim to indeterminateness and meaninglessness for consciousness. But, as a matter of fact, cognitive determination is not the only sort whose absence we should inquire into; for considerable affective organization supervenes upon primitive feeling, as we have seen. Feelings may be variously determined, as pleasure, as pain, as qualitatively differing emotions, as attached to specific cognitive or objective contents; as revived, generalized, ejected, idealized. The specific intent attaching to objects is often affective in one or other of these more derived senses.

With this we must recognize what may be called the immediacy of consciousness itself; the feeling of any and all process as it occurs. States of knowing and willing, whatever their objects or contents, are felt as states of mind.² And this mere presence to or modification of the theatre or background of the psychic life is in much the same sense immediate as the primitive feeling which lacks determination through mediation.

Whatever we may say, therefore, as to the relatively greater simplicity of one or the other, we may place under this general heading of primitiveness certain immediacies, both affective and presentative. The actual primacy or genetic priority probably attaches to the affective, since in certain of its modes it seems to gain determinateness only from the element of presentation to

¹ See "Functional Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. I. chap. iii. §§ 1, 2.

² This is a fact upon which Bradley with right insists, see *Mind*, Jan. 1909, p. 54.

which it is attached. This is a matter, however, which will come before us again, when we attempt to appraise the modes of reality which the different forms of immediacy respectively presume or presuppose.

14. When we take the point of view of conation or action, and recognize the factor of interest and disposition in its entirety in these early states, we get still another characterization of the immediacy of primitiveness. There is a primitiveness of active experience. If conative factors—tendencies summed up in the broad term interest—are always present, then even those early instinctive functions in which contents merely minister to the requirements of life, are satisfactions or fulfilments. In them some active motives of appetite, impulse, or effort must be realized. But it is an immediate fulfilment, at the lower limit; an immediate “doing” in much the same sense that there is also an immediate “knowing” and an immediate “feeling.” At the limit, these distinctions cannot be made; just from the fact of immediacy, the distinctions are not present to consciousness itself. But from our knowledge of the sorts of derivative meaning that spring up within the body of the whole, we may say that these aspects are present in one and the same primitive experience.

15. We may put the matter in a more positive light by noting the sorts of process which may be discovered in the several cases when the experience ceases to be primitive. Avoiding the vain task of attempting to separate the affective and conative factors in the movement toward determinate meaning, we may content ourselves with distinguishing the two modes of mediating process already described as “mediation of facts” and “mediation of values.” One issues in truths, the other in worths. If we ask the questions of the *primum cognitum*, on the one hand, and of the *primum desideratum*, on the other hand, we come, in both cases alike, to the supposed limiting state, in which there is no mediation. In one, the sensation is all of the fact; and in the other, the satisfaction is all of the worth. It is true also that in this state the difference of mediation, which gives the distinction between *cognitum* and *desideratum*, being abolished, this latter distinction goes also. The primitive is then just the immediate, and the immediate is just the primitive; and that is all there is to be said.

Yet the distinctions now made have a certain interest. For it may be that one aspect of this primitively immediate may remain present when the others have passed away. We have just had occasion to see that the sort of immediacy described as affec-

tive, always attaches to contents that are far from primitive when considered as objects of knowledge; and we may ask whether this is not true also of conation. Interest often seems primitive when its objects are complex and derived. These questions may be postponed; but our present attempt to give positive delimitation to the modes of immediacy may not in the sequel prove to be entirely without results.

§ 4. THE IMMEDIACY OF TRANSCENDENCE

16. The modes of immediacy already described have their common right to the name from the negative characterization that in primitive stages of psychic life mediation is absent. Reality of any specific sort is neither believed in nor assumed; it is in the vaguest way merely presumed—if we may use even that word for the mode of acceptance that belongs to simple presence in the psychic life. These modes of primitiveness merge into mere lack of differentiation in respect to the motives which go on to issue in positive mediation.

We have now to note the other extreme case, the mode of immediacy that arises when the mediating processes have fully worked themselves out; when they have seemingly, to consciousness itself, secured the end of mediating the objects which supply termini to the movements, and have thus exhausted themselves. This we may call the "immediacy of transcendence," as the other extreme case was called the "immediacy of primitiveness." Between the two lies the great stretch of mediate or dualistic process in which the mediations of truth and worth are at work.

17. Proceeding in this way, we find states in which each of the motives of mediation terminates in a meaning of completion or final fulfilment. The cognitive movement ends in limiting meanings ascribed to immediate or self-evident or "pure" reason; they are described as intuitive, absolute, *à priori*. This we may call the "immediacy of Pure Reason or of Theoretical Intuition." By theoretical intuition is meant the immediate apprehension or perception of rational principles as such, these principles being looked upon as constitutive or regulative of knowledge. Whatever we may say as to the metaphysical value of these principles themselves, we may at any rate allow that, in being aware of them, one discovers no motive of mediation. They are of the nature of the "given" on the higher plane of reason. In them the mediating process, by which empirical

knowledge proceeds, is no longer evoked, and universal and necessary relations seem to be immediately revealed.

18. To us—in accordance with our reasoned conclusions¹—this represents simply the limiting case of a type of mediation, the discursive; it abolishes the personal end and reifies the context of thought which has arisen as instrument or means. The relational context poses as the real itself.

In reaching this result, consciousness isolates the objective as such. Personal preference is denied; the exercise of inner control or volition is suppressed; all selective intent is lost in the mere recognition of the content of thought, looked upon as the immediately given. The structure of reality is thus revealed independently of the processes of knowledge working upon actual contents. It appears as a revelation, a donation from the heavens, in which all variations due to the reception and mediation of data in experience are done away with.

In this sense, this immediacy is one of transcendence. It is the outcome and end-state of a process of mediation. The approximations of mediated knowledge, the variations in the selective results of interest, the limitations of experience in range and intention, are transcended in an absolute intuition. A pure and self-evident truth, having rational necessity and unconditioned validity, seems to dawn upon the mind.

This "reason," this "*à priori*," seeming thus to come by insight not by discovery, by immediate intuition not by mediation, has what may be called the "immediacy of transcendence." The presupposition of reality made by logical process, hardens into the presumption of the immediate presence of the real. The objective reference of the content reaches its consummation in the presence to consciousness of the real given in the relational system of thought.

Rational idealism is a deliberate elaboration and justification of this procedure; it is a reification of thought as absolute and independent of the human values and purposes to which actual thought is instrumental.

19. But we find the other great mode of mediation pressing forward to its limit in a similar manner. It has its finality in its own sense, the sense embodied in the very word which its movement employs, the word "end." Translated into psychic terms, "end" means *end-state*, desired realization, full satisfaction.

¹ See above, chap. viii. §§ 4 ff. for summary statements on pure and practical reason.

The partial concrete ends which facts and truths mediate all minister to the development of the inner life—the life which embodies the progress of inner control. The self is progressively advanced through the satisfaction of its impulses, desires, and interests. At the limit of the movement, we find an immediacy which is the final term or end-state of the mediation of worths ; just as, at the other end of the series, we find in the immediacy of primitive action, the protoplasm of the indeterminate in which meanings of worth are still to germinate. The mediation of values through ends found worthwhile, goes on throughout all the progress of mind ; and the limit of the process is an ideal state of self-fulfilment, of oneness of the self with its end, of the dying of the will in its own completion.

The self is immediately aware of completeness and perfection, as revealed in the norms of practical reason. The theoretical content lapses in the transcendence of the inner principle which is identified with the ideal end. The means, the fact or truth necessary for partial and conditional satisfaction, completely disappears in the sweep of feeling and will, moving onward to embrace the ideal.

This is illustrated by what is known as “ecstasy.” It is a state of infinite expansion of the self, and of its identification with its ideal of worth ; it is felt as an emotional and volitional transcendence of partial ends and goods, an immediacy of finality and complete fulfilment. It is in no sense the revelation or intuition of a relational, self-evidencing, or self-enforcing thought or truth, given for recognition ; it is rather the completion of the motive of appreciation, the apotheosis of value and beauty and love.

20. There is, therefore, an immediacy of practical transcendence, finding its reality immediately present in its own end-state. From the point of view of philosophical system, it affords justification of voluntarism through its postulation of absolute values ; just as the other form, the immediacy of theoretical intuition justifies rationalism in its own way. Each finds its outcome prophesied in the first movings of mind, when the two great modes of mediation, now fulfilled in immediate realization, give their respective presumption and assumption of reality. The intuitive immediacy of the intelligence need give no further reason for its confidence, since the demand for the reasonable as such is fulfilled in it. The final good also need give no measure of itself, since in it turn the demands of all worth are supplied. Each is quite unable

to appraise the other ; since each issues from a mode of mediation which excludes the motive of the other—or at best admits it only as instrumental to its own proper fulfilment. One says: "*I know the truth of the real*, let feeling subside"; the other says, "*I feel the worth of the real*, let reasoning be still." The immediacy of rational intuition and the immediacy of practical value and mystic love are, each in its own way, transcendent and final.

21. It will be our task further on to inquire into the special modes of reality which these immediacies embody—the meaning given to the real by each. It is in speculative rationalism, as I have intimated, that the one decks itself out in theory ; and it is in the forms of pragmatic voluntarism and mysticism that the other makes its latest appeal. Both are indeed vital approaches to the full meaning of the real, since each is the culmination of an essential movement of commerce of thought with things.

§ 5. THE IMMEDIACY OF RECONCILIATION

22. We now turn to the characterization of mental movements which appear in some way to remove the bonds of partial and exclusive mediation. There remains, in fact, another great class of functions through which the oppositions of rival mediations are seemingly overcome. These functions appear, on the surface, to present a mode of immediacy in which the two typical movements of mediation are no longer in opposition to each other. These functions are not confined to limiting cases, as the forms we have already considered are, but find their place all through the development of knowledge and action. They seem to bear witness to more or less effective reconciliation and reunion, a return to unity after duality.

Assuming that there are such motives of reunion normally at work, we may call the resulting immediacy one of "reconciliation." Its motive, genetically considered, would evidently be one which would show itself in wholeness and unity of experience, as over against those whose operation issues in the dualisms and exclusive pretensions of the purely intellectual and the purely practical.

We come here upon a question the answer to which will be fully developed as we proceed with the interpretation of a class of functions which have already occupied us ; the imaginative functions of the "semblant" order.

23. It will not appear premature to readers of the foregoing

chapters to assume this type of immediacy and to call it "aesthetic"; this is, in the sequel, the outcome, and I venture to suggest here and now that in "aesthetic contemplation" an immediacy of reconciliation is actually and effectively present. This will be shown in the later volume of which the "Comparative Morphology" of meanings of reality, both mediate and immediate, is to be the principal topic.¹

§ 6. THE APPREHENSION OF IMMEDIACY

24. The question may be asked, how we can know or apprehend immediacy, if in its very nature it is free from those objective and relational characters which cognition imparts to its objects? Does it not destroy immediacy to take it up in the process of knowing and describe it? Is not what we are able to describe a content which by this very act has become mediate—which, in so far, is no longer immediate?

This is, of course, the old puzzle of the apprehension of the non-cognitive put in evidence long ago in the discussion of the observation of states of feeling. It is discussed with subtlety by Bradley,² whose main position we may, I think, accept. He holds that a state of immediate feeling may in part pass over into knowledge and be reported descriptively or relationally, at the same time that it, or part of it, continues to be immediate and to serve as a sort of test ("jarring" or not "jarring" with the report of itself made in terms of knowledge). Apart from the actual mechanism of the process, however, we may agree that we do apprehend immediacy; and we may inquire just what this "apprehension" involves. Does it require the process of mediation through the more or less explicit presentation which is considered essential to cognition? If so, then we would after all seem to be shut up to cognitive or mediate process for our view of reality; for the meaning of reality given in immediate experience would be *re-made in cognitive terms* in the apprehension of the

¹ See also chap. xv. §§ 5 ff. below.

² "On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," *Mind*, January, 1909, pp. 40 ff. In general I also agree with Mr. Bradley's definition of immediacy, although for the purposes of this present discussion I prefer to keep to the negative characterization made by the phrase "absence of mediation." Mediation is absent in all the three cases of the immediate described above: in the "primitive" it has not yet arisen; in the "transcendent" it has completed itself; in the "reconciling" it loses its character in a larger function.

immediate state itself. That is, the obscuring net of relation would be thrown over reality after all, and the appeal to immediate experience would have been in vain.¹

25. This result would not be deplored by those who do not disparage relational thinking or minimize the value of its results, but it involves such evidently logistic conclusions that its truth becomes "suspect" even apart from questions of fact. Not only would the immediacy of "primitiveness" be rendered determinate or relational in this way, but the other types of immediacy would have the same fate. The immediacy that arises from complete fulfilment would revert back to the status of logical mediation, and the ideal act no less than the ideal truth would be apprehended only in the dry moulds of thought. The processes by which mediation, of one type or the other, completes itself in immediacy would only give rise to another dualism of self and objects in which thinking and action would begin their rival interpretations over again, on a different plane. The self-evidence of intuition would give place to the "demonstration" of logical proof; and the immediate value of the moral act, to its casuistic establishment in a body of ethical formulas.

Further, any value for "apprehension" of what we have called "immediacy of reconciliation"—aesthetic in its type—would disappear, since by knowing we would lose this sort as we lose the others. What of a "reconciliation" that surrenders the prize absolutely to one of the claimants, cognition.

Hence it would seem that if "immediacy" is not, after all, to mean "mediation," it must not mean *knowledge* of immediacy; that immediacy, if it is to have any meaning of epistemological value, must be apprehended in some mode which is not to be identified with the schematizing and relating processes of cognition. There are, however, two alternatives still open to us, and I present them both, because I believe that both of them are to be accepted as true, each in certain cases or both together.

26. (1) It may be that to cognize a state of immediacy—to know and describe it in relational terms—does not alter it in respect to the marks of immediacy. We have found untenable the view that the cognition of relation obscures the marks of what is related. Relation is found, discovered in objects, not thrown over

¹ It cannot fail to appear to the reader of Bradley that in seeking to establish some sort of autonomy for feeling, he feels the force of this dilemma.

them; and a relatively relational object may be as true to fact as a relatively non-relational one. This would mean in general that the state of immediacy itself, in its non-objective form, is what it is described as being when cognized in objective form. My description of a feeling is, so far as it goes, true of the original feeling; it does not, it is true, exhaust its affective marks, but it also does not subvert them or render them unidentifiable.

The cognitive rendering, on this view, would bring out relations which the direct immediacy had not fully disclosed, and it would leave unexpressed in relational form certain qualitative marks which that immediacy had disclosed. Its lack then would be that those marks of singularity wherein the state of immediacy could not be rendered in conceptual or general terms would still be unrepresented in knowledge.¹

27. (2) This resource is supplemented by the rôle played by affective revival and generalization, as brought out above. An affective or motive state recurs under a disposition or mood, and is identified as belonging under it. A state of melancholy, for example, determines itself in a definite grief. This does not require a cognitive generalization in relational terms; it is the direct implication in a larger affective state, disposition or attitude, of a more special one. It is a *dynamic, not a logical subsumption*; a synergy of processes, as explained above, not a relating of terms.²

There is no reason for thinking this is not true of "immediacies." There is a hierarchy of them and they are revived, recognized, classed, each for itself and all together, simply and only by their direct dynamic and qualitative marks, without the introduction of logical distinctions of class. Immediacy is then "apprehended" as an affective or motive general having various instances; it is not "known" by a cognitive device which distorts and disqualifies it.

In this way much of the content of an immediate state of mind, which distinguishes it as non-cognitive and hence not subject to mediation through ideas, is added to the apprehension given through cognition. So far as the intent of immediacy is a dis-

¹ This is in full accord with our reasoned conclusion ("Experimental Logic," *Thought and Things*, vol. ii. chap. xiv. § 4) to the effect that the marks of qualitative singularity attaching to any content cannot be rendered by cognition, which always proceeds by some sort of generalization of recurrent instances.

² Chap. vii. § 2.

position or attitude covering various instances, so far it would be "apprehended" adequately and without loss of meaning. The entire "apprehension" thus covers the union of both cognitive and motive modes of representation.

28. What is still left over in immediacy, after both cognitive and affective processes have reported it, is perhaps a negligible quantity. In theory there remain the purely singular marks which make the state not merely one of immediacy, one whose character allows of its classification with other immediacies, but further, one of *singularity*—*this one only and incomparable* experience which the predicated immediacy does not exhaust. But there is still another fact among the things of feeling and interest to which recourse may be had, to secure the "apprehension" even of this.

29. It may be recalled that in the account of affective revival and generalization, we saw that the general disposition or mood often precedes the concrete emotion and that the latter comes up to specify or determine the former. An ill-defined state of feeling may remain vague until, by means of a suggestion or association, it embodies itself in an emotion. This latter, the emotion thus produced, is not a mere idea or revived state, but an actual moving of affective and motive factors.

This is, or may be, true of immediacy considered as a state of the affective-conative life. When we describe immediacy, the larger attitude or disposition is constituted, in accordance with the foregoing, by revival processes of knowledge and feeling; this is then followed by the starting up of the actual feelings which reconstitute a present immediacy. Thus the living body of first-hand experience, lacking nothing in directness and intimate quality, is secured anew.¹

30. It is true, therefore, not only that we have immediate experiences but that we can apprehend and describe them. Whatever rôle they may have as revealers of reality continues in the fuller processes by which the meaning of immediacy is conserved and represented in the movement of mind. Not only, further, may we say that we have immediacy, and that we apprehend it, but also that, in our theory, we understand in some degree what it means. It does not mean a sublimated sort of thought.

¹ This would seem, in a way, to reverse the process supposed by Bradley. Instead of a concrete feeling-state continuing contemporaneously with the cognition of part of itself, we have a larger represented whole of disposition or feeling determining itself in a concrete affective state.

It is genuinely a resort to feeling, in all the cases we have distinguished.

We may, therefore, go on with our discussion of its epistemological standing, relative to that of the various other modes of conscious process—rid of this bugbear.

PART VI¹
OUTCOME AND PROGRAMME.
PANCALISM

Chapter XV

THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE

§ I. REALITIES AS APPREHENDED

I. It remains to gather up the intimations as to the meaning of reality, resulting from the discussions of the preceding chapters. We have found, as the Introduction suggested, a distinction in the meaning of reality, according as the functions at work are those of recognition and acknowledgment, cognitive in character, or those of assumption and hypothesis, imaginative in character. This distinction has been fully explained.

Again, we have found that the two sorts of mediation, that of truth and that of worth, proceed *pari passu*, and each makes for itself a report of reality. One gives the "true" and the other the "good," each being in its own sense real. This distinction appears in full force in each of the functions distinguished above, the recognitive and the imaginative; each has both its truths and its worths.

These distinctions may be presented to the eye in the following table:—

I. *Realities of Recognition and Acknowledgment*—

- a. Things known : Truths.
- b. Values attained : Worths.

II. *Realities of Imagination and Assumption* ²—

- a. Things supposed : Hypotheses.
- b. Values desired : Ends.

¹ Being Part XIII. of the entire treatise on Genetic Logic.

² The "schematic assumptions" or "schemata" of our detailed exposition.

2. In addition we find a certain return to immediacy in the movement of mind in the constitution of contents in a "semblant" or contemplative way, in which the realities of all sorts seem to be fused and completed. This mode of treating contents extends throughout the entire development of consciousness, taking on forms which reflect the characters of the knowledges or other meanings reached in this mode or that. Its forms are not contemporaneous with each other, as is the case with the two subdivisions given under each heading above, but successive. We have in consequence this scheme:—

III. *Realities of Contemplation*—

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| a. The Playful Semblance of | { Truths and Values
Hypotheses and Ends. |
| b. The Aesthetic Semblance of | { Truths and Values.
Hypotheses and Ends. |

We will now point out the more striking aspects of each of these three modes of meaning, all of which are called "reality," and then state by way of programme the problem of their correlation in a final synthesis, which is to be the topic of the last volume of the work.

§ 2. REALITIES OF RECOGNITION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

3. It is in this mode of meaning that we find the customary and well-founded use of the term "reality." Reality is what we actually find, recognize, acknowledge, and have a right to presuppose. It is a meaning grounded both in the interest of knowledge proper, and in that of satisfaction; as such it reflects the successful advance of the mind in working out its recognitive and selective meanings alike. It begins with the presumption of reality or existence in the earliest reality-feeling, develops into the acknowledgment of judgment, and remains thereafter the fair and safe presupposition of logical and hyper-logical process. In it consciousness consistently recognizes a mode of control in some sense foreign to itself and persistent; and also the persisting something that becomes the inner control or self.

But we have shown in the present volume that this is not an affair merely of the content of cognition and recognition; it is also as well the outcome of the movement of selection and action to the product of which the designation "selective meaning" was assigned at the start. We find that the "worths" that experience affords, the satisfactions it achieves, attach to the

same set of conditions as that to which the meaning of existence also attaches. It is things, actual things—truths, grounded truths—in which satisfaction resides, and the presumption, acknowledgment, or presupposition of value requires that of fact.

In short, one and the same thing is found both true and valuable. Values are not made in a void; consciousness is selective, not creative of its contents; it finds its satisfaction in the very act wherein its knowledge establishes an object.

4. In the prelogical modes, this appears in the twofold meaning of the actual: it is at once factual and worthful. The worth is a sort of quality, read as in the thing along with the objective qualities.

Later on, when the two great mediations have arisen, ideas taking the place of present things, the same is in effect true. The idea that mediates the existence of the thing, also mediates its value; the existence is presupposed in order to reconstitute or confirm the value. So it is in the whole range of the known; known things and known values are alike rendered in judgments having the same presuppositions of reality.

The motto, the catchword of this sort of reality, therefore, is *actuality*. Its apprehension utilizes the seeing, finding, enjoying, confirming, demonstrating faculties. The good is in this sense here secondary to the true. First we say, "It is actual"; second, "It is good."

5. This issues in a certain realism. The actual is the real; and there is no real save the actual. Whatever control is found in operation, actually operative in giving a sphere of existence, in this is the very presence of reality.

In theory, however, the motives are here present for more than a theory of actuality, or a theory frankly realistic. For the processes of mediation open the door to various sorts of subjectivism¹; and the processes of formal implication, developed in the interests of mediation, open the door to as many sorts of rationalism. These theoretical implications have been from time to time suggested in their proper places above, and are to be more fully considered later on. Let us here only note that the outcome, broadly considered, of this set of actualizing functions is a reality that is established, exercising control upon the operations that apprehend them, common in its character for all, and available at one and the same time in its essential meaning for the

¹ Notably that based upon the presupposition of "inwardness" underlying the dualism of subject-object in reflection itself.

uses of knowledge and appreciation alike. This sort of reality is true first, and good because it is true ; but nevertheless, it is one and the same real thing that is both true and good.

6. As actual, this sort of reality is also dualistic. From the earliest movements in which the inner, subjective, or "self" processes begin to be set over against those to which externality attaches, the dualism continues and develops, becoming ever more refined, but withal more insistent and confirmed. The actual comprises actual persons and actual things, actual minds and actual bodies, actual selves and actual not-selves, actual subjects and actual objects. However novel the form one of these terms takes on here or there in mental development, the other manages to clothe itself in an equally characteristic contrasted form. The reality of either cannot assert itself without enforcing that of the other ; the very acknowledgment of one control is the signal for the assertion of the other along with it.¹

7. This is, of course, not the whole story of reality. It is an important chapter of the story, but it presumes the relative sufficiency of the acknowledging and asserting faculties and the relative isolation of their objects. With this set of functions go always hand in hand the other set. How, we may ask, has the mind come into this body of actual things, truths and worths, which it knows and enjoys so confidently ?—and how can it continue to acquire them and go on progressing in the achievement to which this store of results bears witness ? Only by the use of the imagination, the vehicle of the prospecting, trying, assuming, schematizing, postulating, desiring functions. This we have seen in detail. But do not these functions also make their contribution to the meaning to reality ?

§ 3. REALITIES OF IMAGINATION AND ASSUMPTION

8. The world is peopled by imaginary no less than by actual things ; and most of the things we accept as actual are really things as we imagine them. It has fully appeared in our discussions that besides the aspects of things by reason of which they seem to be stable, fixed, findable on demand for purposes of knowledge and use, they have variable aspects also. Their character shifts with the interest of their apprehension and pursuit ; they are constantly thrown into new arrangements and combinations in the construction of larger wholes or universes of existence.

¹ Cf. the article, "Mind and Body, etc.," *Psychological Review*, May, 1903. See also Appendix B, II.

Moreover, the undiscovered is always in front of us, and each new discovery alters the face of the known. So the real considered as the possible, the undiscovered, the hoped-for is assumed or postulated. We accept a beyond both of truths and of goods, and bend our efforts of imagination to depict its reality and anticipate its value. Suppositions arise as to the true, ends come to supplement the good ; in both these worlds, ideals hover over the body of actualities. We are ever prospecting, and it is only as this prospecting is successful that the store of actualities is enlarged in mass, defined in detail, and enriched in meaning.

9. But it is not merely as depicting a new actual, which is in turn to be proved true and good—not only in the sense in which the imagined is instrumental to the known—that the supposing and assuming consciousness has its place and rôle. In so far this is the sphere of experimentation and hypothesis, that of scientific imagination, subdued and controlled in the interest of truth ; but imagination plays also the more distinguished part of erecting and invoking the ideal as such. The scientific imagination itself not only discovers the true, but also postulates an ideal of truth. Much more is this the case with the practical imagination. It proceeds by the use of the known as instrument, in its turn, to the valuable, the desired, the ideal. In this movement, the selective type of meaning comes to its own, as ministering to the development of the self, whose satisfactions it anticipates and secures. Knowledge becomes means in the working of a control in the interest of ends ; the desirable as such is pursued by means of the merely factual, or at the expense of it. The “ought” comes to dominate the “is.” There is a logic of practice as well as a logic of truth.

Just as in the other movement we see the subordination of the good, its neglect in the disinterested recognition of the true ; so here we see the reverse—the subordination of the mere fact, the true as such, to the pursuit of the good. The theoretical reason sets up a system of valid principles, rational in the sense of holding whether or not one wishes them to, or consents to them ; the practical reason sets up a system of practical norms or rules of conduct which are rational in the contrasted sense of being binding whether we can prove them or not. In both cases alike, one term of the mediation through ideas entirely disappears, while the other comes to mean the ideal.

10. In the one movement, the vindication of the reality of the good seems complete, as in the other the vindication of the reality

of the true seems to be, but for a different reason. In the case of truth, the good appears as the attachment of predicates of worth to the things independently established by knowledge. In the case of the good, the voice of personal interest is directly heard, declaring that the movement of knowledge itself is motivated by interest and activity, and that the need to know, the will to discover, the motive of curiosity, all have ends of gratification, all pursue forms of good. The fundamental human stirring, therefore, from this point of view, is that of interest, a conative-affective mode of process. Without interest, knowledge processes could not move. Instead of the fixed and static things that knowledge discloses, we must recognize the progressive ideal of interest.

Consciousness seems thus to forget its realism, its actualism, and to become moralist and idealist. The corresponding philosophical development is found in voluntarism in some of its forms. Over against the reification of thoughts as absolute truth, the procedure of rationalism, we have here the reification of ends as absolute good.

To the narrower pragmatic forms of the doctrine truth itself becomes a relative "good," knowledge an instrument; successful practice by the agent, successful working by the thought, become the criteria of the real. The finality of the ideal of conduct, no less than that of the ideal of knowledge, is flatly denied by the relative voluntarism of pragmatism. Anything approaching an "absolute" is "taboo"! ¹

For this neglect of the ideal, there is no justification in the practical development of consciousness. The practical life, when true to the genetic factors of its meaning, goes on to postulate a reality which is for it the absolute good, just as the intellectual reaches a truth which is absolute for it. In pragmatism voluntarism is truncated much as rationalism is truncated in scientific positivism. Pragmatism and positivism alike—one in the interest of will, the other in the interest of knowledge—refuse to follow consciousness in the postulation of an ideal beyond the present good and the present fact.

II. Again we must, for the present, decline to enter into the discussion of the theoretical issues raised. It suffices to note them and to emphasize the main result, which is this: the realities of the active life are embodied in ends of worth, not in predicates of fact and truth. These ends are never finally attained in the form of actual worths. There is an ideal constantly hovering over

¹ Cf. Appendix C., sect. 5.

the actual and reaching beyond it. There is an end-state, a further intent, a prospective or ideal value, to which all the realities of the accomplished life, whether of science or of conduct, point. Reality is progressive, unfinished, dynamic, having an ideal meaning, but never achieving it in fact.

12. The curious thing is that in this movement the dualism of which knowledge makes so much—that of inner and outer, self and object—becomes relatively obscured by one of a different kind. Both the sorts of fact or truth, truths of body and truths of mind, are classed together as the property of knowledge, which is made means to further ends. They both disappear alike in the ideal of the practical reason in which the end, the final good, has its apotheosis. The practical reason is categorical, allowing no distinctions between cases, among situations or agents. "Be the knowledge what it may, be the counsel of prudence what it may, be the agent who he may, still *this is what is good to be or to do*"—such is its utterance.

The dualism that now arises is that between *fact and end, is and ought*. The fact is, of course, there, both the mental fact and the physical fact alike, in this case or that, opposing or advancing the good. But beyond them rises the end, sublime in its scorn of the fact; the "ought" dominates the "is."

From this dualism the active life never escapes, and cannot, because it is of its essential movement to produce just this opposition; just as knowledge by its essential movement produces the dualism of subject and object and can never overcome that.

§ 4. MEDIATE REALITIES

13. The realities disclosed by both these processes are those of mediation: they are *mediated realities*. Realities of knowledge are mediated by ideas, through which the controls of a direct kind are secured. The process proceeds by the resolute elimination of selection and preference. The realities of imagination and assumption are mediate also, but in a different sense; they too utilize ideas as means of securing control, but in this case it is not the control *by fact*, but the control *of fact, in the interest of voluntary ends*. Facts and truths are overstepped and neglected in the postulation of the ideal which is the final end or good.

14. In character these two sorts of reality present a very striking contrast. Realities as known are meanings—speaking grammatically—in *the plural number and the indicative mood*; in the plural number, since the thing as cognized and recognized is

always the result of generalization and classification, and the particular case is such only as intending also the general. We have seen in detail that knowledge cannot render the essential singularity of experiences, which resides in their affective or conative characters. To mediate a control is to generalize the case which is brought under that control ; the one case becomes one of many.

The realities of knowledge are also in the " indicative mood," in the sense that they always express what " is," what is found, recognized, established in the actuality of common and repeatable experience. The " *is, was, and ever shall be* " of the " world without end " expresses their presupposition—that of an existing and permanent order.

15. On the other hand, the realities of the other sort of mediation are *in the singular number and the imperative mood*. They are values for the agent, representing his personal conformities, obediences, acts, ends. The worth of the fact or truth is realized only in the single experience. The aspects of the given content which escape the net of cognitive and logical forms are precisely those which the will sets store by—first-hand quality, intimacy of feeling, uniqueness, and singularity. These meanings are in the singular number ; in these aspects they cannot be generalized.

So, too, these postulated realities are contrasted in mood with the indicative " is, was, and ever shall be " of the actual ; for they represent worths—actions, interests, conformities, imperatives—due to the invocation of ideals to which the actual ought to conform. The process of their mediation is one of synergy, dynamic subsumption, achievement, effort directed to the goal of perfection and completeness. The urgency of the imperative " must " replaces the validity of the indicative " is."

So we might go through the characters of the two sorts of meaning, as dwelt upon in detail in our discussions, and point out the contrasts they give in the resulting meanings of reality. It is evident that the psychic process has produced certain pronounced oppositions in the body of its realities, and in so far as we insist on one or the other of the great modes of mediation, our philosophical theory will emphasize either the reality of value in the singular number and the imperative mood, or that of facts in the plural number and the indicative mood.

What then is to be done ? Are we to follow the indications of a recent eminent writer, and go to the psychological laboratory to be examined, in order to discover whether we be " tough-minded " or " tender-minded," and then select the sort of reality

best suited to our temper ? Or are we by sheer choice, or by force of the tradition of a school or of a social mode, or by a reaction of protest and individual contrariness, to take one off-hand and scout the other ? We might proceed in some such way ; most thinkers do, with no serious results in the long run, either in the world of things or in that of values !

16. But let us note that nature, while reaching this contrast and opposition, does not allow an actual diremption or divorce as between her sorts of reality. No one of us lives or could live as a pure logician, an exclusive intellectualist, nor yet as a pure "practician," a hide-bound voluntarist. We can be one or the other only by being also the other or the one. One must will to know if one would know at all ; and one must know what to will if one would will at all !

The meaning of this mutual dependence of knowledge and practice has become clear to us. Both these processes are mediations. Each loses the directness of first-hand presence ; each utilizes means in its own way to bring back the immediate and direct. The two great motives of the mental life thus come to pull apart and pursue different ideals. Knowledge finds its end in the informations which for will are only means. Will sets up its values which for knowledge are variable and unstable accidents. But each is instrumental to the other, and it is only when claiming each a certain autonomy that they are found to be refractory to the conditions of their common task.

But consciousness does not have mediate processes alone ; mind does not lose its immediate touch with reality. It is only the issue of mediate process that presents this acute dilemma. Just as it is in interpreting the mediating state of mind—the idea, the meaning, the suggestion of one sort or another—that the opposition springs up, so it is in the apprehension of this also that consciousness recovers its equilibrium and finds its larger reconciling immediacy.

§ 5. IMMEDIATE REALITIES

17. The return to immediacy would seem to be the only resource of psychical process and of theory alike.¹ Not in a way

¹ Unless, indeed, one be content to rest in a pluralism in which oppositions and disharmonies are themselves attributed to reality, the ideals of both intellect and will being annulled—of which more later on !

that undoes the gains already accruing to knowledge and will ; for these represent normal and essential methods of intercourse with reality : but in a way that subordinates them to the larger outlook upon life and incorporates them in the meaning of the whole of experience as belonging to a living self.

We have described the different sorts of immediacy. There are the three immediacies of " primitiveness," " transcendence," and " reconciliation."

The primitive offers a way of escape from the dilemma of rival mediations, but it reduces the gains of knowledge and practice to incoherence and meaninglessness. The resort to " pure experience," mere life, inarticulate feeling, takes from experience all its quality save the blank immediacy and torpidity of the jelly-fish and the amoeba. We may discount the categories of intellect and disavow the ideals of will, but at the cost of the entire spiritual life. The psychic life does not find in the sheer intensity of the religious mystic, the sheer quality of the impressionist or the aesthete, the sheer activity of the Marathon racer, its solution of the oppositions of its normal and moderated functions. Quietism, " decadence," the strenuous life, all miss the reflective and contemplative excellencies that are truly human.

18. Again, and with greater show of success, our theory may follow out one or other of the motives of knowledge and practice and find the final immediacy in the " transcendence " given by pure or practical reason. But the question arises, which of these ? Each is the outcome of a process of mediation ; each presupposes its own set of immanent conditions. Is our immediate reality to be that of theoretical intuition in which the first principles of a rational system of truth are formulated ? Do we reach an apriorism of the " pure reason " ? Then the moral life, if not to be left a blank, must be categorized by the theoretical principles of identity, cause, sufficient reason, etc. But against this the will, the moral life, rebels.

Or if we take the outcome of the processes of practical mediation as our final immediacy, finding in the norms of the practical reason the constitutive principles of reality, then the intellectual is made subordinate, and it is with a more or less pragmatic agnosticism that we snub the ambitions of the intelligence.

The force of the example of psychic process is to be found, not in a choice as between these two modes of transcendence, but in their recognition and enforcement in common. The lesson of their theoretical rivalry has been taught us once for all by

manuel Kant,¹ who after asserting the detachment from experience of each of these modes of the *a priori*, had to adjust one another the claims of several "absolutes."

19. It is as clear as day that process and theory alike confront problem of reconciliation, rather than one of destructive rivalry and opposition. Where each process reaches a state of impelling transcendence valid for its type of experience, each too by a movement upon which the very life of both is conditioned, it is impossible to deny the place of either in the apprehension of the full meaning to which we give the name reality. If knowledge is requisite to the realities of practical life, and practice to those of the intellectual life, then how requisite must both these types of meaning be to the higher immediacy in which the practical and the intellectual are found fused in one!

The immediacy of reconciliation must be the resource for theory as it is for life, rather than that of primitiveness or that of transcendence. A mode of reconciliation must be recognized, in theory as it is in life, as always normal to the entire process of consciousness. Apprehension by contemplation, by sheer acceptance of things in their own interest—not merely in that of their truth or that of their value, according as one of the motives of life requires one or the other—this is the manner in which the actual procedure of mind achieves the "realist" real.

§ 6. REALITIES OF CONTEMPLATION

20. We have found, in our detailed examination of imaginative experience of the semblant order, that it has characters that fit it for this reconciling rôle. At each stage of mental development, a natural release from the contracting conditions of mere knowledge and of strenuous action is found in the freer life of fancy. By reason of its exclusion of choice, knowledge is a prison house; and by reason of its exclusion of insight, freedom spells caprice. One loses interest in the impersonal, and one tires of the capricious. But in the imaginative reinstatement of the true, the self regains its interest and its self-possession; and in the same imaginative sembling, knowledge reclaims the fugitive creatures of fancy. Upon the body of ideas thus set up for contemplation—which serves none the less for serious thought and for serious

¹ Kant's "third Critique," the *Urtheilskraft*, however, should always be considered as an organic part of his system. I shall return to this later on.

effort in turn—the breath of life plays when both these serious interests give place to the interest of apprehending the thing itself as an immediate presence, a complete thing and a completed meaning.

The semblant make-believe of play summarizes and holds up for contemplation the varied meanings of the materials played with ; but in play the lack of idealization gives rein to a certain licence and permits a certain chaos. In aesthetic contemplation, however, all the legitimate motives of both mediations—the interests of the actual and the ideal alike—are taken up in an immediate apprehension in which all their high values are conserved.

By our detailed analysis, not by an exegesis in any sense forced, we have shown that aesthetic experience has the following reconciling characters.

(1) By the detachment which the imagination makes possible the aesthetic object secures a certain isolation from the bonds of knowledge and utility extending outside of itself. The motives of inner control and evaluation are thus given their opportunity. The exclusiveness and neutrality of the actual are broken down. A relative freedom of construction replaces the impersonal recognition of an external system of things and utilities. However true to life, the artist says of the portrait, " I did it, it is my work."

(2) But by reason of the imitative and semblant character of art the meanings of the actual are conserved and utilized in the further intent of the aesthetic whole. The truth and utility of the suggested situation are depicted and enforced, but in semblant form ; the whole is constituted *as if actual*. All the judgments of truth and value which the prosaic actualities permit are reconstituted in the aesthetic judgment : valid relations are depicted ; moral predicates are reinstated ; ideal suggestions are enforced ; common acceptance is enjoined in the synnomic value of the art work. The entire actuality of the system of things depicted reappears in the semblant whole. But being in a mode of depicting and reinterpreting, the imagination is allowed place and scope.

(3) The result is that the motives of ownership, of freedom, of inner control, play in turn upon the construction and enrich it from the point of view of a selecting and appreciating intent. The motive of idealization enters to introduce the forward reading toward ends, which supplements the backward reading toward facts. The facts, not in themselves denied nor contorted, are read in the light of ideals and ends, of values for the self.

construction, ~~though~~ made up under external and impersonal control, is interpreted as ~~underlying~~ personal ends and

(4) The movement of person ~~to the whole~~ finding all the motives of fact and ~~and their meaning~~ to an inner psychic life. The motive of control by self, of ~~and~~ self-identification, absorbs the partial factors, and the work of art stands the symbol of completed ideals and a completed life.

21. In the first two of these characters, we see the mediation of knowledge actually in operation, but in the sublimated form that denies to it the exclusiveness and impersonality of its experimental and scientific forms. It must add its results to the whole of experience, and allow of their incorporation in the body of a larger human interest. Facts of all and every kind are thus made over in the world of ends. But the relation is reciprocal: ends arise and are justified only in the domain of knowledge. Ideals are actualities charged with further values. This reciprocal independence is realized in the imagination. This wonderful sphere of semblance is the meeting ground of the opposed terms of the practical life, fact and end. The fact is deprived of that aspect of its meaning which makes it repugnant to its own further and completed value; the end loses that fugitiveness and unreality which made it as creature of imagination in turn repugnant to the actual. So the two meanings fuse in the rich apprehension of the aesthetic which reads the semblant as conserving the meaning of the actual, while also embodying the intent of the ideal.

Thus the terms of the dualism of fact and end, the dualism of the assuming, intending, desiring, idealizing consciousness are reconciled in the meaning of the work of art.

22. In the remaining two characters of the aesthetic mentioned above, the other great dualism in experience, that of the inner and the external, self and object, is as fully overcome in a meaning of reconciliation. The external reference of the constructions of knowledge and of all contents of cognition and judgment, is broken down in the reconstruction of the semblant imagination. The control of an exclusively external order gives place to the relative freedom of an internal and selective intent. The process issues in a reconstruction made in the light of an ideal, a value in prospect, over and above the truth and worth of mere actuality and fact. The artist chooses his facts, moulds the material form to the desired end, reads into the whole the suggestion of a larger and more significant meaning. This is seen even in the simpler

caprice. In the aesthetic, this completes itself in the more re-
outcome of personalization. The inner control, the self,
simply accepts the idealized whole as its own, makes it a thing of
personal experience, and inhabits it as being its appropriate
dwelling. The living thing replaces the dead thing ; the rules
of the movement of organization become those of the psychic life ;
the object becomes the union of the external thing with the inner
principle which lives in it.

Thus in the contemplation of the work of art the dualism of
self and object is overcome ; its terms are reconciled in the
rich experience of a present and living reality.¹

23. With both these dualisms of meaning overcome, the *duality*
of *mediation* also disappears. The reality is not presupposed in
the cognitive sense, nor postulated in the sense of the ideal. On
the contrary, it is directly possessed and lived in. The actual
presupposed is charged with the ideal, the ideal postulated is
embodied in the actual. In this modest but pregnant sense—
the sense in which it transcends the conditions and limitations
both of relative truth and of relative worth—the aesthetic
meaning may be called *absolute*.

§ 7. AESTHETIC IMMEDIATISM : PANCALISM

24. The question may be asked, is this legitimately a view of
reality ?—is reality thus reached in aesthetic contemplation ?—is
this state more than a luxury of the mind, wherein it indulges in
a sort of retreat from the heat and burden of the day, and re-
freshes itself for further strenuous endeavour ? My point is just
that it is a view of reality ; that here is the immediacy that follows
upon and completes the mediations of opposed cognitive and cona-
tive process. Instead of being a side-phenomenon, a superficial
rendering of that which finds its "real" reality in truth and utility,
aesthetic experience presents the profounder significance of which
truth and utility are partial and immature factors. The intuition
of reality reached in aesthetic contemplation preserves all the
meaning of fact or truth except its externality to experience, and
all that of use or worth except its subjectivity in experience ;
thus essentially removing from the constitution of the real the

¹ Even in the objective derivation of art we have found
great controls present in the form of the two motives or "springs,"
imitation and self-exhibition. See chap. xiii. sect. 23.,

opposition of inner and outer, subject and object. Again, it preserves all the meaning of what is established, the "is," except its mere actuality, and all that of the desirable, the "ought," except its mere ideality; thus showing that the dualism of actual and ideal is not intrinsic to the real. Surely, if our experience itself thus removes its temporary dualisms and comes into a meaning which reconciles its partial processes of mediation and accommodation, our theory should not neglect the cue, and go on finding it necessary to throttle one of the great modes of life in the interest of another, or stand mute and agnostic before a fancied *impasse*.

25. Such is the task before us: to understand the meaning of reality which this sort of reconciling experience—aesthetic, in the broad sense—presents; and to interpret it in comparison with those presented by knowledge and revealed in practice. It is a view to which the term Immediatism may well be applied, since it expressly denies the finality of either type of mediation. Aesthetic Immediatism is then the proper descriptive phrase.

The theory which justifies this procedure and issues in the reasoned view that in aesthetic contemplation we have the fullest revelation of what reality means, I shall venture to call *Pan-calism*, rendering in a single term—which has analogies of derivation in the terms Pantheism, Panpsychism, etc.—the meaning of the motto affixed to the first volume of this treatise, *Τὸ καλὸν πάν.*

§ 8. GENETIC MODES AND THE HIERARCHY OF THE SCIENCES.

In reaching the point of view now described—that of the immediate apprehension of reality in aesthetic contemplation—we have claimed that immediacy may be apprehended as such, that is, that it is competent to report itself and its contents. In it reality is self-revealing simply by being immediate. But apart from the truth of this position, we may ask what logical or argumentative grounds there are for such a view; what sort of general philosophy it presupposes. If the logical point of view is valid, as we have contended, in the sense of making its contribution to the significance of reality, then the conclusions of thought and of science about reality—especially in matters which rest upon fact—should give us interesting approaches to our main outcome.¹

¹ The points which follow are not intended to anticipate the reasoned conclusions of the later volume, but to present points in which the principal results of the writer's earlier discussions are united in the theory of reality now to be developed. It is for this reason that the works con-

26. (1) Our immediatism would seem to require, or at least to authorize, a view of things which makes the content of the world dynamic and progressive. For immediacy itself is of varying actual significance : it has its modes, stages, and achievements. While a given immediacy of the aesthetic represents the equilibrium of motives then at work, still as such it is re-constituted at each of the modes of progressive experience. When thus looked at objectively, from the logical or scientific point of view, it is part of the whole movement of mind. In other words, only on the presupposition of an actual progressive movement of mind, both individually and racially considered, can this sort of immediacy be or mean the real in the sense in which it understands itself. Such an objective or scientific theory of mental development, considered as a progressive genetic movement, is worked out in earlier publications.¹

(2) The same statement applies equally to the world at large, as reflected in the theory of science, which is only the body of our knowledge of the world. Its truth appears in certain of the current formulations of the theory of science, to which we have already thoroughly committed ourselves.

27. *First.* We are justified in accepting the radical operation of evolution, not merely as method of change, but as principle of real becoming and creation. This was embodied in the theory of "Genetic Modes" (*Development and Evolution*, chap. xix.²), according to which nature presents "genetic series" as such, movements of progressive change, which are qualitative, irreversible and non-mechanical. These genetic series constantly place in evidence the rise of new and progressive "genetic modes," or sorts of organization which are *each for itself novel, sui generis, and creative*. In passing from one genetic mode to another, nature achieves a real evolution ; there is an actual production of novelties.³

taining these more partial conclusions are cited, that any one interested may see the grounds on which the points are separately made out. The present outcome may be looked upon as a synthesis of results.

¹ See especially *Mental Development in the Child and Race*, 1 ed., 1895.

² Published in 1902, it is, I think, one of the first presentations of the point of view now more generally understood through the writings of James and Bergson. See also the present writer's *Darwin and the Humanities*, chap. 5, and cf. Appendix B, below, sect. 6, note.

³ The logic of this general movement is stated in the "axioms" of genetic science there worked out (*Devel. and Evol.*, chap. xix. § 8) ; and it is interpreted for the movement of mental process in the "canons of genetic

With this goes the view, now supported by our detailed discussions in "Experimental Logic" (vol. ii. of this work), that science is both positive and hypothetical. As positive and quantitative, each science expresses the static and "a-genetic" aspects of organization present in the particular mode with which it deals (mechanical, chemical, vital, etc.). But science rests upon postulation and assumption, inasmuch as the truth of each mode is relative to the movement of genesis and progress as a whole; thus science is always fundamentally hypothetical.

28. *Second.* We have to recognize a hierarchy in science and the sciences, when these are looked at in relation to one another, this hierarchy resting actually upon the genetic movement of reality itself. Each group of sciences having a peculiar content, physical, vital, etc., deals with a mode of organization *sui generis*, which presupposes the principles of the sciences preceding it. Thus physics and chemistry are necessary to biology; biology to psychology; psychology to sociology; sociology to ethics. Each in turn is conditioned upon the truths of those which genetically precede it; but each has its own principles formulated in view of the material and organization peculiar to it.¹

logic" in chap. i. of vol. i. of *Thought and Things*. It is not in place here to restate the details of what such a position implies over against the mechanical or "energetic" theories so long current. On the other hand, I hold that it is not a "teleological" movement, in the narrow sense of the analogy drawn from human will and purpose; nor is it vitalistic in the sense of being moved entirely by some inner self-directing impulse; on the contrary, the evidence is that its movement is externally guided in accordance with the Darwinian principle of natural selection, which is more than a mere biological formula. See Appendix C, sect. 2.

¹ In the books *Social and Ethical Interpretations* and *The Individual and Society*, I have argued against the formulation of social principles in terms of those of the conditioning sciences of biology and physics ("energetics"); and above (chap. viii.) we have seen that sociology cannot fully explain the norms of ethics. In the *Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will* (1891), chap. xii., I maintained the *sui generis* character of volitional organization in the interpretation of liberty, as over against mechanical and other views of the play of motives (see above, chap. viii., sect. 48). In the *Dictionary of Philosophy*, art. "Force and Condition," the recommendation is made that the affix "nomic" in compounds such as "bionomic," "psychonomic," etc., be used to fix the distinction between factors or forces which are merely conditioning or limiting ("nomic") in a given domain and those that are "intrinsic" or proper to it (e.g., brain changes are "psychonomic" but not "psychological"). See note to sect. 19, chap. iii., of vol. i., "Functional Logic."

Hence the folly of the reduction or "levelling down," attempted by certain theorists, by which each mode of reality is eviscerated of all the significance most characteristic of it. If in their nature social phenomena, for example, cannot be "levelled down" to vital, nor vital to mechanical, then the science of each must stand for the peculiar sort of uniformities of behaviour actually in evidence in the content of which it treats.¹

29. *Third.* Some sort of real time is undoubtedly a logical presupposition of aesthetic immediatism as we have here sketched it. It is questionable, no doubt, whether aesthetic experience as such implicates time; but a more careful examination fails, I think, to remove all form of duration from the aesthetic meaning. The motive of persistence found to attach to both the controls which the aesthetic unifies, itself persists in the content of contemplation. It seems to enter into the ideally real, no less than into the actual. In the aesthetic the ideal is felt as permanently, lastingly, realized. It is, however, a difficult problem; it raises the speculative question of ultimateness or absoluteness, which no self-respecting philosophy—*pace* pragmatism!—ought to shirk.

¹ Cf. the examination of K. Pearson's biological theory of history in *Development and Evolution*, chap. xix. §§ 6, 7. The characteristic features of each of the great modes under which nature actually presents herself should be made out; the features by reason of which each is irreducible. In my opinion the following points hold good, each argued in its own connexion: (1) what the ethical adds to the purely social is the determination of the social matter in ethical judgment (see above, chap. viii., sect. 49 ff); (2) what the social adds to the purely psychological is the element of common or over-individual force attaching to belief, judgment, etc. (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, and this work, vol. ii., chap. iii.); (3) what the psychological adds to the purely vital is the subjective point of view with its modes of psychic synthesis (as illustrated by apperception and volition); (4) what the vital adds to the purely mechanical is a certain "form-quality" in which vital phenomena organize themselves and persist through heredity (not discovered in mechanical sequences as such; see *Development and Evolution*, chap. xix., §§ 9, 10, and cf. Driesch's *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, a vitalistic work).

In a series of lectures delivered in Baltimore in 1905-7, this topic of the genetic hierarchy of science was worked out in detail; I had hoped before this to throw these discussions into form for publication, as announced several years ago by Messrs. Putnam. I find that a somewhat similar view of the hierarchy of the sciences has been entertained by Boutroux (*De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*, 1902), who finds increasing spontaneity or "contingency" as one ascends from mechanics to ethics.

APPENDIX A

THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM

1. As intimated in the text (chap. vii. § 12) it is only under artificial conditions that strict logical inference is possible in the domain of feeling ; yet certain forms of syllogistic statement of semi-practical inference are possible when uniformities of fact are involved in the relation of means to ends. Both the prudential or hypothetical imperative and the moral or categorical imperative (see the account given of them, chap. viii. § 6), may be rendered in syllogistic form, as the following examples will show.

(1) Prudential syllogism (based on objective necessity) : the proposition, " You should come in, for it is raining," rendered thus :

You should come in when it rains (if you wish to avoid being wet).
It is raining.
Therefore you should come in.

(2) Prudential syllogism (based on social sanction or conformity of custom) : the proposition, " Do not do this, for society condemns it," rendered thus :

You should not do what society condemns (if you would be happy).
Society condemns this.
Therefore do not do this.

(3) Categorical syllogism (based on ethical sanction or conformity to moral law) : the proposition, " I must do this, for it is a virtuous act," rendered thus :

Virtue must be pursued by action.
This is a virtuous action.
Therefore I must do it.

It is clear that in all three cases the volitional end is introduced in the major premise, hypothetically in the first two, and categorically in the third ; and that the conclusion has imperative

or volitional force only because of this. This is to say that the imperative mood¹ can come into the conclusion only if it is introduced in one of the premises. Put in general form, without distinction of modes of necessity or ground, but with the assumption of the imperative force, we have the following—

(4) General imperative syllogism (based on the relation of means to ends)²: the proposition, "Do that, for the sake of this," rendered thus:

Do this.

But doing this requires doing that.

Therefore do that.

2. Other cases arise in statements involving the correlation or subsumption of ends or in general of "affective generals," as we have described them. Wherever two desirable things, two goods, are uniformly correlated with each other, and the meanings are sufficiently constant, one of them may be involved in or subsumed under the other, and a syllogistic process may be employed to bring this relation out. For example—

(5) Syllogism of affective subsumption: the proposition, "Abou ben Adhem loved his fellow men in loving God," rendered thus:

The love of God includes the love of fellow-men.

Abou ben Adhem loved God.

Therefore he loved his fellow-men.

And in the following—

(6) Syllogism of affective development: the proposition, "I anticipated this burglary, for I felt anxious," rendered thus:

A state of general anxiety may determine itself in a special fear.

I had in this case a general anxiety.

Therefore it was the fear of this burglary that my general anxiety anticipated.

These two cases are chosen to show the extreme variations, extending from the logical and fixed modes of expression in

¹ Cf. the remarks made on the "imperative mood" of practical meaning in chap. xv. § 3. It is, no doubt, on the validity of such procedure that the "scientific" character of the "normative sciences" must finally rest. In the words of M. Lalande, *Revue de Métaph. et de Morale*, July, 1911, p. 528, "il reste tout à fait légitime de tirer le droit du droit par l'intermédiaire du fait."

² I find this general form given incidentally by Poincaré, in *Questions du Temps présent*, "Conférences de Foi et Vie," 1910, p. 61 (somewhat differently worded).

which affective meanings may be thrown, as in the first case (5), to the more fluid forms which translate the actual dynamic processes by which this sort of meaning is developed, as in the second case (6).

The latter form illustrates also the truth made out in the text, to the effect that while a deduction from the more definite and specific to the more indefinite and general emotional state is possible¹—the fear of the burglar justifying one, after the fact, in giving the earlier anxiety a certain definiteness—the reverse is not possible. It cannot be argued: “I have a certain disquiet, therefore I am to be terrorized by a burglar” (or to have some other particular emotional experience).

¹ As to the degree of validity or “success” attaching to such deductions, we have already expressed our opinion; it is not of the highest.

APPENDIX B

I. DARWINISM AND LOGIC : A REPLY TO PROFESSOR CREIGHTON ¹

In his interesting paper, having the same title as this note, published in the Darwin Number, May, 1909, of the *Psychological Review*, Professor J. E. Creighton cites my work, *Thought and Things*, as representative of the Darwinian point of view in logic, and criticizes it in some detail. I am, of course, gratified that the work is honoured in this way. I find, however, that Professor Creighton's criticisms are not altogether valid, and I will accordingly suggest certain considerations which in my opinion show this.

1. Professor Creighton has no difficulty in showing by quotations from my different publications, that I am a Darwinian, and that Darwinian conceptions have had frequent application in my work ; this I have now made explicit enough in the little book on *Darwin and the Humanities*.² Nor has he greater difficulty in showing that I often take the standpoint from which experience is looked upon as an immanent self-integrating movement. But he considers these two points of view inconsistent with each other : one interprets experience " biologically," as a relation of organism and mind to environment ; the other " logically " or " teleologically " (so Professor Creighton), as a principle of internal organization and movement. The question then is this : can both of these points of view be held at once ?—or does either commit us to a philosophy which excludes the other ?

Evidently the first, the method and view-point of biological

¹ From the *Psychological Review*, November, 1909. This short paper is reproduced here, since it sums up the position of this work as a whole on two important questions : (1) the standpoint of science (as involved in evolution theory), and (2) the meaning of teleology as a category. Part of it has appeared as an appendix to the volume *Darwin and the Humanities* ; but, following its inclusion here, it will be omitted from the next edition of that work.

² Review Publishing Co., Baltimore ; London, Allen.

science, must be upheld if we are to have a theory of mental development and evolution at all. Each mind grows up in a body, and both mind and body are in environments. Experience requires things and situations; its own movement establishes and utilizes what we call the "trans-subjective reference." Is the recognition of this consistent with a theory which interprets experience as a progressive organization, having its own "logic"?

Professor Creighton thinks that the latter point of view commits one to a "teleology" which—though somewhat vague to me—seems to require the denial of the validity of a Darwinian conception of adaptation, considered as a necessary factor in the development of experience.¹

2. Proceeding then to the criticism of my views made by Professor Creighton, I may say that it is in the present work, *Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic*, that I have taken exclusively the point of view of experience. It should not be compared with the other books and papers except as this difference is recognized.²

In the *Genetic Logic* the attempt is made to trace out the actual movement of experience from mode to mode, all of these modes being equally "psychic." The result is reached that a dualism of controls, due to segregation of contents, is come upon *in experience itself*. This dualism is not injected by our interpretation, nor read in from an external point of view; *it is found by and in the process*. The important point is that by its own immanental movement into the logical mode, experience *establishes just the dualism that science adopts and employs*. In the discus-

¹ He uses the expression "genetic or teleological" as if these two terms were synonymous (*loc. cit.*, p. 185).

² It is a conscious and deliberate difference, and cannot be looked upon as a contradiction unless it can be shown that one of the points of view is rendered invalid when one takes the other. In the *Social and Ethical Interpretations* both methods are used on occasion, to supplement and confirm each other, the biological, however, having a very subordinate place. In the *Genetic Logic*, the standpoint of experience, the "psychic" point of view, is consistently maintained. It is erroneous, therefore, to say (Creighton, *loc. cit.*, p. 180), "Professor Baldwin's account professes to show, not how the mind becomes conscious of its own logical nature, but how that logical nature is engendered in it through the motor adjustments of the organism to material conditions." How the mind becomes [grows to be] conscious of its logical nature [or processes] is just what the *Genetic Logic* does profess to show, but without making the assumption that the mind's nature is "logical" before it has, by its normal growth, become so.

sion of the relation of the "psychic" and "objective" points of view (*Thought and Things*, I., "Functional Logic," chap. ii. §§ 3, 4), I show that the latter is simply the explicit outcome of the dualism normally established when the mode of judgment or reflection is reached.¹ The scientific is simply the logical point of view made use of as deliberate method. It involves the self judging or thinking and objects judged about or observed—objects known to it as "things." This very dualism is the presupposition of the logical as such; and scientific method—whether its results issue in Darwinism, Lamarckism, vitalism, mechanism, teleology or any other type of biological theory—is *thinking*, no more and no less than thinking. In the more refined operations of thought upon ideas, the ideas are symbols of the things into which they are at any time convertible, while the sciences of observation go directly to the things, to perceptions and sensations; but in both cases the control of the context, whether it be one of ideas or of things, is the same, that of a sphere *taken by the process to be foreign to itself*.

3. So far then from finding a contradiction between the point of view of evolution—dualistic as it is—and that of a truly psychic and immanent account of the genesis of knowledge, I find that *the latter issues in and justifies the former*. Any adequate tracing out of the progress of knowledge, within experience itself, shows it to issue in a system of judgments in which the two controls—things as "outer" and the self as "inner"—are found confronting each other. Reflection sublimates this dualism by erecting a mediating context of ideas; but all validities in the context and all truthful references beyond it rest upon the fact that this mediation is of a duality of existences.

What then I would insist upon is the radically unreal character of the supposed contradiction between the two points of view. The observation, experimentation, analysis, etc., of biological science, as of all science, are processes proper and vital to the logical mode of experience. Science is logical process proceeding under its normal and necessary presuppositions. In recognizing the externality of things in the environment, it is only following the essential movement of psychic process, which

¹ Instead of allowing Professor Creighton's interpretation to the effect that the "inner and outer controls" are, in my hands, "a translation into other terms of organism and environment," I hold that the relation of organism and environment is a *logical transformation of the dualism of inner and outer controls*.

although presupposing externality, still finds it to be a meaning of contrast with the internality of the inner control, of the self. Accordingly, one may freely use the biological method and point of view (as I have done in the paper on "selective thinking" ¹ which Professor Creighton considers very reprehensible in this respect); for this procedure only recognizes as valid, for purpose of deliberate observation, the dualism that logical experience itself establishes for all the processes of thought.

4. Of course, the further question will be asked: Is one's final philosophical view then to be dualistic?—is logical experience to be taken at its word and as the final word? To this question I return below (II.). But Professor Creighton, as just cited, says that I recognize only two alternatives, mechanism and apriorism; and he suggests the third, teleology. But my recognition of these two modes of interpretation is merely to cite them as logical alternatives, both of which are to be avoided.² The teleological interpretation, also, taken in its ordinary sense—barring its excessive ambiguity—is also to be questioned, and for much the same reasons. These reasons I may now briefly state.³ They are implied in the discussions of this volume above (see also *Development and Evolution*, chap. xviii.).

5. (I) We are only remaining true to the standpoint of experience itself in seeking to trace out the rise and development of such categories as mechanism and teleology. They arise as meanings attaching to different sorts of experience; and by them objects and situations are consistently and profitably apprehended and treated. Some experiences have a certain regularity and lawfulness; these, thus apprehended, and looked at retrospectively, come to mean the mechanical. In the case

¹ *Development and Evolution*, chap. xvii.

² I do not accept the term "mechanism" as applicable to a genetic movement proper; it denotes only one of the possible naturalistic interpretations of this movement. My own interpretation, embodied in the theory of "genetic modes," *Development and Evolution*, chap. xix., combats the mechanical view. See the further note to sect. 6 below, and chap. xv., sect. 27 ff. above.

It is clear, then, that the following statement of my view is not correct (Creighton, *loc. cit.*, p. 184), "here as e'sewhere the alternative for Professor Baldwin is between deriving logical principles mechanically and *finding them existing a priori*" (italics his).

³ The following has reference also to Professor Creighton's paper on the "Implicit," read at Baltimore, in which he examines my views; it has now been published in the *Philosophical Review*, Jan., 1910.

of other experiences, developing conation shapes the contents towards personal ends ; these, so apprehended, and looked at prospectively, mean the teleological. In the logical mode, these two meanings become general ways of assimilating events of one type or the other. Each is valid for its purpose, and each is restricted in its use ; one means to experience just the dominance of external, the other that of internal control.

Now to use either of these as an exclusive or universal mode of interpretation is to abolish the other in its own province, and so to falsify our report of the progression of experience in which they have together arisen. The mechanical would not be mechanical but for the possession of those characters which show it to be bare of teleological meaning ; it represents knowledge formed under a control which evidences itself as foreign. The teleological, on the other hand, would not be teleological but for its character as embodying the agent's control exercised in the pursuit of personal ends. Teleological processes as such are for consciousness not mechanical, and mechanical are not teleological.

I have contrasted the results of these two modes of process by using the two expressions " knowledge through (external) control "—issuing in sequences which are mechanical in their meaning—and " (internal) control through knowledge "—issuing in sequences with which personal interest and conation are identified (*Thought and Things*, ii., chap. xiv.). Unless the teleologists can show, from the movement of further experience, that there is positive justification for the step,¹ they may not employ, as a universal solvent, the partial meaning which they favour.

6. (2) But even if we allow the category of teleology to apply universally, it also issues in a characteristic dualism from which there is no logical escape. Ends are attained *through the mediation of ideas or facts*. Facts and ideas are not ends : " what a man hath why doth he yet hope for ? "—it is a further realization, beyond the idea or fact, that he hopes for. A conscious end is always meditated—furthered or hindered—by some fact or idea.

¹ Actually the progress of experience, both personal and racial, is away from animistic, anthropomorphic and teleological interpretations of nature. Science has had gradually to achieve its birthright, only gradually establishing a conception of natural law which operates without " teleological " interference. Just here is, in fact, in my opinion, the great service rendered by Darwinism to philosophical thought. But with it has gone the similar clarification of the subjective and teleological proper.

To any teleology which involves genuine purpose, the dualism of "fact-idea and end," taking the form of "means and end" or of "hindrance to end," is as stubborn as that of "thinker and thing" in the domain of cognition.

To escape this difficulty, the intellectual idealist goes over to a teleology which does not involve purpose in any concrete or actual sense, while he still retains ~~the~~ the principle of "means and ends." But what "means and ends" apart from an agent who adopts the means (facts or ideas) to attain the ends (results), it is difficult to see. What is really present is the actual flow of genetic process, with its great dualisms of knowledge and purpose. If we take this process for what it is, it discovers itself to experience in the two modes of organization called teleological or mechanical according as the situations of actual life present contents of one sort or the other, and according to the interest by which their apprehension is motivated.¹

7. If this actual genetic movement, so apprehended in experience—the progressive integration of contents, as on occasion both "factual" and "end-fulfilling" for the agent—is what Professor Creighton means by "teleology," then I am with him. I prefer that term to "mechanism," if one is to use but one term for the entire movement. But my aim is to go further construc-

¹ In my discussion of "genetic series" as such (in "Theory of Genetic Modes," *Development and Evolution*, chap. xix., described by Professor Creighton as a sort of invalid compromise), I have pointed out that these series present both aspects, the quantitative or mechanical and the qualitative or in the large sense "worthful"; they show a form of sequence or conditioning which is not exhausted by either interpretation taken alone. Professor Creighton is, I think, in error in saying (*loc. cit.*, p. 182) about this theory that "the something new" that it recognizes as arising in a genetic series "simply comes into the series as a miracle." I reply: It is not a miracle except to one who has already adopted a quantitative or mechanical conception of all natural change. Such a cast-iron quantitative conception apart, why should not nature produce novelties? James and Bergson, as well as the present writer, have recently protested against the arid "energistic" conception of "cause and effect." For my part, I am not willing to prejudice the case even by using the terms of mechanics for such sequences; I have employed the term "progression." . . . Further, I do not admit Professor Creighton's claim that a genetic series, as I conceive it in my theory of "genetic modes," "exhibits no identity throughout the different stages of the process." On the contrary, the varying degrees of identity which it actually has for consciousness serve as motive to the transformations of the "sameness" meaning, up to the logical judgment of identity, as traced in great detail in *Thought and Things*, vol. i., chap. viii., § 3, and chap. ix., § 5; and vol. ii., chap. x.

of other experiences, towards personal end prospectively, near two meanings become type or the other, restricted in its of external, though hyper-logical immediacy, which is essentially moving.

My present purpose is accomplished, however, in showing how it is possible to turn the edge of Professor Creighton's criticism. I accept both the terms of the supposed contradiction. I hold that when legitimately employed both mechanism and teleology are naturalistic or empirical categories of mediation, both valid, but both restricted in their proper use, and both superseded in a hyper-logical mode of immediate experience.

II. THE QUESTION OF "ISMS"

8. The question of dualism, or of dualistic realism, seems to be the insistent one to certain of my critics (e.g. Prof. Tawney, in *Journal of Philos.*, March 30, 1911, p. 187) in view of the emphasis placed in the earlier volumes upon the opposition of the two sorts of control, inner and outer. Is this then, or is some other "ism," to be our final outcome?

In addition to the remarks made in chap. iv., § 5, and also just above, I may here say that, in my opinion, realistic dualism inevitably issues from the point of view of the development alike of logical process and of volitional process. Furthermore, the acceptance of this outcome carries with it the acceptance also of an irreconcilable opposition between these two mediating processes themselves; since thought as such reports a fixed static reality, while will desiderates a moving progressive ideal, and there is no legitimate way—if we are true to the facts of experience—of subordinating one to the other. Hence I can not rest content with either, or with the realistic dualism for which they in common declare.

What then? Simply, I reply, that we are not shut up, as is usually supposed, to the alternative between such a realism (either cognitive or conative) and phenomenalism. Phenomenalism is altogether shut out by our results, in any case; for it makes abstraction of the inner world from the controls which concrete process of both sorts presupposes.

9. There is a third alternative. It is found in an imme-

Appendix B

diatism in which the opposition between real and phē are all is annulled ; in which thought and things come to With as common content of contemplation—a direct presence, ¹ion, awareness of which is itself just the apprehension of the reals This fully significant real, found in aesthetic contemplation, ¹ assumes the partial reals of knowledge and will and reconciles their oppositions ; in this sense, our view is realistic. But it brings the real, as most adequately apprehended, into a mode of experience ; in this sense it is idealistic. Yet it abrogates all trans-experiential reference, since all controls, external and internal, are fused in one : in this sense it is *neither realistic nor idealistic*.

10. In short, this point of view seems to give philosophical standing to the resort to feeling, contemplation, intuition, immediacy—by whatever term the transcending and fusing of the motives of intellect and will be known—not in the Hegelian sense of a solution which is always logically more abstract, or in the sense of their mere reduction in the melting-pot of mystic feeling, ² but in the simple empirical sense in which the movement of experience itself comes to unity and equilibrium in contemplation.

This is to be developed fully in the volume still to follow. I wish here merely to disclaim both dualism and phenomenalism in the usual sense in which the antithesis between them is considered as a final one. Yet I am well aware that to announce a programme is in itself to invite further criticism.

¹ See chap. xv. §§ 5 ff. above.

² In which I should include the mysticism of ecstatic religious experience. So far as religious apprehension and contemplation retain what is characteristic of them they always show the dualism of self and other-self. In the ecstasy that overcomes this dualism, the motives proper to religion are no longer present.

APPENDIX C

ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

The following passages are extracted from an article on the Progress of Philosophy and Psychology contributed by the writer to the first volume (for 1910), new series, of the *American Year Book*.¹ They are reproduced here as serving to "orient" the reader in the more recent literature of the general topics of our discussion.

1. *Logic*.—It is in logic that the positivist and evolutionist movements have worked upon philosophy, and the United States has been the field of productive logical work now esteemed everywhere. What is known as "Instrumentalism" in logic has been developed largely by American writers. By this name is known the theory of truth which is commonly associated with pragmatism in philosophy.

Instrumentalism holds that truth is not something existing absolutely and quite apart from human life, being what it is whether known to us or not, and revealed to us by intuition or some sort of revelation in universal conceptions and axioms. On the contrary, truth is what is experimentally established as holding good in nature and life; it is the instrument of effective conduct and thought. It is accumulated gradually by the race, as the result of trial, and by the elimination of error. Its universal principles are those found to be effective; these are selected in evolution because they are useful. We know no absolute standards; there is a hypothetical strain in all our knowledge. James' essays, of various dates, collected in the book, *The Meaning of Truth* (1909); Dewey's (and colleagues') *Studies in Logical Theory* (second edition, 1909); and the present writer's

¹ *American Year Book for 1910*, Appleton & Co., 1911, presenting especially the work of American writers. This limitation accounts for evident omissions. The remarkable movement of recent French philosophy is admirably presented in *La Pensée contemporaine* by P. Gaultier (1911).

Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic (vol. i., 1906) are all works which take up the instrumental point of view. With variations, both in emphasis and in philosophical interpretation, these authors agree in combating all absolutist and *à priori* theories of knowledge and truth. They agree that all knowledge has been empirically and experimentally derived, that the tests of truth are of similar origin, and that thought is a growing system or organism, gradually built up in the progress of the race. Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin, 1910*, emphasizes the instrumental character of truth to the individual, who uses it to solve problems of further adjustment and control of experience. James dwells upon the practical reference and utility of truth, making the "working" of a concept in practice the final test of its validity (see his work, *Pragmatism*, 1907). The present writer emphasizes the social character, the logical "community" of knowledge, and the external control of fact to which truth is always submitted in experimental research; and he carries this point of view through the discussion of all the principal problems of formal logic (*Thought and Things*, vol. ii., 1908).

These variations are important for the further development of these authors' views, respectively; but for the theory of knowledge and for logic, they may all be classed properly together. "Instrumentalism" is the proper term by which to describe their common and fundamental thought. The word "Pragmatism" should be reserved for the philosophical theory built up by James and others upon this common doctrine. But philosophical pragmatism is not the only theory which is consistent with instrumentalism in the theory of knowledge.¹

The intellectual parentage of this point of view is easily discovered. Positivism appears in the insistence upon the experimental method of discovery, and the denial of any royal road—by deduction, intuition, *à priori* revelation—to absolute truth. In this the British tradition of Locke, Hume, and Mill (James dedicates one of his books to J. S. Mill) is carried forward, as against the German tradition of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Indeed, we seem to be in the atmosphere of the "blooming period" of English utilitarianism, as we hear the insistent claim that truth must be useful, must "work," must be a "good" like money or health. The English utilitarian moralists argued the case for the origin of the rules of practice: these represent custom, social prescription, being derived from racial experience

¹ See further below.

and prescribed by and for individuals in whom their utility as instruments of the general good reappears. This is their account of the utterances of the "moral sense," as they called what the Germans denominated "practical reason." The same considerations, utilitarian and instrumental, we now see pressed into service in the theory of truth. Logical principles, the categories, have had, we are told, the same origin as practical principles or rules of action. They are social formulations, the instruments of our successful commerce with nature, just as moral rules are instruments of our successful intercourse with our fellow-men.

There is in fact not a mere likeness between instrumentalism and utilitarianism, a mere similarity in point of view; there is an identity of motive and philosophical point of departure. In the future, the current instrumentalism of knowledge will constitute the second great chapter in the historical development of utilitarianism.

On the side of the criticism of science, the ground was prepared for instrumentalism by the analyses of Mach (*Erkenntniss und Irthum*, second edition, 1906); Pearson (*The Grammar of Science*, second edition, 1909); Enriques (*Les Problèmes de la Science*, 1909, from the Italian of 1908); and Poincaré (*La Valeur de la Science*, and *La Science et l'Hypothèse*, 1902, both in English translation), an interesting series of works—German, English, Italian, and French—all demonstrating the hypothetical and experiential character of scientific knowledge, and showing the relativity of the universal postulates on which it is built up. With them we may include also the work *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*, 1902, by Boutroux.

In Germany, however, this movement has been contested. A new impulse has been given to absolutism in logic and philosophy by Husserl (*Logische Untersuchungen*, 1901-2), and Meinong (*Ueber Annahmen*, second edition, 1910, and *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie*, 1904). The work of Meinong and his pupils deserves notice, also, as an independent attempt to establish a "theory of objects," understanding by "objects" whatever the mind can entertain or think about. With these may be classed the *Philosophie der Werte* (1908) of Münsterberg.

2. *Theory of Evolution*.—The demand that both logic and ethics become thoroughly genetic shows the need of a new philosophical statement of evolution itself. The two historical points of view, naturalistic and vitalistic, have both had recent and remarkable advocacy. Vitalism is the term applied to theories

which recognize some sort of vital force or inner impulse by which the course of evolution is directed, in more or less independence of the physical environment. The theory of *entelecheia* of Aristotle was its earliest philosophical statement.

There has been a strong revival of vitalism in the last five or six years, culminating in two important works of date 1907-8, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, Gifford Lectures, by Driesch, and *l'Évolution créatrice*, by Bergson. The former returns to the *entelecheia* of Aristotle, actually adopting that term; and his view is properly to be called vitalism. The latter argues that there is a real *élan vital*, a vital impulse; but does not deny the laws of interaction of organism and environment, such as that of natural selection, under which this impulse works itself out. Bergson's view is part of his system of philosophy to which I return below.

On the other hand, the anti-vitalistic or purely naturalistic point of view has had its sharper statement and fuller exposition. Besides the defence of Darwin's principle of natural selection by such eminent advocates as Poulton (*Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species*, 1909) and Lankester, the new theory of "Mutation" has been brought out by De Vries (*Die Mutationstheorie*, 1901-3; English translation). This theory supposes large variations or "mutations" to occur (for unknown reasons) in single plants or animals, and to perpetuate themselves by inheritance, giving rise to new species. It agrees in principle with Darwinism, in that it seeks the origin of species in variations; and it must be classed with the natural selection theory, which indeed it actually invokes, as naturalistic and anti-vitalistic. In the minds of advocates of these theories, the newer like the older vitalism lends itself to mystical and obscure interpretations of the phenomena of life and mind.

No doubt the future will see some adjustment of the respective claims of an actual dynamic movement, present in the process of evolution—the least that will satisfy moderate vitalists—and of a process of selection due to interaction between the organism and its environment, as claimed by the Darwinians.

Such a synthesis was suggested by the present writer in his "theory of genetic modes" (*Development and Evolution*, 1902); and the position is strengthened by the strong argumentation contained in the book of Bergson cited above. There would seem to be no reason that a really genetic or dynamic impulse—an *élan vital*—should not be dependent, in its actual develop-

ment, upon the favouring conditions offered by the selection and elimination of cases or variations.

3. *Philosophy Proper*.—As we should expect, the tendencies mentioned above as showing themselves in psychology have made themselves felt also in philosophy. In the first place, the radical acceptance of evolution must result in a view of reality which recognizes its essentially dynamic and progressive character, whatever the method of its progress may actually be. This raises the question of progress or "teleology," in the form of an interpretation of the modes which reality shows in its continuous longitudinal course. It has been brought out that the mechanical view of reality is inadequate; and that some theory which allows an actual creative advance or, at least, a genuine principle of progressive organization from stage to stage of life and mind, must be worked out. Hence Bergson adopts the phrase *évolution créatrice*, in somewhat the sense of the theory of "genetic modes."

In the development of both life and mind alike, we must admit that new stages—new organizations, new modes of qualitative happening—are constantly appearing. This means the acceptance of evolution in a sense so radical that no mechanical or "equational" statement (such as the law of the conservation of energy) will do justice to it.

There are, however, differences of view appearing here. No less than four interpretations of reality have had able advocacy with more or less reference to this new conception of the requirements of evolution.

4. *Mechanical and Idealistic Views*.—The mechanical theory has been revived under the name of "energetics" by Ostwald, according to whom all social and psychological organization is reducible to the play of the laws of energy (*Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft*, 1909). This joins hands with the chemico-physical explanation of life attempted by Loeb.

At the other extreme, the idealists resort to the logical development of experience or thought, to explain the movement of reality, recalling the genetic views of Hegel and the refined dialectical idealism of Green and Bosanquet. The reader may consult the able papers of Creighton on "Darwinism and Logic" in the *Psychological Review*, May, 1909, and on "The Implicit" in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1910, which present this point of view, and *The Elements of Ethics* of Muirhead (3 ed., 1910). Such a position, in turn, allies itself with the new vitalism of writers like Driesch.

The difficulty with these two solutions is at bottom the same : they exclude movement in the sense of progress from the final reality. One postulates a quantitatively identical energy—a material principle—and the other a qualitatively identical thought—a formal principle—while both explain the dynamic aspect of nature and mind as an aspect of incompleteness. The real is, for both these theories, after all as to relations absolute, and in its nature identical and unchanging.

5. *Pragmatism*—Another way of treating the problem is possible, that of Pragmatism, which accepts radically the principle of evolution and carries it out to its last results.

According to pragmatism, strictly defined, reality is just and only the sum of what we find true, and the true is just and only the useful series of guesses and formulas by which we conduct our life, with all its varied interests. Not only is truth instrumental to life, but further, there is no reality existing apart from our apprehension and use of the true. *We make reality by discovering and utilizing it.* Reality is but a name for those relatively stable and "dependable" items, in the network of our experience; which recur and serve as fulcra for the levers of utility.

This is logical, considered as the outcome of instrumentalism, allied with positivism and evolutionism. It is a "radical empiricism" of knowledge, a utilitarianism of truth and morals, a cosmological evolutionism, and a *metaphysical nihilism*—that is, if taken simply for itself. William James' works show explicitly and fully all these modern tendencies ; they have attained the currency and influence which their character, as representing the *Zeitgeist*, fits them to have.

Confining ourselves to the consideration of the broader significance of the movement, we may weigh it in the light of the actual criticism it has received. Royce (*Proceedings Fourth International Congress of Philosophy*, Heidelberg, 1908) is able to include it as a factor in his system of absolute "voluntarism." Bradley (in articles in *Mind*, 1908–10) in turn considers it a partial truth long done justice to in the development of intellectualism. So far as the apostles of the movement would themselves agree upon the psychological experience of which truth is the organ and reality is the presupposition, it would probably be the "heart," the "passional nature," the "will to believe" (see James' *The Will to Believe*, 1897, for these phrases).

This form of pragmatism, at least, amounts then to a philosophy in which personal passion, choice, feeling, preference, sup-

plies the touchstone—or a touchstone—to value and validity ; and it may be described as an “affectivism,” taking the term in somewhat the same sense that the systems of its critics are respectively described as “voluntarism” and “intellectualism” (or rationalism). Indeed, the presence of the mystical motive—the motive to displace discursive and rational machinery by immediate and direct feeling of value—is so prominent in James’ later work (see his *A Pluralistic Universe*, 1909) that it cannot fail to suggest to the reader the procedure of historical mysticism.

Philosophers have thus again boxed the compass. Intellect, will, feeling—rationalism, voluntarism, mysticism—each of this historical trio has had its new apotheosis. In pragmatism the last two, feeling and will, join forces against the first : temper *versus* reason, will *versus* conviction, results *versus* logic—this is now the issue joined.

Stated in this way the futility of criticism from any of the traditional points of view becomes evident. One is temperamentally a rationalist or a pragmatist ; and so far as the philosophical motive is concerned, pragmatism is exemplified from the start. If, then, no final result can be reached by logical reasoning, what is the critic to do ? The weapon of rationalism is broken by the pragmatist before the fight begins.

Consequently criticism, taking another form, deprecates the attempt to solve the problem of philosophy by elevating one or two of the mental functions—intellect or feeling or will—to a place of high dignity and monopoly, at the expense of other functions. Who made reason more reliable than feeling, or will more potent than argument ? The whole mental life—all aspects of experience—must be concerned in the apprehension and management of things, and philosophy should not disparage certain functions in order to dignify others. But it should try to discover what partial contribution each of them makes to the full meaning of the world and of man.¹

¹ My objection to accepting pragmatism so defined, to answer the question put by certain of my reviewers (notably M. Lalande in *Athena*, June, 1911) appears sufficiently here, apart from points of specific criticism. It is not its instrumental theory of knowledge that I object to, but its interpretation of reality in a meaning in which thought and its results do not have an intrinsic or vital place. It is the “limits of pragmatism” as a philosophy to which I would call attention, as I have in the article of that title, *Psychological Review*, Jan., 1904. Life becomes—with the reality it postulates—an engine lacking the “governor” found, in actual experience, in the directive and regulative rôle of thought.

6. *Immediatism*.—This issues in another—a fourth—point of view from which each of the three doctrines so ably represented in recent discussion seems partial, although partially true. Pragmatism is a revolt against the abuse of reason; but rationalism is equally a revolt against excess of passion and caprice. A logical machine would perhaps be a better guide than a weather-vane—to have in one's head! But we are not shut up to one of these. Will informed by knowledge and moved by feeling—this is what every normal man has and is, not one of these alone nor two of them. So the protest arises against dividing the personality and considering the glimpse of reality that one part gives more to be esteemed than the vision which comes from the whole.

Hence attempts to trace out the mental life as a whole, and find its issue in some mode of experience comprehensive of all the partial meanings reality has here or there. Bradley (*Appearance and Reality*, second edition, 1897) claims that reality comes to us most fully in a state of super-personality which lies beyond the contradictions of thought. Bergson (*Les Données immédiates de la Conscience*, sixth edition, 1910¹) finds in a higher "intuition," a sort of further instinct, the immediateness that logical processes lack or destroy. Similar is our claim that in aesthetic experience the partial insights of intelligence and feeling are mutually conserved and supplemented, and the things of personal desire and worth are reconciled with the things of truth and fact. "Contemplation" would be perhaps the term best suited to express the function these writers in common have in mind. It is a mode of apprehension in which all the values of experience regarding the world, are taken up in a richer sense of self. Knowledge is instrumental to practice, and practice is instrumental to knowledge, while both serve the ends of personal feeling; and each must do its perfect work, if we would discover the full reality of the most prosaic things of life. Everything may be looked at from the point of view of aesthetic perfection.

Such a point of view has never been worked out as a philosophy, though many—among whom one thinks of the great master Lotze—have protested against the partial character of the solutions which alternately come into vogue in the progress of thought. Just now, in pragmatism, it is the "heart" that has its vogue; but the heart, too, is but part of the human person.

The net gain to philosophy, however, from recent discussion

¹ Eng. trans. *Time and Free Will*, 1910.

is great. The working out of motives profoundly rooted in the soil of the nineteenth century has issued in instrumentalism and pragmatism: the motives of evolutionism, scientific naturalism, social solidarity. These are enemies to absolutism, mysticism, individualism. The development, indeed, is not yet complete. Pragmatism and immediatism, as so far stated by their principal advocates, are too individualistic. They hinge too much on private will and feeling and on utility to the individual, just as the evolution of the early Darwinians, Huxley and Romanes, dwelt upon individual struggle and prized individual utility. But for all that, never again can scholastic rationalism or logical dogmatism hold its own in the theatre of public discussion. Experimental proof, utility, personal acceptability, are hereafter to be as important in a system that is to commend itself to men as are the consistency, disinterestedness, and universal applicability of the verbal propositions it comprises.

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